JUDGMENT - A.D. MANE, J. :---These two appeals are preferred by the original accused Nos. 1 and 2 respectively (hereinafter referred to as the accused Nos. 1 and 2) to challenge the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amalner on 19-11-1993 in Sessions Case No. 40 of 1990. 2. The graveman of the charge levelled against these accused was that on the night between 18-10-1990 and 19-10-1990 they forcibly entered in the hut of P.W. 6 Kasubai and committed sexual inter-course not only with her but with her married daughter P.W. 1 Sangeeta, who had come there for Diwali festival. 3. The accused No. 1 is convicted under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs. 2000/- in default, rigorous imprisonment for one year in addition to further suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused No. 2 is, however, sentenced under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code with rigorous imprisonment of one year but he came to be acquitted under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. In the nut-shell the prosecution case was that during Diwali festival of 1990 prosecutrix P.W. 1 Sangeeta came to her mother P.W. 6 Kausabai who resides in a hut separate from her husband in the locality known as Tadipura, Amalner. Sangeeta was pregnant by 4/5 months. It was alleged that they went to bed in the hut after taking meals. Both prosecutrix and her mother were sleeping on a cot. There is no shutter to the hut. Prosecutrix however, awaken on finding that someone was pulling her hands. It was alleged that both these accused had come, they gave threats and under duress prosecutrix submitted to the wish of the accused and the accused committed sexual intercourse not only with Sangeeta but also with her mother. 5. It is alleged that on the next day morning a girl Kiran, daughter of neighbour Laxman, finding that neither prosecutrix nor her mother came out of hut, entered the hut and enquired and it is only then according to prosecution, mother of prosecutrix narrated the incident to Kiran, who later on informed to her father Laxman and it is Laxman who advised these ladies to go to police station to lodge a complaint. That is why, on filing the complaint from Sangeeta, crime was registered and accused were arrested and prosecuted. 6. The defence of the accused was one of total denial and according to them a false complaint came to be lodged when they were pressurising the prosecutrix and her mother to vacate the hut in the area. 7. At the trial the prosecution mainly relied upon evidence of P.W. 1 Sangeeta, P.W. 6 Kasubai on one hand and P.W. 5 Laxman and P.W. 10 Investigating Officer on the other. There is evidence in the shape of circumstantial evidence i.e. seizure of clothes of prosecutrix, as well as accused, seizure of quilt and report of Chemical Analyser etc. There is also evidence of P.W. 2 Dr. Suman. 8. At the outset it may be stated that so far as evidence of P.W. 5 Laxman and P.W. 6 Kasubai is concerned both these witnesses have turned hostile and never supported prosecution version. The medical evidence as spoken to by P.W. 2 Dr. Suman also does not corroborate that any marks of violence were noticed either on the person of prosecutrix Sangeeta or her mother. The evidence of Doctor is plain enough to show that there were no signs of sexual intercourse especially when prosecutrix is a pregnant married lady. 9. The prosecution version, therefore, solely depends upon the testimony of prosecutrix P.W. 1 Sangeeta. The learned trial Judge did not accept that in a case like present corroboration to the testimony of prosecutrix is necessary. It appears that the learned trial Judge is influenced with the often drawn inference that no woman of honour will accused another of rape since she sacrifices thereby what is dearest to her and as such to insist on corroborative evidence would amount to added insult to injury. 10. Question, therefore, arises, whether that approach of the learned trial Judge is proper in law in a given situation of the case. It is true that a woman who has been raped is not an accomplice. If she was ravished she is the victim of an outrage and if she consented there is no rape. The true rule of prudence requires that in every case of this type the advisability of corroboration should be present in the mind of the Judge and that must be indicated in the judgment. If she was ravished she is the victim of an outrage and if she consented there is no rape. The true rule of prudence requires that in every case of this type the advisability of corroboration should be present in the mind of the Judge and that must be indicated in the judgment. But corroboration can be dispensed with by the Judge if in the particular circumstances of the case before him he himself is satisfied that it is safe to do so. Even if corroboration is insisted upon in a particular case, the Court is required to see the peculiar facts and circumstances such as whether corroboration can come from the previous statement of the prosecutrix soon after the occurrence and her subsequent conduct showing protest. The proved circumstances in the evidence of prosecution, therefore, require emphasis. 11. The elderly women P.W. 6 Kasubai, mother of prosecutrix 4 as indicated in the evidence of Sangeeta (sic) herself was similarly situated. It is her version that when both the accused entered the hut, the accused No. 2 took P.W. 6 Kasubai out and accused No. 1 remained inside the hut and she obeyed the command made by the accused No. 1 in spreading the quilt on the ground from the cot, lying on it and later the accused committed sexual intercourse. Then she listened to the accused No. 1 in dressing herself and calling her mother inside. It is her version that thereafter, when both accused No. 2 and her mother came in the hut, the accused No. 1 also committed rape on her mother. 