S. N. MALLICK, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal the wife appellant has challenged the decree of divorce passed by the learned Trial Judge as per Judgment dated 3. 4. 93 in Matrimonial Suit No. 224 of 86 in the 13th Bench of the City Civil Court at Calcutta on ground of desertion under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. Learned Trial Judge had dissolved the marriage after coming to a finding as follows :-"anyway, considering all these facts and circumstances before me I am of opinion without any hesitation that the respondent left her matrimonial home without any just reason or cause and thus made constructive desertion and as she deserted the petitioner for more than two years prior to the institution of the suit, the petitioner is entitled to get the decree of divorce accordingly". The respondent husband brought the aforesaid suit for divorce against the appellant wife under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the grounds of living in adultery by the wife with the present respondent No. 2, desertion and cruelly. The ground of adultery was not pressed before the Trial Court by the learned Advocate for the husband-petitioner to course of his arguments and as such the issue No. 3 regarding the alleged adultery was decided by the learned Trial Judge against the husband petitioner being answered in the negative. The issue No. 6 was framed by the learned Trial Judge as to whether the appellant wife was guilty of commission of acts of cruelty towards the petitioner husband. It appears from the impugned Judgement that the Trial Judge after considering the evidence on record adduced by both the parties decided the issue in the negative against the petitioner-husband while finding that the petitioner-husband has failed to proved the charge of cruelty levelled against wife, the present appellant. Cross-objection or appeal has been preferred by the husband respondent No. 1 against the said finding of the Trial Judge before this Court. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate appearing for the husband respondent No. 1 that he challenges this finding of the learned Trial Judge on the issue of cruelty without filing any cross-objection while supporting the impugned decree for divorce. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY state the facts of the case are as follows:-the appellant and the respondent No. 1 were married in Hindu form on 23. 2. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY state the facts of the case are as follows:-the appellant and the respondent No. 1 were married in Hindu form on 23. 2. 84 within the jurisdiction of this Court. In paragraph 5 to 9 and 11 of the petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act the husband has made various allegations against the wife for maintaining an indecent and adulterous relationship with the respondent No. 2 who happens to be the husband of one of her sisters. As ground of adultery has not been pressed so, we do not think it necessary to give details of such allegations here, but the same may be referred to at appropriate places of the Judgement while considering the allegation of desertion and cruelty. It has been alleged by the husband that the wife was in the habit of leaving the matrimonial home on various occasions with all her valuables and letters etc. without any intimation to the husband and his parents and to come back after a few days in the company of the respondent No. 2 with something each time. It is also the case of the husband that the wife on or about 10. 7. 84 left the matrimonial home for Puri in the company of the respondent No. 2 and came back after spending seven days there and that after coming back when she was asked to explain her conduct she begun to treat the husband and his parents with inhuman cruelty hurling insults at them in filthy languages and creating tantrum scene and that she even indulged in various nefarious acts such as putting kerosene oil in cooked food, adding large quantity of salt etc. It is also urged by the husband in his petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Trial Court that the wife is also guilty of acts of extreme cruelty inflicted upon him and his parents which are numerous and cannot be stated in writing. It is further stated that on 23. 7. 84 the wife appellant took out all her marriage gifts, ornaments, wearing apparels and the letters etc and went away along with the respondent No. 2 without the consent of the husband and his parents and that since then the wife never came back to matrimonial home nor resumed the matrimonial relation with the petitioner. 7. 84 the wife appellant took out all her marriage gifts, ornaments, wearing apparels and the letters etc and went away along with the respondent No. 2 without the consent of the husband and his parents and that since then the wife never came back to matrimonial home nor resumed the matrimonial relation with the petitioner. It is the case of the husband that the wife has thus deserted him more than two years immediately before the institution of the proceeding for dissolution of marriage and has refused to resume matrimonial relationship with him with any excuse reasonable or just. The case of the wife appellant before the Trial Court as made out in her written objection is that shortly after her marriage with the petitioner she was subjected to cruel treatment, both physical and mental and that she had to suffer various forms of indignities at the instance of the husband, his mother and other members of the family. According to the wife the husband neglected and refused to maintain her and that the husband is guilty of acts of cruelty towards her in collusion with his mother and created circumstances which compelled her to leave the matrimonial home on 23. 