Judgment J. C. VERMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is criminal revision petition under S. 401/397 of Cr. P. C. against the judgment dated 17-2-88 passed by Shri D. N. Joshi, Sessions Judge, Balotra, whereby learned Sessions Judge had discharged the accused Purkha Ram from the offences under Ss. 17 and 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter called the N. D. P. S. Act ). The accused was discharged on the ground that prosecution had grossly violated the mandatory provisions of S. 42 of the Act and actions under the mandatory provisions of S. 42 of the Act were not initiated by the officers empowered i. e. the Inspector, Sub-Inspector etc. The Sessions Judge had relied upon 1987 Cri LR 698 (Nandlal v. State) a judgment of this High Court while passing above said impugned order. ( 2 ) THE facts relating to the said case, as per prosecution are that one Pratap Singh; Foot Constable had given an application in the Police Station, Balotra to the fact that when he was on duty, he was informed that the accused Purkha Ram was in possession of illicit opium. The Foot Constable, Pratap Singh had taken this accused to the police station and presented him before the A. S. I. Prabhu Singh. An F. I. R. No. 138 dt. 22nd May, 1987 for committing offences under Ss. 17 and 18 of the N. D. P. S. Act was recorded and investigations were started. It is stated that A:s. I. Prabhu Singh had inspected the site and site plan was prepared. He had arrested and searched the accused and also prepared recovery memo. He had recorded the statements of Pratap Singh, Hamir Khan and Budha Ram under Section 161, Cr. P. C. On receipt of report from the Laboratory, the case was filed in the Court. ( 3 ) THE learned Sessions Jduge had discharged the accused on the ground that prosecution had violated the mandatory provisions of S. 42 of the N. D. P. S. Act. This order of the learned Sessions Judge is under challenge. ( 4 ) THE main ground for attack against the order of the learned Sessions Judge is that the provisions of S. 42 of the N. D. P. S. Act are not that mandatory as to vitiate the proceedings itself. This order of the learned Sessions Judge is under challenge. ( 4 ) THE main ground for attack against the order of the learned Sessions Judge is that the provisions of S. 42 of the N. D. P. S. Act are not that mandatory as to vitiate the proceedings itself. To support his contention, the learned Counsel appearing for the State has relied on AIR 1985 SC 989 : (1986 Cri LJ 824) (Dr. Pratap Singh v. Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act) on the proposition as to how the search is to be made by the Officer concerned. In that case S. 37 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act provided that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to searches, shall, so far as may be, apply to searches under this Section, subject to the modification that Sub-Section (5) of Section 165 of the said Code shall have effect as if for the words "magistrate", wherever it occurs, the words "director of Enforcement or other officer exercising his power" is substituted. It was submitted that if the power to search premises is conferred on the officer therein mentioned, it is hedged in with a condition that in exercise of the power he is bound by the requirements of Section 165 of the Code and any violation of search and seizure provisions shall not vitiate the action of the prosecution. The facts and circumstances in Pratap Singhs case (supra) were different and hence the authority quoted by the learned Counsel appearing for the State is not helpful. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents relies on the case of this High Court reported in 1987 (3) Crimes 629. It was held that Head Constable/a. S. I. was not authorised to carry out search and arrest under S. 42 of the Act. It was further held as under :"i have carefully gone through the cases cited above and have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that for launching the prosecution or for initiating the proceedings the authority doing so must have a clear and unambiguous power. In criminal cases while enacting such provision the legislature puts a complete ban on the authorities beyond one mentioned in the Section to carry out the functions under the Act. In criminal cases while enacting such provision the legislature puts a complete ban on the authorities beyond one mentioned in the Section to carry out the functions under the Act. In S. 42 of the Act the legislature has clearly empowered the persons mentioned therein or who are authorised to do so by notification. The legislature intended that a peon, sepoy or constable should in no case be empowered to enter search or seize or arrest a person without warrant. It also did not empower in the Act even the police officers unless there was a notification in that behalf and as quoted by me above the officers of the police department had been empowered only by notification, dated Oct. 16, 1986 and thereto the Government authorised the Inspectors of Police and Sub-Inspectors of Police who too were posted as Station House Officers a person accused of a crime particularly like the one where the legislature provides a minimum sentence of ten years and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, it is essential that the intention of the legislature must be carried out in letter and spirit. The accused has a right to expect a fair investigation and a fair trial keeping in view the basic concept that justice should not only be done but, it should appear to have been done, has facing a trial by itself as an ordial. A Head Constable is also a constable and is certainly not a Sub-Inspector or Inspector