Judgment : 1. The Revision is directed against the Fair and Decretal Orders dated 12.07.1996 made in LA. No. 230 of 1996 in O.S. No. 167 of 1988 on the file of the II Additional District Munsif of Coimbatore, allowing an application filed by the respondent herein/defendant under Section 152 C.P.C. praying for to amend the decree dated 29.03.1994 in accordance with the prayer sought for in the suit. 2. The Revision is filed by the plaintiffs. They filed the suit against the respondent herein claiming that the suit property is surrounded by a Pallam to the width of 10 feet running north south on the west, S.F. No.737 on the north and Avanashi road on the south and third parties lands on the east. The Pallam on the western side is running from north-south carrying rain water from the entire fields on the north to south and reached east-west Pallam abutting the Avanashi main road and that the entire land owners of the said area provided the said Pallam and used the same to drain the water in order to avoid stagnation of rain water in their respective fields and to protect the standing crops in the lands. It is also averred in the plaint that the said Pallam is in existence for the last several decades and it is the only source of draining the rain and sullage water from the lands of the plaintiffs and other neighbouring land owners. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant is the owner of the lands on the western side of the pallam and he formed a lay out of his lands and divided his lands into the plots and sold the same to various third parties and the defendant in collusion with his close associates is trying to close the said pallam and to annex the area covered by the said pallam to the respective sites and that if the defendant is allowed to do so, the entire rain water and sullage water from the northern side will stagnate in the lands of the plaintiffs and not only the crops will be spoiled but also there will be no access for the drain water to reach the pallam abutting Avanashi road. 3. The reliefs asked for in the plaint are as follows : The plaintiff therefore prays that this Honble Court may be pleased to pass a decree against the defendant. 3. The reliefs asked for in the plaint are as follows : The plaintiff therefore prays that this Honble Court may be pleased to pass a decree against the defendant. a) declare that the suit pallam is in existence for the last several years and the same is the only source of draining the rain water from the lands on the northern side of Avanashi road ; b) restraining the defendant and his men and servants and associates from in any way interfering with the suit pallam by means of a permanent injunction; c) and directing the defendant to pay the costs of the suit; d) and to grant such other and further reliefs. 4. The suit was posted on 29th March 1994 before the II Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore. Counsel for the defendant/respondent herein reported no instructions and the defendant was called absent and set ex parte. Thereupon, the Court proceeded to pass the decree as follows :- 1. It is hereby declared that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit pallam which is in existence for the last several years and the same is the only source of draining the rain water from the lands on the northern side of Avanashi road ; 2. and that the defendant and his men and servants and associates be and hereby restrained from in any way interfering with the suit pallam by means of permanent injunction ; 3. and that the defendant do pay to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 183.25 being the costs of this suit. 5. Since the decree has not been drafted in accordance with the prayer in the plaint, which is for a declaration that the suit pallam is in Existence for the last several years and the same is the only source of draining the rain water from the land on the northern side of Avanashi road and for an injuction to restrain the defendant from in any way interfering with the suit pallam, the defendant filed I.A. No. 230 of 1996 to amend the decree dated 29.03.1994 as follows : PROPOSED AMENDMENT. In decretal portion in clause 1 the words "that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit pallam" to be deleted. In decretal portion in clause 1 the words "that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit pallam" to be deleted. The said application was filed under Section 152 C.P.C. It is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the above application that the lower court has granted a decree for a declaration in favour of the plaintiffs/petitioners herein as if they are the absolute owners regarding which there is no prayer and that it is rather surprising that the decree has been provided in such a manner and the plaintiffs, having obtained a copy of such an erroneous decree, are claiming absolute rights of ownership over the pallam and fencing the same. It is further contended that the decree has been provided incorrectly and since the mistake is apparent on the face of the records, it has to be amended forthwith, since it is only a clerical mistake. It is also pointed out in the affidavit that there is no pleading to the effect that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit pallam and immediately after coming to know that the Court has declared them as absolute owners, the petition to amend the decree dated 29.03.1994 in accordance with the prayer and judgment by deleting the words "that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit pallam" was filed. 