D. K. SETH, J. The order dated 12-7-1989 (Annexure-4 to the petition) by which the petitioners services were ter minated without assigning any reason on the ground that the service was temporary, has been challenged by means of this writ petition. 2. Dr. R. G. Padia, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner con tends that the petitioner having been ap pointed on 4-7-1977 and worked for 12 years ought to have been regularised and should have been treated as in regular ser vice and, therefore, his services cannot be terminated in the manner aforesaid in as much as by reason of the decisions cited by him which will be referred to shortly, hereinafter, the petitioners services ought to have been regularised and the same cannot be terminated before considera tion for regularisation was undertaken. According to him after three years of ser vice, as has been held by Apex Court in the decision cited by him, the petitioners ser vices should have been regularised after expiry of three years and, therefore the order terminating the services of the petitioner should be set aside after having been passed after 12 years of service. Dr. Padia, learned Counsel for the petitioner also contends that in the counter-affidavit the respondents have made -out that the services of the petitioner was not satisfac tory and that the petitioners services should be terminated as a measure ol punishment since he does not attend his office regularly and had availed Medica leave for unnecessary long time. Therefon since stigma had been attached it was more necessary to hold inquiry without whicl the services cannot are dispensed with. 3. Learned Counsel for the respon dents, on the other hand relying on the decision cited at the bar, contends that the petitioners services was never terminated as a measure of punishment or on account of any misconduct. A preliminary inquiry was held so as to find out as to the suitability or desirability of the petitioners continuance in service on ac count of its being unsatisfactory. No stig ma however has been attached and, there fore, the services being temporary could be terminated without assigning any reasons. 4. A preliminary inquiry was held so as to find out as to the suitability or desirability of the petitioners continuance in service on ac count of its being unsatisfactory. No stig ma however has been attached and, there fore, the services being temporary could be terminated without assigning any reasons. 4. It appears from Annexure-CA 9-A to the counter-affidavit, which is a note to the Vice-Chancellor by the Registrar given on 6-9-1989 that after the appointment of the petitioner on 4-7-1977 on ad hoc basis his services were extended for a period of six months at a time successively till 28-2-1981. The particulars whereof have been indicated in the said order. The report consists of certain grounds which indicates that the services of the petitioner was not satisfactory but the same does not indicate any misconduct. It is indicated that the petitioner is not regular in coming to the office and he availed leave without suffi cient cause despite request to improve his quality of work which he had promised. Ultimately, he did not do so. The post in which he was appointed is a temporary post and not against substantive post and his service has not been confirmed. The work of the petitioner was not satisfactory and that three Officers on Special duty under whom he had served, had been suc cessively writing for his transfer and on account of unsatisfactory work. It is also noted that he did not take interest in routine work seriously and despite suffi cient opportunity he did not improve. He appears to be unsuitable for the job. The respondents had never initiated any domestic inquiry against the petitioner. Various other documents disclosed in the counter-affidavit that for one or the other reason the petitioner was asked to clarify the position since he had over-stayed his leave as is clear from Annexure- CA-1 dated 10-5-1978, as well as from An-nexure-CA-2 dated 14-1-1980. He was ab sent without application for which by let ter dated 2-7-1984 the petitioner had asked for pardon, which is Annexure- CA- 3. Overstaying or leave was also men tioned in Annexure-CA-4 dated 15-12-1978. Annexure-CA-5 dated 20-1-1989 is the letter by which the petitioner was sought to be shifted some where else. He was ab sent without application for which by let ter dated 2-7-1984 the petitioner had asked for pardon, which is Annexure- CA- 3. Overstaying or leave was also men tioned in Annexure-CA-4 dated 15-12-1978. Annexure-CA-5 dated 20-1-1989 is the letter by which the petitioner was sought to be shifted some where else. An-nexure-CA- 6 which is dated 31-12-1978 mentions the name of the petitioner to have connection with the four persons named therein for replacing the answer script which is a grave situation. Annexure-CA-7 also mentions something and asked the petitioner to refrain from repeating the same as indicated in Annexure-CA-7 which is dated 8-6-1989. All these allegations were made in para-9 of the counter- affidavit which has not been specifically dealt with while dealing the said para in para-4 of the rejoinder-af fidavit. On the other hand it was stated that the same are matter of record and had no nexus with the present controversy. He has also not alleged that he had replied to the letter contained in Annexure-CA-7, neither he had denied the allegations made therein in the rejoinder-affidavit nor he had spoken anything against the con tents of Annexure-CA-6 in the rejoinder-affidavit though in the supplementary af fidavit various other statements have been made but no specific denial to Annexures- 6 and 7 are incorporated. 