7. 84. It is further stated in the written objection that the husband had insisted on getting a decree for divorce on mutual consent which she persistently resisted and that she has been always ready and willing to go back to her husband and lead a very healthy and conjugal life, guarantee being given to her of her security of life and property. She has emphatically denied the allegations of adultery and cruelty as made by the husband against her. ( 3 ) BOTH the parties have adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. As already noted, the Trial Court after considering the evidence on record has dissolved the marriage by decree on ground of desertion under section 13 (1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, referred to as the Act. It has been argued by Shri Bhattacharyya the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant that the learned Trial Judge should not have passed a decree for divorce against the appellant on ground of desertion inasmuch as there was no sufficient evidence to uphold his finding on that score. It has been argued by Shri Bhattacharyya the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant that the learned Trial Judge should not have passed a decree for divorce against the appellant on ground of desertion inasmuch as there was no sufficient evidence to uphold his finding on that score. It is contended by Shri Bhattacharyya that there is convincing evidence that the wife was compelled to leave matrimonial home on 23. 7. 84 in the circumstances created by the husband in collusion with his mother and that she has all along been willing to live a happy conjugal life with her husband, however, without any interference from her in-laws. It has also been submitted by Shri Bahttacharyya that the husband on the otherhand had all along Insisting upon the wife to have the marriage dissolved by mutual consent through successive legal notices and he having been resisted by the wife filed the instant proceeding under section 13 of the Act for getting a decree of divorce on false grounds. ( 4 ) THE points for consideration in this appeal are whether the learned Trial Judge has rightly dissolved the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 by passing a decree for divorce on ground of desertion and whether he should have decreed the soil also on ground of cruelty as asserted by the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1. We take up the second point first i. e. whether the wife the present appellant after the solemnisation of the marriage has treated the husband with cruelty or not. The learned Trial Judge has rejected this ground and has disbelieved the story of the husband being treated by the wife with cruelty on the ground that there Is no sufficient evidence of the side of the husband petitioner which could be relied upon by him to pass a decree of divorce also on that score. The learned Trial Judge has observed that "it is true that there is no evidence of cruelly against the respondent". He has further observed that the evidence in this regard is the uncorroborated oral testimony of the husband which has been denied by the wife in her evidence. After going through the evidence on record there is little scope to differ with the finding of the learned Trial Judge on this issue. He has further observed that the evidence in this regard is the uncorroborated oral testimony of the husband which has been denied by the wife in her evidence. After going through the evidence on record there is little scope to differ with the finding of the learned Trial Judge on this issue. The husband P. W. 1 has said in this examination in chief that his wife used to leave the matrimonial home from time to time without informing anyone in the house and that the wife did not discharge her household duties while she was in the matrimonial home and she used to spoil the food by putting kerosene oil etc. The wife D. W. 1 has emphatically denied this in her evidence. It is gathered from the evidence that the wife's fathers house and her matrimonial home were in the same locality within walking distance. It is quite natural for a newly married girl to make frequent visit to her matrimonial home which is very close to her in-law's house. Furthermore the story of spoiling food by sprinkling kerosene oil or putting too much salt does not inspite any reliance for want of corroboration. Under the circumstances it cannot be held that the wife after the marriage has treated the husband with such cruelty so as to justify the passing of a decree of divorce. Accordingly we reject the contention of the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1 that the learned Trial Judge