6. The second plaintiff filed an additional counter statement, denying all the allegations contained in the affidavit filed in support of the above application. It is contended that the decree has been drafted in accordance with the prayer and that the lower court is competent to grant a decree basing on the evidence and materials placed before the Court and it is for the aggrieved party to question the same in an appeal and not by way of an application under Section 152 C.P.C. It is also stated that the defendant having failed in LA. 235 of 1995, which is an application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing an application to set aside an ex parte decree and having not filed a revision in the High Court, the present application under Section 152 C.P.C. is incompetent. 7. 235 of 1995, which is an application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing an application to set aside an ex parte decree and having not filed a revision in the High Court, the present application under Section 152 C.P.C. is incompetent. 7. The II Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore by her order dated 12.07.1996 after hearing the counsel on either side passed the following order :- The ex parte judgment does not at any place disclose that there is a finding that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit pallam. The relief claimed in the prayer also does not reveal that there is a prayer for declaration of plaintiffs absolute ownership. The decree is therefore not depicting the findings in Judgment and is also not in accordance with the prayer. The error is apparent on the face, which is clerical in nature. Therefore, the LA. allowed and the point plaintiffs are the absolute owners of suit Pallam is deleted. Pronounced by me in open court, this the 12th day of July, 1996. Sd./- N. MEENAL. II Addl. District Munsif. Aggrieved against the same, the plaintiffs have preferred the above Revision in this Court. 8. Mr.D. Rajendran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the Court below has failed to consider the scope of Section 152 C.P.C. and has erred in granting the relief by way of amendment, which is not sustainable in law. The defendant/respondent having remained ex parte before the lower Court, is not entitled to amend the decree under Section 152 C.P.C. and in the absence of any revision against the order of the lower court rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing a petition to set aside the ex parte decree and to restore the suit, the application now presented and ordered by the lower court is incompetent. It is also urged that the amendment of the decree can be granted only in respect of arithmetical and clerical mistakes and not the relief granted by the court below. Therefore, it is submitted that the order of the lower court is liable to be set aside. 9. In support of his contention, Mr. It is also urged that the amendment of the decree can be granted only in respect of arithmetical and clerical mistakes and not the relief granted by the court below. Therefore, it is submitted that the order of the lower court is liable to be set aside. 9. In support of his contention, Mr. Rajendran relied on the following judgments reported in Dhikhi Lai v. Tribeni, AIR 1965 SC 1935 , "Velayudhan Nair v. Kerala K.Y. Kuries Pvt Ltd., Trichur, AIR 1988 Kel. 223 and E. Venkata Subba Rao v. K. Nagabhushanam, AIR 1984 A.P. 352 . Bhikhi Lais case, AIR 1965 SC 1935 referred to supra was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners for the proposition that if a decree is not in conformity with the judgment, the Court has the duty to amend the decree so as to bring it in conformity with the judgment and in the instant case since the decree is in conformity with the judgment of the lower court, it cannot be amended by way of an application under Section 152 C.P.C. and therefore, the order of the lower Court is not in order. It is true that the decree passed in the instant case was in terms of the judgment. It is also equally true that the petition filed by the defendant herein to condone the delay in filing a petition to set aside the ex parte decree is dismissed and the respondent has not so far challenged the same by way of revision or appeal. In the instant case the relief asked for in the plaint by the petitioners/plaintiffs is only to declare that the suit pallam is in existence for the last several years and the same is the only source of draining the rain water from the lands on the northern side of Avanashi road and for restraining the defendant from in any way interfering with the suit pallam by means of a permanent injunction. Nowhere it is pleaded that the petitioners/plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit pallam. However, a judgment was passed by the lower court declaring the petitioners/plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the suit pallam, which is in existence for the last several years. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Nowhere it is pleaded that the petitioners/plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit pallam. However, a judgment was passed by the lower court declaring the petitioners/plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the suit pallam, which is in existence for the last several years. As rightly pointed out by Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel that the decree has been incorrectly drafted by the office in such a manner declaring that the petitioners/plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit pallam when such a plea is not pleaded in the plaint. In my opinion, the judgment reported in Dhikhi Lai v. Tribeni, AIR 1965 SC 1935 is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 10. Velayudhan Nairs case, AIR 1988 Kel. 223, was relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners for the proposition that even a wrong or erroneous decree passed with jurisdiction is binding on the parties just like a correct decree unless it is rectified by appeal or other remedies available according to law and that Section 151 of the Code can have application only when no other remedy is available according to the existing provision of law. The learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court has also taken the view that m exercise of the inherent powers, court cannot over-ride general principles of law and it could only be for securing the ends of justice or preventing abuse of the process of court and in order to prevent such prejudice court can always exercise inherent powers. But when the prejudice is as a result of something done by Court consciously in exercise of judicial discretion and other remedies are open to the party, there is no question of invoking inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. and therefore, the said provisions cannot be invoked as a substitute for the appeal, revision or review. 11. Emani Venkata Subba Raos case, AIR 1984 AP 352 cited supra was rendered by a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court for the proposition that even if a judgment was erroneous or wrong. Section 151 or Section 152 C.P.C. cannot be invoked for amending the same and the proper remedy is to prefer an appeal against the wrong judgment. Section 151 or Section 152 C.P.C. cannot be invoked for amending the same and the proper remedy is to prefer an appeal against the wrong judgment. I am unable to share the views taken by me learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in AIR 1984 AP 352 and the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Velayudhan Nair v. Kerala K. Y. Kitties Pvt. Ltd, Trichur, AIR 1988 Kerala 223 in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Samarendra v. Krishna Kumar, AIR 1967 SC 1440 . 12. Samarendra v. Krishna Kumar, AIR 1967 SC 1440 is directly on the point. The Supreme Court has opined that the errors arising from accidental slip can be corrected subsequently not only in decrees drawn up by Ministerial Officer but even in judgment pronounced and signed by the Court. The Supreme Court also referred to the judgment in Janakirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer, AIR 1962 SC 633 . In that case two questions were raised. (1) Whether the tnal court was competent to pass a final decree for foreclosure though the preliminary decree was for sale and (2) Whether the respondent had the right to contend that he was entitled to redeem the said mortgage in view of the fact that he was the execution purchaser of part of the equity of redemption pendente lite. While answering the questions raised, the Supreme Court held as follows :- (11) Now, it is well settled that there is an inherent power in the court which passed the judgment to correct a clerical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission and to vary its judgment so as to give effect to its meaning and intention. "Every Court" said Bowel L.J. in Mellor v. Swire, (1985) 30 Ch. D. 239, "has inherent power over its own records so long as those records are within its power and that it can set right any mistake in them. An order even when passed and entered may be amended by the Court so as to carry out its intention and express the meaning of the court when the order was made. In Janakirama Iyer v. Neelakanta Iyer, AIR 1962 SC 633 , the decree as drawn up in the High Court had used the words "mene profits" instead of "net profits". In Janakirama Iyer v. Neelakanta Iyer, AIR 1962 SC 633 , the decree as drawn up in the High Court had used the words "mene profits" instead of "net profits". In fact the use of the words "me she profits" came to be made probably because while narrating the facts, these words were inadvertently used in the judgment. This court held that the use of the words "mesne profits" in the context was obviously the result of inadvertence in view of the fact that the decree of the Trial Court had specifically used the words "net profits" and therefore the decretal order drawn up in the High Court through mistake could be corrected under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code even after the High Court had granted certificates and appeal were admitted in this court before the date of the correction. It is true that under Order 20 Rule 3 of the Code once a judgment is signed by the Judge it cannot be altered or added to but the rule expressly provides that a correction can be made under Section 152. The Rule does not also effect the courts inherent power under Section 151. Under Section 152, clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the court either on its own motion or on an application by any of the parties. It is thus manifest that error arising from an accidental slip can be corrected subsequently not only in a decree drawn up by a Ministerial Officer of the court but even in a judgment pronounced and signed by the Court. 13. The learned senior counsel then sought support from R Srinivasan v. M. Thambusamy, 1996 (II) CTC 66 : 1996 (2) L.W 539 . This court (AR. Lakshmanan, J.) held that the wide language of Sections 152 and 153 CPC would cover a case like the present one and that the correction of an error need not always amount to an amendment of a pleading. The order was passed by me following the decision of our High Court in "Subbareddi v. Narayanaswamireddi, AIR 1949 Mad. 282 (Dr. Rajamannar O.C.J.,) and "Krishnapoduval v. Lakshmi Nachiar, AIR 1950 Mad. 751 and also of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in "Mohinder Singh v. Teja Singh, AIR 1979 P & H 47. The order was passed by me following the decision of our High Court in "Subbareddi v. Narayanaswamireddi, AIR 1949 Mad. 282 (Dr. Rajamannar O.C.J.,) and "Krishnapoduval v. Lakshmi Nachiar, AIR 1950 Mad. 751 and also of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in "Mohinder Singh v. Teja Singh, AIR 1979 P & H 47. 14. Learned senior counsel for the respondents next relied on the judgment reported in "Varada Reddiar and another v. Jayachandran and another, 1996 (II) CTC 611 for the proposition that the Court can exercise its powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India to rectify any mis-carriage of justice the moment it comes to the notice of the Court. In the concluding portion, the learned Judge has observed as follows :- The case on hand is also similar. A decree which is beyond the scope of the suit has been granted, thereby depriving certain Temples of their properties. A wrongful gain has been obtained by the plaintiffs, respondents 1 and 2 herein. The decree passed by the Court below has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, this is a fit case where I have to exercise my powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, by exercising my powers under Section 115 C.P.C. and Article 227 of the Constitution, I modify the decree passed by the Court below as follows :The decree of the Court below will be read as of injunction was there restraining the defendant (third respondent herein) for conducting auction on 27. 1991 or any other date till 30.06.1992, and the defendant was entitled to auction or lease out the properties after the said period. 11. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed as indicated above. No costs. I may also usefully refer to the decision of Srinivasan, J. reported in "Annapoorani v. Janaki, 1995 (1) LW 141. The learned Judge treated the Revision Petition, which came up for hearing before him as a suo motu Revision Petition by exercising his powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. That was a case where a daughter-in-lawfiled a suit against mother-in-law, claiming to be a legal heir of her husband. She claimed that she is the absolute owner of the property. That was a case where a daughter-in-lawfiled a suit against mother-in-law, claiming to be a legal heir of her husband. She claimed that she is the absolute owner of the property. Though the mother also had an equal share as a heir to her son, the mother did not contest the matter and ultimately a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. Execution proceedings were taken. It was at that time, a question came up of consideration whether the decree is legally valid. The learned Judge held thus:- When this Court finds that a decree suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record owing to non- application of mind of the Court, to the relevant principles of law, this Court cannot keep silent and allow the decree to be in force, particularly, when it causes grave injustice. There can be no doubt whatever that under the Hindu Succession Act, certain persons are designated as Class I heirs and all of them are entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased Hindu. There is no earthly reason for depriving the mother of the deceased, of her legitimate share in the estate which in this case happens to be a moiety. This is a typical case of miscarriage of justice which should be rectified the moment it comes to the notice of the court. It is only for that reason, I am exercising my powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. I am therefore of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondents herein/defendants under Section 152 C.P.C. after the decree to correct the error is perfectly in order and the Courts are empowered to correct the mistakes under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An argument was advanced by Mr. Rajendran that under Order 20 Rule 3 of the Code, once a judgment is signed by the Judge, it cannot be altered or added. An argument was advanced by Mr. Rajendran that under Order 20 Rule 3 of the Code, once a judgment is signed by the Judge, it cannot be altered or added. In my opinion, the above rule expressly provides that a correction can be made under Section 152 C.P.C. and the Rule does not also affect the Courts inherent power under Section 151 C.P.C. Therefore, it is thus manifestly clear that the errors arising from an accidental slip can be corrected subsequently not only in a decree drawn up by a Ministerial Officer of the Court, but even in a judgment pronounced and signed by the Court, it is well settled that the act of the Court should not prejudice any party and Courts have the duty to see that their records are truth and represent the correct state of affairs. In order to prevent such prejudice. Court can always exercise inherent powers. This Court (Sathiadev, J.) also held that there is no time limit for correcting clerical or arithmetical mistake under Sections 151 and 152 C.P.C. The said opinion was expressed by the learned Judge in the Judgment reported in "V.R. Srinivasa Rahavan and others v. Kannanimal alias Janaki by Power Agent N.C Rajagopal and Others, 1980 TLNJ 50. 16. The Civil Revision Petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No. 11122 of 1996 is also dismissed.