Judgment :- Heard Mr.R. Subramanian, learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The second appeal has been filed against the concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below dismissing the suit filed by the appellant. He filed the suit O.S. No.822 of 1987 on the file of the District Munsif, Ambasamudram against the respondents for a declaration that the industrial loan obtained by him from the respondents has been discharged by payment of insurance amounts, and for an injunction restraining the respondents from taking any proceedings for recovery of the same. The suit was contested by the respondents who denied repayment and discharge of the loan. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and the appeal A.S. No. 124 of 1992 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ambasamudram was also dismissed on 210. 1993. Aggrieved against the judgments of the courts below, the present second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 3.. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the courts below have committed an error in holding that the discharge of loan pleaded by the appellant has not been proved and that the courts below have misread the loan agreement and wrongly stated that it does not contain any clause regarding adjustment of the loan from insurance amounts, ignoring interest and other grants. It is also contended that the respondents are not entitled to invoke the provisions of Sec.29 of the State Financial Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) without issuing a prior notice of demand directing the appellant to pay the balance of the loan amount. 4. I am unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. Both the courts below, on a consideration of the entire materials placed before them, both oral and documentary, have rejected the claim of the appellant. I am in complete agreement with the reasons recorded by the courts below for rejecting the claim of the appellant. It is settled by catena of decisions of this Court and also of the Supreme Court that the respondents/ Corporation have got powers under Sec.29 of the Act to take possession of the assets of the defaulting units and sell the same to recover its dues. It is settled by catena of decisions of this Court and also of the Supreme Court that the respondents/ Corporation have got powers under Sec.29 of the Act to take possession of the assets of the defaulting units and sell the same to recover its dues. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation v. M/s.Gem Cap (India) (P) Limited, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1435, has held that courts cannot interfere with the action under Sec.29 of the Act unless there is unfairness, and that the Finance Corporation has to recover its dues. A Division Bench of this Court in T.I.I.C. v. Vimal Formulations (P) Limited, W.A. No.507 of 1993, followed the above cited decision of the Supreme Court and has declined to intervene. The Bench has held that the T.I.I.C. cannot be made to wait for realisation of their monies as it would frustrate their public purpose viz., making available funds to others either for the purpose of starting or expanding industries. The Financial Institutions are in need of funds for discharging their duties and functions and such funds could be secured only by taking necessary steps for the recovery of the amounts due to them. The Supreme Court has also deprecated the practice of forestalling the recovery of public money in Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Limited, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 330: (1985)1 S.C.C. 260 : (1989)1 An.L.T. 257. The Supreme Court has also in its recent judgments reported in Chairman and Managing Director, SIPCOT, Madras v. Contrimax (P) Limited, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1632 and J.T. (1996)5 Supreme Court today 37, while considering the scope and ambit of Sec.29 of the Act, held that courts have no power of judicial review against the action initiated under Sec.29 of the Act. 5. For the foregoing reasons, the second appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission itself. Consequently, CMP. No. 15200 of 1996 is also dismissed as no longer necessary.