should have passed the decree of divorce also an ground of cruelty. ( 5 ) NOW coming to the point of desertion, the law in this regard must be appreciated clearly. Under section 13 (1) (ib) any of the spouses after the marriage is solemnised under the provisions of the Act may pray for dissolution of the marriage by decree of divorce on the ground infer alia that the other party has deserted him or her for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The word desertion has been explained in the said Act as follows:- ". . . . . . . . . . The word desertion has been explained in the said Act as follows:- ". . . . . . . . . . the expression 'desertion' means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. . . . . . . . . . . . . ". The law on this point has been well settled by the Supreme Court, our High Court and many other High Courts to a catena of decisions. Following some Supreme Court decisions and decisions of same other High Courts, our High Court in a case reported in AIR 1989 Calcutta 115 (Apurba Mohan Ghosh. v. Manashi Ghosh) found that in the said case the desertion was complete, whoever might have given the initial cause, because all the three elements that generally go to constitute 'desertion' namely, the factual of separation, the animus deserendi, i. e. the intention to live apart and the animus non-revertendi i. e. the intention not to revert to the matrimonial home were proved. ( 6 ) IN a similar case of our High Court reported in 1991 (1) CHN page 65 (Kamala alias Rita Bhattacharjee v. Nitay Gopal Bhattacharjee) it has been held that it is settled law that the burden of proving desertion the 'factum' as well as the 'animus deserendi' is on the petitioner, and he or she has to establish to the satisfaction of the Court, the desertion throughout the entire period of two years before the petition as well as that such desertion was without just cause. It is the specific view of our High Court in the aforesaid case that in other words, even if the wife, where she is the deserting spouse, does not prove just cause for her living apart, the petitioner husband has still to satisfy the Court that the desertion was without just cause. The said reported case is almost similar to the present one. The said reported case is almost similar to the present one. In that case it was found by our High Court that there was no evidence whatsoever in support of the petitioner's allegations that the respondent wire had developed illicit intimacy with one P and there was also no cogent evidence that the wife left the matrimonial home in the company of the said P. In that case our High Court found on evidence that it was the wife who was treated with torture and cruelty and was not provided with proper maintenance and was driven out from the matrimonial home and as such the Court was of the view there what there was no desertion of the petitioner by the respondent wife. It was further held there the fact that the petitioner has levelled a false charge of adultery against the wife of suspecting her character, would itself afford a reasonable excuse to the wife to refuse to live with the petitioner or to cohabit with him unless he made amends by apologising or otherwise placating the wife. In an earlier case of our High Court reported in 92 CWN page 323 (Kamal Kumar Basu v. Kalyani Basu) it has been held by our High Court that no amount of physical or factual separation would constitute desertion unless the requisite animus deserendi, i. e. the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, also exists. In that case the wife insisted on her living with the husband in the matrimonial home without the husband's sister slaying there. In that circumstance it was held by our High Court that where there is no exhibition of any such animus deserendi on the part of the wife in living apart or leaving the matrimonial home, but there is a clear indication of animus revertendi to the matrimonial home without the husband's sister staying there and accordingly it was held that there was no desertion on the part of the wife to warrant any decree for divorce. It has been further held there as follows:- "but even assuming that there was animus deserendi and no animus revertendi on the part of the wife and there was absence of consent on the part of the husband, still then the state of affairs would not amount to desertion unless it is further established that there was absence of conduct on the part of the husband reasonably causing the wife to form such animus deserendi. In order to constitute desertion within the meaning of explanation to section 13 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, while there must be two elements present on the side of the deserting spouse, namely the factum of his or her withdrawal and the accompanying animus deserendi, there also be two elements present on the side of the spouse claiming to be deserted, namely, absence of his or her consent and the absence of conduct on his or her apart giving the deserted spouse reasonable cause to form the animus desarendi"'. It has been also held there as follows:-"on the ground of desertion very often the question arises as to who was deserted and who has deserted because the physical act of departure by one spouse does net necessarily make that spouse the deserting party if a husband persists in thing which he knows that his wife cannot, and has good reasons not to tolerate and the wife accordingly has to leave the home, then it is the husband who has deserted the wife even though the wife herself has physically left home". In a Allahabad High Court case reported in AIR 1984 page 40 (Smt. Maya Chatterjee v. Shib Chandra Chatterjee it has been held that "if the charge of living in adultery which was levelled by the husband petitioner against the Appellant wife was false and the petitioner had wantonly levelled that charge against the appellant knowing it to be false, no Court of conscience would grant a decree of divorce to the petitioner an the ground that the appellant had deserted him for in that case the very fact that the petitioner had levelled the false charge of adultery against the appellant or suspected her character would afford a reasonable excuse to the appellant to refuse to live with the petitioner or to co-habit with him unless he made amends by apologising or by otherwise placating the appellant". This principle has been followed by out High Court in a case already referred to above [1991 (1) CHN Page 65, supra]. ( 7 ) KEEPING the above provisions of law and the legal principals enunciated in the aforesaid cases on the passing of a decree of divorce on ground of desertion in our mind it may now be seen how far the Trial Court is justified in granting a decree of divorce on ground of desertion against the wife, the present appellant. Admittedly the parties were married according to Hindu rights and customs on 23. 2. 84. It is also admitted that the present appellant left her matrimonial home on 23. 7. 84. It is the case of the husband in his petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act that on 23. 7. 84 the wife took out all her marriage gifts, ornaments, wearing apparels and letters etc. and went away along with the respondent No. 2 the husband of her sister without the consent of the husband and parents and since then never came back to the matrimonial home nor resumed the matrimonial relation with the husband. It is the case of the petitioner that the wife has deserted him for more than two years immediately before the filing of the suit for divorce without any reasonable cause and without his consent and has refused to resume matrimonial relation with the petitioner without any excuse. From the allegations made in para 13 the husband wants the Court to presume or infer that after the wife had left the matrimonial home on 23. 7. 84 he made attempts to bring her back for resuming the matrimonial relation and the wife had refused to come back and resume matrimonial relation without any excuse. This story does not find any place in the evidence on behalf of the husband before the Trial Court. P. W. 1 Tapan Kumar De is the husband. In his chief he says that on 23. 7. 84 his wife left the matrimonial home for good with Samar Babu the respondent No. 2 (the alleged adulterer) and had taken away all her belongings and that his mother and father went to his wife's father house to bring her back but she refused to come. In his chief he says that on 23. 7. 84 his wife left the matrimonial home for good with Samar Babu the respondent No. 2 (the alleged adulterer) and had taken away all her belongings and that his mother and father went to his wife's father house to bring her back but she refused to come. In his cross-examination he has been constrained to admit that he did not lake any steps against his wife when she left her house for good and that he did not know the fact of such leaving and also that he does not know what incident did actually take place on that date in his house. He further admits in his cross-examination that he is unable to say who knows the incident for which the wife left the matrimonial home. It is admitted by P. W. 1 that he was not present in the house when his wife left and that he has no personal knowledge about what his wife took away with her at tire time of leaving the matrimonial home on 23. 7. 84. He has also admitted that his wife used to treat him well and that she also never meted out ill-treatment to his parents in his presence. P. W. 2 is Nilmani De who is the father of the petitioner husband the present respondent No. l. This witness says that at the time of leaving on 23. 7. 84 the wife with her four companions took away all her articles for which he made a G. D. entry with the local police. But he has also been constrained to admit that on 23. 7. 84 neither he nor his son the present respondent No. l was present in the house. He further admits that he does not know what articles the wife took away with her at the time of finally leaving the matrimonial home on that date. He further admits that he did not go to the father's house of the appellant to bring her back. It is clear that neither the husband nor his father were present on 23. 7. He further admits that he did not go to the father's house of the appellant to bring her back. It is clear that neither the husband nor his father were present on 23. 7. 