JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has challenged the order of RPF Commissioner dated 7.10.90 by which the payment from May 1969 to February 1980 of Rs. 1,40,937/- was directed to be paid. 2. In this matter a writ petition was filed earlier before this court No. 4324/88 decided on 26.11.88 in which it was observed as under : "In this writ petition number of grounds have been given. It is not necessary to decide all the grounds at this stage. Arguments were heard by one presiding officer and the order has been passed by Shri K.L. Lamba who was not the presiding officer at that time. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the order (Annex. 10) dated 30.5.88 is set aside the petitioner will be at liberty to raise all the points which he has raised here. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner will decide all the points raised by the petitioner." 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised an argument that the notice in this case was issued on 10.11.80 and thus it was delayed by 10 years. There was power cut and financial stringency besides the labour problem and lock out in the factory from December, 1973 to July 1974 (wrongly typed as July 1984). It is submitted that the petitioner was entitled for infancy benefit in accordance with the provisions of Section 16. The basic liability has already been determined under section 7-A, out these are mitigating circumstances and in view of the decision of Apex Court in AIR 1979 SC 18.30 the Commissioner was not justified in levying damages. 4. Arguments of both the learned counsel for the parties have been heard. From the order of the Commissioner it is evident that the question with regard to infancy benefit was taken by the petitioner, but has not been decided. The decision which has been given on the plea raised on infancy benefit was that the deposit of dues within a stipulated time limit is statutory obligation cast upon the employer which cannot be allowed to be linked with such extraneous factor as preferred by the employer. The plea of the employer cannot be accepted as a valid ground to delay the payment of the statutory dues. The dues should have been deposited under protest. The plea of the employer cannot be accepted as a valid ground to delay the payment of the statutory dues. The dues should have been deposited under protest. The decision of Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, 1979 11 LJ 36 has also been relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in which it has been held by the Apex Court. that even in the case of lock out strike etc., failure to make the contribution resulting in default will be resulting in levy of damages under Section 14-B of the Act. Each and every point which has been raised by the petitioner has been dealt with and in respect of delay the decision in the case of RPF Commissioner v. Allahabad Canning Company, 1978 LIC 998 has been referred where it was found that there is no period of limitation prescribed under section 14-B of the Act, and the employer cannot take the benefit of lapse of time. 5. The order which has been passed shows that there is proper exercise of mind by the Commissioner and the damages have been levied ranking from 2% to 100% looking to the delay involved. It is not a case where the order could be said to be non-speaking order or suffering from non-application of mind. In respect of the' contention that whether the statutory dues have been paid in time or not for the reasons beyond control of employer, a consistent view has been taken by this court that financial stringency or factory lock-out, labour problem or power cut etc. cannot be a valid ground for not levying the damages. This court in the case of Raj. Vanaspati Products v. RPF Commissioner, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4195/91 decided on 3.10.96 has taken similar view that the damages cannot be waived for these reasons. Regarding delay it may be observed that the provisions of Section 14-B does not provide any limitation. In the case of RPF Commissioner v. K.T. Rolling Mills, AIR 1995 SC 943 where the delay was 11/2 years it was found that the order cannot be struck down on the ground of delay. 6. Following the above decisions, this writ petition having no force is accordingly dismissed.Writ petition dismissed. *******