S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. Feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowing revision filed under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in part and remanding the case to the Consolidation Officer after set ting aside the orders passed by the appellate authority dated 27. 11. 90 and Consolidation Officer dated 28. 4. 87 directing the Con solidation Officer to frame an additional issue relating to the sequence of deaths of the original tenure-holders and after afford ing an opportunity to the parties of leading additional evidence decide the claims on merits afresh taking, into consideration the copy of the death extract filed during the pendency of the revision as additional evidence, the petitioner has now ap proached this Court seeking redress praying for the quashing of the said order. 2. The facts, shorn of details and neces sary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. Ram Nath the petitioner had filed an objection in the proceedings under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in respect of the land in dis pute claiming l/4th share therein. Various other persons had also filed objections. The controversy in regard to the determination of the extent of shares raised by the parties involved ascertainment of the sequence of death of Gauri, Buchunwa and Chhoti, The Consolidation Officer had framed two is sues. The first issue was to the effect as to whether Raja had 1/2 share in the land in dispute and the second issue was as to what was the share of the parties in the land in dispute. The Consolidation Officer has ob served in his judgment that parties had been given full opportunity of adducing oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their claims. It was also observed that Ram Nath had examined himself alone as a wit ness and had not produced any other oral evidence. The Consolidation Officer has ob served in his judgment that parties had been given full opportunity of adducing oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their claims. It was also observed that Ram Nath had examined himself alone as a wit ness and had not produced any other oral evidence. It has also been observed that Ram Nath had filed nine documents viz C. H. form No. 23 in respect of chak No. 46 carved out in the earlier proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act the basic year Khataimi for the year 1363 F. pertain ing to Khatas No. 14,24,28 and 43 of village Pilahi, C. H. Form No. 41 in respect of plot No. 198 and others and C. H. 45 in respect of Khatas No. 5,16 and 48, extract of Khatauni 1359 F. , in respect of Khatas No. 16,21,31,3, 13,15,18 etc. , extract of Khatauni 1319 F. , Khasra Bandobast Mohall relating to vil lage Pilahi for 1318-F. The Consolidation Officer clearly noticed in his order that apart from the aforesaid nine documents no other document has been filed by Ram Nath. 3. The Consolidation Officer deter mined the share of Ram Nath to be 4/30 in Khata No. 36 and that of Raja to be 3/10. So far as Khata No. 37 was concerned, the share of Ram Nath was determined to be 4/31 and that of Raja to be 3/7. The share was so determined after taking into consideration the sequence of the deaths of Gauri, Luchunwa and Chhoti and further taking into consideration the various transfers ef fected by the co-sharers. 4. The order passed by the Consolida tion Officer was challenged in appeal by Ram Nath. He claimed that Gauri had died subsequent to Chhoti and Luchunwa had died subsequent to the death of Gauri. The Settlement Officer Consolidation came to the conclusion that Gauri had died sub sequent to the year 1319e, but there was no evidence on the record to indicate the exact date of death of Gauri during the period 1319f. , to 1333 F. The Settlement Officer Consolidation on the evidence and materials on the record concluded that Luchunwa could not be deemed to have 2/3 share on the ground that Gauri had pre deceased him. , to 1333 F. The Settlement Officer Consolidation on the evidence and materials on the record concluded that Luchunwa could not be deemed to have 2/3 share on the ground that Gauri had pre deceased him. After considering the evidence and materials on the record the Settlement Officer Consolidation deter mined the share of Ram Nath in Khata No. 37 to be 5/12 and that of Raja to be l/6th. The share of the other co-sharers was also altered. So far as Khata No. 36 was con cerned the share of Ram Nalh was held to be l/3rd and that of Raja could be l/6th. The shre of other co -sharers were also altered. 5. The order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation was challenged by Raja as well as Ram Nath by means of a separate revisions filed under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. During the pendency of the revision Ram Nath filed additional evidence consisting of Khatauni 1399f to 1404 R, pertaining to Khata No. 187, copy of the voter list, copy of the Khatauni 1334 R, copy of the Khatauni 1333r copy of the extract of death register maintained by Chowkidar relating to Gauri, copy of the death extract maintained by Chowkidar in respect of Luchunwa and copy of extract of death register maintained by Chowkidar in respect of Chhoti. The Deputy Director of Consolidation observed that both the Consolidation Officers as well as Settlement Officer Consolidation had not discussed the claim of the parties in regard to the correctness of the different pedigrees set up by them and had not recorded a dear cut finding as to which pedigree was not proved, II was also ob served that the Consolidation Officer had decided both the issues together which should not have been done, The Deputy Director of Consolidation was of the view that it should have first been decided as to which pedigree was proved and then the question of the sequence of death should have been determined so as to find out as to how the property had devolved observing that it would have been proper if the Settle ment Officer Consolidation had decided the sequence of deaths on the basis of the evidence already on the record. It was also indicated that the question in regard to the determination of share was the question of law and ought to have been decided on the basis of the pedigree and not on the basis of any compromise. It was also noticed that the transfer of the shares had not been properly taken into account while determining the extent of the shares. Being of the view that the entire evidence and materials on the, record had not been discussed properly and important issues arising in the case had not been considered, the Deputy Director of Consolidation concluded that the matter should be remitted to the Consolidation Officer requiring him to decide the case afresh after discussing the matter point wise. It was also observed that the parties should be allowed to lead evidence in respect of the copies from the death register maintained by Chowkidar which had been produced during the pendency of the revision. In the aforesaid view of the matter the Deputy Director of Consolidation set aside the or ders of the appellate authority dated 27. 11. 90 and that of the Consolidation Officer dated 28-4-87 and remanded the mat ter to the Consolidation Officer with the direction to frame an additional evidence in regard to the sequence of deaths in question and providing an opportunity to the parties to lead additional evidence to decide the case afresh on merits. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the impugned order of remand is not only manifestly er roneous but wholly unjustified considering the scope of the jurisdiction with which the Deputy Director of Consolidation stands vested as contemplated under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The controversy in regard to the share of the parties it is urged ought to have been decided by the Deputy Director of Con solidation himself and he has shirked from discharging the responsibility in this regard without any justifiable reason. 7. The contesting respondent in para graph 12 of the counter- affidavit has as serted that it was not within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Consolidation while exercising revisional powers to con sider the evidence afresh and remand the matter to the Consolidation Officer. It has also been asserted in paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit that the revisional authority had no jurisdiction to record a fresh finding of fact itself. It has also been asserted in paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit that the revisional authority had no jurisdiction to record a fresh finding of fact itself. However, the learned counsel for the respondent repre senting Raja who was also a revisionist has tried to support the order of remand passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 8. The question which arises for con sideration in this case is as to whether in the proceedings contemplated under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the additional evidence can be allowed to be brought on record. Additional or fresh evidence cannot be let in only for the pur pose of pronouncing judgment in a par ticular way. As pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lal Pancham and others, reported in AIR 1965 S. C. 1008, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is em powered to admit additional evidence. It was emphasised in the aforesaid decision that while it is the duty of the Court of law not only to do justice but to ensure that justice is done, it should bear in mind that it must act only according to law, not other wise. The power to allow additional evidence may be exercised when any point is required to be cleared upon in the interest of justice but this power has to be exercised cautiously and sparingly and only in excep tional cases and further such new evidence allowed to be let in should have a direct and important bearing on a main issue in the case. The parties who had ample oppor tunity to produce certain evidence in the lower Courts but failed to do so or opted not to do so cannot have such evidence admitted in appeal. It seems to me that the statutory principles underlying the provisions con tained in O. XLI, R. 27, CPC should be kept in mind while considering an application for bringing on record additional evidence at the stage of appeal or revision even in the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 9. It seems to me that the statutory principles underlying the provisions con tained in O. XLI, R. 27, CPC should be kept in mind while considering an application for bringing on record additional evidence at the stage of appeal or revision even in the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 9. This Court in its decision in the case of Smt. Manbhawati Devi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, reported in 1970 R. D. page 378 after taking into con sideration the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Kerala v. K. M. Abdullah and Com pany, reported in AIR 1955 SC1585 and the implications arising under the scheme un derlying the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act had indicated that in a suitable case and on sufficient grounds having been made out the revising authority acting under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act may take additional evidence before passing final orders observing that it cannot be said that the Directors powers of revision are confined in every case to the evidence already on the record. The aforesaid decision was subsequently followed by another learned Single Judge in the case of Mirchi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U. P Lucknow Camp at Meerut and others, reported in 1971 A. W. R. 526. 