MUNSHIRAM D. ANAND v. PRAVINSINH PRABHATSINH — 1996 DIGILAW 12 (GUJ)

S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Appeal is preferred by original opponent No. 1 in petition filed under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before Motor accident Claims Tribunal (Auxiliary) at Jamnagar. The opponent Pravinsinh prabhatsinh instituted such petition under Sec. 140 of the said Act inter alia claiming that on 16/02/1990 around 10. 15 in the morning because of rash and negligent driving by the present appellant of his Fiat Car bearing No. GRI 8061 on Jamnagar-Rajkot Road, there was an accident as the car dashed against the scooter and he received multiple injuries including fracture of left leg and foot. He also stated that he has received 50% permanent disability and that he has also filed regular motor Accident Claim Petition to recover compensation of Rs. 3,66,000. 00. He has further stated that during the pendency of such petition, he has filed application at Exh. 18 for interim compensation under Sec. 140 of the said Act. Such application was fixed for hearing by the Tribunal on 22/10/1992 and ultimately by judgment and award dated 22nd of October, 1992, the Tribunal has awarded the interim compensation of Rs. 12,000. 00 under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the said amount is deposited by the appellant in the Tribunal. ( 2 ) BEING aggrieved by the judgment and interim award passed by the Tribunal, the owner of the vehicle has preferred the present Civil Appeal and in such First appeal, Mr. N. K. Phava, appearing with Mr. P. M. Thakker has strenuously urged before this Court that the Tribunal could not have awarded interim compensation of Rs. 12,000. 00 as the main Motor Accident Claim Petition which was instituted by the claimant was already dismissed. He submitted that accident admittedly took place on 16th of February, 1990 for which the Motor Accident Claim Petition was filed on 5th of September, 1991, i. e. , beyond the maximum period of one year then provided by Sec. 166 of the said Act. Section 166 (3) as it then stood contemplated that every application for compensation under Sec. 166 (2) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred. Sub-section (3) provides that - no application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. Section 166 (3) as it then stood contemplated that every application for compensation under Sec. 166 (2) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred. Sub-section (3) provides that - no application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso, however, contemplated that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant-claimant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. ( 3 ) THE effect of the aforesaid provision was fully discussed in the case of Mer ramde Vejanandbhai v. Harshadbhai Parbatbhai, reported in 1992 (2) GLR 976 wherein this Court has taken the view that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone delay over a period of one year from the date of the accident. The petition lies as of right within a period of six months but if there is delay, the Tribunal could condone the same between six months to 12 months and not beyond 12 months. The Parliament has subsequently realised the adverse effect of such provision on the rights of claimants of vehicular accident and has, therefore, by amendment which has come into force w. e. f. 14/11/1994, by Amendment Act No. 54 of 1994, deleted the entire sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The effect of such amendment is that the Motor Accident Claim petition could now be preferred at any point of time as no limitation is prescribed, subject of course to the reasonableness of the period and applicability of the provisions of Limitation act, 1963, if at all, same is applicable. Such question is not examined in this First appeal as it does not directly arise for consideration. However, in the present case, when the petition was filed, on 5th of September, 1991, Sec. 166 (3) operated and as per the said provision read with the aforesaid decision of this Court, it was not open to the Tribunal to condone delay and to entertain the petition. However, in the present case, when the petition was filed, on 5th of September, 1991, Sec. 166 (3) operated and as per the said provision read with the aforesaid decision of this Court, it was not open to the Tribunal to condone delay and to entertain the petition. The Tribunal has while considering application for condonation of delay filed along with the main petition, by judgment and order dated 7/08/1992, refused to condone delay on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to condone delay under Sec. 166 (3) of the said Act. However, the Tribunal has proceeded to pass the order on application for interim compensation which was filed under Sec. 140 of the said Act and, therefore, the Counsel for the appellant submitted that once the main petition for compensation is dismissed as it was beyond the prescribed period of limitation, application for interim compensation was also liable to be dismissed and that the tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction in passing an award of interim compensation. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid contention raised by the Counsel for the appellant it shall have to be stated that by Chapter X, the Legislature has introduced the concept of "liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no-fault". Such liability was for the first time sought to be introduced by Sec. 92a in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 140 as it stood prior to Amendment in 1994 being relevant for the purposes of this Appeal, same is set out hereunder :"sec. 140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of nofault :- (1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-sec. (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twelve thousand rupees. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-sec. (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twelve thousand rupees. (3) In any claim for compensation under sub-sec. (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other persons. (4) A claim for compensation under sub-sec. (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement. " ( 5 ) MERE perusal of the said section makes it abundantly clear that where any permanent disablement is caused to a person from vehicular accident, the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to pay compensation in respect of such disablement in accordance with the provisions of the said section. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that compensation payable for the permanent disablement to any person shall be a fixed sum of Rs. 25,000. 00 which amount is enhanced and amended by Act 54 of 1994, which has come into force from 14/11/1994. Prior thereto, the said amount was limited to Rs. 12,000. 00. Since the judgment and interim award passed by the Tribunal is prior to 14/11/1994, the Tribunal has awarded the interim compensation at the rate of Rs. 12,000. 