5. The above facts goes to show that there are reasons supporting the report that the service of the petitioner is unsatis factory, particularly, when no inquiry was contemplated against him and no stigma was attached. The termination appears to be at termination-simplicitor with in meaning of termination of temporary ser vice. 6. V. B. S. Negi, holding the brief of Mr. M. S. Negi, learned Counsel for the respondents contended relying on the decision in the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India and others, AIR 1964 SC 1854 , that the preliminary inquiry to find out as to the suitability of retention of temporary Government servant does not attract mis chief of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In the said judgment it has been observed that: "10. In the said judgment it has been observed that: "10. It is well settled that temporary ser vants are also entitled to the protection of Ar ticle 311 (2) in the same manner as permanent Government servants, if the Government takes action against them by meeting out one the of the three punishments i. e. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, (see 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36 . But this protection is only available where discharge, removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted byway of punishment and not otherwise. It is also not disputed that the mere use of expressions like terminate or "dis charge" is not conclusive and inspite of the use of such innocuous expressions the Court has to apply the two tests mentioned in Parshotam Lal Dhingras case, 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 86 , namely- (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences; and if either of the tests is satisfied it must be held that the servant had been punished. Further even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducting factor which influences the Govern ment to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists under the contract or the Rules to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant, it is on these principles which have been laid down is Par shotam Laldhingra s case, 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36 , that we have to decide whether the appellant was entitled to the protection of Ar ticle 311 (2) in this case. (12 ). . . . . a preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether aprimafacie case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out and it is very necessary that the two should not be confused. (12 ). . . . . a preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether aprimafacie case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out and it is very necessary that the two should not be confused. Even where Government does not intend to take action by way of punishment against a temporary servant on a report of bad work or misconduct a preliminary enquiry is usually held to satisfy Government that there is reason to dispense with the services of a tem porary employee or to revert him to his substan tive post; for as we have said already Govern ment does not usually take action of this kind without any reason. Therefore when a prelimi nary enquiry of this nature is held in the case of a temporary employee or a Government servant holding a higher rent temporarily it must not be confused with the regular departmental enquiry (which usually follows such a preliminary en quiry) when the Government decides to frame charges and get a departmental enquiry made in order that one of the three major punishments already indicated may be inflicted on the Government servant. Therefore so far as the preliminary enquiry is concerned there is no question of its being governed by Article 311 (2) for that enquiry is really for the satisfaction of Government to decide whether punitive action should be taken or action should be taken under the contract or the Rules in the case of a tem porary Government servant or a servant holding higher rank temporarily to which he has no right. In short a preliminary enquiry is for the purpose of collection of facts in regard to the conduct and work of a Government servant in which he may or may not decide whether or not to subject the servant concerned to the enquiry necessary under Article 311 for inflicting one of the three major punishments mentioned therein. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be held expane, for it is merely for the satisfaction of Govern ment, though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken from the servant concerned even at such an enquiry. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be held expane, for it is merely for the satisfaction of Govern ment, though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken from the servant concerned even at such an enquiry. But at that stage he has no right to be heard for the enquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government and it is only when the Government decides to hold a regular departmental enquiry for the purposes of inflict ing one of the three major punishments that the Government servant gets the protection of ar ticle 311 and all the rights that protection implies as already indicated above. There must there fore be no confusion between the two enquiries and it is only when the Government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the Government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the Government servant is entitled to the protection of that Article. That is why this Court emphasised in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case, 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36 and in Shyam Lal v. State of U. P. (1955) 1 SCR 26 : ALJ 1954 SC 369, that the motive of the induct ing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule is ir relevant. (13 ). . . . . . . . . The mere fact that some kind of preliminary enquiry is held against a temporary servant and following that enquiry the services are dispensed with in accordance with the con tract or the