JUDGMENT 1. - It is alleged that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 happen to be Khatedar-tenants of the land bearing Khasra Nos. 67 and 68 measuring 2.23 hectares, situated in village Sitapur, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur. It is alleged that petitioner No. 2 has 3/4th share while petitioner No.3 has 1/4 share in the land measuring 8 Bighas 17 Biswas in the disputed khasras. The said lands have been mutated on 19.4.89 in their names vide Annex-1, which was purchased by petitioner No. 1, a registered society under an agreement Annex-2 dated 24.8.90 for residential scheme and possession of the disputed land has been taken over by petitioner No. 1. Thereafter, the petitioner society has spent considerable amount in developing the land in question. The respondent No. 1 had issued a notification vide Annexure-4 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter to be referred as `the Act') on 2.8.91 notifying that the land detailed therein is required for public interest for the use of Bharat Petroleum Limited, Jaipur for constructing its godowns. It was also mentioned in the notification that due to urgency, provisions of Section 5-A of the Act will not be applicable. On 29.11.91 a notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued vide Annex-5 stating that in view of the urgency involved in the matter direction was required to be issued under Section 17-A of the Act and that after 15 days of the date of notification the possession of the land may be taken. Thereafter, the award Annex-7 was passed on 23.3.92 by the Land Acquisition Officer. 2. Reply to show cause notice alongwith preliminary objections has been filed by the respondents. A rejoinder was also filed. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that though the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are khatedar-tenants of the land in question but their names have not appeared in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them and have prayed that notifications dated 2.8.91 and 29.11.91 and the Award dated 23.3.92 be quashed and set aside in respect of the land in question. It has also been stated that proceedings started on 6.6.89 by appraising the Collector, Jaipur of the need of land, but the notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued only on 2.8.91 and notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 29.11.91 and thus the delay of about 2 years itself shows that there was no urgency and as such dispensing of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is bad. It has further been alleged that the entire acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed and set aside for want of issuance of notice under Section 9 of the act, and the award has been passed without previous approval of the State Govt. He has also relied on the judgment in the matter of Smt. Geeta Devi Ghatiwala & 5 Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in 1993(1) WLC (Raj.) 466 , State of T.N. and Another v. Mahalakshmi Animal and Ors., reported in (1996) 7 SCC 269 , Balmokand Khatri Edn. & Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab; reported in (1996) 4 SCC, 212 and in the matter of State of U.P. & Ors v. Rajiv Gupta & Anr., reported in 1994(5) SCC, page 686. 4. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Kasliwal appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 alleging inter-alia that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 have no locus standi to file the writ petition as according to their own averments they have sold their land to petitioner No. 1 under an agreement of sale and thus they have no right to question and file this writ petition after considerable delay. On merits, it is argued that the notifications are perfect, justified, the award has been, passed by the competent authority which is within the jurisdiction and there is no error, irregularity or infirmity in the impugned orders. 5. Mr. Jinesh Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Kasliwal, submits that once the suit filed by the petitioner-society No. 1, against some proceedings which was withdrawn, it has no right to file this writ petition for not challenging the notification at the initial stage has now join hands with petitioners Nos. Jinesh Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Kasliwal, submits that once the suit filed by the petitioner-society No. 1, against some proceedings which was withdrawn, it has no right to file this writ petition for not challenging the notification at the initial stage has now join hands with petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, who are alleged to he Khatedar-tenants and has challenged the acquisition proceedings at this belated stage, which is nothing but abuse to the process of law and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this count alone. It is further argued that similarly situated ~ersons have also challenged the acquisition proceedings which has been held to he valid by this Court. It is also argued that possession has been taken and compensation amount has been paid to other co-khatedars, thus the challenge by the original-Khatedar alongwith the society by way of this writ petition is liable to he dismissed. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the following judgments : 1. Banwari Lal v. State of Raj & Anr.: 1986(2) WLN 648 . 2. State of Maharashtra v. Umashanker Raja Basu : 1996(1) SCC 299 . 3. Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.: (1996) 2 SCC 549 . 4. Statc of T.N. & Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Amal & Ors.: (1996) 7 SCC 269 . 5. The Topkhana Desh Grah Nirman Sehkari Samiti v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.: SBCWP No. 110/86 decided on 31.1.96. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the material on record and the case law cited at the bar. 7. It is well settled position of law that all interested persons have to challenge the notification immediately and unless validity of the notification under Section 4 of the Act is challenged within a reasonable time, no relief is available. It is also true that while invoking urgency clause subjective satisfaction of the Government as to the dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is sufficient and there cannot be an objective reappraisal of it by the Court however, it can be questioned only if the power is exercised malafidely or in arbitrary manner. It is also true that while invoking urgency clause subjective satisfaction of the Government as to the dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is sufficient and there cannot be an objective reappraisal of it by the Court however, it can be questioned only if the power is exercised malafidely or in arbitrary manner. It is also not disputed that enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act dispensation with Section 17-A, notification under Sections 4 and 6 to be made on the same day. Once the award has been passed, possession has been taken by the State Government in accordance with law, the only right of compensation remains with the Khatedar-tenant. The interested persons can make reference even if no notice under Section 9 of the Act is issued and the persons receiving no notice under Section 9 are entitled to seek reference under Section 18(3) of the Act and there will be no bar to claim for increase of compensation. 8. The above law is well settled and, therefore, it is not necessary to deal with cases cited by the parties, however, each case depends upon the facts of its own. 9. So far as the mein argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the disputed land was needed in the year 1989 but notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were issued in the year 1991, itself shows that there was no urgency. On the other hand considering the argument and the reply, case of the respondents is that for laying oil pipe-line from Kandla-Bhatinda (in Gujarat-Punjab) passing through Sanganer, District Jaipur which is in public interest is needed for laying pipe-line, which is situated in village Sitapur, a part of Sanganer and for this purpose the nearby lands were sought to be acquired by respondent No. 2 as well as the other oil companies. Since it was a vey big project and about 2500 kilometers were required to be acquired for establishing the pipe-line, the survey was conducted with the help of World Bank and it took time in the progress and after seeing all pros and cons and feasibility, the notifications were issued, therefore, the argument that there was no urgency to invoke urgency clause, as the respondents were having sufficient time before issuing notifications, is not well founded and the same is rejected. 10. 10. That apart the delay in pre-notification and post notification by the Government officials could not render the exercise of power to invoke urgency clause invalid for the reason that project itself is in the greater interest of public and this important fact cannot be lost sight of and the individual right of an owner must yield larger public interest. Moreso, nothing has been placed on the record to show that such notification has been issued malafidely and in colourable exercise of powers. Under the circumstances, the invocation of the urgency clause and to form opinion of urgency by the Government to take possession within 15 days is subjective conclusion and on that basis, if such notification is issued, the same cannot be vitiated and this Court cannot sit as a court of appeal to re-appreciate the same and under the circumstances of the case, the notification, so issued, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. 11. So far as the argument that once the land is mutated in the name of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 on 19.4.89 vide Annex-1 and non-mention of name of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3; in the notification the same become invalid and is liable to be quashed, is not accepted for the reason that the name of original owner alongwith other particulars is already mentioned. The requirement of law is that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act must contain the particulars including the name of owner,'such as locality, area, khasra number etc., so as to enable the interested person to know as to which land is being proposed to be acquired and for what purpose. In this regard reference can be made to the matters of Smt. Ratna Devi v. State, reported in 1996(1) WLC, 371 and in the matter of Hawa Singh v. State reported in 1992(2) WLN 303. 12. This argument is otherwise not acceptable as per the allegations of the petitioners Nos. In this regard reference can be made to the matters of Smt. Ratna Devi v. State, reported in 1996(1) WLC, 371 and in the matter of Hawa Singh v. State reported in 1992(2) WLN 303. 12. This argument is otherwise not acceptable as per the allegations of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 that they have already sold their land to the society-petitioner No. 1 in 1987 for consideration and even on the basis of the alleged mutation, the agreement will not be helpful as it cannot be given effect curing the continuation of settlement which commenced from 11.2.82 and came into effect after 10 years only on 6.6.92, as per letter dated 19.9.92, after the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 2.9.91. 