JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This is an appeal filed by the defendants against the judgment and decree dated 19.2.1992 passed by Second Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge. Bhopal, in Civil Appeal No. 40-A of 1988, arising out of judgment and decree dated 7.7.1988 passed by Tenth Civil Judge Class-II. Bhopal, in civil Suit No. 24-A of 1988. 2. The judgment and decree in this appeal shall also govern the disposal of Second Appeal No. 284/92 as the facts involved in this appeal are similar to those arising in that appeal. This Court has framed identical questions of law in both these appeals and the counsel for the parties advanced common arguments in both these appeals. 3. The facts/necessary for disposal of this appeal are as follows Naziran Bi filed in Civil Suit No. 24-A of 1988 for eviction against Yusuf Khan, the original tenant. The appellants are substituted as his legal representatives after his death during the pendency of the suit. The respondent, who was substituted after the death of Naaziran Bi, on 2.10.71, as her legal representative, claims that he is the landlord of the suit house by virtue of registered gift-deed dated 3.3.1970 in his favour by late Naziram Bi. In her suit for eviction, Naziran Bi claimed that she had stepped into the shoes of the previous landlord Abdul Rahim after his death on 30th September. 1967 by virtue of will executed by him in her favour on 21.9.67. Naziran Bi claimed that thereafter, she became the landlady of Yusuf Khan, the original tenant. Yusuf Khan did not pay her the agreed rent at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month from 1.10.67. Therefore, she served a notice of demand as per Section 12 (1) (a) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act'). Upon refusal to pay. Naziran Bi brought the suit for eviction against Yusuf Khan under Section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act' after two months from the date of receipt of notice of demand. 4. Yusuf Khan defended the suit by stating that Naziran Bi was not his landlady. He claimed that Naziran Bi did not get the suit house by the aforesaid will. After the death of his original landlord. Abdul Rahim, his sons Abdul Azeez and Abdul Shakoor inherited his property and they became his landlords. 4. Yusuf Khan defended the suit by stating that Naziran Bi was not his landlady. He claimed that Naziran Bi did not get the suit house by the aforesaid will. After the death of his original landlord. Abdul Rahim, his sons Abdul Azeez and Abdul Shakoor inherited his property and they became his landlords. They sold the suit house of Rafiq Mohmmad Khan on 2.3.1968. Rafiq Mohammad Khan was, therefore, his landlord. 5. The trial Court, inter alia found the Yusuf Khan was the tenant of Naziran Bi by attornment. Naziran Bi became the landlady by virtue of will dated 21.9.67, Ex. P-l executed by Abdul Rahim, Rafiq Mohammad Khan was not the landlord. It was also found that present respondent Hafiz Mohammad Hamid was entitled to continue the suit after death of Naziran Bi, as her legal representative, by virtue of registered gift-deed dated 3.3.70, Ex. P-2. It was also held that the appellants were in arrears of rent which they did not pay despite notice of demand under Section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act'. It was further held that the appellants were not entitled to benefit of Section 12 (3) of 'the Act' as they had not deposited the entire arrears of rent after receipt of writ of summons within one month and had not continued to do so. Thus, the suit for eviction under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. as well as the arrears of rent were decreed. 6. In appeal, the lower appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of trial Court. It held, inter alia that relationship of landlord and tenant between Naziran Bi and Yusuf Khan was established. The will dated 21.9.67 executed by Abdul Rahim in favour of Naziran Bi was valid and she became the landlady of the suit house after death of Abdul Rahim, on 30.9.67. The lower appellate Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court in respect of anears of rent under Section 12(1)(a)of 'the Act' and declined to grant the appellants the benefit of Section 12 (3) (c) of 'the Act'. In appeal, the respondent was permitted to amend plaint to claim the benefit of Section 12(1) (c) of 'the Act'. The lower appellate Court has also granted the benefit of Section 12(1) (c) of 'the Act' to respondent as the appellant had denied title of original landlord. 7. In appeal, the respondent was permitted to amend plaint to claim the benefit of Section 12(1) (c) of 'the Act'. The lower appellate Court has also granted the benefit of Section 12(1) (c) of 'the Act' to respondent as the appellant had denied title of original landlord. 7. This appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law by order dated 15.9.93. 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the defendant/appellants denial of plaintiff's tenancy on the basis of derivative title affords no ground for eviction under Section 12(1) (c) of the Act ? 2. Whether the evidence on record established the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ? 8. The counsel for the appellants had not challenged the finding of the trial Court on the ground under Section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act'. He has confined himself to question of law trained by the Court. Thus, the respondent shall be entitled to a decree, if this Court answers the second question in favour of respondent-landlord. 