JUDGMENT 1. - Since both the revision petitions are connected and arising out of a common order, passed by the learned trial court, they are being disposed of by this common order.The first revision petition No. 958/96 (titled : Ratan Kumar Malpani Vs. M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar) has been preferred to this Court against the order dated 1.6.96, passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Alwar in C.M.A. No. 6/96, whereby the said appellate court dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner/plaintiff above named against the Order dated 16.3.96, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), Alwar in C.M.A. No. 46/543/95, whereby the plaintiff's application for grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 was rejected. 2. The second revision petition No. 1000/90 (Kishan Chand Jain Vs. M/s. Bharat Cinema & Others) has been perferred to this Court against the Order dated 1.6.96, passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Alwar in C.M.A. No. 6/96, whereby the said appellate Court confirmed the order dated 16.3.96, passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) in C.M.A. No. 46/543/95, whereby the plaintiff's application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 was dismissed. 3. The grievance of the petitioner-plaintiff is that he has instituted a suit bearing No. 223/95 on 18.9.95/26.9.96 against the non-petitioner No. 1, M/s. Bharat Cinema and two others for grant of permanent injunction in the court of learned Civil Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, which was subsequently transferred to the court of learned Additional Civil Judge No. 6, Jaipur City and sought an interim direction from the learned trial court against the non-petitioners that defendants should be directed to exhibit in their cinema hall, the films, belonging to the petitioner only in view of the agreement dated 27.7.94 as referred to above. Alongwith the said suit, the plaintiff had also filed an application for grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 Civil Procedure Code with a prayer to the learned trial court for grant of interim relief against the non-petitioner No. 1, M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar from exhibiting the films of anyone else except the petitioner in view of the agreement dated 27.7.94, which was executed at the first instance during the subsistence of the contract between the petitioner M/s. S.R. Enterprises and non-petitioner No. 1 M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar. It was contended by the plaintiff-petitioner before the learned trial court that an agreement was executed between the parties i.e. the petitioner and M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar through Shri Ajeet Singh, resident of New Delhi incorporating the terms and conditions, which were duly agreed between the parties inter alia : (i) w.e.f. 5.8.94 M/s. Bharat Cinema will start exhibiting the films of the plaintiff-Vs. S.R. Enterprises, Jaipur in the cinema hall for a period of 104 weeks, i.e. for a period of 2 years at Alwar on weekly higher charges of Rs. 14,000/- subject to payment of advance at the time of signing of the agreement. (a) M/s. Bharat Cinema shall neither have the option to reduce the contractual period of 2 years as referred to above nor shall permit the exhibition of the films belonging to anyone else during the said period and that it shall be binding on M/s. Bharat Cinema to exhibit the films of plaintiff alone. (b) It was further agreed between the parties that the theatre rent for exhibiting the films of the petitioner shall be Rs. 14,000/- which shall be deposited by the petitioner with M/s. Bharat Cinema in advance per week. It was further agreed that advance amount of Rs. 4 lacs only shall be deposited by the second party i.e. the petitioner with the first party i.e. M/s. Bharat Cinema as against receipt, issued by the non-petitioner. This amount shall be subject to adjustment towards weekly theatre rent payable @ 9,000/- per week for 1st 52 weeks and Rs. 10,000/- for the next 52 weeks i.e. for 104 weeks in all. (c) It was further agreed that a sum of Rs. 51,000/- was deposited by the plaintiff with defendant-non-petitioner No. 1 through pay order dated 27.7.94 by way of security, which was refundable on the expiry of the aforesaid agreement. (d) That the period of the agreement was for 2 years commencing w.e.f. 5.8.94 to 3.8.96 and its terms were binding on the parties being irrevocable. Clause-3 of the aforesaid agreement imposes an embargo on the first party i.e. M/s. Bharat Cinema not to exhibit any picture belonging to any other party except those booked or supplied by the second party i.e. the petitioner. Clause-3 of the aforesaid agreement imposes an embargo on the first party i.e. M/s. Bharat Cinema not to exhibit any picture belonging to any other party except those booked or supplied by the second party i.e. the petitioner. (ii) The other relevant clauses of the agreement i.e. 11, 12, 13, 18, 19 & 20 are reproduced as under:- (a) That the second party or their representatives shall have power to check tickets, auditorium etc. and the first party shall fully co-operate with them in checking the auditorium, sale of tickets, publicity etc. The first party shall get verified by the second party or their representative all expenses incurred by the first party on behalf of the second party and submit these bills to the second party for payment. (b) That the first party shall maintain proper accounts of collections for each show and the same shall be open for inspection at all times by the second party or their representatives. (c) That all amount payable to the distributors shall be paid and cleared by the second party and if claim of the Distributors remain outstanding and any award of the CCCA is passed then the first party shall be entitled to deduct the outstanding share/hire accounts from the collections. The second party shall submit 'no dues' certificate from the Distributors to the first party within 90 days of the termination of the pictures. (d) That the first party hereby authorises the second party to enter into contracts with Film-Distributors on behalf of the cinema. However, the second party shall get such balance contracts cancelled on expiry of the period of this Agreement. If the second party fails to get the contracts cancelled the first party shall screen such films in account of the second party. (e) That if any breach is intended by the first party in respect of clause 3 above the second party shall have an option to get injunction against the first party restraining it from committing breach of contract from a Civil Court in Jaipur. (f) That in the event of any dispute or differences or question touching this agreement, arising between the parties except clauses Nos. (f) That in the event of any dispute or differences or question touching this agreement, arising between the parties except clauses Nos. 18 & 19 the same shall be preferred to the arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party and in the event of disagreement between the arbitrators to an umpire to be appointed by the Arbitrators, before entering upon the reference as per Arbitration Act. If any party fails to nominate any arbitrator within 15 days of the intimation for appointment, the arbitrator appointed by the other party will have jurisdiction to arbitrate. The sitting place of the arbitrators shall be at Jaipur and in all cases the jurisdiction of the Court shall be at Jaipur only. 4. The perusal of the aforesaid relevant clauses of the greement reveal that in the event of any breach of the terms and conditions of the said agreement committed by the first party, the second party i.e. the petitioner was within his rights to move to the Civil Court to bet an injunction order against the first party with a view to restrain it from committing breach of the contract from any competent Civil Court at Jaipur. 5. That in accordance with the aforesaid terms and conditions of the agreement dated 27.7.94 as referred to above the 1st party M/s. Bharat Cinema had started exhibiting films of the second party viz. M/s. S.R. Enterprises w.e.f. 5.8.94. However, during the subsistence of the agreement and with the sole intention of causing unlawful loss to the petitioner and unlawful gain to itself M/s. Bharat Cinema in collusion with Kishan Chand Jain of M/s. Jai Kali Devi Films, M.I. Road, Jaipur (N.P. No.3) and in breach of the agreement and in violation of the terms and conditions as referred to above suddenly started exhibiting the films of N.P. No. 3 by suspending the exhibition of the films of the petitioner on its cinema hall. it is under these circumstances that the petitioner-plaintiff was constrained to file the aforesaid suit in the court of learned Civil Judge at Jaipur. 6. it is under these circumstances that the petitioner-plaintiff was constrained to file the aforesaid suit in the court of learned Civil Judge at Jaipur. 6. It has further been contended in the plaint that so far as the plaintiff is concerned, he had complied with all the terms and conditions of the agreement as referred to above and its non-compliance was on the part of the M/s. Bharat Cinema, who had caused substantial loss to the petitioner on account of which he was left with no option but to file the aforesaid suit in the Court of learned Civil Judge at Jaipur. The plaintiff had further prayed to the learned trial court that the Non-Petitioner No. 1 should be restrained by means of interim injunction from exhibiting the films of any other party except that of the petitioner during the subsistence of the period of agreement as referred to above. On 29.9.95, the learned trial court, Jaipur passed an interim order in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner by restraining the defendant-non petitioners from exhibiting the films of any other party in their cinema hall at Alwar except those belonging to that of the petitioner in view of the agreement dated 27.7.94. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit at Jaipur N.P. No. 3, Kishan Chand Jain of M/s. Kaila Devi Films, Jaipur filed an another Civil Suit (Second suit) against the petitioner M/s. Bharat Cinema at Alwar in the Court of learned Civil Judge (J.D.) at Alwar on 4.10.95, in which he impleaded M/s. Bharat Cinema Alwar and its manager as defendant Nos. 1 & 2, respectively for the relief of permanent injunction by restraining M/s. Bharat Cinema from exhibiting the films of anyone else except that of the plaintiff in view of the agreement dated 13.9.95 (second agreement) allegedly executed between M/s Bharat Cinema and the plaintiff Kishan Chand Jain during the subsistence of the earlier agreement dated 27.7.94 between M/s. Bharat Cinema and M/s. S.R. Enterprises as referred to above. It has been contended by the petitioner that the aforesaid second suit was obviously a collusive suit between Kishan Chand Jain and M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar in which the plaintiff had deliberately concealed the fact of the earlier suit, which was pending between the parties before learned Civil Judge at Jaipur and in which an interim order had already been passed by the learned trial court at Jaipur on 29.9.95, restraining the defendants M/s. Bharat Cinema from exhibiting the films of anyone else except that of the plaintiff M/s. S.R. Enterprises in view of the first agreement dated 27.7.94, which was valid, lawful and irrevocable and hence binding on the parties. 7. The perusal of the record, which was summoned by this Court also reveals that on 29.9.95 when the aforesaid interim order was passed by the learned Civil Judge at Jaipur, the trial court had specifically observed that before passing the interim order, the notices were sent for effecting service on Kishan Chand Jain (N.P. No. 3) and the refusal report was sent to the trial court by the process server. In view of the refusal to accept notices, the notices were pasted on the outer wall of residence of the said non-petitioner on the basis of which the trial court arrived at the conclusion that the substituted service was effected lawfully on the said non-petitioner and that the service was deemed to be valid, lawful and proper. This obviously shows the mala fide conduct of the non-petitioner No. 3, who deliberately wanted to avoid the service of notices, issued by the learned Civil Judge at Jaipur since his sole intention was not only to avoid by defaulting his appearance before the said court at Jaipur but had also filed a collusive suit with M/s. Bharat Cinema at Alwar by deliberately not impleading the petitioner as a party-defendant to the suit and also to conceal the fact of the interim order passed earlier by the learned trial court at Jaipur, it was under the aforesaid circumstances that the learned Civil Judge at Jaipur had restrained the non-petitioners from exhibiting films belonging to any other party in the cinema hall at Alwar except that of the petitioner till further orders. The notices were also sent by registered A.D. on the non-petitioners. 8. The notices were also sent by registered A.D. on the non-petitioners. 8. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a caveat at Alwar before the Civil Court was also filed by M/s. Bharat Cinema in the aforesaid second suit, filed by N.P. No. 3, Kishan Chand Jain (plaintiff in the second suit), which obviously proved collusiveness between plaintiff and M/s. Bharat Cinema and in which the petitioner M/s. S.R. Enterprises (plaintiff in the first suit at Jaipur) was deliberaty not impleaded as a party-defendant being a necessary party to the suit. This was done purposely with a view to frustrate the first agreement lawfully executed between the parties w.e.f. 27.7.94 and also with a view to frustrate the interim order, which had been passed by the learned trial court at Jaipur on 29.9.95 as referred to above and also with a view to overcome and overreach the process of law. In the second suit, injunction order was obtained by Mr. Kishan Chand Jain (N.P. No. 3) from the Civil Judge, Alwar with a view to frustrate the earlier order obtained by the petitioner from the Civil Court at Jaipur as referred to above. 9. The terms and conditions of the second agreement are pari materia the same as of the first agreement and the only difference was that the second agreement was for a period of one year i.e. for 53 weeks w.e.f. 14th September, 1995 with the option to the parties to extend the same after mutual negotiations. In the second agreement, the word irrevocable is also mentioned as in the first agreement. The first agreement was for a period of 104 weeks w.e.f. 27.7.94 irrevocably, whereas the second agreement is for a period of 3 weeks w.e.f. 13.9.95 and was effective for one year only. 10. During the course of hearing, it was contended by Shri A.K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner that it is under the aforesaid circumstances and in violation and breach of the first agreement dated 27.7.94, which was lawfully executed between M/s. Bharat Cinema and the petitioner M/s. S.R. Enterprises, which was irrevocable and binding on the parties during the period 5.8.94 to 4.8.96 that the petitioner was constrained to file a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants initially at Jaipur and which was subsequently transferred and consolidated with the Civil Suit at Alwar. 11. 11. That the non-petitioner No. 3 during the subsistence of the aforesaid circumstances and in breach of Clause 19 of the agreement entered into a collusive agreement (second agreement) on 13.9.95, which was executed between M/s. Bharat Cinema with Kishan Chand Jain N.P. No. 3 during the subsistence of the earlier agreement. 12. Perusal of the summoned record also reveals that as soon as the petitioner became aware of the aforesaid breach, he immediately and telegraphically communicated his prejudice with the N.P. No. 3 and the said telegram was replied by the said non-petitioner on 14.9.95 itself by a registered letter not only denying the registered telegram but also conveying therein that although they have started exhibiting another film "Farishte", but it is not in violation of the terms of the agreement and they have absolutely no intention of violating the terms of first agreement and surely within a period of 10-15 days after screening the two-three fims, the said non-petitioner will start exhibiting the films of the petitioner. In this regard, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the perusal of the said reply of M/s. Bharat Cinema clearly establishes the violation of the agreement committed by N.P. No. 3 and hence the petitioner was within his rights to institute the aforesaid suit at Jaipur with a view to restrain the non-petitioner from exhibiting any other films with any other party since the terms of the first agreement were irrevocable binding on them. This was followed by another letter dated 14.9.95, which was received by the petitioner from M/s. Bharat Cinema, the perusal of which again reveals the breach of the terms of the first agreement. 13. That during the pendency of the first writ, instituted in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Jaipur City, Jaipur, the second suit for permanent injunction (bearing No. 709/95, titled : Kishan Chand Vs. 13. That during the pendency of the first writ, instituted in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Jaipur City, Jaipur, the second suit for permanent injunction (bearing No. 709/95, titled : Kishan Chand Vs. Bharat Cinema) was filed in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Alwar by Kishan Chand (N.P. No. 3), in which the plaintiff had prayed for decree of permanent injunction against M/s. Bharat Cinema in respect of the said cinema hall and had further prayed for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 Civil Procedure Code, as soon as the petitioner became aware regarding the second suit, which was filed collusively by the aforesaid plaintiff, the petitioner immediately filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code in the said second suit in the Court of learned Civil Judge (J.D.) at Alwar for impleading him as a party-defendant in the suit. The petitioner highlighted all the aforesaid circumstances and the learned Civil Judge, Alwar after hearing the parties allowed the petitioner's request by impleading him as a party in the said suit. Aggrieved by the said order, plaintiff Kishan Chand filed a Civil Revision before this Court vide S.B.C.R. No. 1405/95 (titled : Kishan Chand Vs. M/s. Bharat Cinema). 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and examined the rival claims and contentions as well as the documents placed on the record. 15. Prima facie, I am of the view that since the first agreement dated 27.7.94, executed between M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar and M/s. S.R. Enterprises, Jaipur through Shri R.K. Malpani, Jaipur (viz. the petitioner in S.B.C.R. Petition No. 958/96) irrevocably, it was binding on the parties for a period of 104 weeks w.e.f. 5.8.94 to 3.8.96. As a matter of fact, it was the bounden duty of M/s. Bharat Cinema to have honoured the said agreement in its letter and spirit rather than having committed a breach of the same by executing a second agreement collusively with Kishan Chand Jain (N.P. No. 3) in the aforesaid revision petition. In my view the binding nature of the agreement is highlighted by the parties by adding the word 'irrevocably'. 16. In my view the binding nature of the agreement is highlighted by the parties by adding the word 'irrevocably'. 16. I am of the view that if it was done then it was not open to M/s. Bharat Cinema to have executed the second agreement during the subsistence of the first agreement, which too was made irrevocable, if the first agreement was irrevocable and binding between the parties for a period of two years as aforesaid, then low could M/s. Bharat Cinema during the subsistence of the first agreement could have entered into a second agreement, which too was made irrevocable for a period of one year as aforesaid. It obviously shows the mala fide intentions of M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar, who had not only committed breach of the first agreement with M/s. S.R. Enterprises but had also collusively entered into a second agreement with Kishan Chand Jain during the subsistence of the earlier agreement and which fact has apparently not been noticed by the courts below, while declining the relief of interim injunction to the petitioner Mr. R.K. Malpani of M/s S.R. Enterprises (S.B.C.R. No. 958/96). 17. I am further of the opinion that since the petitioner had succeeded in making out a prima facie case before the learned Civil Judge at Jaipur in the earlier suit, filed at Jaipur and which was subsequently transferred to Alwar pursuant to the orders of this Court as referred to above, the interim order dated 29.9.95, passed by the learned Civil Judge at Jaipur deserves to be confirmed and maintained during the pendency of the said suit and there was no justification to vacate the said interim order subsequently. This has resulted in unlawful loss to the petitioner and unlawful gain to the respondents M/s. Bharat Cinema, who had the double advantage of taking advances of substantial amounts as referred to in the two agreements from both the parties and then committing breach of the said agreements by not accepting their films during the duration of the agreements as referred as referred to above. 18. 18. Shri S.M. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent (M/s. Bharat Cinema) has contended at the bar that the suit for injunction, filed by the petitioner at Jaipur was not maintainable in view of the fact that the petitioner had alternative remedy of claiming damages against the non-petitioner if so aggrieved and the relief of injunction was rightly declined by the learned trial court. He has further contended at the bar that revision petition not maintainable in view of the concurrent findings of both the courts below and the revisional jurisdiction should not have been invoked by the petitioner in this case. Learned counsel for the respondent has further contended at the bar that since there was no illegality, impropriety or jurisdictional error, committed by the courts below while declining the relief of injunction in both the suits, the revision petitions are not maintainable. I am of the opinion, that the courts below have apparently failed to notice the collusive nature of the second suit, filed by Kishan Chand against the M/s. Bharat Cinema and others at Alwar during the pendency of the earlier suit which was filed by the petitioner at Jaipur and this fact was deliberately concealed and not brought to the notice of the learned Civil Judge at Alwar by not impleading the petitioner as co-defendant in the second suit. If the petitioner had not brought this fact to the notice of the learned trial court at Alwar by moving an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, for his impleadment as a necessary party to the suit and subsequently before this Court by way of revision petition and this would have resulted in conflicting orders being passed by the courts. 19. In support of his contentions, advanced at the bar, learned counsel for the petitioner Shri R.K. Agrawal has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (1) AIR 1993 Supreme Court C. (Vol. 4) page 595 titled : S. Nagaraj & others Vs. State of Karnataka and another. (2) AIR 1987 Supreme Court page 2179 titled : Vinod Kumar Arora Vs. Smt. Surjit Kaur. (3) AIR 1988 (Vol. 75) page 312 Calcutta, titled : Sailen Seth Vs. Still Authority of India Limited and others. (4) JT 1995(8) S.C. 81 Page 283 titled : Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab. (5) AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853 titled : S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Smt. Surjit Kaur. (3) AIR 1988 (Vol. 75) page 312 Calcutta, titled : Sailen Seth Vs. Still Authority of India Limited and others. (4) JT 1995(8) S.C. 81 Page 283 titled : Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab. (5) AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853 titled : S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others. (6) AIR 1983 Delhi page 392 titled : M/s. Magnum Films and another Vs. Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd. (1) In the matter of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others (supra), the question, which had arisen for consideration before the Apex Court was as to where in a case the proceedings in the court were vitiated by fraud perpetrated by a litigant, whether he could be entitled to any relief : 20. It was held by the Apex Court with reference to the relevant provisions of the Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), Section 44, that with holding of vital documents relevant to the litigation amounted to fraud on the Court and guilty party was liable to be thrown-out at any stage. In this case, the guilty party had obtained preliminary decree for partition of the property by suppressing material facts from the notice of the trial court. The said party had not informed the learned trial court regarding his having executed a release deed prior to the filing of the suit. The Apex Court while reversing the decision of the High Court observed that "The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. It can be said without hesitation that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown-out at any stage of the litigation. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him, which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the courts as well as on the opposite party." (2) In the matter of Vinod Kumar Arora Vs. Smt. Surjit Kaur (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that in the appropriate cases, the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court Under Section 115. Smt. Surjit Kaur (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that in the appropriate cases, the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court Under Section 115. Civil Procedure Code will be fully justified when the findings recorded by the courts below are splendour and suffer from inherent infirmities and when they are based on conjectures and surmises, where the courts below have failed to consider the relevant pieces of evidence, which have been controverted. It has further been held by the Apex Court that the pleadings of the parties formed the foundation of their case and it was not open to them to set up the case set-out in the pleadings and pronounced a new and different case. (3) In the matter of Sailen Seth Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and others (supra), the question which had arisen before the Calcutta High Court was regarding the maintainability of a suit for declaration the maintainability of a suit for declaration and permanent injunction notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy of compensation by way of damages. It was held by the High Court while distinguishing the Judgment of the Apex Court in the AIR 1983 Supreme Court page 1272, that the suit has framed was maintainable as the compensation in money value could not be the adequate relief for breach of the contract. It could not, therefore, be said that Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act prima facie bars the institution of the suit. (4) In the matter of Magnum Films and another Vs. Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), it was held by the Delhi High Court that a temporary injunction can be issued only in case of extreme hardship and compelling circumstances and mostly in those cases, when status quo existing on the date of institution of the suit is to be restored. 21. It was further held by the Apex Court that such it judgment/decree passed by the First Court or by the Highest Court it has to be treated as a nullity by every court whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. 22. 21. It was further held by the Apex Court that such it judgment/decree passed by the First Court or by the Highest Court it has to be treated as a nullity by every court whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. 22. Applying to the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court as well as the High Court to the instant case, I am of the considered opinion that M/s. Bharat Cinema (N.P. No. 1) in collusion with N.P. No. 3, Kishan Chand Jain had deliberately not brought the notice of learned Civil Judge, Alwar that the fact regarding the execution of the earlier agreement between M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar and the petitioner, which was executed on 27.7.94 was irrevocable and binding on the parties for a period of 2 years. As a result of suppression of this material fact, the learned Civil Judge (J.D.) at Alwar had passed the interim order in favour of the plaintiff (Kishan Chand Jain) in the second suit notwithstanding the pendency of the earlier suit, between the same parties, which was pending before learned Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) at Jaipur and was also suppressed, which resulted in passing the interim order by the said court at Alwar, which has subsequently been vacated notwithstanding the interim order dated 29.9.95, which was duly communicated to M/s. Bharat Cinema by the petitioner telegraphically, the plaintiff obtained a stay order from the Civil Court Alwar on the basis of the collusive agreement with N.P. No.3 as referred to above. 23. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the following judgments: (1) AIR 1971 (Vol. 58) page 202 titled : Ramchandra Tanwar Vs. M/s. Ram Rakhmal Amichand and another. (2) AIR 1929, Privy Council page 190 titled : Ramji Patel Vs. Rao Kishore Singh. (3) AIR 1979, Calcutta 324 titled : Calcutta Construction Investment Corporation Vs. Shekhar Chand Law and another. (4) AIR 1954 SC, page 956 (5) AIR 1966, S.C. page 153 & 439 titled : Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others Vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav and others. & titled : Ratilal Balabhai Nazar Vs. Ranchhodbhai Shankarbhai Patel and another. (6) AIR 1971 Supreme Court page 2324 titled : M/s. D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sarup Singh and others. (7) AIR 1972, S.C. page 2379 titled : Shri M.L. Sethi, Vs. Shri R.P. Kapur. Maruti Hari Jadhav and others. & titled : Ratilal Balabhai Nazar Vs. Ranchhodbhai Shankarbhai Patel and another. (6) AIR 1971 Supreme Court page 2324 titled : M/s. D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sarup Singh and others. (7) AIR 1972, S.C. page 2379 titled : Shri M.L. Sethi, Vs. Shri R.P. Kapur. (8) AIR 1973 Supreme Court page 76 titled : The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and another Vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores), Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad. (9) AIR 1984 Supreme Court page 1894 M/s. Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill and Ginning Factory and another Vs. Yograj singh Shankershinhan Parihar and another. (10) AIR 1987 Supreme Court page 2179 Vinod Kumar Arora Vs. Smt. Surjit Kaur. (11) AIR 1994 Supreme Court page 853 S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others. (12) AIR 1983 Supreme Court Page 392 M/s. Magnum Films and another Vs. Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd. (13) AIR 1988 (Vol. 75) page 312 Calcutta titled : Sailen Seth Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others. (14) AIR 1986 Orissa page 22 titled : M/s. Misra and Company Vs. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and others. (15) Specific Relief Act (16) 1991 (Vol. 1) S.C.C. (17) 1984 S.C. page 143. 24. I have examined the above cases and I am of the opinion that the ratio of the aforesaid decisions are not applicable to this case in view of the observations as referred to above. As a result of the above decision I am of the view that the petitioner in S.B.C. Revision Pt. No. 958/96 deserves to succeed. 25. As a result of this the impugned order dated 1.6.96 passed by the learned A.D.J. No. 3, Alwar in C.M.A. No. 5/96 (titled : Ratan Kumar Malpani Vs. Shri Kishan Chand Jain) arising out of the order dated 16.3.96 of learned Civil Judge (J.D.) Alwar in C.M.A. No. 46/543/95 is quashed and set aside. As a result, the interim order dated 29.5.95, passed by the learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Jaipur is restored and shall remain operative, pending the hearing and disposal of both the suits, before the learned Civil Judge (J.D.) at Alwar. 26. The Civil Revision Petition No. 1000/96 (titled : Kishan Chand Vs. As a result, the interim order dated 29.5.95, passed by the learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Jaipur is restored and shall remain operative, pending the hearing and disposal of both the suits, before the learned Civil Judge (J.D.) at Alwar. 26. The Civil Revision Petition No. 1000/96 (titled : Kishan Chand Vs. M/s. Bharat Cinema and another) arising out of the C.M.A. No. 6/96 confirming the order dated 16.3.96 of learned Civil Judge (J.D.) Alwar is dismissed. 27. It is further directed that the rights and obligation of the parties arising out of the first agreement dated 27.7.94 shall remain operative and binding for the remaining period of the said agreement and shall be duly honoured and implemented by the first party to the agreement i.e. M/s Bharat Cinema, Alwar. 28. It is further directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to get his films exhibited in the cinema hall of M/s. Bharat Cinema, Alwar for the remaining period of the agreement of which breach was committed by M/s. Bharat Cinema. The petitioner shall also be entitled to be suitably compensated on account of breach of the agreement by M/s. Bharat Cinema, which may be assessed by the parties accordingly. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. 29. The summoned record of the trial court be sent back immediately. The trial Court is further directed to deal with and decide the pending suits expeditiously and possibly with a period of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.Revision No. 958/96 allowed. *******