D. S. SINHA, J. Heard Sri Yogesh Kumar Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri D. N. Verma, learned Standing Counsel representing the respondent Nos. 1, 2. 3 and 4. 2. The petitioner, an erstwhile temporary Collection Peon of Tehsil Bhongaon, district Mainpuri, invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievance against the order dated 4th April, 1995, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer/sub-District Magistrate, Tehsil Bhongaon, district Mainpuri, the respondent No. 2, a copy whereof is Annexure 9 to the petition, purporting to dispense with his service. 3. Asserting that he was selected on regular basis for appointment on the post of collection peon in accordance with the provisions contained in U. P. District Office Collectorate Ministerial Service Rules, 1980 read with Group d Employees Service Rules, 1985 he claims that dispensation of his services without observing the principle of natural justice id est without affording him any opportunity of hearing to him, is bad in law and liable to be struck down. 4. Noticing the above assertion, the court passed the following order on 3rd May, 1995 : "the petitioner has asserted that he had selected on regular basis for appointment on the post of Collection Peon in accordance with the provisions contained in U. P, District Office Collectorate Ministerial Service Rules, 1980 read with group d Employees Service Rules, 1985. 10. The appointment of the petitioner, being fixed term appointment could continue only for a period of three months unless it was extended further. The appointment was not extended, and the time bound appointment of the petitioner came to an end. 11. However, on 24th October, 1994 W. B. N. made another proposal for giving to the petitioner full time temporary appointment terminable without any prior notice. The proposal was countersigned by the Naib, Tehsildar and Tehsildar on 24th October, 1994 itself. Eventually, the Sub-Divisional Officer by his order dated 28th October, 1994 approved the proposal. Thus, the petitioner was given appointment on the post of collection peon purely on temporary basis on condition that his appointment was terminable without any previous notice. 12. Accepting the appointment of collection peon, purely on temporary basis and terminable without notice, the petitioner joined the post. 13. Thus, the petitioner was given appointment on the post of collection peon purely on temporary basis on condition that his appointment was terminable without any previous notice. 12. Accepting the appointment of collection peon, purely on temporary basis and terminable without notice, the petitioner joined the post. 13. On 4th April, 1995 the Sub-Divisional Officer/sub-District Magistrate passed an order purporting to bring to an end the temporary employment of the petitioner. This order is the foundation of the grievance of the petitioner and is under challenge in instant petition. 14. The principal, and in the fore-front, submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the order dated 4th April, 1995 is bad in law inasmuch as it was passed in violation of the principle of natural justice, namely, the opportunity of hearing to the petitioner against the action of bringing about the termination of his service. 15. Under the circumstances, the court is called upon to decide as to whether the petitioner was legally entitled to any opportunity of hearing before his employment was brought to an end by the impugned order ; and that the denial of such an opportunity resulted in any legally cognizable infirmity justifying intervention by this court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. An incumbent who has been given appointment purely on temporary basis, terminable without notice, has no right to hold the post and he is not entitled to any opportunity of hearing before his service is dispensed with. The decisions rendered by the Honble Supreme Court of India in the cases of Purshottam Lai Dhingra v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1958 SC 36 ; State of U. P. Kaushal Kishore Shukla reported in JT 1991 (1) SC 108 ; Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1992 SC 496 ; Commissioner of Food and Civil Supply v. Prakash Chandra Saxena reported in (1994) 5 SCC 177 ; Ram Chandra Tripathi v. U. P. Public Service Tribunal IV reported in JT 1994 (2) SC 84 and Madhya Pradesh Hast Shilp Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 638 , leave no room for taking any contrary view. 17. 17. The petitioner being an incumbent given temporary appointment liable to be brought to an end without any previous notice had no legally cognizable and judicially enforceable right on the post of collection peon, and was, therefore, not entitled to any opportunity of hearing before termination of his appointment. 18. In the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1558 , the Honble Supreme Court has very clearly laid down that "a breach of procedure, whether called by failure of natural justice, or an essential administrative fault, cam of give aggrieved person" a remedy in the courts, unless behind if there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The court does not act in vain. " 19. Therefore, mere breach of any principle of natural justice is of consequence, and cannot nullify the order if such order does not affect any vested right of the aggrieved person. No observance of any principle of natural justice must result in loss of something of substance in order to entitle the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to make out some capital in favour of the petitioner from the use of the Hindi words niyukti nirast in the impugned order whereby purely temporary services of the petitioner have been brought to an end. According to him niyukti nirast meant appointment cancelled He, therefore, argued that may be that the purely temporary and terminable without any notice employment of the petitioner could be brought to an end without any opportunity of hearing being given to him, but his appointment could not be cancelled without giving him opportunity of being heard. 21. It is to be remembered that what is to be seen is the import and impact of the order as a whole, and not only a few words used therein. No word used in an order can be read de hors the context in which it is used. Tested on this touchstone, there is no doubt that the import and impact of the impugned order is to terminate the purely temporary and terminable with out any notice employment of the petitioner on the post of collection peon which he had no vested right to hold. Tested on this touchstone, there is no doubt that the import and impact of the impugned order is to terminate the purely temporary and terminable with out any notice employment of the petitioner on the post of collection peon which he had no vested right to hold. The use of the words niyukti nirast may be inappropriate, but the import is discernable. The predominant intention of the impugned order is clearly to terminate the absolutely temporary service of the petitioner. The use of inappropriate words niyukti nirast in the impugned order is immaterial and inconsequential. After all the words are merely vehicles used to convey the thoughts and ideas. If the thoughts and ideas are clearly and understandably conveyed the use of inappropriate words sinks into insignificance and no umbrage can be taken to the same. 22. The order of appointment had vividly conveyed to the petitioner that this appointment was purely temporary and liable to be terminated any time without notice, and he had accepted the same with eyes wide open. Therefore, the alleged lapse of using inappropriate word niyukti nirast in the impugned order has not resulted in any manifest injustice to the petitioner as he had no vested right to hold the post of collection peon. The loadstar for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the failure of justice and prevention of injustice. Any infirmity, either legal or factual, which does not result in failure of justice cannot be the substratum for exercise of special and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner invites the attention of the court to certain averments made in the writ petition suggesting mala fides in the impugned action of termination of the employment of the petitioner. However, he very fairly concedes that on these assertions the plea of a mala fides cannot be sustained. 24. All told, the court it clearly of the opinion that the petition has no substance and is liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly. Petition dismissed.