JUDGMENT 1. 1. This revision petition has been preferred to this Court against the order dated 8.1.96 passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas distt. Alwar, whereby the said appellate court had confirmed the order dated 27.5.1995 of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division in Civil Misc. Application No. 23/95 in Civil Suit No. 91/95. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the plaintiff-petitioners have come up in revision before this Court. 2. The case of the petitioners in short is that the petitioners had filed a civil suit for injunction against the defendant-non-petitioners in the court of learned Civil Judge Senior Division Kishangarh Bas, Alwar on 7th April, 1995 contending inter alia that plaintiff-petitioner No. 1 company is engaged in the manufacture of condensor coils, evaporator coils and heat exchangers for air conditioning and refrigeration equipments including room air conditioners, automobile air conditioners, air conditioning plants and refrigeration cooling plants etc. It was further stated in the plaint that the aforesaid components used for manufacture of air conditioners are second most essential components after the compressor. Prior to the year 1989 the said components were manufactured by the petitioner No. 2-M/s. Fedders Loyed Corporation Ltd., New Delhi. In the year 1987 with the object of setting up of a high technical automatic plant for the manufacture of the aforesaid components, factory was established at Bhiwadi and petitioner No. 1 emerged as one of the largest manufacturers of coils in the country and came to hold 30% to 35% of shares in the market of all leading manufacturers of air-conditioners. 3. In the year 1986 defendant non-petitioner No. 1, Dr. R.K. Malhotra, was appointed as General Manager (Manufacturing) of petitioner No. 2. Prior to his appointment he was not having any experience as stated by the petitioner in the manufacture of coils and in refrigeration/air-conditioning. As a General Manager of the company respondent No. 1 was entrusted with the work of coordinating with marketing and service division, improving the existing models and developing the new models of the products. Thus in due course of his tenure he became over all in-charge of the company and also had access to the confidential and valuable details, datas, designs, drawings, documents and trade secrets of the company. Thus in due course of his tenure he became over all in-charge of the company and also had access to the confidential and valuable details, datas, designs, drawings, documents and trade secrets of the company. Subsequently non-petitioner No. 1 was promoted on the prestigious post of President of petitioner No. 1 w.e.f. 1.7.93 and thus he came to occupy the most coveted post in the company. During the course of his employment as President he was also sent to U.S.A. in January, 1994 and incurred huge expenditure of the company on his trip. Soon after his return from U.S.A. petitioner No. 1 came to know that non-petitioner No. 1 did all the spade work for establishment of a factory as a rival competitor against the petitioner by setting up a factory in very close vicinity of the petitioner at Alwar rather than promoting the business interest of the petitioner. It has been contended that in further promotion of his aforesaid business interest the said non-petitioner had conspired and colluded with non-petitioner No. 2, S. Srinivasan, who was serving as Deputy General Manager (Works) and Mr. Anand Sharma, Assistant Manager (Production) of petitioner No. 1 with the sole object of setting up a separate unit, i.e., M/s Spirotech Exchangers non-petitioner No. 3, for manufacturing those very products which are being manufactured by the petitioners as immediate rivals and competitors of the petitioners' business. 4. It has been further contended that the aforesaid persons procured relevant document of all technical dates, specifications, designs, drawings and information relating to manufacturing of coils and other particulars relating to various components of refrigeration and air-conditioning and also collected all relevant information of suppliers and customers of the petitioners. 5. In the above circumstances non-petitioner No. 1, Dr. R.K. Malhotra, feeling ashamed of his conduct stopped coming and attending his office in the company and furnished an undertaking on 11..5.94/8.6.94 to petitioner No. 1 to the following effect : "As I am no more in the employment of the Company I hereby undertake not to make use of designs, drawings and other intellectual property of the company either directly or indirectly for benefit of competitors of the company. I hereby also undertake not to compete with the company either directly or indirectly in the next three years." Likewise non-petitioner No. 2, S. Srinivasan, also furnished an undertaking on 11.5.94/2.6.94 in favour of petitioner company which was to the following effect : "As I am no more in the employment of company, I undertake not to use directly or indirectly all the information, drawings, know-how, intellectual property right of the products manufactured viz. coils which I was previliged to know in service. I further undertake not to pass on the information to any competitors in the above field". 6. It has been further contended on behalf of the, petitioners that both the employees of the company viz. Dr. R.K. Malhotra and S. Srinivasan soon after their having furnished undertakings as aforesaid suddenly and without obtaining the prior permission or consent of their employer stopped coming to the office of the company and also stopped performing their duties assigned to them by the company with the result that the petitioner was not only taken by surprise as there was no termination of their services by petitioner no. 1 and hence the only logical inference which can be drawn against the said employees was that it was a voluntary abandonment of service on their part, since the petitioner had neither compelled them to leave their offices nor had compelled them to abandon their duties in the circumstances as referred to above. Both the employees had significantly chosen and decided voluntarily of their own accord to abstain from attending their duties assigned to them by the petitioner company which in fact amounted to voluntary abandonment of service by the said employees and which could not be construed as exercise of duress, coercion or undue influence on the part of the company. It is under the above circumstances that the petitioners have contended that defendant-non-petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 not only worked for their personal gain and advantage with a view to promote their own business in the industry which they had set up as rival competitors of the petitioners with a view to cause unlawful gain to themselves and unlawful loss to the petitioners, since they continued to be in the employment of the petitioners and had no right or justification to set up the separate business in the manner in which they had done as afore stated. It has further been contended by the petitioners that defendant-non-petitioners had during the aforesaid period of their abandonment of their service and the period intervening the setting up of their own industrial unit in rival competition with the petitioners had surreptitiously procured valuable information unlawfully from the petitioner's company, i.e. technical datas, designs, drawings and other technical knowhow, information and trade secrets of the suppliers and customers relating to the manufacture and production of the air-conditioning coils, evaporator coils and other, components deployed in the manufacture of air-conditioners and refrigeration in which plaintiff-petitioners had obtained remarkable position on the basis of the good will set up by them in the market during the long duration of 35 years which fact is evident from the position that the day on which non-petitioners Nos. 1 & 2 abandoned the service of the company, on the very same day they applied to the Registrar of the companies for registration of their company for production and manufacture of air-conditioning and refrigeration equipments of which they had acquired sufficient expertise and technical knowhow as referred to above which not only amounted to an act of betrayal on their part towards the employer, i.e. petitioners company but also amounted to serious breach and the violation of undertakings furnished by them as referred to above to their employer, i.e. petitioner No. 1 on 11.5.94/8.6.94 and 11.5.94/2.6.94 respectively. Significantly the non-petitioners had established their factory/unit with a view to manufacture the same products and components involved for the manufacture of air-conditioners and refrigeration equipments in respect of which they had acquired technical know-how and data on the basis of experience which they had acquired in the course of employment of the petitioner company and set up their factory in the close proximity of the petitioners' company at Bhiwadi Distt. Alwar. 7. It has further been contended by the petitioners that thus they entertained reasonable apprehension that in the manner and circumstances in which the aforesaid non-petitioners had wilfully left their duties without obtaining any prior permission of the employer by setting up a rival business unit in the circumstances as aforesaid, the plaintiff-petitioners were constrained to file a suit for permanent injunction against the non-petitioner nos. 1 & 2 and their company non-petitioner no. 1 & 2 and their company non-petitioner no. 3 with a prayer to the learned trial court for issuance of immediate interim-injunction that during the pendency of the suit the said defendants be restrained to compete with the plaintiffs directly or indirectly for a period of 3 years as undertaken by them in their undertakings as aforesaid. The injunction application was heard and dismissed by the learned Civil Judge Sr. Division vide his order dated 27.5.95 in civil misc. application No. 23/95 as referred to above. Being aggrieved an appeal was preferred before the learned Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas, District Alwar which too came to be dismissed vide order dated 8.1.1996. 8. The plaintiff-petitioners being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 27.5.95 and 8.1.96 have preferred the present revision petition to this court on the grounds inter alia : (a) that the impugned orders referred to above are contrary to the law and facts on the record. (b) that the learned courts below have committed illegality in having failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by law. (c) that the courts below have exercised the jurisdiction not vested in them by law. (d) that the courts below have failed to appreciate that the loss suffered by the petitioners if the impugned order is allowed to stand, cannot be compensated by way of damages or money as so observed by the courts below. (e) if the impugned orders are allowed to stand it would result in miscarriage of justice. (f) that the courts below have committed error of law in holding that the injunction cannot be granted in view of the undertakings furnished by the non-petitioners as the same would be void being hit by Section 27 of the Contract Act. (g) that the courts below have grossly erred in not examining the validity of the aforesaid undertakings furnished by the said employees to their employer in their true perspective because post-service negative covenants have been held to be valid by the Apex Court and enforceable by the employer qua the employee in its latest pronouncement with a view to safeguard the rights and interests of the employers. The negative covenants cannot per se be held to be void for the reason that they come within the ambit of exception to Section 27 of the Contract Act, since the employer is within his rights to impose such reasonable restrictions on his employees, which may be justified for the protection of his business and the good will which he has earned by reason of his well establishment. (h) The courts below have not taken into consideration that the restrictions imposed by the employer company were only to operate for a limited period of three years w.e.f. the date of the employees having furnished their undertakings and immediately on the expiry of period of undertaking the said employees were free to operate their separate unit and industry which had been set up by them. 9. Apart from the contentions advanced in support of grounds taken by the petitioners in their memo of revision as referred to above, learned counsel for the petitioners has further contended at the bar that the courts below have committed grave illegality in not appreciating that the undertakings executed by the non-petitioners were valid documents of binding nature and sufficient to establish prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners particularly when the defendant-non-petitioners had not specifically denied the execution of the said undertakings and had rather admitted the execution thereof.It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the courts below have grossly erred in not appreciating that the undertakings dated 11.5.1994 were validly executed documents and sufficient to establish prima facie case of the plaintiffs, specially when the defendant Nos. 1 & 2 have admitted the fact of execution of the same. Hence the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that keeping in view the background and the context in which the aforesaid undertakings were executed and duly furnished by the non-petitioners to the petitioner company merit consideration and the same are binding on the said non-petitioners and rather there is no escape route from the said undertakings which are in all probability binding on the said non-petitioners. Moreover the said undertakings were executed by them during the course of their employment and in discharge of their duties to their employer viz. petitioner No. 1. As a matter of fact. the said undertakings furnished is a proof of binding nature in discharge of contractual obligations of the employee towards the employer. Moreover the said undertakings were executed by them during the course of their employment and in discharge of their duties to their employer viz. petitioner No. 1. As a matter of fact. the said undertakings furnished is a proof of binding nature in discharge of contractual obligations of the employee towards the employer. 10. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioners further contended at the bar that the learned courts below have grossly overlooked the aforesaid aspect of the matter that the undertaking dated 11.5.94 was validly executed document and was sufficient to establish prima facie ease in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners particularly when defendant Nos. 1 & 2 have admitted the execution of the same. Thus all the necessary ingredients to restrain the non-petitioners in view of the undertakings furnished by them were present in this case and it was incumbent upon the trial court to have restrained the non-petitioners by way of an interim measure not to make use of the designs, drawings, and other intellectual property of the company either directly or indirectly for the benefit of the competitors of the petitioner company and further not to compete with the petitioner company directly or indirectly during the period of said undertakings. 11. While repelling the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the non-petitioners, contended that the undertakings were furnished by the non-petitioners under coercion and unlawful influence of the petitioners, Shri Sudhanshu Kasliwal learned counsel for the petitioners while controverting this contention of the respondents' counsel contended at the bar that there could be no question of either compulsion, exercise of undue influence or duress in this case particularly when both the non-petitioners are intellectual persons and being in senior managerial position of management could not be expected to either yield or succumb to any pressure or undue influence as referred to above since they were free to exercise their discretion in this matter and if it did not suit them, then they could not be bound down by the employer to execute the said undertakings since they could have gladly refused to execute the said undertakings. Once having executed the aforesaid undertakings they were under an obligation to the employer not to violate the same during the period the undertakings remained in force and the petitioner company is within its lawful rights to enforce the said undertakings against the non-petitioners who are bound by the terms and conditions of the same. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that assuming though not admitting the contention of the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, even then the same cannot be accepted as gospel truth by this court for the simple reason that there is no iota of evidence furnished by the non-petitioners on the record regarding their having lodged any protest against the undertakings furnished by them towards their employer either in the shape of any representation to the employer that the undertakings were recorded under coercion or under compelling circumstances and further even more no letter of protest or even F.I.R. by the non-petitioners is on the record which would justify the truthfulness of the aforesaid contention of the non-petitioners. 12. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the question of non-petitioners having ceased to be the employees of the petitioner company would not arise since the undertakings were furnished by them during the course of their employment with the petitioner company and merely because they had wilfully abstained from attending duty of the employer company because of voluntary abundonment of the service on their part would not lead to an inference that they had ceased to be employees of the petitioner company when they had executed the aforesaid undertakings. This fact is fortified from the evidence on the record, since the non-petitioners have failed to furnish or place any documents on the record which would establish their contention regarding the termination of their service by their employer. This fact is fortified from the evidence on the record, since the non-petitioners have failed to furnish or place any documents on the record which would establish their contention regarding the termination of their service by their employer. Hence it is neither a case of termination nor a case of dismissal of the non-petitioners from service but rather it is a case of wilful and voluntary abandonment from service of the employer, hence the petitioner company was within its rights to get the aforesaid undertakings executed from non-petitioners with a view to safeguard the rights and interest of the business and goodwill which the company had established for past several years and hence the said undertakings executed by the non-petitioners cannot be termed as exercise of unlawful restraint, duress or coercion by the employer towards the employee and rather they are reasonable restrictions imposed by the employer and hence within the purview of 1st exception to Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which envisages as under : "Section 27-Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void. Exception 1-one who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying or a similar business, within specified local limits, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein: Provided that such limits appear to the court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the business. In this case although there is no sale of goodwill of a business by the petitioner-company to its employees viz. In this case although there is no sale of goodwill of a business by the petitioner-company to its employees viz. the non-petitioners, but rather reasonable restrictions or restraint for a limited period of two years has been imposed which cannot be construed as unreasonable.It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard that such a contract between the employer and the employees whereby the employer had restrained the employees from carrying on aforesaid trade or business in which the employer was engaged and from using the drawings; technical know-how including intellectual property rights of the products manufactured by the employer, cannot be construed, as an unlawful agreement in violation of Section 27 of the Act, since the petitioners were within their rights to impose reasonable restrictions on the non-petitioners for the limited period as aforesaid for protection of their business and goodwill and hence the aforesaid undertakings cannot be construed as unlawful documents amounting to restraint of trade or lawful business as they are protected documents. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since both the courts below have not taken note of the aforesaid aspects of the matter in their order dated 27.5.95 of learned Civil Judge Senior Division as well as the order dated 8.1.96 (impugned) passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas (Alwar), the petitioners were left with no alternate remedy except to move this Court by way of present revision petition under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. 13. On 27.5.96 the revision petition was taken up for hearing and the learned counsel for the parties were heard at length before the interim order was passed by this Court on that date. This court while passing the interim order on prima facie view of the matter had observed that admittedly both the courts below had not taken note of salient features of the case and the context in which the undertakings, as referred to above, were executed by the non-petitioners which operate as positive covenants as per clauses IV to VII of the letter of appointment dated 1.7.94 of Dr. R.K. Malhotra, non-petitioner No. 1. R.K. Malhotra, non-petitioner No. 1. At this stage it will be pertinent to refer the relevant clauses of the aforesaid undertakings which are as under : Clause-5-While in the employment of the company, you shall wot 'engage yourself in any other job or business in any manner whatsoever without the prior written permission of the company. Clause-6-You shall keep all the information, literature and other materials supplied to you as a trust on the company's behalf and in safe custody. You shall not divulge company's information, policies and trade secrets to any outsider. Clause-7-All pamphlets, drawings, documents, designs, charts and other materials that may come into your possession from time to time or the notes made by you during the course of your services or on account of your employment, shall be the property of the company and in the event of cessation of your employment at any time for any reason, such materials or documents or pamphlets, designs etc. shall be returned to the company forthwith and information contained therein shall not be divulged to the competition of the company. The relevant clauses of appointment letter ,dated 13.6.86 of Dr. R.K. Malhotra as General Manager (Manufacturing) are as under : Clause-12-You should not engage yourself in any job or business in any manner, without prior permission of the Management. Clause-14-All pamphlets, drawings, documents, designs, charts and other materials that may come into your possession from time to time or the notes made by you during the course of your services or on the account of your employment, shall be the property of the management and in the event of cessation of your employment at any time for any reason, such materials or documents, pamphlets, designs etc. shall be returned forthwith and the information contained therein shall not be divulged to the competitors to the management. Clause-15-In the event of your leaving the employment/or your employment is terminated for any reasons, you shall not employ yourself or enter into service with any firm, company or person or employer who is a competitor in the market to the Management, for a period of two years. Clause-15-In the event of your leaving the employment/or your employment is terminated for any reasons, you shall not employ yourself or enter into service with any firm, company or person or employer who is a competitor in the market to the Management, for a period of two years. The decision of the management in respect or whether such employer is a competitor or not shall be final." Perusal of the aforesaid terms and conditions of the letter of appointment of non-petitioner No. 1 reveals that the latter had specifically undertaken vide clause VI to keep all the information, literature and other materials supplied to him as trust on behalf of the company and to keep the same in a safe custody and not to divulge company's information, policies and trade secrets to any outsider. Said non-petitioner vide clause VII had further undertaken not to make use of the pamphlets, drawings, documents, designs, charts and all such other materials of which he may acquire possession from time to time including notes, if any, during the course of his employment with the company and in the event of cessation of his employment at any point of time for any reason whatsoever such materials or documents as referred to above were to be returned to the company forth-with and information contained therein was not to be divulged to the competitors of the company.It was further contended by the learned counsel that in violation of clause 15 of the appointment letter dated 13.6.86 as aforesaid, non-petitioners had set up a company (non-petitioner No. 3) which was their own creation in gross violation of the terms of appointment which was infact a direct competitor of the petitioner company dealing with manufacture of same goods and components, which are being manufactured by the petitioner company. 