84 when the wife left the matrimonial home, that only the mother of the husband and a minor grand daughter were present in the house on that date and that none of them has any personal knowledge of the facts for which the wife left the matrimonial home were or was compelled to leave the matrimonial home. Furthermore, the evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 are inconsistent with and contradictory to each other. The father-has admitted, as we have already seen, that he never went to the paternal house of the appellant to bring her back on 23. 7. 84 or on any date subsequent thereto. It is in the evidence of P. W. 1 that his mother died on 30. 12. 84 i. e. almost three years after, the suit was filed on 5. 1. 87. So it was only the mother who could give the most valuable evidence about the circumstances under which the appellant left the matrimonial home for good on 23. 7. 84. The Lower Court Record does not show that any attempt was made to get her examined on commission before the hearing of the suit. Anyway it does not require much to say about the gaping inconsistency between the evidence of the petitioner husband and his own case made out in the petition under section 13 of the Act and in addition to that the evidence of P. W. 1 and his father are inconsistent with and contradictory to each other as we have already noted above. Now we should look into the evidence adduced on behalf of the wife as to the circumstances which compelled her to leave the matrimonial home for good on 23. 7. 84. It has been suggested to P. W. 1 and denied by him in cross examination that due to torture inflicted to her by his parents on ground of dowry she left the matrimonial home as such torture was unbearable to her. 7. 84. It has been suggested to P. W. 1 and denied by him in cross examination that due to torture inflicted to her by his parents on ground of dowry she left the matrimonial home as such torture was unbearable to her. In pars 20 of her written objection the wife stated that after the marriage she was subjected to ill-treatment, both physical and mental and had to suffers various forms of indignities meted out to her by the husband, his mother and other members of the family and that the husband neglected and refused to maintain her and that when the situation came to a head she was compelled to leave her matrimonial home with her bare clothing on the 23. 7. 84 for good. It is admitted that since then she has been living in her father's house with her brothers. . In her evidence D. W. 1 the wife says that on 23. 7. 84 she came out from the husband's house as the torture inflicted upon her was unbearable and that her mother-in-law used abusive languages against her and she came to know that they were making conspiracy to turn her into a lunatic. She says on oath that she left all alone her husband's house and that none went to bring her back. She, however, says that her husband's behaviour to her was good but the torture inflicted by her parents-in-law were unbearable and that her mother-in-law did not like any good relationship between herself and her husband. She further says that she is willing to go back to her husband's house. Presumably she has no objection to return to her matrimonial home as the mother-in-law is already dead. The husband has, however, said in his evidence that it is no longer possible for him to accept his wife even if she desired to go back. The wife has produced a copy of a letter dated 5. 2. 85 (Ext. F) purportedly written to her husband asking him to make suitable arrangement to take her back in the matrimonial home. It is the evidence of the wife that the original letter was sent to the petitioner by registered post with A/d which was received by the mother-in-law by putting her signature on the A/d slip. Ext. G is the postal registration slip and Ext. It is the evidence of the wife that the original letter was sent to the petitioner by registered post with A/d which was received by the mother-in-law by putting her signature on the A/d slip. Ext. G is the postal registration slip and Ext. H is the A/d slip bearing the signature of the mother-in-law duly proved by D. W. 1 the wife. There was no reason to reject this document as an important piece of evidence showing the wife's sincerity of her purpose of going back to the matrimonial home. The learned Trial Judge has rejected the Ext-F on the ground that it is unusual for a wife to write a letter to the husband by keeping a carbon copy thereof and that instead of writing a letter she was expected to go back to the matrimonial home as she had left it on her own. To our such reasoning for rejecting this Ext. F is not sound. The necessity of writing such a letter is to be assessed in the facts and circumstances of the case. We have found that after her leaving on 23. 7. 84 there was no attempt on the part of the husband or her in-laws to bring her back. Under such circumstances it was quite natural for the wife to write a letter to the husband by a registered post so that it could reach him. The learned Trial Judge has held that the Ext. F speaks more about to consolidate a plot to file the suit in future than a sincere attempt by the wife to go back to her husband. The learned Trial Judge has ignored the fact that the suit for dissolution of marriage was brought not by the wife but by the husband. Anyway the D. W. 1 has been cross-examined at length on behalf of the husband. In crossexamination she says that she left her husband's house due to torture which became unbearable and that she has denied the suggestion that she left her husband's house on that day voluntarily as she was not willing to stay with her husband. She further says that there is no quarrel between her and her husband on the night on 22. 7. She further says that there is no quarrel between her and her husband on the night on 22. 7. 84 and that she complained to the husband in respect of the ill treatment and torture inflicted on her by the parents-in-law and that the husband in spite of such complains remained silent and did not take any action. The wife further says that in spite of that she has no grievance or grudge against her husband. In cross-examination there has been a suggestion to the D. W. 1 which has been denied by her that on 23. 7. 84 that she left her husband's house after picking up quarrel with the family members of the husband. So it can be said that from the tenor of the suggestion that a quarrel between the wife and the members of the husband's family on 23. 7. 84 is admitted. So the question arises who are the family members present at that lime. The husband and his father were admittedly not present on that day at the time of the incident. As we gathered from the evidence only the wife, the mother-In-law and a child were present. The mother-in-law was also dead when the parties entered into evidence. The grand daughter has not been examined. There is no explanation for such non-examination. In this position there is no reason for disbelieving the wife's evidence that she was abused by the mother-in-law and she came to know that there was a plot to turn her into a lunatic and that as such she was compelled to leave the matrimonial home for her father's house was very near to her matrimonial home. The evidence of D. W. 2 and 3 does not throw any light in the matter in issue and as such it is not necessary to look into their evidence. D. W. 4 is respondent No. 2 who is the husband of the appellant's sister with whom she is alleged to have left the matrimonial home 23. 7. 84. He has denied this in his evidence which we have no reason to reject in view of the fact that the charge of adultery has been abandoned by the petitioner-husband before the Trial Court at the time of argument and the husband has also fatted to prove by any cogent evidence that the wife left the matrimonial home on 23. 7. 7. 84 with the respondent No. 2 D. W. 4. ( 8 ) FURTHERMORE, it appears from the admitted documentary evidence adduced on the side of the wife that the petitioner husband had been more eager to get the marriage dissolved on mutual consent under section 13b of the Act than to restore the matrimonial relationship. Ext. A is a lawyers notice dated 11. 3. 84 given to the wife and two others on the instruction of the father of the husband that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. l has failed, that there is no chance for them to live as husband and wife and that as such the marriage should be dissolved by a joint petition without any mudslinging. Ext-B is also an Advocate's notice given on behalf of the husband to the Advocate of the wife dated 25. 6. 86 asking him to advise the wife to file a joint petition for divorce under section 13b of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground that she was leaving in adultery and that she left the matrimonial home on 23. 7. 84 with Samar De (respondent No. 2) and her brother. Ext-C are the lawyers letters and correspondences which have been marked exhibits collectively. In the letter dated 25. 7. 86 the Advocate for the wife denied the allegations made in Ext-B and communicated the unwillingness of the wife to file a joint petition for divorces as suggested on behalf of the husband. There is another letter dated 1. 10. 86 given an behalf of the husband to the wife asking her to file a joint petition for divorce under section 13b of the Hindu Marriage Act. So from these Advocates' letters the intention of the husband is quite clear that he wanted to get rid of his wife at any rate and on any pretext by persuading her to dissolve the marriage by consent. Such admitted conduct on the part of the husband casts a deep cloud of doubt touching the very basis of his petition for divorce. From the evidence it appears that the husband petitioner was suspecting the chastity or fidelity of the wife without any reason whatsoever. Such admitted conduct on the part of the husband casts a deep cloud of doubt touching the very basis of his petition for divorce. From the evidence it appears that the husband petitioner was suspecting the chastity or fidelity of the wife without any reason whatsoever. He had gone to the desperate point of levelling a charge of adultery against her in his petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act which, however, his lawyer abandoned at the argument stage. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No. l that the wife has failed to give any satisfactory reason for leaving the matrimonial home on 23. 7. 