specific service rule (e. g. Rule 5 in this case) would not mean that the termination of service amounted to infliction of punishment of dismissal or removal with in the meaning of Art. 311 (2 ). Whether such termination would amount to dismissal or removal with in the meaning of Article 311 (2) would depend upon facts of each case and the action taken by Government which finally leads to the termina tion of service. " 7. In the case of State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, AIR 1976 SC 2547 , cited by the learned Counsel for the respon dents, it was held: "23. . . . . . . . a temporary hand had no right to the post. " 7. In the case of State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, AIR 1976 SC 2547 , cited by the learned Counsel for the respon dents, it was held: "23. . . . . . . . a temporary hand had no right to the post. It is also not denied that both under the contract of service and the service rules govern ing the respondent, the State had a right to terminate his services by giving him one months notice. The order to which exception is taken is exfacie an order of termination of service simplicitor. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil conse quences nor is it funded on misconduct. In the circumstances the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order and claim the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 24. . . . . . . . . . the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment by probing into the departmental correspondence that passed between the superiors of the respondent overlooking the observations made by this Court in I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1967)2scr 496: AIR 1967 SC 1264 , that when there are no express words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma on the Government servant the Court would not delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research. " 8. In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. M. D. S. Iskander Ali, AIR 1980 SC 1242, cited by the learned Coun sel for the respondents, it has been held: "7. . . . . . . . . it is obvious that temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained. The remarks in the assessment roll merely indicate the nature of the performance put in by the officer for the limited purpose of determining whether or not his -probation should be extended. These remarks were not intended to cast any stigma. In the case of R. L. Stall v. Union of India, (1971) 2 SCR 55 : 1971 Lab. The remarks in the assessment roll merely indicate the nature of the performance put in by the officer for the limited purpose of determining whether or not his -probation should be extended. These remarks were not intended to cast any stigma. In the case of R. L. Stall v. Union of India, (1971) 2 SCR 55 : 1971 Lab. 1c (N) 2, this Court while indicating the nature of assessment made by the reporting officer observed as follows: "these rules abundantly show that a con fidential report is intended to be a general as sessment of work performed by a Government servant subordinate to the reporting authority, that such reports are maintained for the purpose of serving as data of comparative merit when questions of promotion, confirmation etc. arise. " 12. . . . . . . . . even if misconduct, negligence, in efficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the employer to ter minate the services of the employee, a power which the appellants undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the terms of appointment of the respondent such a power flowed from the contract of service it could not be termed as penalty or punishment. " 15. . . . . . . the short history of the service of the respondent clearly shows that his work had never been satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being retained in service and that is why even though some sort of an enquiry was started, it was not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him; In these cir cumstances, therefore, if the appointing authority considered it expedient to terminate the services of the respondent-a probationer it cannot be said that the order of termination attracted the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Thus if the appellant found that the respondent was not suitable for being retained in service that will not vitiate the order impugned as held and observed by this Court in the cases cited above. " 9. In the case of State of U. P and another v. Premlata Misra (Km.) and others, (1994) 4 SCC 489, cited by learned Counsel for the respondents, it has been held: "5. Giving anxious consideration to the respective contention we are of the considered view that the High Court had not considered the matter in its proper perspectives. " 9. In the case of State of U. P and another v. Premlata Misra (Km.) and others, (1994) 4 SCC 489, cited by learned Counsel for the respondents, it has been held: "5. Giving anxious consideration to the respective contention we are of the considered view that the High Court had not considered the matter in its proper perspectives. This court interpreted the self- same rules and held in K. K. Shukla case in paragraph-7 that (SCC pp. 697-698 ). "a temporary Government servant has no right to hold the post, his services are liable to be terminated by giving him one months notice without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such ter mination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of tem porary Government servants. A temporary Government servant can, however, be dismissed from service by way of punishment. Whenever the competent authority is satisfied that the work and conduct of a temporary servant is not satisfactory or that his continuance in service is not in public interest on account of his un-suitability, misconduct or inefficiency, it may either terminate his services