1 do not find any justifiable reason to depart from the view on this question as indicated in the decisions noticed hereinabove. 10. However, it should not go un noticed that the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, is not co-extensive with the jurisdiction contemplated under Section 11 of the said Act with which the appellate authority stands vested. The provisions con tained in Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is to the following effect: "48, Revision and Reference.-The Deputy Director of Consolidation may call for and ex amine the record of any case decided or proceed ings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of specifying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Deputy Director of Consolida tion also a reference under sub-section (3 ). (3 ). any authority subordinate to the Deputy Director of Consolidation may, after al lowing the parties concerned an opportunity on being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (l ). Explanation.-For the purpose of the sec tion, Settlement Officer Consolidation, Con solidation Officer, Assistant Consolidation Of ficers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolida tion. " 11. The implications arising under a provision which stands pan materia with the aforesaid provision came up for considera tion before the Apex Court in the cas6 of M/s. Bhool Chand v. M/s. Kay Pee Cee Invest ments and another, reported in 1991 J. T. (Part I) S. C. 186. In its aforesaid decision, the Apex Court pointed out that the revisional power envisaged under the provisions referred to above cannot be equated with appellate power and must fall short of the appellate powers of inter ference with a finding of fact where the find ing of fact depends upon the credibility of witnesses there being a conflict of oral evidence of the parties. 12. In its another decision in the case of Ram Dular v. Deputy Director of Consolida tion, Jaunpur, reported in 1994 All. C. J. 935, the Apex Court had observed, while inter preting the scope of Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act that for con sidering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or irregularity thereof, the revising authority could not assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact finding authority by appreciating itself those facts de novo. It was further observed that the revising authority has to consider whether the legality admissible evidence had not been considered by the authority in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by it is based on no evidence or any patent illegality or im propriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity going to the root of the matter had been conducted in record ing the finding. 13. 13. Taking into consideration the scheme underlying the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the observations made by the Apex Court referred to hereinbefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the jurisdiction with which the Deputy Director of Consolidation stands vested under the provisions contained in Section 48 of the aforesaid Act cannot be deemed to be such an appellate power as is vested in the appellate authority envisaged under the Act. The revisional power contemplated under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, therefore, must fall short of the appellate power of interference with a finding of fact where the finding of fact depends on the credibility of the witnesses there being in conflict of oral evidence led by the parties. 14. In the aforesaid view of the matter if a decision on a question of fact in the circumstances indicated above cannot be impugned in a revision contemplated under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is clear that if such an evidence is tendered in order to impugn a finding on a question of fact, it will be futile to allow the same to be brought on record as it cannot be utilised for the purpose for which it is tendered. Where a party wishes to produce further evidence affecting a matter of fact it must get that evidence produced before a court or authority which can decide a question of fact as it is useless for him to tender that evidence before a court or authority which is confined to questions of law. 15. In the present case, that I find is that on the own showing of Ram Nath, the petitioner, the previous proceedings under the provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in respect of the land in dispute had been finalised in the year 1960 before the Consolidation Officer. He had set up a pedigree and had asserted that the property in dispute was the joint family property acquired at the time when the father