A. P. SINGH, J. A representative suit No. 477 of 1969 was filed by Safiullah and Kamaruddin Irshad Mohammad, Wakeel Ahmad and Shakeel Ahmad are the sons of Irshad Ahmad who have been substituted as plaintiffs after the death of Safiullah. The suit was filed in representative capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code with the permission of the Court. Relief sought in the suit was that the defendants, present appellant, Abdul Kareem be restrained by permanent in junction from interfering with plaintiffs right to lay brick soling (Kharanja) on land shown in the plaint map by letters Al, A2, H and not to cause hindrance in plaintiffs right of passage from the land lying after the land dispute (Jamin tahati majkoor ). Further prayer was for issue of a man datory direction to defendants to demolish the Chabutara shown by letters Al, A2, A6 and Zeena (stairs) shown by letters X, Y, Z existing on the land in dispute and to re store the Rasta (passage) on the land lying after the land in suit (on jamin tahati) in its original condition failing which it should be demolished through the Court. 2. The defendants denied existence of Rasta (passage) from land A, Al, A2 and H and pleaded that this was the Sahan of their house in use from before the time they had purchased the house from one Sri Mohan Kundu. According to defendants Mohan Kundu had laid brick soling over the Sahan land and was running a shop for selling Takauri over the said land. After purchase of the house of Mohan the defen dants replaced the brick soling with new bricks and thereafter the Chabutara and stairs were constructed on the said Sahan land for the better enjoyment of the house by them. The showed that the Rasta (pas sage) passed or the south of the Sahan land (land in dispute) on which brick soling of Nagar Palika was already there which was quite different from the brick soling put by Mohan and then by defen dant. 3. Plaintiffs gave a map in the plaint at the back of the last page of the plaint. 3. Plaintiffs gave a map in the plaint at the back of the last page of the plaint. In the said map houses of defendant (Ancestral and acquired from Mohan) have respec tively been shown by letter x and y whereas the house of Shafiullah is shown towards East of house y. Masjid and Sahan Masjid have been shown towards south of the Nagar Palika road. Stair case is shown by letters f and y towards ex treme north-west of house y. Chawk (Tazia) is shown towards south-west of the Rasta (passage ). The Chabutara and the Rasta which pass therefrom is shown towards south-west corner of house y of defendant, whereas Rasta is shown passing from south-west side touching the edge of the house of defendant passing towards east down below the house of plaintiff Shafiullah (since deceased ). Houses of plaintiff Shafiullah and defendant lie side by side. 4. Both the parties are residents of Mohalla Domanpura in the township of Maunath Bhanjan which fell earlier in dis trict Azamgarh but now it is in district Mau. From the situation of the land in suit the houses of the plaintiff No. 1 since deceased and defendant it becomes very obvious that the dispute in respect of the land in suit is simply between the plaintiff No. 1 (now represented by L. Rs.) on the one side and the defendant on the other. However, private dispute between them was converted into a public dispute by taking resort to the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code and the trial Court permitted the plaintiffs to file the suit in a representative capacity. 5. There has been score of litigation between different set of persons in respect of the Rasta (passage) which is involved in the suit. On one or the other score reliance on maps filed either with the plaint or with the written statement or the ones prepared by Commissioners with their reports in earlier suits has been sought by both the parties to derive help for proving their respective pleadings ; that apart other documents suggesting admission made by plaintiff No. 1 about the land in suit being Sahan land too has been filed. Apart from the voluminous documentary Evidence the parties also produced wit nesses in support of their plea. Whereas plaintiffs produced four witnesses defen dants produced two. 6. Apart from the voluminous documentary Evidence the parties also produced wit nesses in support of their plea. Whereas plaintiffs produced four witnesses defen dants produced two. 6. Trial Court divided the dispute be tween the parties in respect to the land in dispute in two parts; first part was confined to land marked by letters Al, A2, A5 and the second part was comprised of the land marked by letters A, Al, A2 and H. After discussing evidence which the parties ad duced and giving cogent reasons for ac cepting the one and discarding the other evidence in relation to each of the two parts separately the trial Court decreed plaintiffs suit in respect of the first part whereas the suit was dismissed by it in regard to the second part which trial Court held was Sahan land of the defen dants wherefrom no Rasta (passage) was in existence. One set of appeal only by plaintiffs was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was heard and decided by 1st Additional District Judge, Azamgarh. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and has decreed the suit in to. It is now the defendants who have approached this Court by means of the above second appeal filed under Sec tion 100 of the Code to question the legality of the appellate judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court in plaintiffs favour. 