JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This is a revision petition filed by the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) against the order of Rent Controller, Shimla in case No. 26/11 of 1995, dated 29-11-1995 whereby ejectment has been ordered. Respondent N. K. Bansal (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) filed a petition for ejectment of tenant under section 15 (2) of the HL P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. The landlord claimed himself to be a specified landlord within the meaning of section 2 (i)of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act hereinafter referred to as the Act on the plea that he will be retiring from the service of Himachal Pradesh Government on 31-7-1995 when he attains the age of superannuation. According to the landlord, he is Class I officer in the Himachal Pradesh Government Forest Department and at the time of presentation of the petition, was posted at Kunihar Since the landlord intends to settle permanently at Shimla, he claimed possession of the premises in question. It was further pleaded by the landlord that either he or his wife do not have any other building within the urban area of Shimla nor any other member of his family possesses or occupies any other suitable accommodation within the urban area of Shimla except the premises in question which are in occupation of the tenant. It was also the case of the landlord that he alongwith proforma respondents (who are his brothers, mother being co-owners alongwith him) had filed eviction petition against the respondents on the ground of personal bona fide requirements, however, the same is being delayed by the tenant and thus during the pendency of the said petition, the proceedings under section 15 (2) of the Act were filed subject to the said proceedings It was also the case of the landlord that he and proforma respondents had mutually partitioned the building in question and the portion of the building which is in occupation of the tenant consists of three bed rooms, one dining-cum-drawing room, one kitchen, one covered lobby, two toilets-cum-bath, gallery on both sides, which are under the tenancy of the respondent in the ground floor of the premises, has come to the share of the landlord. Further according to the landlord one of his brothers proforma respondent No. 2 Dr S K. Bansal. Further according to the landlord one of his brothers proforma respondent No. 2 Dr S K. Bansal. who is employed as Professor of-Medicine in Indira Gandhi Medical College and Hospital, Shimla was managing the property on behalf of the landlord as well as other co-owners It may again be clarified here that all the other co-owners have been arrayed as proforma respondents in the ejectment proceedings though not arrayed as such in the revision petition by the tenant for reasons best known to him. This petition was accompanied by an affidavit of the landlord to the effect that he is going to retire on 31-7-1995 as Divisional Forest Officer from the Forest Department of Himachal Pradesh and he shall settle in Shimla. 2. After receipt of summons, the tenant sought leave of the Rent Controller to contest the ejectment petition, which leave was allowed and thereafter, he filed his reply to the ejectment petition and repudiated the claims of the landlord. While resisting the ejectment petition, tenant pleaded that he was inducted as a tenant by respondent No. 2 (Dr. S. K. Bansal) and it was he who was receiving the rent from the tenant and it was always given to understand to the tenant that he is the exclusive owner of the demised premises. Theory of landlord being a specified landlord is not tenable for want of ownership of the demised premises. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller below framed following issues : 1. Whether the petitioner is not specified landlord of the premises and the premises are required by him for his personal occupation ? OPA 2. Relief. 4. During the course of proceedings, landlord examined himself as PW 1 and his other co-owner and brother Dr. S. K. Bansal appeared as PW 2, whereas respondent did not appear as his own witness and examined his Special Attorney Sh Kuldip Sharma. 5. The Rent Controller below after recording evidence recorded findings on Issue No. I in favour of the landlord and ordered ejectment of the tenant from the premises in question, hence this revision petition. 6. During the course of hearing of this revision petition, Shri K, D, Mohan, learned Counsel appearing for the tenant, submitted that initially the land in question was purchased in equal shares by late Shri Padara Swarup Bansal and Dr S K. Bansal (proforma respondent), Sh. 6. During the course of hearing of this revision petition, Shri K, D, Mohan, learned Counsel appearing for the tenant, submitted that initially the land in question was purchased in equal shares by late Shri Padara Swarup Bansal and Dr S K. Bansal (proforma respondent), Sh. Padam Swarup Bansal has since died and his estate has devolved upon his four sons and widow Sml, Parwati in equal shares. One of his four sons is the present landlord and other three sons, namely, Dr. S K. Bansal, M. K. Bansal and V. K. Bansal have been arrayed as proforma respondents along-with Smt. Parwati their mother. While attacking the findings of the Rent Controller below, Shri Mohan vehemently urged that the petitioner does not fall within the meaning of specified landlord as defined under section 2 (i) of the Act and therefore, the petition is not maintainable. He further pointed out that in Ex. PA landlord and proforma respondents have been shown to be the co-owners and the property in question was mutated in their favour vide Mutation No 2042 dated 25-9-1993. According to the learned Counsel after the reply had been filed by his client, the landlord and proforma respondents came up with Ex. PD the memorandum of settlement and infact this whole exercise is a sham transaction to throw the tenant out of the premises in question. According to Shri Mohan earlier petition was filed under section 14 of the Act for bona fide requirement of the landlord which has now been withdrawn after the passing of the present ejectment order by the Rent Controller. Thus the learned Counsel further submitted that the petition deserves to be rejected by allowing this revision petition 7. In the background of this case, it may be appropriate to mention that the plea of the landlord having retired on 31-7-1995 has not been disputed as also his requirement of the premises in question. The whole thrust of the learned Counsel for the tenant was that the petition was not maintainable under section 15 of the Act and if at all he can file the petition which is only, under section 14 (3) of the Act. 8. No doubt vide Ex. RB again petition was filed, however, there also the plea of mutual partition of the building in question has been and the requirement of the present landlord was pleaded therein. 8. No doubt vide Ex. RB again petition was filed, however, there also the plea of mutual partition of the building in question has been and the requirement of the present landlord was pleaded therein. So far as the plea of the learned Counsel for the tenant with reference to section 2 (i) of the Act is concerned, it does not hold good because even if the Ex. PD is excluded from consideration, the fact remains that he is admittedly a co-owner which position was not disputed by Shri Mohan learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant and thus the landlord could seek ejectment of the respondent from the premises in question. This position has not been seriously contested by the tenant during the course of arguments. However, in support of his submissions, Shri K. D. Mohan has persisted with the argument that since the property was joint Hindu property as pleaded by the landlord, therefore, its partition had to be effected in accordance with the provisions of Hindu Law, whereas Ex. PA shows that it has gone by succession and not by survivorship to the legal representatives of late Sh. Padam Swarup Bansal. He further advanced his this submission by arguing that the partition having cot been done in accordance with the provisions of Hindu law, as such Ex PD is liable to be held as a sham document prepared to oust his client. In this behalf, as explained above, he submitted that since the landlord is not entitled to receive rent in respect of his building of his own account, therefore, he could not be held to be a specified landlord. According to Sh. Mohan co-ownership and partition cannot go together. So far the later plea of the tenant is concerned, it is not his case that the landlord has no interest in the suit property. Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that there is no partition of co-ownership still remains and therefore it does not advance the case of the tenant, in any manner whatsoever, in the present revision petition. The landlord in the present case derived his title to the property alter the death of his father late Sh. Padam Swarup Bansal and he is entitled to evict the tenant from the premises in question. The landlord in the present case derived his title to the property alter the death of his father late Sh. Padam Swarup Bansal and he is entitled to evict the tenant from the premises in question. In this behalf a reference can usefully be made to case S. R Bose, Petitioner v. S1 Gurbax Singh and others, Respondents, 1993 (2) RCR 323 As such on the basis of the observations made in this judgment, it was not necessary that the premises ought to have been let by the specified landlord as in the present case. As already pointed out all the co-owners were parties before the Rent Controller below, inasmuch as that Sh N. K. Bansal was arrayed as landlord whereas other co-owners had been arrayed as proforma respondents in the ejectment petition. In these circumstances, merely because rent was being recovered by proforma respondent No. 2 who is the brother of the landlord is of no consequence. Relevant observations in this behalf made in paragraphs 6 and 14 are to the following effect : “6. The most important contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is with regard to interpretation of section 14-C as to whether the said ground of eviction could be made available to the co-owner who had not himself let out the premises. On first principle if this court was to examine this point, here could become possibility of agreeing with the learned Counsel for the petitioner with regard to interpretation of section 14-C where the words clearly indicate that landlord who is retired employee of the Central Government or the Delhi Administration could bring a petition for eviction if the premises have been let out by him and are required for his own residence. However, this point came to be settled by the Supreme Court in a case decided by there Honble Judges of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak and others, 1979 (1) RCR 435 : AIR 197? SC 1599. A new ground of eviction had been introduced fn the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which is provided in section 14-A. That also gives a right to a particular type of landlord to recover immediate possession of residential accommodation of any premises let out by him. SC 1599. A new ground of eviction had been introduced fn the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which is provided in section 14-A. That also gives a right to a particular type of landlord to recover immediate possession of residential accommodation of any premises let out by him. While interpreting these words let out by him the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case clearly laid down that section 14-A is available as a ground if the premises are owned by him as inherited from his propositus in whose name the property stood. It was laid down that in his name and let out by him read in the spirit of the provision and without violence to the words of the section, clearly convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly which is the case where he, as their, steps into his fathers shoes who owned the building in his own name and let it out himself." "14. It was then contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Gurbax Singh had retired from the service since long and thus, he cannot take advantage of section 14-C Similar contention was raised in the case of Surjit Singh Kalra in respect of similar ground of eviction covered by section 14-B. It was held that the statute gives a right to even the retired officer to bring a petition within a period of one year from the introduction of the said provision by the Amending Act, 1988 and the petition having been brought within one year of the date of the enforcement of the Amending Act cannot be considered not maintainable because the officer had retired long back. In the present case, the ingredients which go to constitute a new ground of eviction covered by section 14-C clearly are established and in the present case the Rent Controller was fully justified in declining the leave to defend application and in passing the eviction order against the petitioner." 11. Similarly in case Moti Lal Gaur, Petitioner v. Amrit Lal Chauhan, Respondent, 1992 (2) Rent LR 451, it has been held by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana that an ejectment petition under section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 can be maintained by one of the co-owners/co-sharers without impleading the other co-owners and landlords. 12. 12. Shri K. D. Mohan, learned Counsel for the tenant while arguing that the landlord cannot maintain the present proceedings as a specified landlord, not only this, but the reply of the tenant showed that the tenant disputed the status of the landlord as a co-owner. While making this submission, the learned Counsel for the tenant forgot the provisions of section 116 of the Evidence Act, therefore, on this ground also the submissions of the learned Counsel made in support of the revision petition deserve to be negatived. 13. Honble apex Court in case Anupama Sen Gupta and others. Appellants. Dev Kumar Sen Sarma and others. Respondents, (1981) 4 SCC 544, held in para 7 of the report as under : “7. The first question which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the first respondent was entitled to get possession of the premises in question under section 29-B of the Act at all. This contention is raised by the appellants on the ground that the premises in question which stood in the name of his wife actually belonged to her and that section 29 B was applicable only to cases where the residential accommodation in question truly belongs to the Government employee and is standing in his own name or nominally in the name of his wife or dependent child. It is urged on behalf of the appellants that since the finding of the High Court is that the premises in question belonged to the wife of the first respondent, the eviction petitions filed were liable to be dismissed, On the other hand it is urged on behalf of the respondents that the question of title to the property in question is foreign to the scope of a proceeding before a Controller who has to dispose of the matter in a summary way and (hat the Government employee acquires a right to resort to Chapter VI of the Act by mere service of a notice on him by his employer requiring him to vacate any residential accommodation provided for by the employer or in default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation in bis name, or in the name of his wife or dependent child, near the place where he is posted. It is urged that since in this case a notice containing a statement which satisfies the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 29-B of the Act had been served on the first respondent, no enquiry is called for on the question of title. In the alternative, it is urged on behalf of the respondents that even granting that the issue, relating to title can be raised, the respondents have established that the premises in question belonged to the first respondent though it stood in the name of his wife. It is further urged that the finding of the High Court on the question of title is not sustainable and that they are entitled to raise that plea in support of the judgment of the High Court which has gone in their favour. In the circumstances of this case we feel that it is not necessary to go into the questions whether the question of title to the premises is relevant at all and if it is relevant, whether it can be gone into by the Controller. We shall assume for purposes of these appeals (but without deciding) that as contended on behalf of the appellants, a Government employee can succeed, where the building stands in the name of his wife or dependent child, only if he establishes that he is himself its true owner and that the building is only nominally standing in the name of his wife or dependent child, as the case may be. In the instant case it is to be noted that on the date of the petitions before the Controller, the wife of the first respondent had died. Even granting that she was the owner of the building in question, the first respondent had become its co-owner alongwith his children. The order asking him to vacate the Government accommodation issued earlier had not been withdrawn and was still in force even on the date of the petition. He was, therefore, entitled to maintain the petitions as he otherwise satisfied the requirements of the law. Such a petition had to be filed before the Controller as the civil court had no jurisdiction to try it. He was, therefore, entitled to maintain the petitions as he otherwise satisfied the requirements of the law. Such a petition had to be filed before the Controller as the civil court had no jurisdiction to try it. As held by this Court in Kanta Goel v. B, P. Pathak, even though the first respondent was a co-owner, he was as such an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property and owned every part of the composite property alongwith others and he could file the petitions. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, which was a case arising under the Act this Court had expressed the same view. The first respondent as an heir could avail of the benefit of the notices issued in the name of his wife under section 13 (6) of the Act which she was entitled to issue the object of which was only to give previous intimation to the tenants that eviction petitions would be filed against them. There was no need to issue fresh notices after her death, Having regard to the peculiar features of the case, we do not consider that there is any infirmity in the petitions filed for the eviction of the appellants. Any other view would defeat the very object of Chapter VIA of the Act." 14. In the face of this position, the case of the landlord is fully covered and he is entitled to the order of ejectment has been rightly passed by the Rent Controller below. In the context of this case, it may be worthwhile to point out that even on evidence whatsoever case has been set up by the landlord has not been repudiated by the tenant in any manner whatsoever. In fact the tenant has chosen not to appear as his own witness in support of his case and from the evidence of the landlord as well as the documents on record produced by him it is clearly established that firstly he is co-owner and secondly he retired on 31-7-1995, as such, on both counts the decision of the Rent Controller below calls for no interference. 15. Now coming to the question of Ex. PD whether it is sham trans-action as submitted by Sh. K. D. Mohan on the basis of which he is seeking ejectment of the tenant. 15. Now coming to the question of Ex. PD whether it is sham trans-action as submitted by Sh. K. D. Mohan on the basis of which he is seeking ejectment of the tenant. In this behalf it may be appropriate to mention that the settlement has been arrived at by all the co-owners whether any of the co-owners has been given a larger share is a matter to be decided amongst the co-owners. Tenant cannot question the same more especially when the tenant is not disputing that the landlord is one of the co-owners. This aspect is being examined because according to Shri K. D. Mohan learned Counsel for the tenant the present landlord Sh. N. K. Bansal had 10% share and he has property which is more than his 10% shares in the total building. How the co-owners have adjusted their shares and made mutual adjustments amongst themselves is no concern of the tenant Thus