Honble MADAN, J. – This revision petition has been preferred by the above named petitioner-defendants (tenants in the suit) against the Order dated 6.11.1995, passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge No. 4, (Junior Division), Jaipur City, Jaipur in Case No. 5/87, whereby the application of the non-petitioner plaintiff for amendment of the suit u/O.6 R. 17 CPC was allowed by the trial Court vide its impugned order referred to above. Briefly stated that Jai Kumar, non-petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit for rent and ejectment under Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), against the petitioners, M/s. Nanag Ram & Company & Anr. and Nanag Ram, Bhola Nath, Suresh Kumar & Hari Narain are the proforma defendants. The plaintiff sought ejectment of the petitioner- tenant on the following grounds :– (A) That the disputed shop premises is required reasonably and bonafidely by the plaintiff for his business. (B) That the defendants-tenants have committed second default in payment of rent for the period 1.3.76 to 31.12.77 i.e. for 22 months. It was alleged that in the earlier suit No. 158/71, the tenant has availed the benefit of payment of arrears of rent u/s. 13(A) of the Act. (C) The tenant has caused substantial damages to the property. (2). In their written statement, the petitioners denied the averments of the plaintiff by contending inter alia that since the tenants had been continuously depo- siting the rent in the first suit No. 158/71, which is still pending in accordance with the order of the trial Court and since the entire rent for the disputed period stood deposited in accordance with law and hence nothing remained due to be paid towards rent and hence the petitioners could not be termed as defaulters. Para 6 of the written statement reads as under :– ^^;g fd nkos ds iSjk ua- 5 esa c;ku fd;s gq;s rF; fcYdqy xyr gS vkSj gedks Lohdkj ugha gSA oknh ds mDr nkok nhokuh ua- 158 lu~ 1971 esa U;k;ky; ds }kjk jktLFkku izhfetst dUVªksy vkWQ jsUV ,.M ,foDku ,DV lu~ 1950 dh /kkjk 13 dh mi/kkjk 4 o 5 ds vuqlkj dk;Zokgh gksdj vnkyr ds }kjk ckdh kqnk fdjk;k vnkyr esa tek fd;s tkus dh vkxs dh nkos dk QkbZuy QSlyk gksus rd nkSjkus eqdnek esa ekg o ekg fdjk;k vnkyr esa tek djkus dh vkKk izfroknh dks nh xbZ gS fd ftlds vuqlkj vnkyr dh bl vkKk dk ikyu djrs gq, eqruktk nqdku dk fdjk;k ekg o ekg le; ij mDr nkos esa vnkyr esa tek djk;k tk jgk gS D;ksafd oks nkok vnkyr esa vHkh isafMx gS] ml nkos ds isafMax gksrs gq, izfroknh ds }kjk bl nkSjku eqdnesa esa mDr ,DV dh nQk 19¼,½ ds rgr fdjk;k tek djkus dk ;k efuvkMZj ds }kjk Hkstus dk izu gh iSnk ugha gksrk gS pwafd fdjk;k ekg o ekg le; ij tek vnkyr fd;k tk jgk gS blfy, izfroknh dk vnk;xh fdjk;s esa fMQkYVj gksus dk dksbZ izu gh iSnk ugha gksrk gS vkSj u rFkkdfFkr fMQkYV ds vk/kkj oknh nqdku [kkyh djkus dk vf/kdkjh gh gksrk gSA oknh dk rkjh[k 1-3-1976 ls 31-12-77 rd 22 ekg dk fdjk;k 770@& #i;s izfroknh ij nsuk ckdh ugha gS D;ksafd bl ihfj;M dk fdjk;k igys nkok nhokuh ua- 158 lu~ 1971 esa vnkyr dh vkKkuqlkj U;k;ky; esa tek gS o ;g rF; oknh dh tkudkjh esa Hkh gSA izfroknh ds }kjk tek djk;k x;k fdjk;s dk ;g #i;k dkuwu dh iqf"V esa buoSfyM dg dj eq> izfroknh dh vnk;xh fdjk;s esa fMQkYVj crykus dk ;k 770@& #i;s fdjk;s ds uke ij eqls fMekUM djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gSA** (D) That on 7.11.1978, the petitioners-tenants submitted an application in the second suit i.e. the present suit whereby they requested the trial Court for determination of the provisional rent u/s. 13(3) of the Act with a further prayer that, that amount already deposited by them in the earlier suit No. 158/71 be permitted to be adjusted in the present suit and if any amount is still found due, the same may be determined and the defendants were willing to deposit the same. The petitioners sought a specific direction from the trial Court as to in what manner and in which suit, future rent was to be deposited. (3). The learned trial Court rejected the application of the petitioners vide its order dated 18.1.1984 on the ground that they were not entitled to get any order u/s. 13(3) of the Act in the second suit. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Addl. Civil Judge against the Order dated 15.10.1994 of the trial Court, which too was dismissed. The petitioners thereafter preferred a revision petition before this Court vide S.B.C.R. No. 165/85, which came to be decided by this Court on 8.7.1985. The learned Single Judge of this Court while observing that the petitioners were not obliged to deposit the rent u/s. 19(A) of the Act and if they have been continuously depositing the rent within time in the earlier suit No. 158/71, there was no question of second default and the present suit was not maintainable on this ground. The contention of the plaintiffs-respondents before this Court was that since the petitioners had thus submitted an application u/s. 13(A) of the Act and since they have taken advantage of the said provisions in the earlier suit vide order dated 20.4.1976 on the question of first default, the petitioners were bound to deposit the rent thereafter u/s.19(A) of the Act or pay the same to the plaintiff and any deposit ma- de by them in the earlier suit cannot be considered as a valid deposit and in this view of the matter, the plaintiff was within his rights in filing the second suit for eviction on the ground of second default. The question, which had arisen for determination of this Court in the earlier revision petition, was as to whether in these facts and circumstances of the case, the defendants were bound to deposit the rent only u/s. 19(A) of the Act and whether any deposit made by them in the previous suit, though within time, can be considered or not as a valid deposit so far as not to make them a defaulter in the payment of rent in the second suit. The defendants had earlier filed an application u/s. 13(3) of the Act for determination of the provisional rent and the same had been rejected by both the Courts below. The defendants had earlier filed an application u/s. 13(3) of the Act for determination of the provisional rent and the same had been rejected by both the Courts below. This Court while disposing of the earlier revision petition had directed that determination of question regarding the maintainability of the second suit on the question of default was not required to be gone into by this Court as the decision of the application, filed u/s. 13(3) of the Act on merits either way may affect the rights of both the parties. In view of these circumstances, this Court held that the Courts below should not have rejected the application of the petitioners-defendants u/s. 13(3) of the Act. The revision petition was disposed of with the direction that :– (i) The plaintiff would be entitled to withdraw the rent deposited by the tenant-defendants in the earlier suit No. 158/71 upto the month of June, 1985. Now onwards from July, 1985, the tenant-defendants shall deposit the monthly rent in the second suit now pending between the parties on or before 15th of each succeeding month and in case the plaintiff gives any bank account, then, the defendants shall deposit the amount of future rent in the said account of the plaintiff. (ii) The withdrawal of the rent or receipt of rent by the plaintiff will not, in any manner, prejudice his rights regarding the controversy raised in the suit. (iii) The decisions of the Courts below, rejecting the application of the defendants u/s. 13(3) of the Rent Control Act will not, in any ma- nner, affect the rights of the defendants in contesting the present suit on the ground that they have not committed any default in the payment of rent. (iv) The plaintiff would be free to take an objection before the trial Court in the second suit that the rent deposited by the defendants in the earlier suit No. 158/71 was not made in time, or according to the provisions of the Rent Control Act, or in compliance with the orders of the Court in that case. (4). It will be relevant to mention that the first suit was instituted by the plaintiff-non-petitioners on 4.3.1971 on two grounds : (1) Default in payment of rent; (2) Reasonable and bonafide necessity of the plaintiff to occupy the shop premises. (4). It will be relevant to mention that the first suit was instituted by the plaintiff-non-petitioners on 4.3.1971 on two grounds : (1) Default in payment of rent; (2) Reasonable and bonafide necessity of the plaintiff to occupy the shop premises. During the pendency of the first suit, an Ordinance came to be passed by the State Government on 28.9.1975, whereby the Sec. 13- A was inserted in the Act of 1950, the relevant paragraphs of which read as under :– (a) No Court shall, in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the (amending Ordinance) pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies u/Cl. (b) and pays to the landlord, or deposits in Court, with such time such aggregate of the amount of rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit, as may be directed by the Court under and in accordance within that clause; (b) In every such proceeding, the Court shall, on the application of the tenant made within thirty days, from the date of commencement of the Amending Ordinance notwithstanding any order to the contrary, determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at six per cent per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord; and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed by the Court and on such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the proceeding shall be disposed of, as if the tenant had not committed any default; (c) The provisions of Cls. (a) & (b) shall mutatis-mutandis apply to all appeals or applications for revisions; preferred or made, after the commencement of the (amending Ordinance), against decrees for eviction passed before such commencement with the variation that in Cl. (b) for the expression ``from the date of commencement of the Amending Act, the expression ``from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision shall be substituted. (5). (b) for the expression ``from the date of commencement of the Amending Act, the expression ``from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision shall be substituted. (5). On 23.1.1978 second suit was filed by the non-petitioner- landlord against the petitioners-tenants for their eviction u/s. 13(1) (a) of the Act that the tenant had not paid entire arrears of rent, due from him for the period 1.3.1976 to 31.12.1977 i.e. for a period of 22 months and had thus committed second default and since he had not complied with the second order passed by the trial Court in the previous suit by paying or depositing the rent to the landlord, therefore, he was liable to be evicted on the ground of second default from the shop premises in dispute. (6). On 7.11.1978, the petitioners submitted an application in the second suit i.e. the present suit, whereby they requested the trial Court for determination of provisional rent u/s. 13(3) of the Act and sought further direction that the amount already deposited by them in the earlier suit No. 158/71 be allowed to be adjusted in the present suit and if any amount is still found due, the same may be determined and the defendants were willing to deposit the same. Another specific direction was sought from the trial Court by the petitioners as to in what manner and in which suit the future rent is to be deposited. The learned trial Court vide its order dated 18.1.1984 rejected the aforesaid application of the petitioners on the ground that the tenant is not entitled to get an order u/s. 13(3) of the Act in the second suit. Against this the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Addl. Civil Judge No. 1, Jaipur City, who too dismissed the same vide its order dated 15.10.1984. (7). Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed a revision petition before this Court and the said revision petition (earlier petition) No. 165/85 came to be disposed of vide order of this Court dated 8.7.1985 as referred to above. (8). Thereafter, 6.9.1995, the plaintiff-non-petitioner filed an application before the trial Court that in accordance with the aforesaid order of this Court dated 8.7.1985, the tenant may be directed to deposit the rent in the S.B. Account No. 14/2718 of S.B.I. Kanwar Nagar Branch, Jaipur. (8). Thereafter, 6.9.1995, the plaintiff-non-petitioner filed an application before the trial Court that in accordance with the aforesaid order of this Court dated 8.7.1985, the tenant may be directed to deposit the rent in the S.B. Account No. 14/2718 of S.B.I. Kanwar Nagar Branch, Jaipur. The aforesaid application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the said application was malafide, but yet he was ready to comply with the directions of this Court. It is significant to mention that the aforesaid application was made notwithstanding the earlier order dated 2.5.1984 of the trial Court directing the petitioner to deposit the rent w.e.f. January95 onwards in the bank account given by the plaintiff. The said application was decided by the trial Court vide its order dated 9.5.1995 with the direction that the earlier order dated 2.5.1994 in any way does not violate the directions of this Court given on 8.7.1985 and hence no further clarification was necessary. (9). The said application was decided by the trial Court vide its order dated 9.5.1995 with the direction that the earlier order dated 2.5.1994 in any way does not violate the directions of this Court given on 8.7.1985 and hence no further clarification was necessary. (9). On 3.3.1986, the plaintiff filed an application seeking amendment of the plaint u/O. 6 R. 17 CPC with a prayer that the following new prayer be allowed to be added in para 6-Ka of the plaint :– ^^;g fd okn i=k esa ua- 6 ^^d** fuEufyf[kr c<k;k tk;sa % & 6 ^^d** ;g fd fuxjkuh uEcjh 165@85 muoklh eSllZ ukuxjke ,.M dEiuh cuke t; dqekj o vU; equQlyk fnukWad 8-2-1995 jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; esa tks fd izfroknh fdjk;snkj }kjk dh x;h FkhA fnukWad 8-7-1985 dks ;g vknsk fn;k x;k Fkk fd tqykbZ 85 ls fdjk;snkj izfroknh eqdnesa gkthj esa gj efgus dh 15 rkjh[k dks ;k