7. As per requirement of Section 100 this Court while admitting the appeal under Order XL1, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure confined the scope of enquiry for the hearing of the appeal only on the following questions: - (a) Whether the Courts below had no jurisdiction to decree the suit ? (b) Whether the Courts below have erred in not considering the admissions made by the plaintiffs which is the best evidence ? (c) Whether the Courts below have not considered the material evidence namely the report of the Commissioner and have misread the gift-deed executed by Smt Indiri? Though only above three questions have been framed but with respect to the learned counsel for the parties the appeal, which must be decided only on a substan tial question of law, was argued as a first appeal under Section 96 and not as a second appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. Though only above three questions have been framed but with respect to the learned counsel for the parties the appeal, which must be decided only on a substan tial question of law, was argued as a first appeal under Section 96 and not as a second appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. Be that as it may I do not wish to fall in that trap and will not dwell upon the factual aspects of the case until it is found having been decided by the lower appellate Court in clear disregard of es tablished Rules of Evidence. The question which have been framed at the time of admission too, with respect to the Honble Judge, who admitted the appeal, do not appear to be questions arising in the ap peal as substantial questions of law. Sec tion 100 Civil Procedure Code allows this Court to enter into the exercise of review of the judgment of the first appellate Court. For the purpose of understanding the scope of Section 100 it is better to remind oneself with the precise words bearing relevance to the power conferred on this Court, which are under: - ". . . . . (1) an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal from any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2)- (3) In an appeal under the Section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the ap peal. (4) Whether the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the ques tions formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question. Provided nothing in this Section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such questions. Provided nothing in this Section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such questions. " Shortly stated the appellant can exer cise his right of appeal in High Court only on a substantial question of law for which the memo of appeal which the appellant has to file under Order XL1 Rule 1 must state the substantial question of law which as per the appellant is required to be decided by the High Court in the appeal. The High Court too while scrutinizing the appeal under Order XL1 Rule 11 at the admission stage has to apply its mind on that substantial question of law and will formulated that question in its order of admission on being fully satisfied that such a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The Code gives right to the respondent to satisfy the Court at the time of final hearing of the appeal that the substantial question of law on which the appeal was admitted is actually not in volved in the appeal ; appellant too is allowed to argue the appeal on a substan tial question of law which has not been framed by the Court at the time of admis sion of the appeal provided the Court after recording reasons allows the appeal to be heard on such other substantial question of law. 8. Term substantial question of law has not been defined in the Code nor it is capable of being confined in a straight jacked definition. The word substantial in the ordinary parlance means thing of sub stance. Thus if a question of law touching substantially on the merits of the case is involved only then appeal under Section l00 will be entertain able. 9. In the present case the question which fell for decision before the Courts below was neither a question of law nor a mixed question of law and fact. It was an abstract question of fact as to whether the land involved in the suit was Sahan land of the defendant or it was a Rasta "passage". Answer to this question could be given on evidence which the parties, interested in the judicial determination of that ques tion, could tender. It was an abstract question of fact as to whether the land involved in the suit was Sahan land of the defendant or it was a Rasta "passage". Answer to this question could be given on evidence which the parties, interested in the judicial determination of that ques tion, could tender. Appreciation of evidence in most of the cases too does not involve any question of law. Courts of fact (trial Court and with some exceptions the 1st Appellate Court) have the requisite power to arrive at their own conclusions of fact from the evidence which has been adduced in the case. There are, however, certain exceptions to this power within which both trial Court and the 1st Appel late Court can draw their conclusions from the evidence available on the file. Those exceptions are.- (i) the Courts cannot pick one and leave the other piece of evidence for arriv ing at a conclusion of fact without given cogent reasons for choosing one as against the other piece of evidence; (ii) the Courts cannot admit and place reliance on an evidence which is not relevant under the evidence; (iii) the Courts cannot reject a relevant evidence and refuse to admit it without recording reasons; (iv) Courts can draw only reasonable inference from a piece of evidence. (v) 1st appellate Court will reap-preciate evidence only when it is satisfied for sufficient reason that the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court was vitiated for any of the reasons detailed in (i) to (iv ). If a finding, even of fact, is recorded in disregard of any of these (above men tioned) principles that finding gets vitiated which may, looking to the importance of that finding to the fate of the case, may offer a ground for this Court to interfere. 10. After hearing Shri G.