of Police and in the instant case PW 1 Amunulla Khan was admittedly not Station House Officer of G. R. P. Police Station, Ajmer. I have also quoted his statement in extenso where he has admitted that he had gone to the police station after ten minutes of the search of which he had no jurisdiction express or implied. Even the SHO, PW-6, Ram Chandra had no jurisdiction vested in him on November 21, 1985 and as such very foundation of the case is without proper authority of law. I need not go into other points raised as this alone is sufficient to dispose of this case. " ( 6 ) SIMILAR view was taken by another bench of this Court in Shanti Lal v. State of Raj. reported in (1989) 1 Crimes 276 . I need not go into other points raised as this alone is sufficient to dispose of this case. " ( 6 ) SIMILAR view was taken by another bench of this Court in Shanti Lal v. State of Raj. reported in (1989) 1 Crimes 276 . ( 7 ) IN the present case, it is admitted fact that notification was published in Rajasthan Gazette on 16-10-86 which is reproduced as under :" (III) Published in the Rajasthan Gazette, Extra, Part IV-C (II) dated Oct. 16th, 1986. No. F. 1 (3) FD/fx/85-1, dated 16-10-86. S. O. 115.- In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (Act No. 61 of 1985) the State Government hereby authorise all inspectors of police, and sub-inspectors of police, posted as Station House Officers, to exercise the powers mentioned in S. 42 of the said Act with immediate effect :provided that when power is exercised by police officer other than police Inspector of the area concerned such officer shall immediately hand over the person arrested and articles seized to the concerned police Inspector or S. H. O. of the Police Station concerned. ( 8 ) UNDER the above said notification, the only officers who were empowered to take action under the NDPS Act, were specified as Inspector of Police and Sub-Inspector of Police posted as S. H. O. s and none else. The above view has been fully approved by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, AIR 1994 SC 1872 : (1994 Cri LJ 3702 ). The object of NDPS Act is to make stringent provisions for control and regulation of operations relating to those drugs and substances. At the same time, to avoid harm to the innocent persons and to avoid abuse of the provisions by the officers, certain safe-guards are provided which in the context have to be observed strictly. Therefore, these provisions make it obligatory that such of those officers mentioned therein, on receiving an information, should reduce the same to writing and also record reasons for the belief while carrying out arrest or search as provided under the proviso to S. 42 (1 ). To that extent they are mandatory. Consequently, the failure to comply with these requirements thus affects the prosecution case and therefore, vitiates the trial. To that extent they are mandatory. Consequently, the failure to comply with these requirements thus affects the prosecution case and therefore, vitiates the trial. ( 9 ) CHAPTER V specifically provides only the officers mentioned and empowered therein can give an authorisation to a subordinate to arrest and search if such officer has reason to believe about the commission of an offence and after reducing the information, if any, into writing. Under Section 42 only officers mentioned therein and so empowered can make the arrest or search as provided if they have reason to believe from personal knowledge or information. In both these provisions there are two important requirements. One is that the Magistrate or the Officers mentioned therein firstly be empowered and they must have reason to believe that an offence under Chapter IV has been committed or that such arrest or search was necessary for other purposes mentioned in the provision. So far as the first requirement is concerned, it can be seen that the Legislature intended that only certain Magistrate and certain officers of higher rank and empowered can act to effect the arrest or search. This is safeguard provided having regard to the deterrent sentences contemplated and with a view that innocent persons are not harassed. Therefore, if an arrest or search contemplated under these provisions of NDPS Act has to be carried out. the same can be done only by competent and empowered Magistrates or officers mentioned thereunder. ( 10 ) THE Honble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994 Cri LJ 3702) (supra) had categorically held that if an arrest or search contemplated under Ss. 41 and 42 is made under a warrant issued by any other Magistrate or is made by any officer not empowered or authorised, it would per se be illegal and would affect the prosecution case and consequently vitiate the trial. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the accused submits that, in any case, the period of about 9 years has passed from the date of incident and it will be highly unjust, if the accused are sent for trial after such a long period. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the accused submits that, in any case, the period of about 9 years has passed from the date of incident and it will be highly unjust, if the accused are sent for trial after such a long period. In normal course, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this contention would have been acceptable, but because of the reason that revision petition of the State is being dismissed, there is hardly any need to go into the matter. ( 12 ) FOR the reasons mentioned above, and in view of the consistent view of this Court and Honble Apex Court, no fault can be found in the order of the learned Sessions Judge. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed. Petition dismissed.