9. Shri N.S. Kale, learned senior counsel for the appellants, urged firstly that a decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act', cannot be granted when the tenant challenges the derivative title of the landlord. The further contention of the counsel for the appellants is that since the appellants were the tenants of Abdul Rahim initially and Naziran Bi was claiming that she became the landlady by virtue of the will dated 21.9.67 after death of Abdul Rahim on 30.9.67, the appellants can challenge her derivative title. According to learned counsel for the appellant, Section 116 of the Evidence Act did not bar such a challenge. For this purpose the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the case of Kumar Krishan Prasad Lal Sinha Vs. Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd. and others A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 251. The attention of this Court was also drawn to the case of Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif and others A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 636. On the foundation of these cases the learned counsel for the appellants draw the attention of this Court to sections 117 and 118 of Mull's Principles of Mahomedan Law (Nineteenth Edition)". The attention of this Court was also drawn to the case of Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif and others A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 636. On the foundation of these cases the learned counsel for the appellants draw the attention of this Court to sections 117 and 118 of Mull's Principles of Mahomedan Law (Nineteenth Edition)". He pointed out that as per Section 117 of that book the testamentary disposition by a Mahomedan in favour of the heirs is not valid unless the heir gives consent to the will and testament after the death of testator, in respect of their shares. It is also pointed out that such bequest could be made partially valid by one of the co-heirs by giving consent to the extent of his share. It is made clear by the explanation to Section 117 that eligibility of inheritance of property to an heir would be determined at the the point of time of death of a person and not when the testator made the will. Section 118 of the same book points that Muslim gentleman cannot make a will for more than 1/3rd of his property after deducting debts and funeral expenses to a person other than an heir, unless all the heirs give their consent to it. A bequest of more than 1/3rd share cannot take effect unless heirs give consent thereto. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that heirs of Abdul Rahim did not give any consent to the bequest made by him. Naziran Bi was an heir at the time of his death and, therefore, he never acknowledged or recognized Naziran Bi as the landlady. He was always recognizing sons and natural heirs of Abdul Rahim as his landlords, and thereafter, their transferee. Rafiq Mohammad Khan, was recognized by him as the landlord. 10. Shri S.K. Seth, learned counsel for the respondent urged that in view of the trial Court's finding that Yusuf Khan attorned in favour of Naziran Bi, and therefore, he could not have denied her title. He contended that for the reason aforesaid Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act' was definitely attracted. 10. Shri S.K. Seth, learned counsel for the respondent urged that in view of the trial Court's finding that Yusuf Khan attorned in favour of Naziran Bi, and therefore, he could not have denied her title. He contended that for the reason aforesaid Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act' was definitely attracted. So far as the question of bequest in favour of Naziran Bi was concerned, it was clear from Section 118(1) (ibid) that bequest to any person other than heir would be valid even without consent subject to conditions mentioned in the same to the extent of 1/3rd of the suit house. In the alternative, assuming that Naziran Bi was an heir at the time of death of Abdul Rahim, she would be an heir without the bequest and inherit the property. In either case, she would be one of the landlord and she had a right to file a suit against the tenant. There was nothing on record to show that anyone of the co-landlords had raised any objection. Further, the learned counsel submitted that Yusuf Khan had no right to challenge the bequest as other heirs of Abdul Rahim Khan had not challenged the will. 11. This, Court of the controversy revolves round the question, if Yusuf Khan can be permitted to challenge the derivative title of Naziran Bi and consequently that of respondent. The evidence on record does not suggest that Yusuf Khan ever recognized, acknowledge, or attorned to the tenancy in favour of Naziran Bi. Therefore, the question of attornment does not arise. The finding of trial Court on issue No. 1 is not correct. The lower appellate Court has not decided this point. For this reason this Court was required to examine the record for recording a finding on this point. Even the trial Court has nowhere found the Naziran Bi was recognized as a landlady by acknowledgment or attornment. Even so, without understanding implication of word 'attornment' the trial Court has decided the issue No. 1 is affirmative. The evidence on record does not support the case of the respondent on this point. 12. This takes us to question whether the appellants can challenges the derivative title of Naziran Bi. The answer to such question lies in the language of Section 116 of Evidence Act which reads as under:- 116. The evidence on record does not support the case of the respondent on this point. 12. This takes us to question whether the appellants can challenges the derivative title of Naziran Bi. The answer to such question lies in the language of Section 116 of Evidence Act which reads as under:- 116. Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession.- No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title of such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession there of, shall be permitted to deny that such person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had title to such possession at the time when such licence was given. It is clear from that section that it deals with estoppel between landlord and tenant and licensor and licensee. So far as relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned, the estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, in terms provides as follows- (i) No tenant of immovable property or any person claiming through him (ii) shall be permitted to deny the title of his landlord, (iii) that the landlord had the title at the beginning of the tenancy (iv) such estoppel shall be operative during the continuance of the tenancy. The aforesaid analysis of Section 116 of Evidence Act would show that this section anacts a special kind of estoppel, based on contract and is an example of what is known to English law "Estoppel in pais". However, the limits of this estoppel are enshrined in the section itself. The tenant of immovable property is not permitted to deny the title of the landlord at the beginning of tenancy, that is to say when the relationship of landlord and tenant was started. This estoppel is an example of the well known principle that you cannot approbate and reprobate approbate, what is to your advantage, and reprobate when it is no longer advantageous. Section 116 of Evidence Act carves out one of the estoppels covered by general principles of estoppel and gives it a statutory form. This estoppel is an example of the well known principle that you cannot approbate and reprobate approbate, what is to your advantage, and reprobate when it is no longer advantageous. Section 116 of Evidence Act carves out one of the estoppels covered by general principles of estoppel and gives it a statutory form. While giving it a statutory shape, there is another limitation which is expressed by the words during the continuance of tenancy. This binds the operation' of estoppel to a specific period. The estoppel is operative during the currency of tenancy. The moment the relationship of landlord and tenant ceases, the estoppel does not operate. 13. This was recognized by Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal Sinha v. Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd. and others (supra) (ibid). It has been observed as follows at page 255;- The Section postulates that there is a tenancy still continuing that it has its beginning at a given date from a given landlord. It provides that neither a tenant nor anyone claiming through a tenant shall be heard to deny that, that particular landlord had at that date a title to the property. In the ordinary case of a lease intended as a present demise - which is the case before the Board on this appeal-the section applies against the lessee, any assignee of the term and any sub-lessee or licensee. What all such person are precluded from denying is that the lessor had a title at the date of the lease and there is no exception even for the case where the lease itself discloses the defect of title. The principle does not apply to disentitle a tenant to dispute the derivative title of one who claims to have since become entitled to the reversion, though in such cases there may be other gorunds of estoppel, e.g. by attornment acceptance of rent etc. In this sense it is true enough that the principle only applies to the title of the landlord who let the tenant in as distinct from any other person claiming to be reversioner. Nor does the principle apply to prevent a tenant from pleading that the title of the original lessor has since come to an end. The passage has been quoted with approval by Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif sand others (supra) (ibid). 14. Nor does the principle apply to prevent a tenant from pleading that the title of the original lessor has since come to an end. The passage has been quoted with approval by Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif sand others (supra) (ibid). 14. The learned counsel for the appellants had not challenged the title of the original landlord in this case during the argument. What he says is that he can challenge the title of Naziran Bi by showing that she did not get the property by Will. In the opinion of this Court, the appellant are entitled to do so. Yusuf Khan never attorned to or acknowledge the title of Naziran Bi. 15. However, even if it he held that the appellants are entitled to challenge the derivative title of Naziran Bi another question arises whether they have been able to do so successfully 7 On the death of Abdul Rahim, Naziran Bi was an heir. It is not necessary to decide whether she would be an heir as a 'sharer' or a "Residuary" and to what extent she would inherit the property of her brother in absence of will. Assuming for a moment, that she being an heir, cannot get any property by bequest as other sharers have not given consent to the will made by Abdul Rahim after his death and so the will is not valid as per section 117 of the Mulla's 'Principles of Mahomedan Law", she would get property of Rahim Khan on his death as an heir. This, as one of the co-sharers she could have brought a suit for eviction against Yusuf Khan. This preposition of law is well established (See Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2335 Smt. Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak and others A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1599 and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh (dead) by Lrs. and others A.I.R.1989 S.C. 758. Shri S.K. Seth, learned counsel for the respondent appears to he right in his contention that result would not be otherwise, if Naziran Bi was not heir at the time of the death for Abdul Rahim Khan. Thus, she could get the property by will to the extent of 1/3rd in accordance with conditions laid down in Section 118 (ibid). 16. Thus, she could get the property by will to the extent of 1/3rd in accordance with conditions laid down in Section 118 (ibid). 16. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion it is held that Naziran Bi was entitled to evict the appellants because in any case she was one of the landlords either by virtue of the Will or because, she was entitled to inherit the property as an heir in absence of the Will. The second question is thus answered by saying that there was relationship of landlord and tenant. 17. The question No. 1 now must be dealt with. It is true that despite the will, Yusuf Khan chose to deny the title of Naziran Bi and set up a title in sons of Abdul Rahim Khan and then upon Mohammad Rafiq Khan. The question is whether such a denial of title would entail a decree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act'. It is well established that denial of title in the written statement would furnish ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' (Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (deceased by Lrs.) A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2187. However, the question in this case is whether the appellants chose to deny the drivative title of Naziram Bi. In fact, they did by pleading that after death of Abdul Rahim his sons became the landlords and thereafter Abdul Rafuq, Mohammad Khan who purchased the suit property by registered sale-deed dt 2.3.68 Ex. D-6. In the case of Balveersingh v. Kishanlal A.I.R. 1988 M.P. 225 a Division Bench of this Court has held that a denial of title by a tenant must amount to a 'disclaimer of title' entitling the landlord to claim benefit of section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act'. The Division Bench approved the case of Ghulam Mohammad v. Poonam Chand 1969 M.P.L.J. 843 holding that 'denial of title" is covered by third contingency in section 12(1) (c) of 'the Act' expressed in the words "has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of landlord". In the beginning of paragraph 2 at page 225 it has been observed:- "2. The question, as trained, is purely that of law. It presupposes that estoppel under S.116 and there is also disclaimer by him prior to the date of institution of the suit. In the beginning of paragraph 2 at page 225 it has been observed:- "2. The question, as trained, is purely that of law. It presupposes that estoppel under S.116 and there is also disclaimer by him prior to the date of institution of the suit. We say so because there may be case where, in certain set of circumstances, the estoppel under S. 110 of the Evidence Act may not be operative, entitling the tenant to challenge the plaintiff's title and his averments may not amount to disclaimer. This preface to question required to be answered by the Division Bench shows that where Section 116 of the Evidence Act itself permits denial of title by implication Sec. 12 (1) (I) of 'the Act' does not apply. Where the estoppel under Section 118 (ibid) is not operative, the tenant has a right to challenge the title of landlord. In these circumstances, a bona fide denial of title may not amount to disclaimer. The Division Bench further observed:- The terms "disclaimer" has not been defined cither in the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, or in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In order to appreciate the import of that term, a reference to S. 111 (g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary because the term has been in the use since long to describe that provision in short. Under that provision, a lease of immovable property determines in case the issue renounces his character as such by setting up a title in third person or by claiming title in himself. Thus, in the context, the term disclaimer" has to be understood to mean renunciation by the tenant of his characer as such by the tenant of his character as such by setting up a tile in a third person or by claiming title in himself. So a 'disclaimer' necessarily jeopardise the landlords title and when the landlord's title itself is no jeopardised, the "disclaimer" necessarily has the tenancy to constitute an act which is likely to at feed adversely and substantially the landlord's interest in the accommodation. That constitutes a ground for eviction under S.12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 18. So a 'disclaimer' necessarily jeopardise the landlords title and when the landlord's title itself is no jeopardised, the "disclaimer" necessarily has the tenancy to constitute an act which is likely to at feed adversely and substantially the landlord's interest in the accommodation. That constitutes a ground for eviction under S.12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 18. Thus, the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench is as a "pure question of law", if tenant renounces his character as a tenant as sets up a title in himself or in a third person then it would amount to "disclaimer of title" attracting the provisions of section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. 19. The Division Bench itself recognized that, where the bar of estoppel under Section 116 of Evidence Act does not operate, a tenant's a plea challenging the title of landlord may not amount of "disclaimer". The said Division Bench concluded that question of "disclaimer of title' may be in a given case a mixed question of law and facts. Under given facts of circumstances, if the Court comes to conclusion that act of a tenant does not amount to 'disclaimer of title' then Section 12(1) (o) of the Act is not attracted. The tenant may not renounces his character as a tenant but may bond fide set up a title in a person who may appear to him to be his landlord in case of derivative title. His denial way be in order to protect his own interest. His denial may be in accordance with information received by him. It may be under mistaken facts. It may under mistaken interpretation of correct facts in accordance with legal advice received by him. The Division Bench relearning to examples given by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Nebraj v. Amrit Kaur 1973 J.L.J. 445 has held that "mistaken denial" or denial in order to protect the interest of tenant may not amount to disclaimer of title. In Balveer Singh v. Kishanpal (supra) reported in, it was held by a learned single Judge, following the dictum of the Division Bench, that in order to protect his interest, a tenant may deny title of rival claimants until the person could be judicially accepted as the true landlord. 20. In Balveer Singh v. Kishanpal (supra) reported in, it was held by a learned single Judge, following the dictum of the Division Bench, that in order to protect his interest, a tenant may deny title of rival claimants until the person could be judicially accepted as the true landlord. 20. Applying the aforesaid principles we have to examine whether 'the Act' of the appellants amount to disclaimer of the title of the respondent. This is obviously a mixed question of law and facts. The facts established are that the Naziran Bi was claiming through a will whereas the tenant was setting a title in the real sons of the testator who were his heirs. There is had executed the sale-deed in favour of Mohammad Rafiq Khan and, therefore, the tenant was setting up a title in him. There was a registered sale-deed in favour of aforesaid person. Thus, the tenant was setting up a title in a person who was claiming through the heirs. If these basic facts are borne in mind, there is no question of disclaimer of title. Firstly the appellants, predecessor in title was challenging the derivative which he was entitled to do and, therefore, his act would not come within the meaning of 'disclaimer of title' as per decision of Division Bench, in paragraph 2, quoted above. That apart, his act amounted to protection of his own interest. As already seen, such denial may amount to mistaken denial on question of law. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court concludes that denial by Yusuf Khan does not amount to denial under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act'. 21. The learned counsel for the respondent had argued that a tenant cannot dispute the validity of will because he is a stranger. It is true that ordinarily a will cannot be questioned by a stranger. But, here Yusuf Khan was claiming his right of tenancy with the natural heirs of Rahim Khan i.e. his two sons. Thus, the tenant cannot be said to be a total stranger as he was claiming his title through the real heris. For this reason. Yusuf Khan is ostensibly not a stranger and, therefore, this Court does not rest its decision on the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. 22. Thus, the tenant cannot be said to be a total stranger as he was claiming his title through the real heris. For this reason. Yusuf Khan is ostensibly not a stranger and, therefore, this Court does not rest its decision on the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. 22. Thus, the answer to question No. 1 is that denial of plaintiff s tenancy under the facts and circumstances of the case does not entitle the respondent to obtain of decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act'. The answer to question No. 2 is that relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the appellants is proved. 23. As already observed earlier no question of law was framed under Section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act'. No argument was addressed on this point. Thus, the respondent is entitled to a decree under Section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act'. 24. In result, this appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are confirmed. There shall be no order as to costs of this appeal.