B. S. CHAUHAN, J. The instant petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 19-7-1987, contained in An-nexure-5 to the writ petition, passed by respondent No. 2 and order dated 17- 4-1989, contained in Annexure-6 to the writ petition, passed by respondent No. 1. 2. Petitioners were appointed in 1977 and 1978 for a short period from time to time by respondent No. 2 which is evident from the orders dated 16-4-1987, 27-4-1987, 31-7-1987, 11-4-1988 and 19-7-1989 con tained in Annexures-2 to 4 to the writ peti tion. The petitioners were given work-charge employment and vide order dated 19-7-1989, the services of the petitioners had been terminated as respondent No. 1 had allotted the work of Tendu Patta collec tion to respondent No. 3, vide order dated 17- 4-89. The said order of termination has been challenged in the instant writ petition. 3. The main contention raised by Sri Ram Niwas Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners is that respondents No. 2 and 3 both are instrumentalities of the State and even if the contract to collect the Tendu Pattas had been allotted to respondent No. 3 by respondent No. 1 in the year 1989. The petitioners services could not be ter minated. Sri V K. Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents has vehementally op posed and argued that respondents No. 2 and 3 are separate legal entities governed by separate statutes and respondent No. 3 is not concerned with the liability by respon dent No. 2. It is the exclusive prerogative of the State to allot the work to anybody as the agent of the State to collect Tendu Pattas under Section 4 of the Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1972 and respondent No. 2 had been given the said agency only for the year of 1987 and 1988. Respondent No. 2 during that period required the services of the work-charge employees to collect Tendu Pattas, but in 1989 when the said work had been allotted to respondent No. 3, the ser vices of the petitioners were no more re quired and terminated in accordance with the terms of their appointment. 4. Respondent No. 2 during that period required the services of the work-charge employees to collect Tendu Pattas, but in 1989 when the said work had been allotted to respondent No. 3, the ser vices of the petitioners were no more re quired and terminated in accordance with the terms of their appointment. 4. The next contention raised by the respondents is that in 1989 when the ser vices of the petitioners and other similarly situated persons were terminated they filed Writ Petition No. 4998 of 1989 under the name and style of U. P. Tendu Patta Karam-chari Sangh v. State of U. P. and others, which was dismissed by the Lucknow Bench of this Court, vide its order dated 8-5- 1990. The petitioners were members of the aforesaid Association and their writ petition having been dismissed earlier, it was the solemn duty of the petitioners to disclose the said fact before this Court. Moreover, the said writ petition is not maintainable as their earlier writ petition had been dismissed. 5. The further contention of Sri. V. K. Singh is that the petitioners have not ap proached this Court with clean hands as being members of the Association they must have been aware of this fact. However, the petitioners have denied of being the mem bers of the aforesaid Association in the rejoinder affidavit. 6. Sri R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners has referred to and relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in Ban Nigam Karamchari Kalyan Sangh v. Divisional Logging Manager, 1988 (3) SLR 432, wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held that 149 workmen who were ap pointed by respondent No. 3 would be taken over by respondent No. 2 as there had been an agreement between the said two respon dents. This case deals with a situation when the agency for collecting Tendu Patta was given to respondent No. 2 in 1987. However, there is nothing on record to show that the said 149 workmen had also reverted back to respondent No. 3 when the agency had again been given to respondent No. 3 in 1989 and, thus, the judgment is of no help to the present petitioners. However, there is nothing on record to show that the said 149 workmen had also reverted back to respondent No. 3 when the agency had again been given to respondent No. 3 in 1989 and, thus, the judgment is of no help to the present petitioners. Sri R. N. Singh was vehementally argued that this would also apply vice versa and now as the contract has been given to respondent No. 3, the liability of the workmen appointed by respondent No. 2 should be taken over by respondent No. 3. However, he has fairly conceded, as he has always been fair to the Court, that the petitioners did not fall with in the said 149 workmen. Moreover, there is no material on record to show that there was any agree ment between respondents No. 2 and 3 when the agency to collect the Tendu Patta was given to respondent No. 3 to take any liability to absorb the work charge employees appointed by respondent No. 2. The appointment letters issued from time to time clearly contain a condition that the Services of the petitioners were of tem porary nature. It will come to an end on the expiry of the work of Tendu Patta Collection or on the instance when the services of the petitioners would not be required. 7. In the case of State of Punjab v. Surendar Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1593 , it has been held by the Apex Court that there is no reason as to why the services of the employees cannot be terminated by enforc ing the terms and conditions of their ap pointment letter. The Apex Court, in the case of Uaswani Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 115 , held that the petitioners had accepted the offer of appointment knowing very well the terms and conditions of their appointment. They had understood and ac cepted the conditions of service, thus, they cannot object when they are removed in accordance with the conditions subject to which they were appointed and, thus, the employees can never raise any grievance if the action taken against them is primarily governed by the terms of their appointment. 8. They had understood and ac cepted the conditions of service, thus, they cannot object when they are removed in accordance with the conditions subject to which they were appointed and, thus, the employees can never raise any grievance if the action taken against them is primarily governed by the terms of their appointment. 8. The concept of work charge employee was explained by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is as under: "the work charge employees are engaged on a temporary basis and their appointments are made for the execution of a specified work. From the very nature of the employment, there services automatically come to an end on the completion of the work for the sole purpose to which they are employed. They do not get any relief under the Payment of Gratuity Act nor do they receive any retrenchment benefits or any benefits under the State Employees Insurance Scheme". 9. Similar view has also been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. S. K. Sinha v. State of U. P. , 1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 456. The terms used in their ap pointment letter itself indicate that they were work charge employees and, thus, they had no right to continue in service after the work for which they were appointed was no more available with the employer, i. e. respondent No. 2 in the instant case. 10. The petitioners have filed an ap plication for amendment to the effect that they may be permitted to amend the peti tion to the extent that if for any reason the petitioners cannot be given a job with respondent No. 2, they may be absorbed by respondent No. 3, who has now been al lotted the work to collect the Tendu Patta. Such a relief cannot be granted because there is nothing on record to show that by any agreement respondent No. 3 has taken over the liability of any type of employees employed by respondent No. 2. 11. In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the petition is devoid of any merit and hence it is dis missed. Petition dismissed. .