K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition quite an interesting question raised pertains to the interpretation of sub-Rules (10) and (11) of Rule 2 of the "gujarat High Court Rules, 1993" (for short "the Rules" ). The same is "whether in matters pertaining to preventive detention, where the order of detention is challenged, and further wherein by amending, adding the prayer clause, issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is played for, the same should be heard and decided by the learned single Judge as warranted under sub-Rule (11) of the Rule 2 of the Rules or by the Division Bench taking up habeas corpus as required under clause (2) of sub-Rule (10) of Rule 2 of the rules?" ( 2 ) FEW relevant facts : This matter has little chequered history. The petitioner who came to be detained as a property-grabber as defined under Section 2 (h) of the Gujarat prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short "pasa") by the order of detention dated 18-6-1995 passed by the district Magistrate, Ahmedabad, has challenged the same before this Court by filing petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India inter alia praying for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, quashing and setting aside the same and to set him at liberty forthwith. It appears from the record that much prior to this petition, initially the petitioner had challenged the impugned order of detention without surrendering to the authorities, by filing pre-detention petition, the same being SCA no. 4914 of 1995, which ultimately came to be unconditionally -withdrawn on 5-7- 1995 before Mr. Justice S. D. Shah. Thereafter the petitioner challenged the very same order of detention by filing SCA No. 6370 of 1995 before this Court Which was partly heard by Mr. Justice S. D. Shah, however since His Lordship could not take up the said matter further on medicial ground, the matter was posted for hearing by the order dated 9-10-1995 before the appropriate court. Thereafter this petition was placed before Mr. Justice J. M. Panchal. Before Mr. Justice Panchal, it appears that the petitioner requested to give priority to his petition over other matters however, since the court was not inclined to give such priority, the learned Counsel for the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the petition which was granted on 10-10-1995. Thereafter this petition was placed before Mr. Justice J. M. Panchal. Before Mr. Justice Panchal, it appears that the petitioner requested to give priority to his petition over other matters however, since the court was not inclined to give such priority, the learned Counsel for the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the petition which was granted on 10-10-1995. Thereafter the petitioner challenged the very order of detention before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by filing Writ petition (Criminal) No. 538 of 1995, which also ultimately came to be withdrawn on 12-12-1995. Thereafter once again the petitioner moved this court by filing yet one more petition the present SCA No. 10610 of 1995. When this matter came up for hearing before Mr. Justice J. M. Panchal, the petitioner moved the court for amending the petition, adding prayer to the effect that of issuing a writ of habeas corpus. This was granted. Thereafter the controversy was raised before Panchal, J. that since the petition as amended stood in character as habeas corpus petition, the same should be heard by the Division bench as provided in Clause (2) of sub- rale 10 of Rule 2 of the Rules. Thereupon, mr. Justice Panchal, on 15-2-1996, passed the following order:"as. the petitioner has prayed for issuance of writ of habeas corpus, the matter may be required to be dealt with by division Bench in view of the provisions contained in Rule 2. I Civil 10 (2) of Part - 1 Chapter - I of Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993. The office is directed to ascertain the matter and place the matter before- appropriate Court. "this is how the office has placed this detention matter before this Bench. ( 3 ) HEARD learned Advocate Mr. P. M. Raval for the petitioner and Mr. D. C. Dave, learned AGP for the Respondents. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the point at issue it is indeed quite necessary first of all to refer to the relevant Rules, of Gujarat high Court Rules, 1993 in Part-I Chapter - i which pertain to the High Court. In this chapter Rule 2 pertains to the matters to be dealt with by a single Judge, which reads as under:"2. Save as otherwise expressly provided by any law in force or by these rules, a single Judge may dispose of the following matters. In this chapter Rule 2 pertains to the matters to be dealt with by a single Judge, which reads as under:"2. Save as otherwise expressly provided by any law in force or by these rules, a single Judge may dispose of the following matters. I. CIVIL (10) Applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India except (2) those for issue of writs of habeas corpus and also those for issue of appropriate directions, orders or writs in respect of orders of deportation. (11) Matters pertaining to Preventive detention Laws. ( 5 ) IN our considered opinion, the mended sub-Rule (11) of rule 2 is ex facie express, specific and unambiguous enough calling for any other interpretation whatsoever, wherein it is clearly stated that the matters pertaining to detention laws are required to be placed before the learned single Judge. The matter before us is undisputably a matter under PASA Act - a Preventive detention Law - enacted by the State of gujarat. In that view of the matter, merely because the petitioner has subsequently amended the petition by adding the prayer for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, that standing by itself will not alter the jurisdiction of a single Judge to hear the matter or take away the matter from the purview of sub-Rule (11) of Rule 2 of the rules. If indeed the petitioner has any grievance in this regard, it is open to him to challenge the vires of the Rules, of course ultimately it is quite doubtful as to what extent he can successfully do it. In our opinion the matter as it stands on today, this court is not empowered to hear the detention matters. We indeed cannot permit the detenus to be the forum-choosers on the basis of some whims and caprices of labelling the petition as habeas corpus. In types of the preventive detention under the regular detention law which is not declared ultra vires otherwise, the ultimate question before this Court is to quash and setting aside the order of detention. Not only that but when the detenu himself files petition specifically challenging the impugned order of detention, strictly speaking, there is indeed no necessity of directing any person, authority to produce the body of the person detained before the court. Not only that but when the detenu himself files petition specifically challenging the impugned order of detention, strictly speaking, there is indeed no necessity of directing any person, authority to produce the body of the person detained before the court. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that ultimately in such cases of preventive detention in substance the prayer is to quash and set aside the detention order and not for production of detenu before the High Court. Accordingly, in view of the specific amended provision, as contained in sub-rule 11 of Rule 2 of the Rules, unless and until the vires of the same is successfully challenged, we do not deem it proper to further enter into the niceties of what habeas corpus is, as argued by Mr. Raval. ( 6 ) WHEN this Court made its view, stand clear on the question involved, Mr. Raval submitted that whenever the challenge is to the illegal detention, writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate relief and even if such a relief is not so worded in the petition, the court should mould the relief prayed for accordingly since illegal detention is essentially a criminal matter and not a civil matter. This submission of Mr. Raval, on the face of it, is quite untenable because ultimately the court is required to know what is the relief prayed for. In the instant case, the petitioners was detained under the pasa Act. The relief prayed for is essentially for quashing and setting aside the order of detention, the instant and immediate fall out of which is the release from the preventive detention. This is a clear position emerging from the record. In that view of the matter also, the court is not in a position to help Mr. Raval. ( 7 ) MR. Raval finding himself further in tight corner when we said that in this petition, ultimately the order of detention is challenged, he submitted that he also prayed for the quashing of the continued detention of the petitioner. Now, this is also once again an aspect which can be ultimately taken up before the concerned learned single Judge who takes up detention matters. ( 8 ) MR. Raval further submitted that this is essentially a matter of criminal nature because a person has been illegally detained. Now, this is also once again an aspect which can be ultimately taken up before the concerned learned single Judge who takes up detention matters. ( 8 ) MR. Raval further submitted that this is essentially a matter of criminal nature because a person has been illegally detained. Now, Whether the matter is of civil or criminal nature is indeed not of any consequence as ultimately what is challenged before us is the order of preventive detention. In fact, liberty of a citizen is essentially a matter of the constitution/fundamental right. Not only that but even the provision regarding preventive detention law is governed by Article 22 (4) (5) and (6) of the Constitution. Further still, whenever suph liberties are interfered with, the constitutional remedy is available under Article 226 of the constitution of India. Thus; since both the right and the remedy to it when flow from the Constitution, division of preventive detention matters into civil and criminal pales into total insignificance and the matter ultimately remains within the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 9 ) AS informed, by learned AGP Mr. Dave, the final hearing of other such matters filed challenging the detention orders passed in December 1995, is going on, that is to say, the petitions filed challenging the detention orders passed in june 1995 are already disposed of. In this view of the matter, had the petitioner not taken this technical plea, perhaps this matter would have been already over. We under the circumstances, fail to understand as to why indeed the petitioner has taken this sticky, disadvantageous stand at the cost of early disposal. To avoid particular court? We dont know! We have no material to draw any such inferences. But we would emphatically say that no petitiouer can be permitted to arbitrarily interpret relevant rules with a view to be successful forum- chooser which we hope this is not the attempt of the petitioner. ( 10 ) IN the result, ihe office is directed to place this matter immediately before the learned single Judge. Order accordingly. .