in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service or the relevant rules or it may decide the take punitive action it may hold a formal inquiry by framing charges and giving opportunity to the Govern ment servant in accordance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Since a tem porary Government servant is also entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) in the same manner as a permanent Government servant, very often, the question arises whether an order of termination is in accordance with the contract of service and relevant rules regulating the tem porary employment or it is by way of punish ment. " 6. This court considered the entire case law elaborately and had held that the termina tion is in terms of the order of appointment and that therefore, it is not by way of punishment as a punitive measure. Accordingly, the need to con duct an inquiry into the alleged misconduct does not arise and the termination of service in terms of the contract was held to be valid. Accordingly, the need to con duct an inquiry into the alleged misconduct does not arise and the termination of service in terms of the contract was held to be valid. It is settled law that the Court can lift the veil of the in nocuous order to find whether it is the founda tion or motive to pass the offending order. If misconduct is the foundation to pass the order than an enquiry into misconduct should be con ducted and an action according to law should follow. But it is motive, it is not incumbent upon the competent officer to have the enquiry con ducted and the service of a temporary employee could be terminated in terms of the order of appointment or rules giving one months notice or pay/salary in lieu there of. Even if an enquiry was initiated it could be dropped midway and action could be taken in terms of the Rules or order of appointment. The same principle ap plies to the facts in this case. It is seen that the respondent was appointed by direct recruitment by selection committee constituted by the Government in this behalf and on finding about the suitability to the post as an Asstt. Project Officer the respondent was appointed and was posted to the place where she had joined. There after her work was supervised by the higher officers and two officers have submitted their reports concerning the performance of the duties by the respondent. She was regularly ir regular in her duties, insubordinate and left the office during office hours without permission etc. On consideration there of the competent authority found that the respondent is not fit to be continued in service as her work and conduct were unsatisfactory. Under these circumstances the termination is for her unsuitability or unfit-ness but not by way of punishment as a punitive measure and one in terms of the order of ap pointment and also the Rules. Accordingly, the High Court has gone against settled law in allow ing the writ petition. " 10. In reply thereto Dr. Padia, learned Counsel cited the case of State of U. P. v. Rafiquddin, AIR 1988 SC 162 and relied on para 20. Accordingly, the High Court has gone against settled law in allow ing the writ petition. " 10. In reply thereto Dr. Padia, learned Counsel cited the case of State of U. P. v. Rafiquddin, AIR 1988 SC 162 and relied on para 20. In the said case it was held that the Munsifs who were appointed, though did not qualify and their appoint ment having been made not in accordance with law but since they were appointed by the competent authority and the judgment and orders passed by them have not been rendered invalid because of their having not been eligible, therefore, they upheld the inval idity yet considering 12 years ser vice Supreme Court refrained from strik ing down their appointment. The facts of the case are completely different from one, in the present case in as much as in the said case the said Munsif, who claims fixation of their seniority in accordance with Rule 22 on the ground that they were recruited in pursuance of 1970 Examination and therefore, their seniority should be decided at par with the candidates belong ing to 1970 Examination, though the said Munsifs were unsuccessful in 1970 Ex amination but because of the Government need they were given appointment despites their having been unsuccessful. Where as in the present case it is not the question of determining seniority or in valid appointment. The case cited was also not the case where Munsifs had rendered unsatisfactory service for which their ser vices have been terminated. Therefore the facts of the present case where services have been terminated on account of un satisfactory service is materially different from the facts of the case cited at the bar, as referred to above. 11. The next case cited by Dr. Padia, is the case of Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, AIR 1990 SC 371 . In the said case the workmen have claimed that since they were per forming the same duties as are being performed by Group-D employees, therefore on the principle of equal pay for equal work their services should be confirmed and should be paid same pay along with designation available against each workmen performing skilled or semi skilled job or job of clerical nature, as the case may be. In para 6 it was noted as follows: "6. In para 6 it was noted as follows: "6. The main controversy centres round the question whether some petitioners are pos sessed of the requisite qualifications to hold the posts so as to entitle them to be confirmed in the respective posts held by them. The indisputable facts are that the petitioners were appointed between the period 1983 and 1986 and ever since they have been working and have gained a sufficient experience in the actual discharge of duties attached to the posts held by them. Practi cal experience would always aid the person to effectively discharge the duties and is a sure guide to