00 as the opponent injured person has received permanent disability to the extent of 50% as stated and asserted by him before the Tribunal. It is pertinent to note that Sec. 140 nowhere prescribes the period of limitation within which an application for interim compensation can be made. It also does not provide that for filing an application or a petition for interim compensation, one must always file a petition for compensation under Sec. 166. It is pertinent to note that Sec. 140 nowhere prescribes the period of limitation within which an application for interim compensation can be made. It also does not provide that for filing an application or a petition for interim compensation, one must always file a petition for compensation under Sec. 166. In other words, lodging of a petition for compensation under Sec. 166 is not a condition precedent to filing of a petition for interim compensation on the principle of no-fault liability. However, Counsel very strenuously urged before the Court that if ultimately no petition for compensation is filed under Sec. 166, it would amount to giving wide spectrum to Sec. 140 of the Act as a person would simply file application for interim compensation and may not file the substantial petition for compensation. In the alternative, he submitted that when the substantial petition for compensation itself is dismissed on the ground that it is beyond the prescribed period of limitation, an application for interim compensation under Sec. 140 could not be entertained by the Tribunal. Ordinarily, the situation as put before this Court in the first part of submission of the Counsel for the appellant may not arise because in case of death, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased or in case of injury, the person injured would ordinarily prefer to file a petition for compensation. One would always prefer to receive entire compensation receivable under Sec. 166 of the said Act and one would not be content with receiving only interim compensation under no-fault liability. In the present case also, the opponent injured person did file a petition for compensation under Sec. 166 of the said Act but since same was barred by limitation under Sec. 166 (3) (as it stood prior to its amendment in 1994), unfortunately, the petition came to be dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground that it was barred by limitation. However, the Tribunal was conscious of the fact that application for interim maintenance under Sec. 140 is altogether an independent application which confers a right on the claimant to receive interim compensation irrespective of establishment of negligence or otherwise or irrespective of establishment of any liability. However, the Tribunal was conscious of the fact that application for interim maintenance under Sec. 140 is altogether an independent application which confers a right on the claimant to receive interim compensation irrespective of establishment of negligence or otherwise or irrespective of establishment of any liability. Concept of an absolute liability is introduced by this section as no fault is required to be proved and once the factum of vehicular accident is established coupled with the involvement of the vehicle and the ownership of the vehicle, the Tribunal can always pass an order under Sec. 140 for interim compensation. The intent of the Legislature in enacting such provision was to see that the injured person or the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased person are not rendered to helpless or destitute situation of even not receiving any medical aid or treatment in absence of the finances. The Legislature, in fact, intended that for immediate medical aid as well as for enabling the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased to meet with certain expenses including expenses for filing of petition, some amount by way of interim compensation should be awarded by the owner of the vehicle irrespective of establishment of liability. Keeping the aforesaid broad intention of the Legislature in mind coupled with the absence of any provision prescribing limitation for interim maintenance in Sec. 140, the second part of submission of the Counsel for the appellant is required to be examined. In my opinion, to control or limit operation of Sec. 140 to those cases where a substantive petition under Sec. 166 of the said Act of 1988, is filed and is pending, would tantamount to giving a very limited scope to a beneficial piece of legislation which is enacted for the benefit of the class of claimants, either heirs and legal representatives of the deceased or injured persons in vehicular accident. The legislature has advisedly, therefore, no where stated in Sec. 140 that application for interim compensation can be made only if a substantive petition under Sec. 166 is filed. Secondly, the Legislature has also nowhere prescribed the period of limitation within which the application for interim compensation can be made under Sec. 140 of the said Act. Therefore, accepting the submission of learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, would in substance, amount to reading something more in Sec. 140 than what the Legislature has enacted. Secondly, the Legislature has also nowhere prescribed the period of limitation within which the application for interim compensation can be made under Sec. 140 of the said Act. Therefore, accepting the submission of learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, would in substance, amount to reading something more in Sec. 140 than what the Legislature has enacted. It would amount to prescribing the period of limitation for filing such application when the Legislature has not thought it fit to prescribe any period of limitation. Secondly, it would also amount to introducing one another requirement of pendency of a substantive petition under Sec. 166 for compensation, which is also not the situation stipulation by Sec. 140. Thirdly, to introduce such a condition in Sec. 140 would in fact frustrate the object of the legislature of providing interim maintenance at the earliest possible opportunity. The injured person or the legal representatives can move the Tribunal for interim compensation within a week even before filing a petition under Sec. 166 of the act and the Tribunal is bound, if requirements of Sec. 140 are satisfied, to award the interim compensation. Keeping the aforesaid factors in mind, in my opinion, the submission of Mr. N. K. Phava, though appears to be attractive at the first blush, cannot stand the judicial scrutiny of this Court and shall have to be rejected. In fairness to the learned Counsel, it must be stated that he has taken this Court to the various provisions of Chapter X of the said Act and Sec. 144 clinches the issue in favour of the claimant and against the owner, not leaving any doubt in the mind of this Court about the interpretation placed by this Court on Sec. 140 of the said Act. Sec. 144 reads as under :"144. Overriding effect :- The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time-being in force. " ( 6 ) FROM the aforesaid provision it becomes clear that the provisions of Chapter x are intended to have the overriding effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time-being in force. " ( 6 ) FROM the aforesaid provision it becomes clear that the provisions of Chapter x are intended to have the overriding effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time-being in force. Therefore, Chapter XII which deals with the Claims Tribunal and Sec. 166 which finds it place in Chapter XII, cannot have overriding effect over Sec. 140 in light of the aforesaid clear statutory provision enacted by Sec. 144 of the said Act. The legislature has in no uncertain terms made its intention clear by providing that provisions of Chapter X shall have overriding effect and irrespective of any liability, if requirements of Sec. 140 are satisfied, the Tribunal can pass as award for interim compensation in favour of the claimant. In view of the aforesaid situation emerging from the reading of Secs. 140 and 144 of the said Act, this Court cannot accept any of the aforesaid two submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant. In the result, this Civil Appeal fails, the same is dismissed. .