mlls iwoZ fdjk;k tek djkosxkA vkSj ;fn oknh viuk cSad vdkmUV cryk nsxk rks vkxs dk fdjk;k izfroknh oknh ds crk;s gq;s cSad vdkmUV esa tek djk;sxkA oknh us vnkyr ls jde fudyokus dh fnDdr ds dkj.k fnukWad 6-8-1985 dks izkFkZuk i= ds }kjk ;g crk fn;k Fkk fd izfroknh fdjk;snkj Hkkjrh; LVsV cSad daoj uxj kk[kk] t;iqj esa ,l-ch- vdkmUV la[;k 14@2718 esa fdjk;k tek djkrk jgsA exj izfroknh fdjk;snkj us vdkmUV uEcj crkus ds ckn Hkh fdjk;k oknh ds crk;s gq, cSad vdkmUV esa tek ugha djk;k ftldks Hkh 6 ekg ls vf/kd vlkZ xqtj pqdk gS vkSj bl rjg mlus ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vknsk dk Li"V mYya?ku fd;k gSA o cSad vdkmUV crkus ds ckn mldks dsoy cSad vdkmUV esa gh #i;k tek djkuk pkfg;s Fkk ,slk gh vknsk mPp U;k;ky; dk Fkk bl izdkj ls izfroknh us vnk;xh fdjk;s esa lSd.M fMQkYV fd;k gSA ftldh fcuk ij oknh eqrgd bfU[kuk gSA** (10). The aforesaid amendment in the suit was allowed by the learned trial Court vide the impugned order dated 6.11.1995 against which the present revision petition has been preferred. (11). The aforesaid amendment in the suit was allowed by the learned trial Court vide the impugned order dated 6.11.1995 against which the present revision petition has been preferred. (11). During the course of hearing, Shri B.P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended at the bar that the learned Trial Court has committed material irregularity and jurisdictional error in allowing the aforesaid amendment on the grounds inter alia :– (i) That the amendment prayed for by the plaintiff was neither relevant nor necessary for the purpose of decision of the suit. (ii) That the Court itself has held earlier on 9.5.1995 that the order dated 2.5.1994 of the trial Court does not contravene or violate the order of Honble High Court dated 8.7.1985, inspite of this the trial Court has allowed the amendment to the effect that the tenant has committed violation of the High Court order. (iii) That the plaintiff has already filed the suit on the ground of second default. It is not understandable how the plaintiff has again pleaded second default which as a matter of fact can be termed as a 3rd default. The Rent Control Act does not contemplate for the 3rd default. As such the amendment is contrary to law. (iv) That the consequences of not depositing the rent in accordance with the direction of the Court is provided u/s. 13(5) & (6) of the Rent Control Act itself, and for this the plaint cannot be allowed to be amended. (12). It has further been contended by the petitioners counsel that the plaintiff had adopted contrary stands since he had earlier sought direction from the Court that the tenant be directed to deposit the rent in his bank account and the Court having passed the order in accordance with the desire of the plaintiff, and since the tenant had started depositing the rent in the bank account of the plaintiff, it cannot, therefore, be said that the tenant has committed any default. The said amendment was, therefore, fully misconceived and malafide. (13). I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also examined the relevant claims and contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties as well as the documents placed on the summoned record. (14). The said amendment was, therefore, fully misconceived and malafide. (13). I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also examined the relevant claims and contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties as well as the documents placed on the summoned record. (14). I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed in view of the well-reasoned findings of the learned trial Court that it was just and proper to allow the amendment as sought for by the plaintiff and the same was accordingly allowed by the learned trial Court for compliance of the earlier orders of this Court in Civil Revision Pt. No. 165/85 dated 8.7.1985. Since the trial Court has specifically observed in the impugned order that on 6.9.1985, the plaintiff had specifically indicated the saving bank account No. 14/2718 of the S.B.I. Branch Kanwar Nagar, Jaipur in which rent was to be deposited in compliance with the orders of this Court, the plaintiff should have continued to deposit the rent for the disputed period as well as for the future in the aforesaid bank account of the plaintiff and no further directions were required from the Court. I am of the view that there is no- thing wrong with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned order dated 6.11.1995 that since the petitioners had become fully aware of the bank account of the plaintiff in which they were directed to deposit the arrears of rent as well as the future rent, no default should have been committed by them and they should have rather continued to deposit the rent as determined by the trial Court w.e.f. 13.5.1971 originally and should have continued to deposit the future rent by 15th of every month as so directed. I am further of the view that no further directions or clarifications were necessary from the trial Court by the petitioners. Hence I find nothing wrong with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court to the effect that since the petitioners were duty bound to deposit the rent as directed by the learned trial Court in the bank account of the plaintiff and, therefore, the amendment, which was sought for by the plaintiff had become necessary and that the same was accordingly allowed keeping in view the requirements of O.6 R.(17) CPC. (15). (15). Shri S.M. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents while controverting the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner has stated at the bar that the petitioner was fully aware of the implications of the order dated 8.7.1985 passed by this Court in Civil Revision Pt. No. 165/85 as well as the order dated 6.9.1995 of the trial Court in view of which no further clarification or directions were necessary, he should have continued to deposit the rent in the plaintiffs bank account for the disputed period of 22 months as referred to above, but has committed default by not complying with the aforesaid orders. (16). I am further of the view that since the directions given by this Court in view of the aforesaid order, no further clarifications were required by the parties but the difficulty had arisen to the plaintiff on the ground of non-compliance of the aforesaid directions and for which the plaintiffs application for amendment of the suit was allowed vide the impugned order dated 6.11.1995. (17). In my view, the petitioner has violated the order dated 6.9.1995 passed by the learned trial Court by not depositing the arrears of rent, which are due to the plaintiff for the disputed period of 22 months i.e. 1.3.1976 to 31.12.1977 and this amounts to commission of 2nd default on the part of the petitioner since having taken advantage of the 1st default in the earlier suit vide order dated 20.4.1976 of the trial Court, the petitioner- defendants were bound to deposit the rent for the said disputed period as well as the future rent due to the plaintiff in the 2nd suit instead of claiming adjustment of any deposit made by them in the earlier suit. (18). I am further of the view that at this stage since there is no decision given by the trial Court on merits of the suit, which are still pending for adjudication before the trial Court and evidence has not yet commenced and hence no prejudice would be caused by either party if the suit is further allowed to proceed. (19). My aforesaid observations are fortified from the decision of the Apex Court in the matters of Maitreyee Banerjee vs. Prabir Kumar Mukherjee(1), Panchdeo Narain Srivastava vs. K. Jyoti Sahay & Anr. and M/s. Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill & Ginning Factory & anr.(2) vs. Yograjsinha Shankersinha Parihar & Ors.(3) (20). (19). My aforesaid observations are fortified from the decision of the Apex Court in the matters of Maitreyee Banerjee vs. Prabir Kumar Mukherjee(1), Panchdeo Narain Srivastava vs. K. Jyoti Sahay & Anr. and M/s. Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill & Ginning Factory & anr.(2) vs. Yograjsinha Shankersinha Parihar & Ors.(3) (20). The ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court are to the effect that the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers u/s. 115 CPC ordinarily should not interfere in any case, where no jurisdictional error is involved. The Apex Court has further held that if an amendment, which has been allowed by the trial Court u/s. O.6 R. 17 CPC on just and reasonable grounds and if the same is necessary in determining the real matters in controversy, the High Court in exercise of its re- visional jurisdiction should ordinarily refrain from interference in the orders, passed by the trial Court. (21). In my view there is no illegality, impropriety or jurisdictional error committed by the trial Court in passing the order dated 6.11.1995 and which does not call for any interference. (22). As a result, I find no merit in the revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Learned trial Court is directed to expeditiously deal with and decide the pending two suits at the earliest and in any case not later than 4 months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Parties are also directed to co-operate with the learned trial Court in expeditious disposal of the said suits. (23). The summoned record be sent back to the learned trial Court immediately.