14. It is keeping in view the aforesaid terms and conditions of appointment of the non-petitioners as well as the undertakings furnished by them and also keeping in view the observations of the Apex Court in the matters of Niranjan Shanker Golikari Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd., AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1098 , Superintendence Company of India Vs. Krishna Murgai, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1717 and subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of M/s. Gujarat Bottling Company Ltd. Vs. Coco-cola Co. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd., AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1098 , Superintendence Company of India Vs. Krishna Murgai, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1717 and subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of M/s. Gujarat Bottling Company Ltd. Vs. Coco-cola Co. Ltd., 1995(5) SCC 545 , that this court by the aforesaid interim order restrained the non-petitioners from making use of designs, drawings and other intellectual property of the petitioner company and from contracting suppliers and customers of the petitioner company either directly or indirectly for doing or permitting their business for a period of 3 years w.e.f. the date of their furnishing the aforesaid undertakings. Non-petitioners were further restrained from doing any competitive business of manufacturing or trading and establishing the industry competitive to the petitioner company for the aforesaid period from the date of their furnishing the undertakings.The non-petitioners challenged the order dated 27.5.96 passed by this Court before the Apex Court vide S.L.P. (Civil) No. 12651/96 which was disposed of by the Apex Court on 23.7.96 as withdrawn by the non-petitioners. It was thereafter, that the matter was finally heard by this Court on day to day basis.The record of the trial court was also summoned and which has been fully perused by this Court during the course of hearing of this revision petition. 15. The non-petitioners in their reply to the revision petition have contended inter alia by way of preliminary objections to the maintainability of the revision petition that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code is to be exercised sparingly in respect of the rare cases and as such in view of the concurrent findings of the courts below there is no scope left for exercise of jurisdiction by this Court. Non-petitioners have further contended that mere perusal of the revision petition would reveal to this court that while seeking redressal by way of revision, there is no averment satisfying the requirements relating to positive requirement as envisaged under Section 115 CPC, i.e., (a) that the order if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the parties against whom it was made. It was further contended that since there is no averment in the plaint filed by the petitioners before the learned trial court satisfy the aforesaid requirements and is conspicuously silent with regard to the aforesaid requirements as envisaged by Section 115 Civil Procedure Code, as such the interference by this court with the impugned order passed by the appellate court would not be justified since the suit from which the impugned order emanates is still pending before the trial court.The second preliminary objection which has been taken regarding the maintainability of the revision petition is that there is no whisper by the petitioners with respect to the monetary compensation which would not be adequate enough to compensate the petitioners as against the relief of injunction which has been sought by the plaintiff-petitioners and hence it is needless to submit that the relief prayed for by way of injunction cannot be entertained and granted in the revision petition by this court. It has been contended in this regard that the jurisdiction under section 20 with respect to various reliefs under the Specific Relief Act are discretionary whereas in this case no averment has been made with respect to the requirements laid down in sections 14, 20, 38 & 41 of the Specific Relief Act (here in referred to as "the Act") and as such apart from other considerations, there is no prima facie case for the plaintiff-petitioners for grant of interim relief of temporary injunction as prayed earlier before the trial court and now before this court. Non-petitioners have further referred to Section 14(a) and Section 4 of the said Act and clauses (g), (h) and (i) of the said provisions and hence it has been contended that the petitioner company is not entitled for the relief of injunction as prayed. Reliance has been placed on Sub-clauses (c) and (d) of clause (3) of Section 38 of the said Act which read as under:- Clause (c)-where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; Clause (d)-where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. Reliance has been placed on Sub-clauses (c) and (d) of clause (3) of Section 38 of the said Act which read as under:- Clause (c)-where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; Clause (d)-where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. In this context I deem it proper to refer to the relevant provisions of Section 38 of the Act which provide as under: Section 38:-Perpetual injunction when (granted) (1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this chapter a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, either expressly or by implication. (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II. (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's rights to, or enjoyment of, property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases. 16. With regard to Section 14 of the said Act it was contended that clause (a) of Section 14 of the Act specifically provides that "a contract for non-performance of which a compensation in money is an adequate relief" cannot be made a ground for obtaining permanent and temporary injunction from the court. The interpretation which has been placed by the non-petitioners on the said provisions of the Act is that at the most it can be said that in view of the breach of the undertakings committed by the non-petitioners since money/damages is the adequate compensation which can be provided to the petitioners, there is no ground for interference by this court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, since it may not cause irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiff-petitioners whereas the grant of injunction may result in irreparable loss and injury to the non-petitioners. 17. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1717 wherein it has been held that a post service covenant/undertaking is void under section 27 of the Contract Act and as such cannot be enforced at all. 18. 17. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1717 wherein it has been held that a post service covenant/undertaking is void under section 27 of the Contract Act and as such cannot be enforced at all. 18. By way of another preliminary objection it has been further contended that this court may consider that Section 105 Civil Procedure Code provides that where no appeal shall lie from any order made by a court in exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction, but where a decree is appealed from any error, defect or irregularily in the order affecting the decision of the case may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. This court will appreciate that in view of Section 105 read with Section 115 Civil Procedure Code it is abundantly dear that only such orders which suffer from exercise of material irregularity or jurisdictional defects are subject to interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this court. 19. It has however, not been disputed by the non-petitioners that a civil suit for grant of permanent injunction alongwith an application for the grant of ad-interim relief by way of injunction was filed before the learned Civil Judge at Kishangarh Bas (Alwar) but since the plaintiff-petitioners have not made out any prima facie case for the reliefs prayed for in the suit, the trial court was justified in declining the relief of injunction during the pendency of the suit. Non-petitioners have however not stated anywhere in the reply as to whether the loss of goodwill which the petitioners are likely to suffer in their business on account of setting up of a new industrial unit to be commissioned by them primarily with the object and sole intention of manufacturing the same components which are presently being manufactured by the petitioners in their unit would occasion failure of justice besides causing irreparable loss and injury to the business of the petitioners which cannot be compensated in terms either by way of damages or monetary compensation since there is no measuring standard to determine such loss or injury which would be of permanent nature. 20. 20. In the reply it has further been contended that non-petitioners had not voluntarily abandoned the services of the petitioner company and rather they were prevented entry in the premises of petitioner company. Surprisingly not a single document has been filed by them in support of the said averment which would justify their contentions and surprisingly enough they are highly qualified and experienced in the field of manufacturing the air-conditioners and refrigeration equipments etc. It is further surprising to note that from perusal of the reply as well as the written submissions filed by them it is apparent that there is no whisper in this regard as to what were the sparing or exceptional circumstances which suddenly led them to abandon the services of the petitioner company by setting up their own industrial unit in the dose proximity of the petitioner company and rather there is enough evidence on the record to establish that notwithstanding the loss which was likely to occasion to the petitioners in the aforesaid circumstances, yet the respondents were adequately compensated by settlement of their dues by the petitioner company on the demand raised by them. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended in this regard that this would not by any stretch of imagination deem to infer that the petitioner company had condoned the breach of the undertakings committed by the non-petitioners. With regard to the undertakings it has been contended in the reply that the same were procured from the non-petitioners as a result of undue-influence and coercion exercised on them unlawfully. Surprisingly enough there is not a single document which has been placed on the record and which would justify this contention of the non-petitioners and the same cannot be held logical in view of the fact that the non-petitioners being highly educated persons nothing prevented them from lodging their protest with their employer the petitioner company or by way of an F.I.R. with the police in this regard. Hence the only inference which can be drawn logically against the non-petitioners is that the execution of the aforesaid undertaking was purely a voluntary act on their part and a solemn assurance conveyed by them to their employer that they would abide by the same during the period the said undertaking will remain in force. Hence the only inference which can be drawn logically against the non-petitioners is that the execution of the aforesaid undertaking was purely a voluntary act on their part and a solemn assurance conveyed by them to their employer that they would abide by the same during the period the said undertaking will remain in force. Alternatively it has been contended in the reply that in view of the heavy financial investments made by the non-petitioners in their aforesaid project as a result of having procured loans from the financial institutions and also keeping in view the fact that the industrial unit of the non-petitioners has already started production the same would result in substantial monetary loss to them if remains out of operation and they would suffer irreparable loss and injury as against its share holders including several NIRs who have made huge investments. It has further been contended that if the revision petition is allowed, they would be deprived of their right to earn their livelihood besides loss to their profession and trade. 21. On merits it has been contended that undertakings furnished by the on-petitioners are void to the extent that they are hit by section 27 of the Contract Act and are in complete contravention of the said provisions. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners that the courts below have not committed any illegality in observing that the undertakings are not valid in law since negative covenants cannot be enforced by the employer even if they are voluntary acts to the employee and particularly when they have been executed by them on termination of their services which are totally void and un-enforceable. It has further been stated that the courts below have correctly arrived at the conclusion that the non-petitioners are not bound by the undertakings since they are hit by the provisions of Section 27 of the Contract Act and since the execution of the undertakings was not voluntary act of the employees, there is no prima facie case in favour of the petitioners. 22. By way of written submissions it has been contended by the non-petitioners that their services were terminated by the petitioner company on 11.5.94 by giving them one month's salary in lieu of notice besides house rent allowance as required by clause IV of the appointment letter dated 4.7.1990. 22. By way of written submissions it has been contended by the non-petitioners that their services were terminated by the petitioner company on 11.5.94 by giving them one month's salary in lieu of notice besides house rent allowance as required by clause IV of the appointment letter dated 4.7.1990. It has further been contended that the undertakings are not properly executed documents as they were not registered with the competent authority under the Indian Copy Rights Act, Trade Mark Act or Patent Act and hence they are void to that extent. Furthermore the said undertakings are not binding on the non-petitioners since no consideration was involved and hence they are void. Regarding the maintainability of the suit it has been contended that the petitioners are guilty of lathes since they had deliberately avoided to file a suit for almost one year till 7th April, 1995 while the unit was set up by the non-petitioners in April 1994 and they had full knowledge of the progress of the new unit. 23. In the written submissions filed before this court the non-petitioners have however not disputed the execution of the undertakings dated 11.5.94 and 8.6.94 which according to them was a contract duly executed between the parties which was binding for a period of three years commencing w.e.f. 11.5.94 and which the petitioners have actually sought to enforce through their plaint. Hence even as per their own case a valid and lawful contract had come into operation between the parties w.e.f. the date of execution of the aforesaid undertakings which the plaintiffs sought to enforce by filing a suit in the trial court. 24. During the course of hearing Shri Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the non-petitioners has contended at the bar that in order to appreciate the context in which the undertakings were furnished by the non-petitioners, it will be pertinent to divide time into the following periods for better appreciation of the case with with regard to the previliged information received by non-petitioner No.1. 1. 1986 to 1989 2. 1989 to 30.6.93 3. 1.7.93 to 11.5.94 4. 12.5.94 to 11.5.97 With regard to the period 1.9.86 to 1989 it has been contended that para 29 of the plaint deals with the said period when non-petitioner No.1 allegedly received from petitioner No. 2 knowledge and experience in production process, raw material for quality production, technology of production and manufacturing methods etc. 1.7.93 to 11.5.94 4. 12.5.94 to 11.5.97 With regard to the period 1.9.86 to 1989 it has been contended that para 29 of the plaint deals with the said period when non-petitioner No.1 allegedly received from petitioner No. 2 knowledge and experience in production process, raw material for quality production, technology of production and manufacturing methods etc. relating to air conditioning and refrigeration and coil making and when they were also introduced to the customers of the company. It is employment obligations and event if period had extinguished on the expiry of the aforesaid period ending on 30.6.95 hence not enforcible.With regard to the period 1989 to 30.6.93 which was been dealt with by the plaintiffs from paras 31 to 42 of the plaint, non-petitioner No. 1 was governed by appointment letter dated 13.6.86 with petitioner No.2. It has been contended in this regard that even though non-petitioner No.1 is alleged to have looked after the work of petitioner No. 1, in absence of any contract with the said petitioner, he was not covered by any contractual obligation.With regard to the period 1.7.93 to 11.5.94 which is covered by paras 43 to 53 of the plaint, is admittedly the period when non-petitioner No. 1 was in employment of petitioner No.1 vide appointment letter dated 1.7.93.With regard to the period 12.5.94 to 11.5.97 it has been contended that since non-petitioner No. 1 had ceased to be in employment of petitioner No. 1 due to termination of his services on 11.5.94, the post employment restraint sought to be imposed through undertaking dated 8.6.94, even if it was valid, is relevant only for previleged information received during the period 1.7.93 to 11.5.94.With regard to the relief of injunction which has been sought by the petitioners against non-petitioner No.3 (M/s. Spirotech Heat Exchangers Pvt. Ltd) it has been contended that it is a separate legal entity and since non-petitioner No. 3 had not executed any agreement with petitioner No.1, no restraint can be imposed on the said company. It has been contended in this regard that non-petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 have individual holding in the said company only to the extent 21% of their shares and have no control over the said company since overwhelming majority of the shares are held by NRIs and UTI/RCTC. It has been contended in this regard that non-petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 have individual holding in the said company only to the extent 21% of their shares and have no control over the said company since overwhelming majority of the shares are held by NRIs and UTI/RCTC. It has further been contended in this regard that as per Sections 37 & 40 of the Indian Contract Act no person who is not a party to a contract can be held liable for the purpose of that contract and since non-petitioner No.3 is an independent legal entity, no contractual obligations towards petitioner No.1 company can be enforced since there is no privity of contract and the contractual obligations of non-petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 even if valid, cannot be imposed on non-petitioner No. 3 and the said respondent cannot be restrained by an injunction order as it is not bound by any undertakings given by non-petitioner Nos. 1 & 2. 25. Mr. S. Kasliwal while controverting the above contentions advanced by learned counsel for the non-petitioners by way of rejoinder contended at the bar that the basis of the petitioner's case is the underakings executed by Dr. R.K. Malhotra non-petitioner No. 1 on 11.5.94/8.6.94 and Shri S. Srinivasan non-petitioner No. 2 on 11.5.94/2.6.94 respectively and the courts below have failed to examine the implications of the aforesaid undertakings in their true perspective and the corresponding legal obligations of the non-petitioners which flow from the aforesaid undertaking in favour of their employer viz. petitioner No. 1 company and it is primarily on account of the breach of the said undertakings that the petitioner company was constrained to file a suit for permanent injunction for restraining the defendant-non-petitioners to make use of the designs, drawings and other intellectual property of the company either directly or indirectly for benefits of the competitors of the company for a period of three years w.e.f. the date of execution of the said undertakings. Since the execution of the undertakings was a voluntary act of the non-petitioners it cannot be construed in any manner whatsoever that the said undertakings were executed by way of exercise of coercion, duress and undue influence of the petitioners. Since the execution of the undertakings was a voluntary act of the non-petitioners it cannot be construed in any manner whatsoever that the said undertakings were executed by way of exercise of coercion, duress and undue influence of the petitioners. The anxiety of the non-petitioners to overcome the effect of the undertakings is apparent from the fact that soon after setting up of their industrial unit at Bhiwadi, the said non-petitioners immediately moved an application to the Registrar of Companies for establishment of respondent No.3 Company M/s. Spirotech Heat Exchangers Pvt. Ltd. non-petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 have further not disowned the said undertakings by serving the petitioner's company either by way of notice or by adopting legal recourse at the earliest possible opportunity which was available to them and rather they had choosen to remain silent till the institution of the suit and hence in absence of such evidence it was contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the non-petitioners are not entitled to raise these objections at this belated stage and they should not be permitted to wriggle out of the said undertakings which are binding on them. Otherwise also the basis of obtaining salary dues cannot be termed as a coercion or duress because the said non-petitioners did not at any point of time either challenged the execution of the said undertakings or disown their responsibility arisen out of the same as a result of the said undertakings to the petitioner company. It was further contended by the learned counsel that this story of alleged duress or coercion is falsified for the reason that settlement of salary dues cannot be termed as a ground to compel the said non-petitioners to set up a rival business in competition with the petitioner's company by deriving benefit of all technical know-how, drawings and other trade secrets etc. as referred to above. as referred to above. This fact is apparent for the reason that the non-petitioners are financially well sound and had already conspired against the petitioner during the tenure of their service career to set up a rival business against the petitioner company and which they successfully manipulated during the course of their employment with the petitioner company and the execution of the undertakings was only a device adopted by them with a view to set up their rival business, since what was the fun of executing the daid undertakings if they were not bound by the same and if they are allowed to escape their responsibility in the manner in which they have done then and in that event no employer would be free to safeguard his business against unscrupulous employees. With regard to Section 27 of the Contract Act, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since the execution of undertakings was a free and voluntary act of the employees they cannot be said to be void so as to constitute an agreement in restraint within the purview of Section 27 of the Contract Act for the reason that enforcement of the undertakings has been sought by the petitioner company during the period of their subsistence only. It is non-petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 who have however endeavoured to make the aforesaid undertakings as post service covenants which is misleading. The Apex Court has repeatedly held that the agreement executed in restraint of trade is valid during the subsistence of the contract and is enforcible and such contracts cannot be constructed as in violation of Section 27 of the said Act, since the undertakings were executed for a limited period and the restraint is also limited to the production and manufacture of identical products, namely, air conditioner coils, evaporated coils and heat exchangers coils etc. and hence the restriction imposed by the employer by was of undertakings cannot be said to be in restraint of trade. In fact they are rather reasonable restrictions which cannot be said to render the non-petitioners out of business, inasmuch as they are free to manufacture other products which are not in conflict with the business interest of petitioner company. Moreover the execution of undertakings has been admitted by the non-petitioners. 26. In support of his contentions advanced at the bar Mr. Moreover the execution of undertakings has been admitted by the non-petitioners. 26. In support of his contentions advanced at the bar Mr. Kasliwal, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the following judgments: Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and others, Vs. Cocacola Co. and Others 1995 (5) SCC 545 , Niranjan Shanker Golikari Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1098 , Workmen Employed in Associated Rubber Industry Ltd. Bhavnagar Vs. Associated Rubber Industry Ltd., 1985(4) SCC 114 , Juggilal Kamlapat Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax U.P., AIR 1969 Supreme Court 932 , Vinod Kumar Arora Vs. Smt. Surjit Kaur, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2179 , M/s. Toyal Bros. Vs. Gram Panchayat, Chichorwari, 1988(1) RLR 850 and M/s. Dharm Vrat Arya & Co. Vs. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr., 1992(2) RLR 1 .In the matter of G.B.C. Co. Vs. Cocacola Co. (Supra) the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether the issuance of interim injunction by the Civil Court for enforcing negative stipulation in a contract was justified ? Since this is a lead case of the Apex Court regarding enforcement of the negative stipulations in a contract the ratio of the said decision and its applicability to this case has to be examined in its true perspective. The case of the appellant before the Apex Court was that 'GBC' is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and on 20.9.93 an agreement was duly executed between the appellant with Cocacola Company as per the terms of which the appellant GBC was permitted and authorised to bottle, sell and distribute the beverages under the trade marks "Gold-spot", "Thumps UP", "Limca", "Maaza", "Rim-Zim" and "Citra". 1993 agreement was to come into effect on the date Coca Cola indicated in writing to GBC that all trade marks relating to the said agreement have been assigned and transferred to Coca Cola. The said agreement was operative till 17.11.98 unless earlier terminated as provided in the said agreement. Under the relevant clauses of the said agreement, Coca Cola was empowered to terminate the said agreement without notice, the said period of notice could be reduced by mutual consent in writing between the parties. The said agreement was operative till 17.11.98 unless earlier terminated as provided in the said agreement. Under the relevant clauses of the said agreement, Coca Cola was empowered to terminate the said agreement without notice, the said period of notice could be reduced by mutual consent in writing between the parties. Paragraph 14 of the aforesaid agreement contained a negative covenant by GBC not to manufacture, bottle, sell, deal or otherwise be concerned with the products beverage of other brand or trade marks/trade names during the subsistence of the agreement including the period of one year's notice as contemplated in the said agreement. The aforesaid agreement came into force w.e.f. 12.11.93 when the trade marks relating to the said agreement were assigned and transferred to Coca Cola. On 25.11.95 the appellant GBC gave notice to Coca Cola under relevant clause of the agreement whereby the same was terminated. On 13.1.95 a suit was filed by Coca Cola in Bombay High Court seeking various reliefs. During the course of hearing of the suit Coca Cola also saught interim relief against GBC. Learned Single Judge of the High Court declined to grant interim relief to the company but issued interim injunction restrianing GBC manufacturing, bottling or selling or dealing with products beverages of any brand or trade mark owned by respondent Nos. 5 & 6 or anyone else other than Coca Cola. Two appeals were filed against hte order of learned Single Judge before Division Bench of the High Court, one by GBC and other by Coca Cola. The motion was finally disposed of by learned Division Bench on 31.3.95 by which notice of motion was made absolute in terms of one of the prayers while the other was modified. The said agreement was however, not limited to any particular period but could be terminated at any time by either party upon giving 90 days' notice or by mutual consent but in the event of either party committing breach of the said agreement, by an interim order of the learned Single Judge which was subsequently confirmed by learned Division Bench of the High Court direction was given that in the event of sale of shares having taken place prior to the institution of the suit, deponent and those to whom the shares were sold and also the subsequent transferees, their servants, agents, nominees, employees subsidiary and controlled companies etc. will not deal with the same in any manner and were restrained by an interim injunction from using brands of respondent No. 1 at Ahmedabad and Rajkot for manufacturing, bottling or selling or dealing with or concerning themselves in any manner whatsoever with the beverages of any person till 25.1.96. It is dear from the above that the High Court had given the effect to the negative stipulation contained in the agreement executed between the parties. The matter went up in appeal before the Apex Court by GBC company and the Apex Court held that grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the court. While exercising the discretion of the court applies the following tests-(i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty are resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience" lies. In order to protect the defendant while granting an interlocutory injunction in his favour the court can require the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking so that the defendant can be adequately compensated if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience" lies. In order to protect the defendant while granting an interlocutory injunction in his favour the court can require the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking so that the defendant can be adequately compensated if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. It has further been held as under: "Having regard to the negative covenant in the agreement, it is clear that Coca Cola has made out a prima facie case for grant of injunction. As a result of the interim injunction granted by the High Court the plants of GBC cannot be used for manufacture of Pepsi products till the specified date and the effort of Pepsi to gain an advantage over Coca Cola by reducing the availability of products of Coca Cola and increasing the availability of Pepsi products in the areas covered by the agreement has been frustrated to a certain extent inasmuch as the increase in the availability of Pepsi products has been prevented. In the absence of such an order Pepsi would have been free to use the plants of GBC for the manufacture of their products. This would have resultant loss in goodwill and profits could not be adequately compensated by damages. The loss that may be sustained by GBC can be assessed and GBC can be compensated by award of damages which can be recovered from Coca Cola in view of the undertaking that Coca Cola is required to give under Rule 148 of the Bombay High Court (original side) Rules, 1980. It has not been suggested that Coca Cola does not have the financial capacity to pay the amount that would be found payable." Pepsi cannot ask Coca Cola to part with its trade secrets to its business rival by supplying the essence/syrup etc. for which Coca Cola holds the trade marks to GBC which is under effective control of Pepsi. Pepsi took a deliberate decision to take over GBC with the full knowledge of the terms of the agreement. It did so with a view to paralyse the operations of Coca Cola in that region and promote its products. GBC, who was a party to the agreement, has not acted in conformity with the terms set out in the said agreement. It was itself, prima facie, responsible for the breach of the agreement. It did so with a view to paralyse the operations of Coca Cola in that region and promote its products. GBC, who was a party to the agreement, has not acted in conformity with the terms set out in the said agreement. It was itself, prima facie, responsible for the breach of the agreement. Neither the consent of Coca Cola was obtained for transfer of shares of GBC nor was Coca Cola informed of the names of persons to whom the shares were proposed to be transferred. Coca Cola therefore, had the right to terminate the agreement but it did not do so. On the contrary, GBC itself issued the notice for terminating the agreements by giving three months' notice. The GBC, having itself acted in violation of the terms of agreement and having breached the contract, cannot legally claim that the order of injunction be vacated particularly as the GBC itself is primarily responsible for having brought about the state of things complained of by it. Since GBC has acted in an unfair and inequitable manner in its dealings with Coca Cola, there was hardly and occasion to vacate the injunction order and the order passed by the Bombay High Court cannot be interfered with not even on the ground of closure of factory, as the party responsible, prima facie for breach of contract cannot be permitted to raise this grievance". (Paras 45, 46, 48 & 49). 27. With regard to the reasonableness of the restraint it was held by the Apex Court that stipulation in a contract which is intended for advancement of the trade shall not be regarded as being any restraint of trade. It was further held that normally the doctrine of restraint of trade is not attracted during the subsistence of the period of contract and it applies in respect of restrictions which operate after the termination of the contract. 28. With regard to the negative stipulation in the agreement between the GBC and Coca Cola it was held by the Apex Court that the purpose underlying the said negative covenant is to promote the trade of the parties concerned who are bound by the said agreement which seeks to achieve the said purpose by requiring GBC to whole-heartedly apply to promote the sale of products of Coca Cola. In that context it was relevant to mention that said negative stipulation operates only during the period in which the agreement in operation because of the express use of the words "during the subsistence" as specified therein. It was further held by the Apex Court that such stipulation cannot be said to be unreasonable restricting in restraint of trade since the said restriction was operative only during the period of subsistence of the said contract and applies also in respect of restriction which operates after the termination of the contract (para 31). It was further held by the Apex Court as under:- Negative covenants operative during that period of the contract of employment, hence the covenant that the employee is bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and therefore, do not fall under Section 27 of the Contract Act. Negative covenant that the employee would not engage himself in a trade or business or would not get himself employed by an other master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar duties is not therefore a restraint of trade unless the contract as aforesaid in unconscionable or excessively harsh or unreasonable or one sided as in the case of W.H. Milsted and Son Ltd." 29. With regard to the reasonableness of the agreement in question the parties it was held by the Apex Court that since the agreement was confirmed in its application to the period of subsistence and the restriction imposed therein was binding on the party and operative only during the period of subsistence of the agreement, the said stipulation cannot be held to be any restraint of trade so as to attract the bar of Section 27 of the Contract Act. It was held in this context that the negative stipulation in the agreement in question being any restraint of trade cannot be said to be void under Section 27 of the Contract Act (para 34). 30. On the question of grant of injunction in such matters the Apex Court drew the analogy in the matter of practice prevalent in England and drew its comparative analogy with that in India. 