B. PANIGRAHI. J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff held this appeal against the reversing judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge at Alipore in Title Appeal No. 1033 of 1980 remanding the Title suit 39 of 1977 to the 3rd Court of Additional Munsif at Alipore for fresh disposal in accordance with law. ( 2 ) THE appellant Lilabati Dash, who was the plaintiff in the Trial Court filed the suit for ejectment against the respondent and for mesne profits in Title Suit No. 39 of 1977. It is alleged, inter alia, that the tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 29. 5. 74 through her lawyer Mr. Arjun Sanyal calling upon the defendant/respondent to quit and vacate the premises on the expiry of the month of July, 1974. The notice was sent by registered post with Acknowledgment Due to the defendant's residential address as well as to his office address. The defendant is said to have refused both the registered letters and those were returned with the postal endorsement as 'not claimed' and 'refused' respectively. Similar attempt was also made by the plaintiff for service of the notice but it was refused by the defendant. ( 3 ) ). The defendant, on the other hand, contested the suit by filing a written statement denying all the material allegations of the plaint He challenged the ownership of the suit premises. He had also disputed regarding the service of notice. During the pendency of the suit the defendant appears to have filed an application under section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act which was allowed vide order No. 15 dated 16. 2. 76 by directing him to deposit the rent in the Trial Court by instalment. The defendant having failed to deposit the rent as directed previously, the Trial Court as per its order dated 29th June, 1979 was pleased to strike out the defence of the respondent under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court after considering the evidence placed before it by the parties held the service of the notice against the defendant was proper and sufficient. It further recorded that the defendant intentionally refused to receive the notice and, therefore, as such service was sufficient for the purpose of notice under section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. It further recorded that the defendant intentionally refused to receive the notice and, therefore, as such service was sufficient for the purpose of notice under section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. While determining the issue of eviction the Trial Court was, however, of the opinion that the defendant having failed to comply the order passed under section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, his defence against ejectment has to be struck off. Accordingly there was no other way left than to pass a decree of ejectment against the defendant/ respondent. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by the judgment and decree of ejectment the defendant preferred an appeal. A positive stand was taken by the respondent that the property having been transferred in favour of a third party and the transferee having not joined as a party to the suit, the original plaintiff could not get the benefit of section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act sine after the transfer she ceased to be the owner of the property. In such premises the order of ejectment on the ground of striking out of defence appears to be untenable in law. Therefore, the appellate court while setting aside the judgment and decree of ejectment remanded the suit again to the Trial Court to decide the case afresh and to find out whether the plaintiff still continued to be the owner of the property after having transferred the same in favour of a third party. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of remand has filed appeal. ( 6 ) MR. Dutt, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has advanced a contention stating that the appellate court has taken an erroneous view, particularly in the absence of any document being filed by the defendant showing that the property was transferred in favour of the third party. He further contended that during the pendency of the suit the defendant filed an application on 13. 6. 79 which was rejected on the same day after hearing the parties. After rejection of that application though the defendant did not take the matter in revision but he could have challenged it during the pendency of the first appeal by filing documents showing that the property was transferred by the original plaintiff to a third party. 6. 79 which was rejected on the same day after hearing the parties. After rejection of that application though the defendant did not take the matter in revision but he could have challenged it during the pendency of the first appeal by filing documents showing that the property was transferred by the original plaintiff to a third party. In the absence of any such document showing transfer was effected and while there was no material before the Trial Court to come to such a finding. It was not legitimate for the appellate court to take such view and accordingly the judgment and decree were liable to be set aside. ( 7 ) MR. De, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has fairly submitted that there was no document placed before the first appellate court regarding the transfer alleged to have been made in favour of a third party by the original plaintiff. ( 8 ) ON considering the contentions of the learned counsel I fell the case lies within the narrow campus to find out if the property covered under the suit in fact was transferred to a third party, the defendant who is the appellant before the learned District Judge could not substantiate about the transfer of the suit property to a third party and, therefore, the order of remand on the ground of transfer is bound to be vacated. In the result, since the defence was struck off under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the order of ejectment of the defendant as directed by the learned Trial Court is bound to be upheld. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate court are hereby set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court are hereby restored but in the circumstances without cost. Appeal succeeds