of Gauri, Buchunwa and Chhoti was alive. It was also asserted by him that Gauri had died issueless and his interest had devolved on Buchunwa whose share got en hanced to 2/3rd. He had however, not filed any documentary evidence showing the se quence of death of Gauri, Buchunwa, and Chhoti. It was also asserted by him that Gauri had died issueless and his interest had devolved on Buchunwa whose share got en hanced to 2/3rd. He had however, not filed any documentary evidence showing the se quence of death of Gauri, Buchunwa, and Chhoti. According the case set up by him, Chhoti was survived by Gauri and Buchun wa out of whom Gauri pre-deceased Buchawna with the result that the share of Buchunwa got enhanced to 2/3rd. 16. The Settlement Officer, Con solidation was of the view that since there was no documentary evidence to establish the date of death of Gauri which occurred during the period 1319 Fasli to 1333 Fasli and since in 1333 Fasli, the names Buchunwa and Jagaru, the son of Chhoti had been recorded it could be safely presumed that both these persons had equal shares therein. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation therefore, disbelieved the claim of Ram Nath in regard to the enhancement of the share of Buchunwa as claimed. The Settle ment Officer, Consolidation in support of his aforesaid conclusion also placed reliance on the entry in the revenue record which had attained finality in the previous proceedings under the provisions or the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, in accord ance with the order passed by the Con solidation Officer dated 20. 2. 1958. The par ties had led their evidence before the Con solidation Officer in the year 1986. The Consolidation Officer had disposed of the objections vide the order dated 28. 4. 1987 and the appeal was decided by the appellate authority on 27. 11. 1990. Ram Nath made no effort to bring on record the additional evidence in regard to the sequence of deaths of Gauri, Buchunwa and Chhoti, during all this period and it was for the first time during the pendency of the revision under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act that an effort was made to let in fresh evidence on that aspect. 17. An order of remand, while exercis ing the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, setting aside the judgment and orders passed by the appellate authority as well as the original authority based on the con clusions reached on an appraisal of evidence brought by the parties on record should be an exception and not a rule. The revisional authority while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act has to con sider whether the legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the lower authority in recording the findings of fact or law or the conclusions reached by it are based on no evidence or any patent il legality or impropriety had been committed any procedural irregularity going to the root of the matter had been conducted in record ing the finding under challenge. The revisional power contemplated under the aforesaid provisions as has already been in dicated hereinabove, must fall short of the appellate power of interference in a finding of fact where the finding of fact arrived at on a proper appraisal of evidence on the record in accordance with law and is based on the credibility of the witnesses. It should also not be lost sight of that additional evidence at such a late stage as that of a revision should not ordinarily be allowed to be let in merely to facilitate the revisionist to fill in lacuna in his case. Moreover, in a case where the party had ample opportunity to bring on record the additional evidence during the stage of the trial of the case or pendency of the appeal, the revising authority should be slow to allow letting in any such evidence unless such an evidence is of an unimpeach able character and has a direct bearing on the controversy and in the opinion of the revising authority is required to be brought on record in the interest of justice in order to enable it to pronounce the judgment. 18. Considering the facts and cir cumstances, noticed hereinabove, it seems to me that the Deputy Director of Con solidation, while passing the impugned order has failed to apply his mind to the aspects indicated in the preceding para graphs, while remanding the case for trial de novo before the Consolidation Officer. 19. Further, the said authority appears to have totally ignored the principles which ought to be kept in mind, while permitting bringing on record any fresh evidence at the revisional stage. This obviously has resulted in vitiating the order passed by him which is under challenge. 20. Sufficient ground has, therefore, been made out of interference by this Court. 21. In view of my conclusions indicated hereinabove, the writ petition succeeds in part. This obviously has resulted in vitiating the order passed by him which is under challenge. 20. Sufficient ground has, therefore, been made out of interference by this Court. 21. In view of my conclusions indicated hereinabove, the writ petition succeeds in part. The impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is quashed with a direction to restore the revisions to their original numbers and reconsider the application seeking bringing on record the additional evidence,, and decide the revisions in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 22. Considering the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed. .