Judgment :- K.A. Swami, C.J. This writ appeal is preferred against the order dated 19. 1996 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing Writ Petition No. 14133 of 1995. 2. The petitioner sought for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Secretary, Selection Committee to admit the petitioner for the I year M.B.B.S. Course, 1995-96 and pass such further or other Orders as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has obtained a decree for divorce by mutual consent and therefore, she is not entitled to claim the benefit as a deserted woman. Hence, the petitioner has come up in appeal. 3. It is true that as per the prospectus issued for the Academic Year 1995-96, under clause 3.5 (vii), certain seats were reserved for the category of deserted women. The appellant applied for entrance examination on 24. 1995 as a deserted woman and applied for admission on 6. 1995 as a deserted woman. The General List of Admission was published on 16. 1995. However, the Special List relating to the reservation was published only on 17. 1995 and long before 17. 1995, on 7. 1995 the petitioner/appellant had obtained divorce by mutual consent under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. The motion for the decree for divorce by mutual consent is required to be made by both the parties not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition as per Sub-sec.(l) of Sec.13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, from a copy of the petition made by the petitioner alone and the order passed thereon, it is seen that the petition to nullify the marriage was filed under Sec. 13(1) of the Act on 110. 1994 by the petitioner only, on the ground of desertion. However, on 7. 1995, a joint memo appears to have been filed by the petitioner and her husband to treat the petition filed on 110. 1994 as the one filed under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act and to grant divorce on mutual consent. This is clear from the order passed by the Principal Sub Judge, Dindigul, on 7. 1995 in M.M.O.P. No. 110 of 1994, which is as follows: "7. 1994 as the one filed under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act and to grant divorce on mutual consent. This is clear from the order passed by the Principal Sub Judge, Dindigul, on 7. 1995 in M.M.O.P. No. 110 of 1994, which is as follows: "7. 1995: Joint memo filed to treat this petition for divorce under Sec.13-B of the Act on mutual consent presented and the petition is created under Sec. 13(b). Statement of petitioner recorded. Statement of respondent recorded. I am satisfied that the petitioner and respondent mutually consented for divorce. This petition is held for more than six months. I am satisfied that there is no fraud or collusiveness in the joint memo. Hence, the divorce is granted under Sec. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground of mutual consent." Thus, it appears that the parties had agreed for a divorce on mutual consent but that petition under Sec. 13( 1) of the Hindu Marriage Act had come to be filed only to take advantage of the reservation made for the category of deserted woman. It is relevant to notice that a joint memo to treat the petition as the one filed for divorce under Sec. 13(B) was filed on 7. 1995 after the admission list for general category was published on 16. 1995 and it was also published in the newspapers on 16. 1995 and the order of divorce on mutual consent was obtained on 7. 1995 itself. The case of desertion under these circumstances becomes doubtful. 4. A Division Bench of this Court has taken the view in State of Tamil Nadu v. N.Santhanalakshmi, (1995)1 L. W. 750, that after the marriage is dissolved by grant of a decree for divorce, a woman ceases to be a deserted woman. She will not be entitled to the benefit of reservation relating to the Special Category of deserted woman. The aforesaid decision was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court in N.Santhanalakshmi v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11001 of 1995 and the Special Leave Petition was disposed of on 27. 1995 in the following terms: "This petition relates to admission to the M.B.B.S., course against the quota reserved for ‘Deserted woman’. The admission of the petitioner has been set aside by the High Court by the impugned judgment. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 1995 in the following terms: "This petition relates to admission to the M.B.B.S., course against the quota reserved for ‘Deserted woman’. The admission of the petitioner has been set aside by the High Court by the impugned judgment. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that this is a fit case in which the petitioner may be accommodated against a seat that may be made available to her in the current year. We, therefore, dispose of the matter with those observations without going into the questions raised by the petitioner. We would, however, direct the State Government to make necessary amendment in the regulations governing admission to M.B.B.S., course so as to clarify the position with regard to reservation of seats for this category. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly." 5. No amendment is made to the Regulations governing admission to M.B.B.S. course relating to the category of deserted woman, nor there is any clarification issued, regarding reservation of seats to the category of deserted women for admission to I year M.B.B.S., 1995-96. 6. Learned counsel submits that as a result of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the decision of this Court referred to above stands reversed, therefore, the appellant is entitled to the relief. We find it very difficult to accept this submission. Firstly, the Supreme Court has not stated anything about the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decision of this Court. Secondly, the said judgment has not been set aside by the order of the Supreme Court. Rule is also not changed. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court has directed that the petitioner herein may be accommodated against a seat that may be made available to her in the current year. Therefore, we find it difficult to hold that the proposition laid down by this Court stands set aside. 7. However, it is contended that as on the date the General List of Admission was published, viz., on 16. 1995, the petitioner/appellant continued to be a ‘deserted woman’ and it was only on 7. 1995 she ceased to be one such. Therefore, she was entitled to the benefit as on the date the General List was published. 7. However, it is contended that as on the date the General List of Admission was published, viz., on 16. 1995, the petitioner/appellant continued to be a ‘deserted woman’ and it was only on 7. 1995 she ceased to be one such. Therefore, she was entitled to the benefit as on the date the General List was published. It may be pointed out here that the publication of the General List had nothing to do with the publication of Special Category List relating to reservation, which was published only on 17. 1995. It is also not in dispute that on 7. 1995 itself, divorce on mutual consent was obtained by the petitioner under Sec.13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act and this fact had been brought to the notice of the Selection Committee also. As stated in the counter-affidavit, the Selection Committee has not selected the petitioner in the category belonging to ‘deserted women’. 8. The petitioner knowing full well did not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court till 110. 1995. In the matter of admission, that too the 1st year M.B.B.S. The delay of three months is itself an adequate circumstance for declining to exercise jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. In addition to this, we may also point out that the Academic year 1995-96 was over long back and as far as the Academic year 1996-97 is concerned, no admission can be directed unless one has applied for and passed the entrance test and secured the required number of marks. Therefore, on this ground also, the petitioner/ appellant will not be entitled to admission. 9. For the reasons stated above, the writ appeal is rejected. 10. C.M.P. No. 15113 of 1996 is dismissed.