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1996 DIGILAW 1237 (MAD)

Sea Shore Traders v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras

1996-12-12

ABDUL WAHAB

body1996
Judgment :- ABDUL WAHAB, J. These writ petitions are for quashing the orders of the respondent dated September 14, 1987 demanding damages from the petitioner for delayed payment. 2. The brief facts of the case is as follows : The petitioner is governed by the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Code allotted to it bearing No. TN/3493. In the first case the demand is for a sum of Rs. 15,391.95 while in the second case the demand is for a sum of Rs. 96,209.05. In the first case the period of default is from March 1977 to February, 1988, while in the second case the demand is from March 1978 to January 1983. Since the petitioner failed to appear for the enquiry after receipt of the notice, the damage has been fixed by the respondent exercising its discretion. The reason given by the respondent is that on account of delayed payment, there was loss of interest and the respondent has incurred administrative charges. He has fixed the damages from 2% to 50% of the amount paid with delay. There is no actual determination of damage as such. 3. Respondents have filed a common counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit it is alleged that the petitioner did not appear for the enquiry and the damages were levied for the two periods from March 1977 to February, 1978 and March 1978 to February 1983. As there was no representation from the petitioner, it was presumed that they did not have any justifiable reason for the delayed payment. The impugned orders were issued considering the facts and circumstances of the case and there is no illegality or impropriety. In view of the default committed by the petitioner organisation respondent was put to loss of interest and proper timely deposits or investments could not be made. The delayed payments increased the cost of administrative expenses. Therefore, the writ petitions must be dismissed. 4. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner Mr. T. Chengalvarayan contended that Sec. 14-B of the Act contemplates damages only when there was default in the payment of any contribution to the fund. But there is no default in these two cases. But on the other hand, there is delayed payment. Therefore, the question of recovery of damages does not arise at all. T. Chengalvarayan contended that Sec. 14-B of the Act contemplates damages only when there was default in the payment of any contribution to the fund. But there is no default in these two cases. But on the other hand, there is delayed payment. Therefore, the question of recovery of damages does not arise at all. Learned counsel further contended that Sec. 14-B of the Act contemplates damages on the amount of arrears. The question of arrears will arise only when there is a partial payment. The percentage fixed is on the basis of arrears. Therefore, there is no default and partial payment, but only the delayed payment of the entire amount, the question of damages does not arise at all. Hence the respondent has no jurisdiction to impose the damage by way of penalty. 5. There is no definition of default in the Act or in the scheme. The New Webstor's Dictionary of English Language, gives the definition of default as follows :- "Failure to Act, neglect, failure to meet financial obligation; law, failure to perform act of obligation legally required, esp, to appear in court or to plead at a time assigned, want, lack, or absence." * As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is failure on the part of the petitioner to pay the contribution. The failure must be read with clause 38 of the Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. Clause (38) makes it obligatory on the part of the employer to pay the amounts of contribution whiten 15 days of every month to the Fund. Clause (38) contained in the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 has been framed under sub-section (1)(b) of Sec. 5 of the Act. Sub-section (1)(b) enables the Central Government to frame a scheme with reference to the matter specified in Schedule 2 of the Act. Item No. 2 in the list in the Schedule II is the time and manner in which contribution should be made . If we read clause (38) of the Scheme along with Sec. 14-B it would mean that a default contemplated under Sec. 14-B is the failure to the Contributions as provided in the scheme, viz., clause (38), i.e., failure to pay within 15 days at the close of every month. That is why Sec. 14-B refers only to recovery of damages and not to the recovery of contribution. That is why Sec. 14-B refers only to recovery of damages and not to the recovery of contribution. If the legislature thought the default mentioned in Sec. 14-B is total failure to pay, they would have definitely included the words recovery of contribution, along with damages in Sec. 14-B of the Act. The intention of the legislature in using the words 'default' in Sec. 14-B of the Act is therefore, clear that word 'default' is failure to pay within the time prescribed under the Scheme. 6. The contention that the question of arrears does not arise when there is no partial payment and there is only delay and therefore the percentage basis cannot be adopted is also unsound. Because the payment of contribution is a continuing process; the payments have to be made every month. When there is failure to pay the amount due for a particular month, that amount becomes arrears in the next month. The meaning of arrear given in New Webster' Dictionary of the English Language as follows : "The state of being behind in completing one's obligations; a debt; that which remains unpaid or undone when the due time is past." * In the light of the definition mentioned above, the meaning given by the counsel for the word 'arrear' is not correct. 7. Yet another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if the time factor is added to the payment, the phrase used in Sec. 14-B is 'default in payment' and not default in paying. Therefore, there's a difference. According to the learned Counsel if the intention of the legislature was to penalise belated listed payment, they could have used the word "default in paying". The omission to use the word "default in paying," according to the learned counsel indicated that the default contemplated in Sec. 14-B is the total failure of payment and not the delayed payment. This contention is also unacceptable. We have already referred to the dictionary meaning of the word "default". The default in law according to the dictionary meaning is failure to perform an act or obligation legally required, especially to appear in Court or to plead at a time assigned. Legally the word default is with reference to a time assigned i.e., failure to perform the act or obligation in time. 8. The default in law according to the dictionary meaning is failure to perform an act or obligation legally required, especially to appear in Court or to plead at a time assigned. Legally the word default is with reference to a time assigned i.e., failure to perform the act or obligation in time. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the contentions of the learned counsel with reference to word "default" are not acceptable. 9. However, in this case also I have to follow my earlier decisions in W.P. No. 8154 of 1987 dated June 25, 1996 and also in W.P. Nos. 9426 and 10926 of 1987 dated September 19, 1996. I have taken the view that there must be determination of damages. Then only, the respondent can proceed to recover the damages. In these two cases the respondent has simply fixed the damages ranging from 2 % to 50 % of the arrears payable. Even according to him, the loss sustained by the establishment is loss of interest and the increase in the cost of administration. This could have been determined by the respondent. After determining the said amount, additional amount can also be added, taking into account the period of delay. That has not been done. In such circumstances, following my earlier decisions mentioned above, I have to set aside the order of the respondent in these two writ petitions. Accordingly, the orders passed by the respondent and impugned in those writ petitions are set aside. The writ petitions are allowed. However there will be no order as to costs.