12. It is clear from the testimony of Sangeeta that she did not raise any hue and cry or that she did not resist the act of accused. The explanation offered by her that due to threats from the accused she did not resists, appears to be imaginary. If we have regard to the normal conduct of married women in all probabilities she would have made hue and cry when she was subjected to sexual assault. Not only that but P.W. 6 Kasubai would have been the last person to keep mum and forget to get assistance of their neighbour Laxman, who's house is just at the calling distance. Not only that but P.W. 6 Kasubai would have been the last person to keep mum and forget to get assistance of their neighbour Laxman, who's house is just at the calling distance. It cannot be forgotten that P.W. 6 Kasubai who was expected to keep honour of her married daughter and save her from being outraged at the hands of accused, would have taken all possible steps apprehending the accused there and there only with help of her neighbours. 13. The very fact that she did not support her daughter Sangeeta is a strongest circumstance which throws a considerable doubt on the truthfulness of the version of Sangeeta. The conduct of mother as well as conduct of prosecutrix, therefore, is not consistent with the happening of such events unless there was an element of consent on their part. It does not stand to reason that P.W. 6 Kasubai would not have supported the say of Sangeeta, had really the accused forcibly done sexual intercourse with them. As said above, she would have been the last person to destroy the very fabric of the prosecution version. The trend of cross-examination of this witness by the prosecution also does not suggest that she was won over by the accused in turning hostile to the prosecution. There is also no reason why P.W. 5 Laxman who is her next neighbour and who is said to have advised them to go to police also turned hostile. It may be stated that neither report from Chemical Analyser nor the medical evidence corroborate the theory of sexual intercourse forcibly as sought to be suggested in the mouth of P.W. 1 Sangeeta. 14. In this context, it is not out of place to mention that according to Sangeeta, she was not knowing names of accused and the names of accused were disclosed to her by her neighbour Shinde. P.W. 5 Shinde, however, does not corroborate prosecutrix on this point. Moreover, Sangeeta herself makes a contradictory statement in para No. 7 of her deposition after having said that the names of accused were disclosed to her by Shinde, she again stated that accused themselves told their names when they were committing act of sexual intercourse. That was indeed improbable. 15. Moreover, Sangeeta herself makes a contradictory statement in para No. 7 of her deposition after having said that the names of accused were disclosed to her by Shinde, she again stated that accused themselves told their names when they were committing act of sexual intercourse. That was indeed improbable. 15. Quite apart it was also highly improbable that P.W. 1 Sangeeta and her mother first disclosed act of sexual intercourse to daughter of Laxman, namely, Kiran, because admittedly Kiran is a minor girl. There is also discrepancy in the narration of events as disclosed in the first information report and as disclosed in the evidence at the trial. The first information report contains narration of events in four pages but it is doubtful that was the narration given by her voluntarily unless there is an element of tutoring. P.W. 1 Sangeeta would not have been an author of this first information report. 16. Coupled with these circumstances, as stated above, the medical evidence also does not corroborate that there would have been forcible sexual intercourse. 17. The learned trial Judge, therefore, is not correct in keeping implicit reliance on the testimony of P.W. 1 Sangeeta in disregard to various other circumstances which make it unsafe to rely upon her solitary statement in support of theory of rape. On the contrary the circumstances as hereinabove discussed make it clear that unless there is corroborative evidence it is unsafe to hold that the prosecution has proved guilt of the accused beyond all manners of doubt. It may be stated that the learned trial Judge misread the authorities upon which defence has relied upon to show that solitary interested statement of prosecutrix is not sufficient to bring home guilt to the accused, unless there is corroborative or clinching evidence to support her testimony. The circumstances as disclosed in the evidence of prosecutrix as well as her mother and her neighbour make it clear that the case of prosecutrix that she passively submitted to the act of the accused cannot be accepted as proved. The evidence which tries to suggest that she was not consenting party is difficult to believe when it is not corroborated by equally material witness PW 6 Kasubai. The evidence which tries to suggest that she was not consenting party is difficult to believe when it is not corroborated by equally material witness PW 6 Kasubai. I think, if the evidence of prosecutrix is tested on basis of probability factors her version is inherently improbable to be acted upon, especially when her mother who is also said to be victim of sexual assault has not supported her on any of the counts at the trial. I am, therefore, of the view that the accused are entitled to the benefit of doubt since theory of accused forcibly entering into the hut and committing forcible sexual intercourse with prosecutrix and her mother is far away from the truth, when that could as well have happened with consent. 18. The result, therefore, is that the order of conviction passed against the appellants is not proper in law and the same is required to be quashed and set aside. 19. The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Court below convicting and sentencing the appellants-accused is hereby quashed and set aside and the accused are acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. The appellant accused No. 1 in Cri. Appeal No. 392 of 1993 i.e. original accused No. 1 shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Bail bonds of accused shall stand cancelled. Fine, if paid, be refunded. Appeal allowed.