P. K. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) THE members of the first party in a proceeding under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "code"), have filed this revision challenging the validity of the order dated 7-12-1995 under S. 146 (1) of the Code attaching the disputed property. ( 2 ) ON the basis of Non-FIR No. 110/95 submitted by the Officer-Incharge, Laikera Police Station, a proceeding under S. 145 of the Code was initiated by the Executive Magistrate on 25-10-1995, wherein the present petitioners had appeared on 13-11-1995 and prayed for time to file show-cause which was duly granted and the case was posted to 13-12-1995 for filing of written statement. It transpires that the second party member Jaya Sankar Patel expired on 28-11-1995 and on 7-12-1995, the legal representatives of said Jayasankar Patel filed a petition for being impleaded as parties as well as a petition to attach the property under S. 146 (1) of the Code. In the said petition, it was alleged that the original second party member had been killed by the members of the first party in connection with a quarrel relating to the disputed land and the latter had been arrested and remanded to jail custody. It was further asserted that after the said incident, there was serious apprehension of breach of peace. The Executive Magistrate on the basis of the aforesaid petition which had been supported by affidavit passed an order on 7-12-1995 attaching the disputed property under S. 146 (1) of the Code and restraining both the parties to enter upon the said land. The Magistrate further directed the Officer-in-charge, Laikera Police Station to attach the property and to appoint a Zimadar not connected to any of the parties. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order under S. 146 (1) has been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners who had already entered appearance through their advocate before the Executive Magistrate. It is further submitted that paddy sheaves belonging to the petitioners had been stacked on the disputed land and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to attach the moveable property and to appoint a Zimadar in respect of the said property. It is further submitted that paddy sheaves belonging to the petitioners had been stacked on the disputed land and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to attach the moveable property and to appoint a Zimadar in respect of the said property. He has relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1961 Raj 216 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 552) (Tikuda v. State); 1986 Cri LJ 2008 (Delhi) (Anand Ram Nanda v. The State); 1975 Cri LJ 621 (J and K), (Gulla Shah v. Mohd. Amin Shah) in support of the first contention and 1992 Cri LJ 278 (Madh Pra) (Rewachand v. State of Madhya Pradesh) in support of the second contention. ( 4 ) SECTION 146 (1) of the Code reads as follows :-"146. Power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver. (1) If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-Sec. (1) of S. 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in Section 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof :provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. "an order of attachment under S. 146 (1) is envisaged in three contingencies; firstly, if the Magistrate considers the case to be one of emergency, he may attach the disputed property; secondly, if he decides that none of the parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the order, he may attach the property; and thirdly, if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties is in possession, he may attach the property. So far as the latter two contingencies are concerned, the order of attachment is to be passed evidently after hearing both the parties. So far as the latter two contingencies are concerned, the order of attachment is to be passed evidently after hearing both the parties. An order of attachment under the second or third contingency is to remain in force until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties with regard to the person entitled to the possession of the disputed land. The matter is, however, different when the Magistrate decides to attach the property under the first contingency, namely that he considers the case to be one of emergency. If the property is attached by invoking the emergency clause, the proceeding under S. 145 does not come to an end and the Magistrate has to decide, evidently after hearing both the parties regarding the possession of either party. The question arises as to whether the Magistrate can pass an order of attachment invoking the emergency clause under S. 146 (1) without affording any opportunity of hearing to the parties affected. Though ordinarily in every judicial proceeding or quasi-judicial proceeding principles of natural justice are to be followed, there may be cases where it would be inapt to insist upon observance of principles of natural justice. The power under S. 146 (1) regarding attachment of property, when in case of emergency, by its very nature may have to be exercised even without complying with the principles of natural justice if the occasion so demands. To insist that in each case before invoking the emergency clause, the Magistrate has to hear the affected parties, may frustrate the very object of the said power. It is, of course, true, as observed in the decision reported in (1991) 4 OCR 440 (Ramani Mohan Mandal v. Santosh Kumar Mandal) that an order of attachment can be passed only when the prerequisite conditions under S. 146 (1) exist and the power has to be exercised in a judicious manner with due care and caution. The Magistrate can, in a given case, if the conditions are fulfilled, pass an order of attachment soon after the initiation of the proceeding under S. 145 and the question of hearing the affected parties at that stage would not arise. The Magistrate can, in a given case, if the conditions are fulfilled, pass an order of attachment soon after the initiation of the proceeding under S. 145 and the question of hearing the affected parties at that stage would not arise. Similarly, even after initiation of the proceeding and appearance of both the sides, circumstances may arise requiring the Magistrate to take emergent action under S. 146 (1) even without giving any opportunity of hearing to any of the parties and it cannot be said that merely because the affected party was not heard, the order becomes vulnerable. In fact, in any case where either of the parties feels aggrieved, resort may be taken to the proviso to S. 146 (1) by filing appropriate petition before the Magistrate who can withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. Similar provision also exists in S. 145 (5 ). In the decision reported in 1975 Cri LJ 621 (J and K) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners a Division Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court was considering the question of constitutionality of the third Proviso to S. 145 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The aforesaid third proviso of the old Code ran as follows :-"provided also that, if the Magistrate considers the case of one of emergency, he may at any time attach the subject of dispute, pending his decision under this Section. "after considering the submission of either party, it was observed by S. Murtaza Fazl Ali, C. J. (as his Lordship then was) :-"10. In these circumstances a careful perusal of the third proviso to S. 145 (4) clearly reveals that the following conditions must be satisfied before an interim order of attachment can be passed :- (i) That the Magistrate must be satisfied and should give cogent reasons for his satisfaction that a case for attachment has been made out. (2) That sufficient grounds must be made out to show that a real emergency exists. (2) That sufficient grounds must be made out to show that a real emergency exists. (3) That an order passed under S. 145 ex parte is subject to any objections and exceptions which may be taken by the affected party, and if the affected party by an application is able to show that no case for attachment has been made out or no case exists as alleged by one party, the magistrate will be within his jurisdiction to cancel the order of attachment. It is well settled that any Court which has the power to pass an order has an inherent power to recall it ex debito justitiae. At the same time it may be pointed out that if an objection is filed by the affected party opposing the attachment, the inquiry must be a very summary one and would be similar to the one on the basis of which the magistrate initiates proceedings under S. 145 and passes the preliminary order and should not be allowed to be a sort of a protracted thing. What is required is that the Magistrate should be prima facie satisfied whether or not a real emergency exists; the satisfaction may come merely from the application or the facts stated therein or from an affidavit or other important documents filed by the party concerned and so on. "obviously, the learned counsel for the petitioners draws inspiration from the third condition indicated in the said decision. There is nothing in the said decision which lays down that in each and every case before passing an order of attachment invoking the emergency clause of the old Code which is almost similar to S. 146 (1) of the new Code the principles of natural justice have to be followed. On the other hand, it was laid down that if any order of attachment is passed ex parte, it is open to the aggrieved party to seek for recall of the said order and in such an event, the Magistrate has to deal with the matter by giving an opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the aforesaid decision does not further the case of the present petitioners in any manner. It may be pointed out that under the present Code, the proviso has been specifically added to cover such a contingency. Therefore, the aforesaid decision does not further the case of the present petitioners in any manner. It may be pointed out that under the present Code, the proviso has been specifically added to cover such a contingency. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to the decision of the Delhi High Court report in 1986 Cri LJ 2008 (Delhi ). In that case the magistrate ordered attachment of the property under S. 146 (1) on the ground that he was unable to decide as to which of the parties was in possession. Surprisingly, however, the aforesaid course had been adopted by the Magistrate without hearing the parties and going into the evidence and even without notice to the other side, which was held to be illegal. The ratio of the aforesaid decision, therefore, cannot apply to the present case. The Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1961 Raj 216 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 552) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is equally inapplicable, as the said decision related to a case of attachment of property under old S. 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which empowered the Magistrate to keep the disputed property under attachment if he was of the opinion 'that none of the parties was in possession of the disputed property, or was unable to decide as to which of the parties was in such possession. In other words, the provisions of S. 146 (1) of the old Code which are similar to the second and third contingencies envisaged under the present S. 146 (1) were under consideration. It is evident that in such a case, the order of attachment has to be passed only after scanning the materials on record and after hearing both the parties. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is negatived. However, it would be open to the petitioners, in the facts of the present case, to approach the Magistrate under S. 146 (1), Proviso, if they so like. Such a course had been adopted in the decision reported in 1988 (1) OLR 465 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 163) (Muralidhar Das v. Dhruba Charan Das ). However, it would be open to the petitioners, in the facts of the present case, to approach the Magistrate under S. 146 (1), Proviso, if they so like. Such a course had been adopted in the decision reported in 1988 (1) OLR 465 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 163) (Muralidhar Das v. Dhruba Charan Das ). ( 5 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioners next raised the contention that attachment of moveable property was illegal and the paddy sheaves belonging to the petitioners should not have been given on zima to the Zimadar. He purports to rely upon the decision reported in 1992 Cri LJ 278 (Madh Pra ). The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel is based on a misconception regarding the true import of the aforesaid decision. Issrani, J. of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (as His Lordship then was) did not lay down that there was no jurisdiction to attach moveable property. On the other hand, it was clarified by the learned Judge in para 7 of the judgement that where immovable property incidentally includes moveable property lying on the immovable property or pertaining to the immovable property is attached, the moveables can be attached along with the said immovable property. Therefore, the second contention of Mr. Routray, the learned counsel for the petitioners, also fails. ( 6 ) DURING the pendency of this revision, Mr. Routray for the petitioners had filed a petition for release of the aforesaid paddy sheaves in favour of the first party members (petitioners in this revision ). It is open to the members of the first party to pray before the Magistrate to give the unharvested paddy sheaves in their zima and if such a petition is filed, the same shall be disposed of by the Magistrate in accordance with law without being influenced in any manner by the dismissal of this revision. If any petition under S. 146 (1), Proviso, for withdrawing attachment, or petition regarding change of Zimadar in respect of the paddy sheaves is filed, the same shall be expeditiously disposed of. In any case, the Executive Magistrate should dispose of the proceeding under S. 145 of the Code expeditiously, preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the records which may be sent back immediately. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the Criminal Revision is dismissed. Revision dismissed. .