the argument raised on this basis is totally fallacious and is hereby rejected. While taking this view, I am guided by the judgment of the Honble apex Court reported in case Mis. Taraknath and another v. Sushil Chandra Dey by Lrs and others, JT 1996 (5) SC 272. How the family settlement is arrived at, of all the persons tenant Is no body to question its existence and/or otherwise. Tenant was well aware even during the course of previous proceedings that it has been specifically pleaded in Ex. RB : "(ii) That the petitioners have mutually and for better management partitioned the said building themselves and the portion of the building or set consisting of three bed rooms, one drawing-cum-dining, two toilets-cum-bath, one kitchen, one dressing room/ covered lobby, which are under the tenancy of respondent in the ground floor of the Ashish Cattage has fallen in the share of petitioner Shri N. K, Bansal The family of Sh. N. K. Bansal, who is at present in Government service, consists of himself, his wife, three grown up daughters. Shri N. K Bansal shall be retiring from service in July 1995 and thereafter he shall permanently settle at Shimla, as his other brothers i. e. the other petitioners and their family members are also permanently residing at Shimla. Petitioner Shri N, K. Bansal before retirement wanted to settle his family at Shimla in the premises in occupation of respondent. Shri N. K Bansal shall be retiring from service in July 1995 and thereafter he shall permanently settle at Shimla, as his other brothers i. e. the other petitioners and their family members are also permanently residing at Shimla. Petitioner Shri N, K. Bansal before retirement wanted to settle his family at Shimla in the premises in occupation of respondent. Respondent at the time of creation of tenancy in his favour has assured that as and when the premises shall be required by any one of the petitioner, he shall vacate the same. It may be mentioned here that the basement floor is being shared by petitioners Shri B. K, Bansal and Shri N. K. Bansal for their use and occupation. The other portion of the building is in occupation of the petitioner No, 1 Dr. S, K. Bansal. The families of other petitioners consists as follows : (a) Dr. S. K. Bansal : Himself, his wife, sons, one servant, old mother. (b) Sh. M. K. Bansal : Himself, his wife one daughter aged 20 years. (c) Sh. V. K. Bansal : Himself, his wife, two daughters 16 and 11 years. There is no accommodation in the entire building out of which any portion can be spared for the occupation of petitioner Sh. N. K. Bansal except the premises in occupation of respondent. Thus, the premises in occupation of respondent is required by petitioner Sh. N. K. Bansal for his own use and occupation of his family members. Petitioner Sh. N. K Bansal or the other petitioners are not owning such similar accommodation within the urban area of Shimla nor he or they have got vacated such accommodation within urban area of Shimla within 5 years of filing the present petition.” The petitioners have mutually effected the partition. Thus to say that Ex. PD is sham by the tenant is also without any merit. The co owners had only acknowledged the factum of already effected partition of the property in question mutually and being in separate possession of the same* vide Ex. PD, only the said factum has been reduced into writing. 16. Learned Counsel appearing for the landlord while supporting the order of the Rent Controller below on the basis of the above noted case law has pointed out that section 16 (8) of the Act, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited. PD, only the said factum has been reduced into writing. 16. Learned Counsel appearing for the landlord while supporting the order of the Rent Controller below on the basis of the above noted case law has pointed out that section 16 (8) of the Act, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited. In this behalf it is sufficient to observe that under the proviso to sub-section (8) of section 16 of the Act, it is clear that it; embraces the power to interfere where there is mis-appreciation of evidence resulting in findings in the sense that no reasonable person would arrive at it on the materials on record, in such like situation the High Court will be well within its powers to interfere if there is miscarriage of justice in case. However, such a power of interference would not in any case extend to interference with a finding of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller on reappraisal of evidence, as argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant, on the ground that a different view of evidence was possible. Since it has been held that there is no infirmity as well as misreading of avidence resulting in miscarriage of justice in the present case, therefore on this ground also the revision of the tenant must fail 17. No other point has been urged in support of this revision petition 18. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the present revision petition is devoid of any merits and the same is accordingly dismissed with costs which are quantified at Rs. 1,000.