30. On the question of grant of injunction in such matters the Apex Court drew the analogy in the matter of practice prevalent in England and drew its comparative analogy with that in India. It was held that where a contract is negative in nature, or contains an express negative stipulation, breach of it may be restrained by injunction and injunction is normally granted as a matter of course even though the remedy is equitable and thus in principle a discretionary one and a defendant cannot resist an injunction simply on the ground that observance of the contract is burdensome to him and its breach would cause little or no prejudice to the plaintiff and that breach of an express negative stipulation can be restrained even though the plaintiff cannot show that the breach will cause him any loss (see Chitty on Contracts, 27th Edn. Vol. 1, General Principles, paragraph 27-040 at p. 1310, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol.24, paragraph 992). In India Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 prescribes that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (e) of Section 41, where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act, coupled with a negative agreement, express or implied, not to do a certain act, the circumstance that the court is unable to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement.shall not preclude it from granting an injunction to perform the negative agreement (para 42).While concluding the discussion, it was held by the Apex Court that the conduct of GBC in the light of the above observations was such from which it was apparent that the said company had not acted in conformity with the terms set out in the said agreement and was prima facie responsible for breach of the agreement, since neither the consent of Coca Cola was obtained nor the said company was informed of the names of other persons to whom the shares were proposed to be transferred and hence Coca Cola had therefore, right to terminate the agreement but it did not do so, while on the contrary GBC itself issued the notice for termination of the agreement. The Apex Court upheld that judgment of the Bombay High Court by observing that the order of the High Court is not open to interference not even on the ground of closure of the factory as party responsible prima facie for, breach of the contract cannot be permitted to raise this grievance. This conclusion was finally arrived at after weighing the equities of both the parties in equal scale and thereafter the Apex Court has come to the final conclusion that the resultant loss in good will and profits of Coca Cola on account of internal alliance with Pepsi during the subsistence of the agreement with Coca Cola would result in reduction of shares of Coca Cola in beverages market which could not be adequately compensated by damages. With regard to the loss that may be caused, GBC as a result of grant of interim injunction by the High Court it was held by the Apex Court that the loss sustained by GBC can be assessed and the GBC can be compensated by order of award of damages which can be recovered from Coca Cola in view of the undertaking that Coca Cola is required to furnish under Rule 148 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1980. 31. On the basis of the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court, I am of the view that the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court is fully attracted to the instant case, since it was bounden duty of the courts below to have weighed the equities of the parties in equal scale as it was an injunction suit and before passing the order of interim relief it was the duty of the trial court to have seen (a) whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the plaintiff, (b) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case and (c) whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury if the prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed . It was only thereafter that the decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction could be arrived at when the existence of legal rights assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation were subsequently contested during the trial of the suit by giving both the parties equal opportunity of hearing and to lead evidence in this regard and the trial court should not have declined the relief of interim injunction in the manner in which it has been done in the instant case with the result that the suit of the plaintiff pending before the trial court had practically been rendered infructuous. I am further of the opinion in this regard that the courts below have admittedly lost sight of this fact that all the essential ingredients for grant of interim relief were present in the case and the relief of injunction even though discretionary should not have been declined by the trial court keeping in view the conduct of the defendant-non-petitioners who were responsible for breach of the undertakings committed by them, hence the courts below have not taken into consideration that by way of interim relief the interest of the plaintiffs could have been safeguarded with a view to mitigate the risk of injustice which may occasion to the plaintiffs during the subsistence of the pendency of the suit so that the question at issue arising out of the execution of the undertakings furnished by the non-petitioners could be resolved by giving parties sufficient opportunity of leading evidence and proving their case in this regard. I am further of the view that the courts below have committed grave illegality by not taking into consideration that the interest of the non-petitioners should have been protected by imposing any reasonable condition such as furnishing of bank guarantee/undertakings which the circumstances of the case may so warrant during the pendency of the suit. 32. I am further of the view that as a result of the denial of relief of interim injunction to the plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit which was subsequently confirmed in appeal by the appellate court, the extent of loss which the plaintiff-petitioners would have suffered as a consequence thereof in their good will in the aforesaid business and the profits thereof could not be adequately compensated by damages. This is not a case where the negative covenants cannot be enforced against the non-petitioners as it would lead them to loss in business or would render their employees out of job, since the courts below have apparently failed to consider the comparative hardship which the plaintiffs have suffered on account of the competitive business which has been set up by the non-petitioners by deriving undue benefit of technical know-how and trade secrets of the petitioners with, a view to cause unlawful gain to themselves and unlawful loss to the petitioners is far greater than that of non-petitioners. This would have further resulted in closure of the plaintiff-petitioners' business since in that situation the defendants would have captured the entire market in respect of the similar products which were being manufactured by the petitioners in their industry and the resultant loss which was likely to occasion therefrom could not be compensated by award of damages. Analysing the conduct of the non-petitioners in the light of the above observations, I am of the considered opinion that interim order dated 27th May 196 deserves to be confirmed by this court and the petitioners are within their rights to enforce the negative covenants in view of the undertakings furnished by the non-petitioners as referred to above. I am also fortified in my observations from the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of Gujarat Bottling Company Ltd. Vs. Coca Cola (Supra) as well as the decisions in Niranjan Shankar Golikari Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (Supra) and Superintendence Co. of India Vs. Krishna Murgai: AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1717 and the decisions of this court as referred to above.In the matter of Niranjan Shanker Golikar (supra) the Apex Court while considering the vires of the agreement in question between the employer and his employee and its necessary implications in view of Section 27 of the Contract Act held that onus is upon the party supporting the contract to show that restraint is reasonably necessary to protect his interest and once this onus has been successfully discharged, onus of showing that the restraint is nevertheless injurious to the public is upon the party attacking the contract. It was further observed that negative covenant arising out of service contract imposed by the employer on its employee that the employee would not during the subsistence of the contract engage in any trade or business or would not get himself employed by any other master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar duties is not restraint of trade unless the contract is unconscionable or excessively harsh or one sided. It was further held that notification issued against the appellant restricted as to time, nature of employment and as to the area could not be said to be too wide or unreasonable or unnecessary for protection of the interest of respondent.In the matter of Superintendence Company of India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Murgai (Supra) the Apex Court dealt with the aforesaid question in respect of covenants any restraint of trade and also analysed their scope with reference to Section 27 of the Contract Act. While two Hon'ble Judges (Tulzapurkar and Untwalia, JJ.) were of the view that negative covenant in service contract that notwithstanding the relevant clause in the service contract to that effect is valid and not hit by Section 27 of the Contract Act, is not enforcible against the respondent at the instance of the appellant company, Hon'ble Sen J. while expressing dessenting opinion and while affirming the judgment of learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court took view that service contracts containing a negative covenant preventing the employee from working elsewhere during the period of restraint imposed in the agreement are not void under Section 27 of the Contract Act on the ground that they are in restraint of trade. Such agreements are enforcible for the reason that the doctrine of restraint of trade never applies during the continuance of the contract of employment and applies only when the contract comes to an end.In my humble opinion the ratio of the aforesaid observation of Hon'ble Sen J. of the Apex Court in the above matter is fully applicable to this case since one of the grounds on which the execution of aforesaid undertakings by the non-petitioners has been assailed is that they were alledgedly executed after the termination of their contract of employment by the petitioners. My observations are also fortified in view of the fact that while during the period of employment the courts undoubtedly would not grant any specific performance of a negative covenant arising out of contract of employment nevertheless Section 57 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 clearly provides for grant of an injunction to to restrain breach of such a covenant as it is not in restraint of trade but in furtherance of trade, hence such an agreement cannot be said to be in restraint of trade since the restraint of trade never applies during the continuance of contract of employment but it would apply only when the contract comes to an end. Assuming the contention as advanced by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners to be correct, yet I am of the considered view that there was no termination of employment by the employer, i.e. petitioner company, but since the non-petitioners have thus voluntarily abandoned the service of the employer, it cannot be said that merely on settlement of their dues, the restraint imposed by the employer for a period of three years as agreed to by the non-petitioners had come to an end and rather it was fully binding on the non-petitioners during the subsistence of the undertakings and such as restraint imposed by the employer cannot be said to be any restraint of trade being hit by Section 27 of the Contract Act or was unconscionable being excesively harsh or opposed to public policy. I am finally of the view that the petitioners have made out a prima facie case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this court under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code in view of the illegalities committed by the courts below and this court is not precluded from exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. I am further of the opinion that rather the restraint imposed by the employer on the employees was imposed bonafide for protection of trade secrets of the employer and with a view to prevent the employees from soliciting or enticing away the trade customers of the employer and the imposition of such restraint was reasonably necessary with a view to safeguard the interest of the employer and such a restraint cannot be said to be harsh or unreasonable since it was for a limited period of three years. I am fortified in my observations from the judgments of the Apex Court as well as the decisions of this court as referred to above.In the matter of M/s. Toyal Bros. Vs. Gram Panchayat (supra) it was held by this court that prima facie case means a case involving a substantial question which has been raised by a petitioner bona fide which at first sight needs investigation and inquiry.In the matter of:Peer Gulam Naseer Vs. Peer Gulam Jelonee, reported in 1988(2) RLR 871 it was held by this court that the courts should finally decide the controversy raised in the pleadings of the parties at the stage of deciding T.I. application and the serious questions raised in the case can be decided only after parties have been given due opportunity of hearing by leading evidence.In this context, I am also fortified in my observations from the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of GBC Vs. Coca Cola (supra) wherein the Apex Court in para 43 of the said judgment has observed as under: "The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory relief has to be taken at a time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence." 33. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the respondent contended that whether the compensation in money is the adequate relief in a case of breach of contractual obligations, injunction should ordinarily not be granted since the employer can be adequately compensated by way of damages and he is free to avail this remedy. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the respondent contended that whether the compensation in money is the adequate relief in a case of breach of contractual obligations, injunction should ordinarily not be granted since the employer can be adequately compensated by way of damages and he is free to avail this remedy. I am of the opinion that if this was the position, then every employee will be free to commit breach of contractual obligations with the employer at his instance and then thereafter after causing substantial loss to the employer would be free to run away from his obligations arising out of his employment by making breach of contractual obligations and it was not the intention of the legislature when Section 27 of the Act read with Section 42 of the amended Specific Relief Act was enacted since the complete restraint which is either imposed by the employer on the employee during the course of employment or between the traders in the course of their business relations, cannot be said to be an agreement in restraint of trade so as to be violative of section 27 of the Act or other provisions of Specific Relief Act and on the contrary a reasonable restraint can always be imposed by the employer on his employee for the protection of good will of his business and likewise by the traders on another trader where corresponding contractual obligations have arisen between the parties which are necessary to be performed during the corse of business. In this context reliance may be placed on Section 42 (Act No. 47 of 1963) of the Specific Relief Act which is analogus to Section 57 of the repealed Act and which reads as under : "Section 42.-Injunction to perform negative agreement-Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (e) of Section 41, where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act, coupled with a negative agreement, express or implied, not to do a certain act, the circumstances that the court is unable to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement shall not prelude it from granting an injunction to perform the negative agreement : Provided that the plaintiff has not failed to perform the contract so far as it is binding." I am fortified in my aforesaid opinion in the matter of Niranjan Shankar Golikari Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1098) = ( 1967 (2) SCR 378 ) from the following observations of Hon'ble Shelat J.: "The evidence is clear that the appellant has torn the agreement to pieces only because he was offered a higher remuneration. Obviously he cannot be heard to say that no injunction should be granted against him to enforce the negative covenant which is not opposed to public policy. The injunction issued against him is restricted as to time, the nature of employment and as to area and cannot therefore, be said to be too wide or unreasonable or unnecessary for the protection of the interests of the respondent company." The defendant was accordingly restrained from serving anywhere else during the period of agreement in the above case. In this context learned counsel for the non-petitioners contended at the bar that in view of the fact that dues of the non-petitioners have been settled by the petitioner company and, therefore, it amounted to cessation of their employment and hence they were free to enter into competitive business with their employer notwithstanding the execution of the undertakings which could not be made binding on them. The said contention of learned counsel for the non-petitioners is wholly untendable since I am of the view that this is not a case where the restraint imposed by the employer became operative on the employees after their cessation of their employment with the petitioner company, since there was no termination of Their service by the petitioner company and rather the employees had voluntarily executed the impugned undertakings executed by them during the course of their employment which have been assailed by them on the ground that they are harsh and unreasonable and hence not binding on them, notwithstanding the fact that they are operative only for a limited period of 3 years. What is more relevant in this case is that the conduct of the said employees has to be seen since they took undue advantage by setting up their separate industrial unit during the course of their employment with the petitioner company by taking benefit of all technical know how which they had gathered or derived during the course of their employment with a view to cause undue gain to themselves and undue loss to the petitioner company and thereafter also executed the undertakings voluntarily after settlement of their dues by the employer when they had abundoned their services by setting up the rival business by first executing the undertakings voluntarily and then making the false allegations against the employer that the undertakings were executed by exercise of undue pressure and coercion of the employer and keeping in view the conduct of the said employees, in my opinion, cannot be said to be appreciable and hence the employer was within its rights to impose reasonable restraint on the employees by execution of the undertakings as referred to above.Learned counsel for the respondent then contended that the undertakings are not binding since no element of consideration is attached to them. I am of the view that this is not the case of sale of good will by the employer to this employee hence the question of any consideration being attached to the undertakings does not arise and the contention of the learned counsel for the non-petitioners is wholly untenable. 34. With reference to Section 27 of the Contract Act, I am of the view that said provision was enacted at a time when trade in India was undeveloped and was at the stage of infancy and the legislature might have wished to make the smallest number of exception to the rules against contracts where trade may be restrained. 34. With reference to Section 27 of the Contract Act, I am of the view that said provision was enacted at a time when trade in India was undeveloped and was at the stage of infancy and the legislature might have wished to make the smallest number of exception to the rules against contracts where trade may be restrained. Subsequently, with the passage of time on account of rapid growth of industrialisation, the application of the above provision in strict sense may not hold good today, since no employer would be safe to do his business unless some reasonable restrictions are not imposed by the said employer on his employees either for protection of his good will or in respect of his trade secrets and said agreement in my humble opinion, cannot be said to be a restraint of trade being opposed to public policy so as to attract the mischief of Section 27 of the Contract Act. I am fortified in my views from the judgment of House of Lords (Justice Watson's) observations in the matter of Nardenfelt Vs. Maxim Nardenfelt, (1984) AC 535-552 , which are as under: "It is to the advantage of the public to allow a trader who had established a lucrative business to dispose of it to successor by whom it may be efficiently carried on. That object could not be accomplished, if on the score of the public policy, the law reserved to the seller an absolute and indefeasible right to start a rival concern the day after he sold. Accordingly, it has been determined judicially, that in cases where the purchaser for his own protection obtains an obligation, restrained the seller from competing, within bounds, which having regard to the nature of the business are reasonable, and are limited in respect of space, the obligation is not opposed to public policy and is, therefore, capable of being enforced." In another judgment of the Privy Council in the matter of Vancouwer Malt Sake Brewing Co. Vs. Vancouver Breweries Ltd., AIR 1934 PC 101 , 104 Lord Macnaghten observed thus: "The public have an interest in every person carrying on his trade freely. So has the individual.... Restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case.. Vs. Vancouver Breweries Ltd., AIR 1934 PC 101 , 104 Lord Macnaghten observed thus: "The public have an interest in every person carrying on his trade freely. So has the individual.... Restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case.. .whether the limits prescribed in the contract are reasonable or not depends upon the kind of business to protect which the contract is made, and the reasonableness of the restraint imposed must be ascertained in every case by reference to the nature of the business of the reasonableness of the restriction is one of law for the court." The test of justification have been authoritatively defined by Lord Chancellor Birkenhed in these words : "A contract which is in restrain of trade cannot be enforced unless:-(a) it is reasonable between parties (b) it is consistent with the interests of the public....... Every contract, therefore, which is impeached as being in restraint of trade must submit itself to the twin standards as indicated above. Both still survive". So the law as to restraints grew to a more liberal pattern. A partial restraint if reasonable would be upheld. Even if the restriction in the covenant be general or particular the test will be that of reasonableness. So the restraint has to be resonable one or good consideration, un-prejudicial to public interest and never larger than what was requisite for the protection of the parties. The law Commission in its 13th Report dated September 1958 observed thus: "But today, trade in India does not lag far behind than in England or the United States and there is no reasons why a more liberal attitude should not be adopted by acknowledging such restraints as are resonable not only as between the parties to the agreement but also as regards the general public. We recommend that Section 27 be suitably amended to permit such reasonable restraint." On the question of duress and undue influence, I am fortified in my observations from Law of Contract by Treitel Eighth Edition Chapter 10 wherein it has been observed thus: "Even under this more flexible text, mere "commercial pressure" will not suffice; nor will a threat amount to duress merely because what is threatened is a legal wrong". "The party who claims relief on the ground of actual undue influence must show that such influence existed and had been exercised, that the transaction resulted from that influence, and that the transaction was manifestly to his disadvantage". "The rule does not apply between husband and wife, or between employer and employee nor does it apply to all relationships which are fiduciary in the sense that they give rise to a duty of disclosure; thus it does not apply between agent and principal. The rule may apply after the relationship has ceased if the influence continues". With regard to the contracts in restraint of trade it has been observed thus: "The general view is that the question whether a restraint is valid must be determined once for all by reference to the circumstances in existence when the contract was made. The view that a restraint which satisfies the tests of validity at that time may become invalid or unenforceable in the light of subsequent events has been generally rejected as it would give rise to an unacceptable degree of uncertainty". "Even in the absence of a covenant in restraint of trade, the law gives an employer some degree of protection against his employee. He can restrain the employee from (i) using or disclosing trade secrets, (ii) using or disclosing confidential information falling short of a trade secret and (iii) soliciting the employer's customers. The restriction on the use or disclosure of trade secrets applied at any time that on the solicitation of customers applies only to solicitation during employment, while that relating to confidential information occupies an intermediate position: it is normally limited to the employee's conduct during employment but in some cases it extends beyond the period of employment". With regard to the inequities of bargaining power of the employee it has been observed thus: "The court certainly attach importance to disparity of bargaining power in restraint of trade cases. But this factor would scarcely be significant where the terms of employment were settled between an employer and a powerful trade union, or where the restraint was undertaken by a company director who, though technically an employee, was by no means in a weak bargaining position". "An employer pays for his employee's services and would not be deprived of what he paid to if the employee competes with him after leaving his service". "An employer pays for his employee's services and would not be deprived of what he paid to if the employee competes with him after leaving his service". In the matter of Commercial Plastics Ltd. Vs. Vincent, (1965) 1 QB 623 . Pearson L.J. observed as under: "For this reason the new interest may be called "Commercial" rather than "proprietary" ones; and we shall see that in some categories of contracts in restraint of trade the law now recognises that such commercial interests may be protected by covenants". After drawing comparative analogy with reference to the contractual relationship of the employers and the employees and viewed in the context of the position prevailing in India I am of the view that reasonableness and fairness with respect to the contractual relationship of the employer and the employee, the question regarding reasonableness and fairness of the restraint, we cannot adopt one sided approach and since the question regarding reasonableness and fairness of the restraint has to be viewed in the context in which it has been imposed and the question of relative bargaining power of the employee is religated to the background. In my view a restraint does not become invalid or void merely because it has been undertaken by a weaker party and an employee who is drawing a handsome salary and is a highly placed person in the management like the non-petitioners herein, cannot be construed as a weaker parties. It is only where the strong party makes unconscionable use of the superior bargaining power that the resulting bargain may be struck down on account of its unfairness, but this is not the case at all herein. 35. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the non-petitioners that whether any kind of negative covenant which is to operate after the expiry of contract of employment would be valid within the ambit of Section 27 of the Contract Act? I am of the view that the question of expiry of contract of employment in this case does not arise since the appointment of the non-petitioners that petitioner No.1 was not for a fixed duration, undertakings were executed by them during the course of their employment with the petitioner company and since there was no cessation of employment by the employer, the question of enforcing the said undertaking after the expiry of contract of employment does not arise. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the non-petitioners is not well sounded, since the mutual obligations between the parties in view of the said undertakings are valid and binding for limited period of 3 years as stipulated between the parties w.e.f. 8.6.94 to 7.6.97. Hence in my opinion the non-petitioners are bound by the said undertakings and they shall be within their rights to manufacture the items as referred to above only after the expiry of period of undertakings, i.e. 7.6.97 onwards. In view of the fact that both the courts below have failed to look into this salient aspect of the matter, this court is fully within its jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order. 36. On the question of equity I am of the opinion that since it is not a case of forced termination of the contract of employment by the petitioner company and rather it is a case of wilful abandonment of the services of the non-petitioners, hence the question of exercise of an equity in their favour merely on the ground that they have made huge investment in setting up a separate industrial unit, does not arise. 37. In support of his contentions advanced at the bar Shir Paras Kuhar, learned counsel for the non-petitioners has placed reliance on the following judgments:- Gujarat Bottling Co. Vs. Coca Cola Co. and Ors., 1983 ILR (Delhi) 1, 1995 (5) SCC 545 (paras 20, 22, 23, 30, 31 & 32) : Vinod Kumar Arora Vs. Surjit Kaur, 1987 (3) SCC 711 : AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1717 (para 64) , Superintendence Co. of India Vs. Krishna Murgai, Terene Traders Vs. Ramesh Chandra Jamnadas & Co., AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1492 , Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. The State of Raj. and another AIR 1981 Rajasthan , 133 : The Managing Director Hindutan Aeroanutics Lid. Vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 76, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2621 , Delhi Municipality Vs. Suresh Chandra, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2324 , D.L.F. Housing etc. Co. Vs. Sarup Singh Mahadeo , Savaramshelka & Ors. Vs. Pune Medical Corporation & Another, 1995 (3) SCC 33 and Niranjan Shankar Golikari Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1098 . I have gone through the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Gujarat Bottling Co. Vs. Coca Cola Co. Co. Vs. Sarup Singh Mahadeo , Savaramshelka & Ors. Vs. Pune Medical Corporation & Another, 1995 (3) SCC 33 and Niranjan Shankar Golikari Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1098 . I have gone through the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Gujarat Bottling Co. Vs. Coca Cola Co. (supra) as well as the observations of the Apex Court in the relevant paras as referred to above and which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners. I am of the view that what the Apex Court has observed is with regard to contracts in restraint of trade. No hard and fast rule has been laid down by the Apex Court that every contract has not to be construed as any restraint of trade and the onus is on the party supporting the contract to show that the restraint goes no further than is reasonably necessary to protect interest of the covenantee and if this onus is successfully discharged, the burden is shifted on the party attacking the contract. If the above proposition is applied in the present case I am of the view that since the restraint imposed on the non-petitioners is most reasonable and is operative only for a limited period of 3 years, it cannot be construed as unreasonable restraint to make the said undertakings void and hence do not fall within the ambit of Section 27 of the Contract Act. Even by application of strict standards as observed by the Apex Court in para 21 of its judgment, I am of the view that it is not open to the non-petitioners to challenge the undertakings duly executed by them voluntarily without any exercise of undue influence since nobody compelled them to execute the said undertakings and accordingly the restraint being most reasonable with a view to protect the good will of the employer for a limited period, cannot be said to be harsh or unreasonable and even on prima facie view the restraint imposed by the employee appears to be most just and reasonable in accordance with the law. With regard to the observation in pars 22 of the judgment I am of the view that since the undertakings in question do not fall within the ambit of Section 27 of the Contract Act, the question of the same being void does not arise. It is always open open to this court to go to the question of reasonableness of restraint and if it is so the same must be upheld. With regard to the observations of the Apex Court in paras 30, 31 & 32 of the judgment, I am of the view that the Apex Court has itself categorically held that with the advancing of trade in the present scenerio, such agreements even incorporate a condition that a franchisee shall not deal with competing goods and such a condition restricting the right of the franchisees to deal with the competing goods is for facilitating the distribution of goods of the franchisees and it cannot be regarded as any restraint of trade. The aforesaid proposition helps in advancing the case of the petitioners rather than the non-petitioners.With regard to the observations of the Apex Court in para 31 of the said judgment, I am of the view that the matter at issue before the Apex Court was regarding the interpretation of the agreement between GBC and Coca Cola Co. which was a commercial agreement for promoting the trade in beverages for their mutual benefits. In that context the Apex Court had observed that it was relevant to mention that the said negative stipulation was operative only during the subsistence of the agreement and the Apex Court has observed that normally the doctrine of restraint of trade is not attracted in cases where the restriction is to operate during the period of the contract is subsisted and it applies in respect of restriction which operates after the termination of the contract as earlier held by the Apex Court in Golikari case (supra) rather than the Apex Court has observed in Golikari's case that a negative covenant operative during the period of contract of employment when the employee is bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded with any restraint of trade and do not fall under Section 27 of the Contract Act. Likewise in the matter of Superintendence Co. Likewise in the matter of Superintendence Co. (supra) Hon'ble A.P. Sen J. in his judgment observed that the said doctrine never applies during the continuance of contract of employment and rather it applies only when the contract has come, to an end. This proposition again helps in advancing the case of the petitioners rather than of the non-petitioners.In 1987 SC 1492 (supra) it has been held by the Apex Court that in matters of interlocutory orders Superior Court interferes only under exceptional circumstances. The ratio of the said decision is regarding the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code in cases arising out of 0.39 R. 1 & 2 CPC. It was held by the Apex Court that the discretion is a judicial one and has to be exercised in accordance with reasons and on sound judicial principles. However, the Apex Court in the said judgment has nowhere stated that there is total bar or prohibition for the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction which cannot be construed as altogether excluded.In Superintendence Co. Vs. Krishna Murgai (supra) the Apex Court was of the view that in view of Section 27 of the Contract Act a service covenant if extended beyond the termination of contract of employment would be void but at the same time it was observed that it would not be void if impose during the contract of employment provided the same is reasonable. In my opinion the interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners is not justified since the Apex Court never intended to observe that a reasonable restriction cannot be imposed by the employer on his employee for protection of his good will and trade secrets and in this case the application of the principle underlying under Section 27 of the Contract Act does not arise in view of the undertakings furnished by the non-petitioners-employees which cannot be said to be void.In the matter of the Managing Director Vs. Ajit Prasad (supra) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question regarding the scope of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. It was observed that on principle the High Court should not interfere with the order of first appellate court. Ajit Prasad (supra) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question regarding the scope of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. It was observed that on principle the High Court should not interfere with the order of first appellate court. In my humble opinion the ratio of the said judgment is not attracted to this case since the Apex Court has nowhere observed that the jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters is altogether excluded in view of the settled law that it is open to the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction for correction of the illegalities or jurisdictional errors by exercising its revisional powers in appropriate case. 38. I have examined the ratio of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners. I am of the view that the principles underlying the said decisions are not attracted to this case. 39. In view of my above discussions the petitions deserve to succeed. The revision petition is consequently allowed. The order dated 8.1.196 passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas District Alwar confirming the order, dated 27.5.1995 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Kishangarh Bas in C.M.A. No. 23/95 arising out of suit No. 91/95 is quashed and set aside. The trial court is directed to deal with and decide the suit expeditiously and in any case not later than six months from today. The summoned record be sent back to the trial court immediately. Parties are left to bear their own costs.Revision allowed. *******