13. Further the petitioner has not been able to show as to what prejudice has been caused to them, more particularly when society has filed objections on 16.3.92 and as stated, mere omission is not material and no prejudice would be caused. It is pertinent to note that if the acquisition is in accordance with procedure the owner can have only a right of compensation, therefore, at the most, the petitioner have a right of consideration for compensation and in any case petitioner cannot have more than that of the original-khatedar and the same has been taken care of in the award itself. Under the circumstances it cannot be said that the notification is bad, and there is no error or infirmity in the impugned order so as to call for any interference, and the writ petition is liable 'to be dismissed. 14. Mr. Dhankar submits that the award is liable to be quashed as no approval of the State Government is taken as per reply of the State Government in para 18-H, wherein it is stated that the award was passed with previous approval of the appropriate Govt./State Government. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the reply, as in award dated 23.3.92 itself, there is an endorsement to get it approved, and in fact the same was approved on 28.3.93 and, therefore, on this count also notification and award cannot be set aside. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the reply, as in award dated 23.3.92 itself, there is an endorsement to get it approved, and in fact the same was approved on 28.3.93 and, therefore, on this count also notification and award cannot be set aside. Moreso, any irregularity in the service of notice under Sections 9 and 10 is curable and on account thereof, the award made by L.A.O. does not become invalid as has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of T.N. & Anr. v. Mahalaxmi Ammal & Ors. (supra). 15. It is pertinent to note that these acquisition proceedings under the notification have been completed long back, award for compensation has been passed and the same has been paid and other Khatedars have already accepted the same. Under the circumstances when possession has been taken over by the State Government, by operation. of Section 16 of the Act, the land vests in Government absolutely free from all encumbrances and the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act cannot be gone into and no relief as prayed for, can be granted. More so the notification has been upheld by the decision rendered in Birdhi Chand's case connected with 6 others, decided by a common judgment on 12.8.93, and I find no good reason to differ the same from the present case 16. Mr. Dhankar has not disputed the above-mentioned decision but his argument is that in Birdhi Chand's case, question of issuance of notice under Section 9 was not considered. The said argument is also not helpful for the reason that even assuming that no notice under Section 9 of the Act is issued, the incumbents are entitled to seek reference under Section 18(3) of the Act. Therefore, the argument that the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed and set aside for want of notice under Sections 4, 6 and 9 is of no avail. The cases reported in Smt. Geeta Devi Ghatiwal v. State : 1993(1) WLC (Raj.) 466 will not be helpful to the facts of this case. 17. The arguments of the respondents have some substance that petitioners Nos. The cases reported in Smt. Geeta Devi Ghatiwal v. State : 1993(1) WLC (Raj.) 466 will not be helpful to the facts of this case. 17. The arguments of the respondents have some substance that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 have no locus standi as according to their own averments, they have sold their land to petitioner No. 1 society for the consideration long back and now they have no subsisting right, and cannot invoke and challenge the same in the facts and circumstances of the case, that too, at this belated stage as he has not challenged the same at the initial stage of issuance of notification in the year 1991. 18. A reference of Sunil Kumar Jain's case reported in 1995(5) SCC 147, may also be made wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that agreement of sale does not confer any title and, therefore, the agreement-holder even assuming that the agreement is valid, does not acquire any title of the property. Under the circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings in this writ petition. 19. In Krishna Co-operative Society (supra) alongwith some identical matters decided by a common order on 8.10.88 considering the D.B. Case in the matter of Dhirajbhai's case (supra) reported in LACC 1989 page 591, has held that neither the society nor the allottee have any locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings and on this ground alone this petition deserves to be dismissed. A reference of the case of Topkhana Desh's case may also be made. 20. The argument of Mr. Dhankar is that the petitioner has recommended for de-acquisition of the land in the case of Hindustan Petroleum where Mr. Kasliwal himself was representing as counsel and by not recommending for de- acquiring the land in this case will amounts to discrimination, therefore,, as the procedure is complete, the land which is not required may be de-acquired otherwise it will be a discrimination, is also not tenable as per the reply that in that case due to challenge in their plea and reduction in the project they have de-acquired the land. Thus the argument of Mr. Dhankar regarding discrimination is not helpful. 21. Thus the argument of Mr. Dhankar regarding discrimination is not helpful. 21. As stated above, the possession has already been taken and under the circumstances the petitioner cannot take any advantage of the order maintaining status-quo passed at the time of issuance of show cause notice on 15.3.96, the same is vacated and stands discharged. 22. No other point was pressed before me. 23. For the reasons, I have already discussed above, I find no illegality and infirmity in the notification and the award and the same are sustainable and no interference is called for, by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******