-N. Varma for the appellant and Shri Sharad Malviya, for the respondents and having perused the judgments of the Court below I feel that the review of the lower appellate Court judgment in this appeal must be kept confined on a point of law which in my opinion has substantial bearing to the facts of the case and which goes to the root of the matter involved in the case. The question is what is the scope of the power which the 1st appellate Court possesses under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure ? The question is what is the scope of the power which the 1st appellate Court possesses under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure ? 11. High Court exercising second ap pellate power under Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure normally will not interfere with findings of fact howsoever erroneous that finding may be but when a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court or by the lower appellate Court is the out come of gross misappreciation of evidence or it has been arrived at by ignoring certain vital documents or that the finding of the lower appellate Court is contrary to the one which was recorded by the trial Court but while recording the said finding the first appellate Court has not given any cogent reason for coming to a conclusion of fact different from the one which had been reached by the trial Court. In other words where it is shown by the appellant that the first appellate Court has itself entered into the exercise of drawing conclusion of fact which are vital to deciding the fact of the case on its own appreciation of evidence without finding fault with the findings al ready recorded by the trial Court on its own appreciation of the evidence on record of the case, this Court will be fully justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the first appellate Court provided on the evidence that finding can not be sustained. 12. In the background of the above legal position and the scope of power which is given to this Court by Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure in my opinion the substantial question of law which is in volved in this case is whether the lower appellate Court was justified in setting aside the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court regarding non-existence of Rasta (passage) in the land in dispute indi cated in the plaint map by letters A, Al, A2, H. ? 13. Before rejecting the plea of the plaintiffs the trial Court had discussed en tire evidence which was available on the record on the point. It gave very good reasons for rejecting some and for accept ing others. 13. Before rejecting the plea of the plaintiffs the trial Court had discussed en tire evidence which was available on the record on the point. It gave very good reasons for rejecting some and for accept ing others. Strangely the lower appellate Court in its impugned judgment did not, nor had any good reason to, indicate any ground for not agreeing with the con clusions which were drawn and the find ings which were arrived at by the trial Court. The lower appellate Court does not in its impugned judgment indicated any infirmity in the reasoning and the con- elusions which were drawn by the trial Court in regard to its finding on the ques tions it had to decide and were actually decided. The lower appellate Court feels satisfied by just observing: These words if translated in English with means "the learned Munsif having determined the findings against the documentary evidence committed judicial impropriety. " The lower appellate Court has however, not indicated in its im pugned judgment any particular documentary evidence which according to it was misinterpreted by the trial Court while recording a finding contrary to what that document communicated. 14. From a perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court it however, ap pears that the lower appellate Court felt too much overtaken from the gift-deed (Ext. 8) which Smt. Indiri had executed in favour of her son Mohan regarding house y. It was executed in the year 1980. In this the boundary of the house has been given as under: - East - House of Noor Md. Dala West - Sahan Darwaja Makan Man-huba. North - House of Abdul Halim. South - "darwaja Makan Manhuba Badhun Rasta. " Trial Court interpreted this descrip tion of the boundary of the house y in Ext. 8 keeping in its view other evidence which included (1) admission by plaintiff No. 1 in Ext. A8 and A9 which respectively were the application and the map which the plaintiff had filed in the Nagar Palika for seeking permission to make certain constructions in which he himself had shown existence of Sahan over the land in dispute towards north of the passage (Rasta); written statement of plaintiff (Ext. A8 and A9 which respectively were the application and the map which the plaintiff had filed in the Nagar Palika for seeking permission to make certain constructions in which he himself had shown existence of Sahan over the land in dispute towards north of the passage (Rasta); written statement of plaintiff (Ext. A7) which he had filed in suit No. 1311 of 1957 with which he had filed map in which too he had himself shown the land in dispute as Sahan land; the written state ment of the Nagar Palika, Mau Nath Bhanjan filed in suit No. 214of 1962 (Ext. A5) in which also a map was filed showing towards south-west of the land in suit exist ence of passage; Map which was prepared by the Commissioner appointed by the Court in suit No. 214 of 1962 (Ext. 4) in which also Rasta (passage) was shown towards south-west and the land in dispute is shown as Sahan land; Commissioners map in suit No. 732 of 1958 (Ext. 3) in which also "way" Rasta has been shown towards south-west of the land in dispute; copy of Commissioners report with map filed in suit No. 1503 of 1954 (Ext. 5 and Ext. A16) wherein Sahan is shown in front of defendants house y and thereafter a Rasta (passage) is shown by arrows. In the background of the above mentioned voluminous evidence the trial Court was of the view that the words "darwaja" which was used in the gift-deed (Ext. 8) for describing the southern boundary of Mohan Kundus house did not mean the point of entry in the house but the Sahan. It is common knowledge that in villages word "darwaja" is generally used also for the Sahan of the house. If the trial Court inter-predated the word "darwaja" to mean sahan and that too in the light of voluminous evidence on the record which went to immensely justify that interpreta tion. I do not think the trial Court had reached on its conclusion in disregard of that document (Ext. 8 ). The lower appel late Court however, applying strict mean ing of the word darwaja confined it to mean a door which is used for entry in a house. Adopting this meaning to the word darwaja which was used in the gift deed Ext. 8 ). The lower appel late Court however, applying strict mean ing of the word darwaja confined it to mean a door which is used for entry in a house. Adopting this meaning to the word darwaja which was used in the gift deed Ext. 8, the lower appellate Court totally ruled out existence of open land by way of sahan between the house y and the Rasta (passage) and held that the land in dispute shown by letters A, Al, A2, H was Rasta and not Sahan land of the defendant as what the defendant got by way of sale-deed from Mohan was only what Mohan got from his mother through the gift-deed Ext. 8. 15. This finding of the lower appel late Court in my opinion is misconceived. Before coming to this conclusion the lower appellate Court wrongly interpreted Ext. 8 which apart from not being acceptable to reason is also in contradiction to voluminous evidence on the record includ ing admissions of the plaintiff showing existence of Sahan land between the house y and the Rasta (passage ). The lower appellate Court however, did not care to examine the impact of that voluminous documentary evidence on which the trial Court had placed reliance before coming to its own conclusion which in my opinion were not at all questionable. 16. The documents Ext, A8, A9, A7, A5, filed by defendants and Exts. 3, 4, 5 and 16 (A5 and 16 being same documents) respectively having been filed by defen dant and the plaintiff) deserved notice of the lower appellate Court. 17. Before coming to the conclusion that no Sahan Land existed between house y and the Rasta (passage) with the aid of the description of the boundary of house y in Ext. 8it was imperative for the lower appellate Court to have applied its mind to the admission of. plaintiff and other cogent material which were available on the record of the case clearly suggesting against that interpretation of the bound ary of house y in Ext. 8. It was therefore, a judicial blunder which was committed by the lower appellate Court in setting aside the finding of the trial Court regarding existence of Sahan land between the Rasta (passage ). 18. There is yet another aspect of the case which too deserves notice. 8. It was therefore, a judicial blunder which was committed by the lower appellate Court in setting aside the finding of the trial Court regarding existence of Sahan land between the Rasta (passage ). 18. There is yet another aspect of the case which too deserves notice. It was not at all safe for the lower appellate Court to believe that house y which was sold by Mohan Kundu to the defendant, remained in the same state in which it was given to him by his mother by means of the gift-deed of the year 1930. Further the descrip tion of the boundary of the house Y given in the gift-deed too could not be accepted as conclusive proof so as to rule out con sideration of any other evidence to show the contrary. At the most Ext. 8 raised a presumption in regard to the existence of Rasta immediately after the door of house y. However, by no stretch of imagination Ext. 8 offered a conclusive evidence of the fact that no Sahan land was there between the said house and the Rasta (passage ). The presumption which at the most could be arrive at from Ext. 8, if whatever appel late Court treated to mean is accepted, then too that presumption stood rebutted, from plaintiffs own admission in Ext. A8, A9, A7anda5and Exts. 3, 4, 5and l6. 19. From the voluminous documen tary evidence which has been referred to hereinabove and from the admission of plaintiffs own witnesses in his oral tes timony that Mohan was running a shop for selling Takauri in front of his house, an inevitable conclusion of fact that there existed Sahan land, between the house y and the passage was rightly drawn by the trial Court. Thus Sahan land obviously was the land in suit. Therefore, conclusion of fact that land marked by the words A, Al, A2 and H in the plaint map was Sahan land of the defendant which the trial Court drew from material evidence on record of the suit offered no legal justification or ground for the lower appellate Court so as to set aside that finding and arrive at its own finding which is contrary to the one recorded by the trial Court by simply saying that the trial Court committed error of ignoring the effect of the gift-deed, Ext. 8. 8. On the other hand, the lower appellate Court itself committed grave illegality by arriving at its own finding not only by misinterpretation of the gift-deed but also by ignoring other material documentary evidence including documents which con stituted admission of plaintiffs defecting a wholly contrary position of the matter in issue. The finding recorded by the lower appellate Court therefore, must be set aside and is accordingly set aside. 20. In the result the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed with costs both in this Court and in the first appellate Court. Plaintiffs suit in regard to the land shown by letters A, Al, A2 and H is dis missed and the judgment of the trial Court is upheld. Appeal allowed. .