84 and that adverse presumption should be drawn for non-examination of her brothers and sisters to whom she allegedly complained about the torture. But it must be made clear that the plaintiff must stand or fall on his own case and the weakness, if any, in the defence case of evidence will not entitle him to succeed in a suit. While emphasizing the provisions of law and the legal principals enunciated by our High Court and other High Courts following the Supreme Court decisions in this regard we have found the necessary facts to be proved by a party praying for divorce on the ground of desertion allegedly committed by the other spouse. In order to get a decree of divorce on ground of desertion it has to be proved by the petitioner that the other party to the marriage has deserted him or her without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of the petitioner including the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. In addition to the fact of separation, the animus deserendi and the animus non-reverentendi it has to be proved by the petitioner husband that the wife where she is the deserting spouse and does not prove just cause for her leaving apart, and to satisfy the Court that the desertion was without just cause. In addition to the fact of separation, the animus deserendi and the animus non-reverentendi it has to be proved by the petitioner husband that the wife where she is the deserting spouse and does not prove just cause for her leaving apart, and to satisfy the Court that the desertion was without just cause. If is also the view of our High Court that in a case where the petitioner-husband has levelled a false charge of adultery against the wife or suspected her character, this itself would afford a reasonable excuse to the wife to refuse to live with the petitioner or to cohabit with him unless he made amends by apologising or otherwise the wife. It has also been held by our High Court In a case reported in 92 CWN page 323 which we have already discussed that no amount of physical or factual separation would constitute desertion unless the requisite animus deserendi, that is the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, also existed. We have found in evidence that the wife has expressed her willingness and eagerness to reunite with tier husband and to resume the conjugal life. There is no reason to disbelieve her in view of the fact that she has consistently refused or resisted the request of the petitioner-husband to end the conjugal life by filing a joint petition for divorce under section 13b of the Hindu Marriage Act and that she has also written to her husband long before the filing of the suit to take her back to the matrimonial home thereby obliterating any scope of misunderstanding between the two. In order to succeed in this case the husband has to prove the absence of any conduct on his part giving the deserted spouse reasonable cause to form the animus deserendi. In this case we found that the husband has levelled a false charge of adultery against the wife which he has abandoned at the time of argument before the Trial Court after giving scanty evidence on his such ground. The principals laid down by our High Court in the case reported in 92 CWN page 323 which we have already quoted are very illuminating. The principals laid down by our High Court in the case reported in 92 CWN page 323 which we have already quoted are very illuminating. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case and in view of the legal principals as discussed above we are of opinion that in the instant case it Is the wife the appellant who has been deserted by the husband the respondent No. 1. The Learned Trial Judge should not have passed the decree of divorces on ground of desertion. The evidence on record has not been properly examined by the learned Trial Judge in the light of the legal provisions and the legal principals laid down by the superior Courts. There is no basis of his finding that the appellant-wife left her matrimonial home without any just reason or cause and thus made a constructive desertion for more than two years prior to the institution of the suit. We would, however, like to point out that much of the evidence adduced by the parties to the present proceeding are irrelevant. Both the parties have made complaint against each other before the local police station which are of no use In this case. There has been much evidence to show the quantity or volume of marriage gifts including ornaments etc. We would also like to note here that the procedure followed by the Trial Court in giving Ext. marks to the documents admitted in evidence is irregular. Each and every document proved by the respective parties and admitted in evidence should have been marked with specific Ext. marks as per legal procedure. It was not proper mark the exhibits collectively making it difficult to identify and refer to a particular document by a particular Ext mark. The exhibits should have been marked individually. Accordingly the appeal succeeds and the appeal is allowed on contest with cost. The Judgment and decree of Trial Court dissolving the marriage between the parties on ground of desertion be set aside. The suit is dismissed on contest without cost. D. B. Dutta, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed