J. ESWARA PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANTS 1 and 2 in original suit No. 142 of 1989 before the court of munsiff, bailhongal are the appellants. The first respondent filed the suit for declaration of title to the suit properties and for injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with his right therein and for mesne profits. The trial court decreed the suit and the appeal filed by the present appellants was dismissed by the principal civil judge, bailhongal, in regular appeal No. 15 of 1991. ( 2 ) THE first respondent filed the suit claiming that his grandfather namely, channabasappa, got 1/3rd share in the partition between his brothers gadigeppa and basavannappa and thereafter, his mother neelawwa continued to be in possession of 1/3rd share. Further contention was that in view of Section 14 of the hindu succession Act, 1956, his mother perfected her title to the suit properties. The suit was contested by the appellants on the ground that channabasappa was living separately from the other brothers and that he had no claim in the suit properties. It was their further contention that neelawwa had no pre-existing claim of right for maintenance and therefore, Section 14 (1) had no application. ( 3 ) THE trial court found that neelawwa is the absolute owner of the suit properties by virtue of Section 14 (1) of hindu Succession Act; that the first respondent is the sole heir of neelawwa and that he was in possession of the suit properties; that the plaintiff established his title. The suit for possession was decreed and enquiry into mesne profits was directed. The appellate court confirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal filed by the present appellants. ( 4 ) SRI g. Balakrishna shastry, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, contended that channabasappa separated from the rest of the coparceners and that there is no evidence to show that the suit properties fell to his share. It was nextly contended that there was no pre-existing right for maintenance and therefore, settlement of suit properties of neelawwa during her lifetime was valid only during her lifetime and had to revert to the defendants. It was nextly contended that there was no pre-existing right for maintenance and therefore, settlement of suit properties of neelawwa during her lifetime was valid only during her lifetime and had to revert to the defendants. ( 5 ) THOUGH there is no evidence to show that the suit property fell to the share of channabasappa during the partition as alleged by the plaintiff, it is to be seen that under exhibit d-1, a registered partition deed dated 17-11-1954, the suit properties were given to neelawwa in lieu of maintenance, to be enjoyed during her lifetime. The contention of Sri g. Balakrishna shastry is that Section 14 (2) of the hindu Succession Act is attracted and neelawwa did not become the absolute owner by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the act. ( 6 ) TO appreciate his argument, it is necessary to extract Section 14 of the hindu Succession Act. "14. (i) any property possessed by a female hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation. in this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this act. (2) nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument of the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property". from a reading of explanation to Section 14 (1) of the Act, it is clear that any property possessed by a female hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, will be held by her as an absolute owner and not as a limited owner. from a reading of explanation to Section 14 (1) of the Act, it is clear that any property possessed by a female hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, will be held by her as an absolute owner and not as a limited owner. The explanation makes it clear that the property in sub-section (1) includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or in any other manner whatsoever. ( 7 ) EXHIBIT d-1, partition deed, makes it clear that the suit properties were given to neelawwa in lieu of maintenance for being enjoyed by her during her lifetime. Even though the suit properties were given to neelawwa by virtue of a registered document, it is to be noted that the properties were given to her for being enjoyed in lieu of maintenance. Therefore, the property acquired by neelawwa was given to her in lieu of maintenance. Admittedly, the suit properties were possessed by neelawwa as a limited owner on the date of commencement of the act. By virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 14, the suit properties which were possessed by neelawwa became her absolute property and she became full owner thereto. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel, relying on a decision in Kothi Satyanarayana v Galla Sithayya and others, contended that Section 14 (2) is attracted to the facts of the case as the property was given to neelawwa to be enjoyed during her lifetime after the partition between the brt thers and therefore, suit properties have to revert to the defendants. The facts of that case are totally different from the facts of this case. By virtue of a deed of settlement, certain properties were settled on the widow with life interest and it was mentioned in the settlement deed that after the death of the widow, the properties were to revert to the reversioners. It was held by the Supreme Court that the settlement deed is an instrument contemplated under sub-section (2) which admittedly created a restricted estate in favour of the widow and hence, sub-section (1) of Section 14 would not be attracted. In the present case, properties were given to neelawwa in lieu of maintenance under the partition deed, exhibit d-1. It was held by the Supreme Court that the settlement deed is an instrument contemplated under sub-section (2) which admittedly created a restricted estate in favour of the widow and hence, sub-section (1) of Section 14 would not be attracted. In the present case, properties were given to neelawwa in lieu of maintenance under the partition deed, exhibit d-1. Therefore, it is clear that the property possessed by neelawwa falls within sub-section (1) of Section 14 and does not fall under sub-section (2 ). ( 9 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, it is to be held that the courts below were correct in decreeing the suit. Appeal is therefore dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .