Judgment :- 1. The above revision petition has been filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, dated 6.9.1995 in I.A. No. 287 of 1995 in O.S. No. 188 of 1993, whereunder the application filed by the first respondent-plaintiff under Order 23, Rule 1 C.P.C., seeking permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a suit on the same cause of action, came to be allowed as prayed for. The second defendant in O.S. No. 188 of 1993 who was the second respondent in the court below in I.A. No. 287 of 1985 is the petitioner in the revision petition. 2. The first respondent-plaintiff filed the suit in question for partition, to pass preliminary and final decrees directing the suit properties to be divided into five equal shares and to allot one such share to the plaintiff and also for calling upon defendants 1 and 2 jointly and severally to render true and proper accounts of the management of the estate of the deceased Unnamalai Achi and 1/5th share of the amount to be ascertained after rendition of sceunts to be directed to be paid to the plaintiff and for making charge over the share of defendants 1 and 2 and ‘A’ and ‘D’ schedules properties till payment of the same is made by defendants 1 and 2. 3. The sum and substance of the claim for partition was that late Unnamalai Achi was the Plaintiffs eternal grandmother and the wife of AL. V. ST. Veerappa Chettiar of Devakottai and the plaintiff is the son of Chinna Valliammai Achi, the pre-deceased daughter of the said Unnamalai Achi. Defendants 1 and 2 are said to be the (sic) sons of the said Unnamalai Achi and defendants 3 and 4 are daughters of the said Unnamalai Achi. The claim for 1/5th share was made on the ground that Unnamalai Achi died intestate on 14.9.1993. 4. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement denying and disputing the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that he had no cause of action at all, that the deceased Unnamalai Achi has not died intestate and has left documents relating to the succession and devolution of her properties and that, the suit claim was, therefore, not maintainable. 4. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement denying and disputing the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that he had no cause of action at all, that the deceased Unnamalai Achi has not died intestate and has left documents relating to the succession and devolution of her properties and that, the suit claim was, therefore, not maintainable. The third defendant has also filed a written statement by denying the claims made in the plaint and sought for allotment of her share by passing a decree therefor by paying the necessary court-fee. A Commissioner was also said to have been appointed to take inventory of the articles and in the course of the same, it appears, some documents including an unregistered Will dated 29.8.1983 said to have been executed by Unnamalai Achi during her life time was also unearthed. 5. In the light of the above, the plaintiff has filed I.A. No. 287 of 1995 under Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C. seeking permission to withdraw the suit in question, with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The said, application was opposed by defendants 1 and 2 by filing a detailed counter affidavit, and it was contended therein that whatever may be the rights open to the plaintiff to withdraw his suit, the question of granting liberty to file a suit on the cause of action does not arise and such liberty cannot be granted in this case, since according to defendants 1 and 2, the suit in question having been filed on the plea of intestate succession, the entire suit has to fail in view of the testamentary disposition said to have been made by the deceased Unnamalai Achi and therefore, the cause of action for the fresh suit, which is sought to be filed would be entirely a different one varying from the present suit. Consequently, the claim for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, cannot be acceded to. 6. The learned trial Judge has chosen to allow the application as prayed for by granting permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Consequently, the claim for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, cannot be acceded to. 6. The learned trial Judge has chosen to allow the application as prayed for by granting permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The learned trial Judge in coming to such a conclusion was persuaded by the fact that the reason for claiming a particular share only differs and otherwise, the cause of action appears to be one and the same for the suit in question as also the one proposed to be filed after withdrawal of the suit. Aggrieved, the above revision petition has been filed. 7. Mr. M.V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioner contended while reiterating the stand taken before the court below, that the cause of action for the suit in question already filed and the one which is proposed to be filed after withdrawal of the present suit varies and differs and therefore, it could not be said that the liberty as prayed for could be legitimately granted by the court below. In support of his claim, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions reported in Vallabh Das v. Madan Lal ( AIR 1970 S.C. 987 ), A.P. Baharudeen and another v. Antony and two others (1993 TLNJ. 27 = 1992-1-L.W. 101), Selvan Estates v. L. Thanga pandia Naharajan (1995 TLNJ. 108). Per contra, Mr. R. Vijayakuar, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent-plaintiff contended that the reasons assigned by the court below are quite in accordance with law, that there has been no change in the cause of action, that the cause of action for the suit already filed and the suit to be filed after the withdrawal of the present suit is the death of Unnamalai Achi and claim of succession to the estate of Unnamalai Achi and therefore, there was no error in the order of the court below permitting the petitioner-first respondent (plaintiff) to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. 8. 8. The decision in Vallabhdas case ( AIR 1970 SC 987 ) (Supra), was the one where the suit filed for partition was said to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same subject matter and such liberty was granted under Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. Subsequently, the plaintiff in the suit filed a fresh suit and it was contended as a defence that these subsequent suit filed was on a different cause of action and the plaintiff therein could not have instituted a fresh suit, except in respect of the same subject matter of the suit whi ch was permitted to be withdrawn. In dealing with such an objection, their Lordships of the Apex Court construed the expression “subject-matter” and held as hereunder: “The expression “subject-matter” is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code. It does not mean property. The expression has a reference to a right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. That expression includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. Unless the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the same as in the first suit, it cannot be said that the subject-matter of the second suit is the same as that in the previous suit. Now coming to the case before us in the first suit Dr. Madan Lal was seeking to enforce his right to partition and separate possession. In the present suit he seeks to get possession of the suit properties from a trespasser on the basis of his title. In the first suit the cause of action was the division of status between Dr. Madan Lal and his adoptive father and the relief claimed was the conversion of joint possession to separate possession. In the present suit the plaintiff is seeking possession of the suit properties from a trespasser. In the first case his cause of action arose on the day he got separated from his family. In the present suit the cause of action, namely, the series of transactions which formed the basis of the title to the suit properties, arise on the death of his adoptive father and other. It is true that both in the “previous suit as well as in the present suit” the factum and validation of adoption of Dr. Madan Lal came up for decision. It is true that both in the “previous suit as well as in the present suit” the factum and validation of adoption of Dr. Madan Lal came up for decision. But that adoption was not the cause of action in the first nor is it the cause of action in the present suit. It was merely an antecedent event which conferred certain rights on him. Mere identity of some of the issues in the two suits does not bring out an identity of the subject matter in the two suit. As observed in Rakhma Bai v. Mahadeo Narayan (ILR. 42 Bom., 1155), the expression “subject matter” in Order 23, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure means the series of acts or transactions alleged to giving rise to the relief claimed. In other words, “Subject matter” means the bundle of facts which have to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. We accept as correct the observations of Walliis C.J. in Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi, ILR 39 Mad. 987) that where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the “same subject matter as the first suit.” 9. In A.S. Baharudeens case (1991 TNLJ. 27 = 1992-1-L.W. 101) (supra), M. Srinivasan, J., as the learned judge then was, expressed the view that it is now well settled that permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit is governed by Order 23, Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure only and the Court is bound to function within the four corners of the said Rule. In that case, the suit which was filed for a declaration that the suit property was a wakf property and for a consequential injunction restraining the defendant therein from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff and which came upto the second appellate stage was sought to be withdrawn at that stage with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action for the reason that the plaintiff wanted to implead the Government as a party to the suit and that four material documents came to light during the pendency of the suit and in order to implead the Government and also to produce all such relevant documents subsequently unearthed, the withdrawal was necessitated. The learned judge clearly found that the grounds urged in support of the application for withdrawal of the suit at the second appellate stage did not conform to the requirements or Order 23, Rule 1(3), C.P.C. In Selvam Estates case (1991 TLNJ. 107) (Supra), Ar. Lakshmanan, J. dealt with a case where under the learned judge, while adverting to a similar claim to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit, held that the suit originally filed was void and hence, the permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action was not necessary. In Some Naickers case (1995 I MIJ. 108) (supra), Rengasamy, J. dealt with a claim for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit and held that the attempt to withdraw was to introduce an altered and new cause of action altogether shifting the very basis of the right claimed and that, therefore, the liberty could not be granted. That was a suit wherein the right of pathway was claimed in the suit filed on the basis of co-ownership and later, it was sought to be projected as an easementary right. 10. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In my view, the challenge made to the order of the court below does not merit acceptance in my hands. 10. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In my view, the challenge made to the order of the court below does not merit acceptance in my hands. No doubt, the law relating to the right to withdraw unconditionally or withdraw the suit on fulfilment of certain conditions with liberty to bring out a fresh suit on the same cause of action is governed by the provisions contained in Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C., and there is no general power in the Court to allow withdrawal except under the said Rule. As rightly contended for the first respondent plaintiff, the cause of action to claim the relief of partition arose on account of the death of Unnamalai Achi, owner of the properties. If the claim has to be sustained treating the said Unnamalai Achi as having died intestate, a particular share will be available and on testamentary disposition by the deceased, the same will depend upon the manner of devolution provided therefor, subject to the condition that the document has been proved to be a valid one binding on parties and governing their rights. The suit in question being one for partition, the cause of action is supposed to continue also till actual partition is effected and jointness of the estate is disrupted. Till such time, the cause of action is supposed to continue. Consequently, the mere fact that the inventory disclosed and resulted in the unearthing of certain documents including the one disclosing the testamentary disposition of the properti es of Unnamalai Achi, does not in any manner alter the subject matter or nature or character of the suit as such. The permission granted to withdraw with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action by the Court below, therefore, accords well with the provisions of the Code and the powers of the Court. To permit such withdrawal on the ground that “there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit on the same subject matter of the suit”, the learned Judge, in m y view, has taken into consideration all the relevant aspects of the matter. To permit such withdrawal on the ground that “there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit on the same subject matter of the suit”, the learned Judge, in m y view, has taken into consideration all the relevant aspects of the matter. The discretion exercised by the Court below in granting permission to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit on other and sufficient grounds also cannot be said to be either arbitrary or vitiated on account of any perversity of approach, justifying any interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The revision petition, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, CMP. No. 2601 of 1996 is dismissed.