JUDGMENT 1. - Both the writ petitions are disposed of by this common order. - On the request of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition No. 729/85 has also been taken up for hearing. 2. The dispute in writ petition No. 574/91 is in respect of acquisition of land of the petitioner society. In this case the petitioner is a member of Sahakari Mitra Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd., which has purchased the land by registered sale-deed dated 17.10.70. The land is measuring 4 Biglias 14 Biswas situated in village Chak Dhula on Jhalana Road, Jaipur having khasra No. 69/6. An application was moved to the Secretary, UIT on 26.5.1978 for permission of sub-division. The said application was rejected on 18.8.83 against which an appeal was preferred to the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal which was decided on 31.3.1984. The writ petition No. 729/85 is against the order of the Jaipur Development Authority Tribunal dated 31.3.1984 which has been filed by the JDA on the ground that the learned Judge, JDA Tribunal was not justified in quashing the acquisition proceedings in appeal filed by the society under section 83 of the JDA Act. 3. In writ petition No. 729/85 the facts which have been stated are that the application was submitted in accordance with the Conversion Rules, 1971 for converting the agricultural land into abadi/residential and the Officer, Land Conversion allowed the application of the society on 3.1.1975. Thereafter the acquisition proceedings were initiated by, issuing notification under section 52 of the UIT Act and the notification under sub-sec. (1) and (2) of Section 52 were published in the official gazette on 22.5.1975 and 30.6.76. The Tribunal proceeded, with presumption that no notice was issued to the society and from the letter of the land Acquisition Officer dated 1.1.1981 the khatedar tenant has taken the amount of the award. The possession of the land was taken on 29.1.1977 as mentioned in the order of the Tribunal. Before the learned Judge of the Tribunal the preliminary. objection was raised that the sub-division could not be approved because the land in question has been acquired by the Government and, therefore, the appeal against the order dated 18.8.$5 be not allowed. Various questions which were raised were stated against the acquisition proceedings and it was submitted that under section 83(8) the appeal is not maintainable. objection was raised that the sub-division could not be approved because the land in question has been acquired by the Government and, therefore, the appeal against the order dated 18.8.$5 be not allowed. Various questions which were raised were stated against the acquisition proceedings and it was submitted that under section 83(8) the appeal is not maintainable. The Tribunal found that the application has been submitted for sub-division and the question of acquisition of land has cropped up incidentally. The appeal is essentially against the order of rejecting the application for sub-division of the land and the appeal was held competent. 4. It wa3, found that the society is interested person under section 52(2)' and -no notice was served upon it. Reliance was placed on the decision given by this court in the case of UIT v. Balbir Singh, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 183/82 decided on 22.8.83 . On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on the decision of Dr. Mrs. Grace Harris v. State of Rajasthan, 1981 RLW 620 . The Tribunal found that in the present case the land was not purchased in contravention of the provisions of law and, therefore, the decision of Dr. Mrs. Grace Harris is not applicable., In the case of Balbir Singn it ' was decided that the provisions of Section 52(2) are mandatory and the notice was required to be served which has not been served and that after publishing notice under section 52(1) of the Act the land vest absolutely free from all encumbrances from the date of publication of notification under section 52(4) of the Act, in the State Government. Since the notice were not served on the society, therefore, it was held that subsequent proceeding of acquisition are vitiated and JDA cannot refuse permission of sub-division on the ground of acquisition. 5. I have considered over the matter. So far as observations of the learned Judge, JDA Tribunal to this extent is concerned, that an appeal against the order refusing sub-division is maintainable, it is perfectly in accordance with law, but the acquisition proceedings which have already been initiated and completed cannot be quashed in any proceedings other than by way of writ. So far as observations of the learned Judge, JDA Tribunal to this extent is concerned, that an appeal against the order refusing sub-division is maintainable, it is perfectly in accordance with law, but the acquisition proceedings which have already been initiated and completed cannot be quashed in any proceedings other than by way of writ. In this regard the decision of Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, 1996(7) SCC 219 is relevant wherein it was found that the civil court has no jurisdiction to give decision on the validity of award and it can be done by the High Court and Supreme Court in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 and 136 of the Constitution. Following this decision, I am of the view that the JDA Appellate Tribunal or civil court has not jurisdiction to decide upon the in-validity of the acquisition proceedings. The order dated 31.5.1984 is accordingly quashed and the writ petition No. 729/85 is allowed. It may however be observed that if the acquisition proceedings is valid then the question of any sub-division does not arise. 6. In writ petition No. 474/91 learned counsel for the petitioner has relied the decision in the case of State of U.P. v. Rajiv Gupta, 1994(5) SCC 686 that limitation period of two years for making the award is mandatory and even before coming into force of the land Acquisition Act, 1894, under the provisions of Land Acquisition (Rajasthan) Amendment Act, 1987 which came into force on 4.4.87, the proceedings should have been concluded within a period of two years. The decision given in the case of Bishambhar Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, 1991(1) WLC 686 has also been relied on this point. 7. The. decision in the case of Nahar Singh v. State of U.P., 1996(1) SCC 434 is also relied where the power under section 17(4) were exercised and since the award was not made within two years it was stated that the proceeding under section 4 and 6 stood lapsed. 8. 7. The. decision in the case of Nahar Singh v. State of U.P., 1996(1) SCC 434 is also relied where the power under section 17(4) were exercised and since the award was not made within two years it was stated that the proceeding under section 4 and 6 stood lapsed. 8. On behalf of the respondents the Division Bench decision of Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1995(6) SCC 31 has been relied to show that even if there is delay of more than 37 years in completing acquisition proceedings due to intervention of some interested parties, the proceedings would not lapse if the possession of the land has been taken under section 17(1) prior to making of the award and even if no award is made within the period of prescribed under section 11-A. The decision in the case of Pratap v. State, JT 1996(2) SC 759 has also been relied wherein the. Division Bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges held that once the vesting of the land in the State Government free from all encumbrances was completed the subsequent extension of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the State and by amending Acts to the UIT Act becomes wholly irrelevant and of no consequence. In view of the decision in the case of Pratap, referred to above, this question that the award was not passed cannot be allowed to be agitated when possession of the land has already been taken in this case on 29.1.1977. 9. A question has also been raised that even if the provisions of Section 11-A are not applicable the acquisition should have been done within reasonable time as was considered by the Apex Court in 1990(4) SCC 44 in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India , where it was observed that even the limitation is not prescribed then the proceedings should have been completed within a reasonable time and after taking into consideration the decision of Aflatoon's case it was observed that the reasonable time's of two years from the judgment. It may also be observed that the award in this case was passed on 27.6.1989. The proceedings were initiated under section 52(1) on 22.5.1975 and Section 52(2) on 30.6.1976. The earlier purchaser appeared in responded to the notice issued. It may also be observed that the award in this case was passed on 27.6.1989. The proceedings were initiated under section 52(1) on 22.5.1975 and Section 52(2) on 30.6.1976. The earlier purchaser appeared in responded to the notice issued. In the award it is mentioned that Shyam Sunder stated that according to sale-deed full consideration was not paid by the petitioner and, therefore, the sale-deed has become infructuous. Notification mentioning khasra No. 69/6/139 has given the complete details of the places where the land is situated and the area thereof. It is stated that the correct number is 69/6. 1 do not consider that while mentioning khasra No. 69/6/139 any illegality has been committed. It may be on account further sub-division of khasra no. 69/6 and in view of decision in the case of RIICO v. Sudesh Gogiya, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 674/92 decided on 1.6.96 it cannot be said that the notifications were issued with incorrect particulars. The publication of the notification in the gazette is itself sufficient to have the legal presumption that every one, was having the knowledge of it. The petitioner has allowed continuation of these proceedings, therefore, after the possession is taken and award is made, the question that he was not given the opportunity cannot be considered. in view of the decision in the case of Ranjus Foundation v. State, 1993 Supll. (2) SCC 20 . 10. A . contention has also been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petition after such a long time suffers from laches. This contention has force. Besides the merit as discussed above, even this presumption cannot be raised that the petitioner has no knowledge. The writ petition suffers from laches and is liable to be dismissed. 11. An application for amendment of the writ petition has been moved that the State Government is regularising the land of other societies in accordance with the circular dated 18.2.1994. So far as this contention is concerned, there is no order passed so far on which any decision for regularisation or not regularisation could be given. There is no prayer for issue of writ of mandamus to pass the order on the application submitted by the petitioner and, therefore, the application for amendment cannot be allowed. 12. The writ petitions, above numbered, having no force are accordingly dismissed.Writ petition dismissed. *******