assess the suitability. The initial mini mum educational qualification prescribed for the different posts is undoubtedly a factor to be reckoned without it is so at the time of the initial entry into the service. Once the appointments were made as daily rated workers and they were allowed to work for a considerable length of time, it would be hard and harsh to deny them the confirmation in the respective posts on the ground that they lack the prescribed educational qualifications. In our view, three years ex perience ignoring artificial break in service for short periods created by the respondent in the circumstances would be sufficient for confirma tion. If there is a gap of more than three months between the period of termination and re- ap pointment that period may be excluded in the computation of the three years period. " Relying on the said finding Dr. Padia contends that three years period is the period determined by Supreme Court for the purposes of confirmation where as in the present case the petitioner had rendered 12 years. Therefore, he is en titled to confirmation. But the facts remained that the facts of the case are completely different where it was a claim for equal pay for equal work and not a case of termination. The court approached the said question altogether from different angle. In the said case there was no allega tion that the workmen therein were rendering unsatisfactory service. On the other hand the finding arrived at on the basis of finding of the Tribunal that the workmen had gained sufficient experience by passage of time. Therefore, on facts the said case is completely different and the ratio decided therein cannot be attracted in the present case. 12. On the other hand the finding arrived at on the basis of finding of the Tribunal that the workmen had gained sufficient experience by passage of time. Therefore, on facts the said case is completely different and the ratio decided therein cannot be attracted in the present case. 12. Relying on the decision in the case of State of Haryana and others v. Piara Singh and others, AIR 1992 SC 2130 , Dr. Padia contends that the State being the Model employer cannot keep a person on temporary or ad hoc status for a long period. The rules should have been prescribed the particular period of service after which one has to be confirmed, if there is no rule then three years rule should be inducted as justified. The said case also deals with the question of regularisation of ad hoc employees but does not deal with the question of ter mination on the ground of unsatisfactory service. Relying on the said decision Dr. Padia further contends that in view of the said decision the petitioners service was required to be regularised. Before passing the order of termination the question of regularisation should have been gone into in view of the said judgment. The question raised by Dr. Padia is a question of con sideration for being regularised depend ent on the condition of fulfilling the qualifications and satisfactory service. Therefore, continuous service does not ipso facto entitles the candidate to be con firmed, it is dependent on the question of qualifications and rendering of satisfac tory service. In the present case the ques tion of qualification is not disputed. But the authorities have found that the ser vices rendered is unsatisfactory, a finding of fact arrived at by the authority which this Court cannot overrule. Because of the reasons that the same has to be gone into from the angle of vision at which the employer views the same. The court which is unconcerned with the business of the employer cannot substitute its views be cause it is the relation between the employer and employee who requires work from whose stand point the matter has to be looked into. 13. The court which is unconcerned with the business of the employer cannot substitute its views be cause it is the relation between the employer and employee who requires work from whose stand point the matter has to be looked into. 13. Learned Counsel for the respon dent contends that the report clearly indi cates that even for the purposes of regularisation the petitioners services being unsatisfactory the same does not merit consideration even if the question of regularisation is considered the same would not serve any useful purpose so far as the petitioner is concerned, when the petitioners service was found unsatisfac tory there cannot be any scope of regularising him. On the other hand the case of his unsatisfactory service, the ser vices having been terminated without any stigma the same cannot be questioned in view of decision cited by him, as indicated above. 14. Dr. Padia relying on the decision in the case of Khagesh Kumar and others v. Inspector General of Registration, 1995 (7) it 515, contends that after three years continuous service the petitioner shall be deemed to be regularised. Though the said judgment, as cited with approval, the decision in the case of Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Co-operation (supra) and follows the same but yet in para-19 it has been held: "19. Regularisation in service in the State of U. P. is governed by the Regularisation Rules which prescribes a period of three years con tinuous service. We cannot say that the said period of three years prescribed under the Regularisation Rules is unreasonable. In these circumstances it must be held that unless the petitioners fulfil the requirement of the Regularisation Rules, they cannot be regularised". 15. Ultimately, the directions were given in the said case, as said in paras 23 and24: "23. We are, however, of the view that in the agent of the recruitment being made on the post of Registration Clerks on regular basis, the petitioners or other similarly placed persons should be given one opportunity of being con sidered for such appointment and they be given relaxation in age requirement provided for such appointment under the Rules. During the process of selection weightage may be given for their experience to the Registration Clerks who have worked on daily wage basis and suitable guidelines may be framed for that purpose by the Subordinate Service Selection Commission. 24. During the process of selection weightage may be given for their experience to the Registration Clerks who have worked on daily wage basis and suitable guidelines may be framed for that purpose by the Subordinate Service Selection Commission. 24. For the reasons aforementioned the impugned judgment of the High Court is upheld with the following directions: (1) The petitioners or other similarly placed persons who were employed as Registra tion clerks on daily wage basis prior to October 1, 1986 shall be considered for regularisation under the provisions of Rule 4 (1) (ii) and they have completed three years continuous service. The said period of three years continuous ser vice. The said period of three years service shall be computed by taking into account the actual period during which the employee had worked as Registration clerk on daily wage basis. The period during which such an employee has per formed the duties of Registration clerk under paragraph 101 of the Manual shall be counted as part of service for the purpose of such regularisation. (2) In the event of appointment on regular basis on the post of Registration clerks, the petitioners or other similarly placed persons who had worked as Registration clerks on daily wage basis may be given one opportunity of being considered for such appointment and they be given realization in the matter of age require ment prescribed for such appointment under the Rules. (3) The subordinate Service Selection Commission while making selection for regular appointment to the posts of Registration clerks shall give weightage for their experience to the Registration Clerks who have worked on daily wage basis and shall frame suitable guidelines for that purpose. (4) If any of the petitioners or other similarly placed persons was required to per form the duties of Registration Clerks as an Apprentice under paragraph 101 of the Manual, he may submit a representation to the ap propriate authority setting out the full par ticulars of such employment with in three months and the concerned authority after verifying the correctness of the said claim shall pass the necessary order for the period he is found to have so worked on the post of Registra tion clerk. The said payment shall be made with in a period of three months from the date of submission of the representation. " 16. The said payment shall be made with in a period of three months from the date of submission of the representation. " 16. Therefore, it shows that it is not absolute right to get regularisation. It is dependent upon certain factors which are to be fulfilled. However the said question cannot be operative when it is found that the petitioners service was unsatisfactory. 17. Therefore, following the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents, referred to above, in my view the petitioner cannot succeed in his challenge assailing the order of termina tion in view of the fact that his services were unsatisfactory without assigning any stigma, in the facts and circumstances of the case. 18. By reason of the Second proviso to Statute 2. 06 (3) the service of a tem porary employee can be terminated without notice if the order does not on it face disclosd that the order was based on any charge of misconduct notwithstanding that the order was based on the charge of misconduct or inefficiency as would ap pear form the provisions contained in Statute 2. 06 which is quoted below: "2. 06 (1) Subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes, the Registrar shall have disciplinary control over all employees of the University, other than the following namely- (a) officers of the Unviersity; (b) Deputy Registrars and Assistant Registrars; (c) employees in the University in the Ac counts and Audit section. (2) The power to take disciplinary action under Clause (1) shall include the power to order dismissal, removal, reduction in rank reversion, termination or compulsory retire ment of an employee referred to in the said clause and shall also include the power to suspend such employee during the pendency or in contemplation of an inquiry. (2) The power to take disciplinary action under Clause (1) shall include the power to order dismissal, removal, reduction in rank reversion, termination or compulsory retire ment of an employee referred to in the said clause and shall also include the power to suspend such employee during the pendency or in contemplation of an inquiry. (3) No order shall be made under Clause (2) except after an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry to imposes upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such in quiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making repre sentation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply in the following cases, not-withstanding that the order is based on any charge (including a charge of misconduct or inefficiency) if such order does not disclose, on its face that it was passed on such basis: (a) An order of reversion of an officiating promotee to his substantive rank. (b) An order of termination of service of a temporary employee. (c) An order of compulsory retirement of an employee after he attains the age of fifty years. (d) An order of suspension". 19. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order is without authority or jurisdic tion and the Rules having provided for such termination the question of regularisation or otherwise cannot stand in the way. 20. In the result the writ petition fails and is here by dismissed. There will, how ever, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .