Judgment : D. Raju. J, .1. The above batch of writ petitions have been filed challenging the constitutional validity of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1996 (Presidential Ordinance No.2 of 1996), hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned ordinance’ and the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995, hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned pension scheme’. Subsequently, the Parliament has enacted the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 1996, Central Act, 25 of 1996, hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned Act, and the Presidents’ assent was also accorded to the same on 18. 1996. Orders have been passed by this court to suitably amend the references in the nature of relief sought so as to substitute the name of the Act in places where the name of the impugned Ordinance, without driving the various petitioners to the necessity of filing formally individual petitions seeking for such amendment and thereupon the challenge stood modified as one directed against the Central Act, 25 of 1996 and the impugned pension scheme, thereunder. These writ petitions, except one or two have been invariably filed by various workers’ unions pertaining to different Industrial Establishments. W.P.No.238 of 1996 has been filed by a Management- a Beedi Manufacturer, for a writ of declaration, declaring Clause 3 of the Central Ordinance 13 of 1995, providing for the transfer of Employee’s contribution of 8.33% of the Employees’ Pay in the Provident Fund Account shall be remi tted by the employer to the Employees Pension Fund Scheme, 1995, as unreasonable and arbitrary. W.P.No.6644 of 1996 has been filed by about 433 employees, joining together, of M/s.Rane Power Steering Limited, Madras, out of whom 40 are said to be governed under a separate Provident Fund Scheme managed by a Trust with effect from 1-4-1989, challenging the provisions of the Act and the Scheme, as in the other cases and also for a declaration that the then Employer M/s.Rane Power Steering Ltd., Madras are entitled to be exempted under Section 17 (1C) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, hereinafter referred to as the ‘main Act, from the operation of the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995. Writ Petitions with similar claim of relief that one or other of the Employers also are exempt from the impugned pension scheme have also been filed by some of the others Employees Union, while challenging the constitutional validity of the Act and the pension scheme thereunder. .2. Though several writ petitions have been filed with varying emphasis on different aspects of the problems and different counsel have appeared for such petitioners, Miss.R.Vaigai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.Nos. 17208 and 17209 of 1995 etc., alone made detailed submissions and the other learned counsel appearing merely stated that they adopt in all respects, the submissions of Miss.R.Vaigai, without any further addition or supplement therefor. It would be appropriate as also usef ul to advert to the averments in W.P.Nos.17208 and 17209 of 1995, in order to appreciate the grievances of the various petitioners. W.P.No.17208 of 1995 has been filed by the Ashok Leyland Employees’ Union, represented by its General Secretary and another employee who is said to be a Trustee of the Ashok Leyland Employees’ Provident Fund, seeking for a writ of declaration that the impugned ordinance and the impugned pension scheme are illegal and unconstitutional. Similarly, the very petitioners have fi led W.P.No.17208 of 1995 for a writ of declaration that the petitioners and their employer Ashok Leyland Limited, Madras are entitled to be exempted under Section 17(1C) of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, from the operation of the impugned pension scheme. The petitioners claim that the petitioners-union represents about 9000 employees working in the Ashok Leyland Ltd., said to be highly profitable industry at Madras, that being an old establishment the employees have tried to evolve various beneficial schemes for the workmen by bilateral negotiations with the Management, that they had exemption granted under Section 17 of the main Act as early as from 1-11-1952 since they had a better provident fund scheme in the establishment than under the statute with better and greater benefits and that after negotiations with the management the petitioners have arrived at a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on 24-5-1995 under which workmen who superannuated from 1- 4-1994 onwards become entitled to pension from the pension fund created jointly by the workers and the management. It is also the claim of the petitioners that as on date, the petitioners-workmen have three retiral benefits viz. gratuity, provident fund and pension each supplementing the other which has been said to be the long standing demand of the working class. While making reference to the main Act and the introduction of the Family Pension Scheme by the amendment introduced in 1971, it is stated that the rate of pension thereunder was very poor with no provision for payment of such pension to the worker himself and that due to alleged improper and lower distribution of Family Pension between 1971- 1995, huge accumulation to the tune of Rs.8,500 crores resulted in the Family Pension Fund. That apart, it is claimed that the Family Pension Scheme itself was quite confiscatory of the retiral benefits of the employees the same not being a proper match for the contribution and the impugned scheme is said to be further drastic, unfair and unjust. As for the employees who joined service before 1971 and who had the option to join or not, the Family Pension Scheme introduced in 1971, 1380 members of the Petitioner union are said to be not members of the same. The provisions of the impugned ordinance and the scheme thereunder are said to be unreasonable, arbitrary and unfair and also violative of Articles 14, 21, 39(a), 39(e), 41 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. Informatio n in the form of figures are also furnished to show that the interest earned on accumulation of deposits alone far exceeds the benefits ultimately granted. A comparative chart showing the benefits under the Company’s pension scheme and the impugned scheme is also given to highlight the grievances of the employees and justify their claim for exemption. The promulgation of the Ordinance, in the teeth of the pendency of the Bill before Parliament is said to be not bona fide and unwarranted, particularly wh en the matter was said to be the subject matter of deliberations by the Parliamentarians and Tripartite Conference consisting of representatives of the Central Trade Unions, employees and the Government. The petitioner-Union also appears to have been making representations separately vindicating the cause of their workers. 3. The petitioner-Union also appears to have been making representations separately vindicating the cause of their workers. 3. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed a common counter affidavit traversing and denying the various claims and assertions of the petitioners, in addition to adopting the counter affidavit filed in W.M.P.Nos.27266 of 1995 in W.P.No. 17208 of 1995. The plea on behalf of the respondents is that the impugned ordinance was not promulgated in haste, that the issue relating to grant of pension to workers was engaging the attention of the Government and Central Board of Trustees of Employees’ Provided Fund from 1991 as a security measure, resulting in the decision to amend the main Act itself taken in 1993, that the amendment bill introduced was referred to the Parliamentary Committee by the Hon’ble Speaker of the Lok Sabha and not the Ministry of Labour, that the long lapse of time involved and delay without finalising the Bill was found to be detrimental to the interests of workers necessitating recourse to the promulgation of the Ordinance. The said bill has since been enacted as Central Act 25 of 1996 and the av erments of the petitioners challenging the wisdom of promulgation of an Ordinance has since been rendered irrelevant and wholly unnecessary. While contending that the validity of the impugned provisions have to be judged on the provisions themselves and not with reference to any individual case of difficulty or hardship, reliance has been placed upon the ruling of the Supreme Court rendered in the context of the Family Pension Scheme of the year 1971. It is further claimed that the entire contribution made by the Employees has been left untouched and it is not also open to the petitioners that every employee must get back not only what he contributes but also the contribution of the Employer and the Government. While disputing the claim of the petitioners for a declaration of the nature made in W.P.No. 17209 of 1995, it is contended that any claim for exemption under Section 17 of the main Act has to go before the competent authorities who are statutory function arises for an appropriate decision in accordance with the requirements of the Act and that such claim cannot be countenanced in this writ petition. The application of the management for exemption under Section 17 was said to be not supported by all the required data and materials and the delay, in the matter of passing orders thereon cannot be attributed to the authorities. The respondents have also highlighted the various advantages and benefits under the impugned act and the Scheme to the workers and the members of their family. The Company’s pension scheme is said to be available for unionised Employees only and not to all workers, that it is also applicable from 4. 1995 onwards in contrast to the option available under the impugned Scheme to join from 4. 1993 itself and that there is no violation of Section 10 of the main Act as alleged. Further, details relating to the many more improvements envisaged are also disclosed in the counter affidavit, and amendments to the impugned scheme are already said to be under process. While adverting to the provision contained in para 16(1) (a) of the scheme that even if one months contribution has been paid to the pension fund family pension becomes payable, it is stated that in the Company’s pension scheme no such safeguard is provided and that workers who are not either confirmed or unionised cannot have any protection. To substantiate the beneficial nature of the impugned scheme two illustrative cases have been referred to. In the case of one A.P.Nandagopal who was a member of the Family Pension Scheme, 1971 and who died on 16. 1995, leaving his wife and child the widow was said to have been sanctioned under the 1971 scheme itself on 11. 1995 family pension at the rate of Rs.1750 per mensem for 7 years and Rs.1050 per mensem for the rest of her life or until she remarries. Under the new impugned scheme if she opts to join under the same (without any contribution) she will be eligible to get a widow pension at Rs.1481 per mensem for herself and the child at Rs.370 per mensem upto 25 years of age of the child. In the case of one P.Nithyanandam who was an employee of Ashok Leyland and who died on 16. In the case of one P.Nithyanandam who was an employee of Ashok Leyland and who died on 16. 1995 also even under the 1971 Scheme the wife was sanctioned family pension as in the other case and if the widows opts for the impugned scheme, they will be paid a sums of Rs.1481 per mensem as widows pension and for the two children at the rate of Rs.371 per mensem, each till the two children attain 25 years. On the above, the respondents contend that the impugned Act and the scheme are really welfare oriented and designed as a social welfare and security measure and as such constitutionally valid and quite in accordance with law. 4. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit reiterating the stand taken in their affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and disclosing further details in support of their attempt to demonstrate that the impugned scheme is not to the benefit of the workmen and to contend that the same is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is claimed for the petitioners that any rational and fair scheme ought to have classified the employees and the rates of pension on the basis of the quantum of contribution to an employee credit and his number of years of service. The impugned scheme is not only said to be unreasonable but also exproprietary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 5. (a) Miss R.Vaigai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.Nos. 17208 of 1995 and certain other writ petitions, whose submissions have been adopted by all the other counsel appearing in these batch of cases, contended that the impugned provisions of the Act and the impugned scheme is unconstitutional being arbitrary, discriminatory and confiscatory in nature and, therefore, the same is liable to be struck down. It may be noticed at this stage that it is not the case of the petitioners that the Parliament lacks legislative competence to enact the law in question. On the other hand, the challenge to the impugned Act and the Scheme is on the above noticed grounds. It may be noticed at this stage that it is not the case of the petitioners that the Parliament lacks legislative competence to enact the law in question. On the other hand, the challenge to the impugned Act and the Scheme is on the above noticed grounds. While elaborating the above submissions, the learned counsel contended that provident fund and pension both being retiral benefits intended as a social security for the employees during their old age and enacted in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Articles 38, 39, 41 to 43 and 47 of the Constitution of India as also the presumable to the Constitution and protected as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the amendment act and the scheme which materially alters the existing provision for Provided Fund and the existing Providend Fund Scheme which carries social security benefits of the minimum level to the employees is patently unreasonable and deprivatory in nature and therefore unconstitutional as being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Argued the learned counsel further that unless it is shown by the respondents that the new legislation and the new scheme under challenge provides improved benefits or atleast maintains parity with the existing statute, they are liable to be struck down as unconstitutional. .(b) The next ground of challenge urged for the petitioners is that by enacting the protective safeguards in Sections 10, 12 and 17 of the main Act the legislature must be considered to have guaranteed the protection of the existing benefits and consequently none including Courts or the Legislatures by any new legislation can take away the said benefits or provide for a lesser benefits than the one available under the existing scheme of Provident Fund and that any new Scheme or provision could provide only any additional benefits that the existing one or accord improved terms of the scheme. The prohibition enacted in the provisions of the main Act, against deprivation of better Provident Fund benefits, it is contended, cannot be defeated by adopting a legislative device in the form of an amendment and, therefore, the impugned amendment Act as also the impugned scheme are violative of Article 14 read with Directive Principles for the reasons that it is a fraud on the Constitution. (c) The next ground of challenge made is that no guidelines have been laid down in the impugned Amendment Act while delegating the power to frame of scheme to the Government and the absence of such guidelines render the delegation excessive and invalid and consequently the impugned scheme also is liable to be struck down on that ground. It is submitted that the basic principles as also the manner in which the scheme has to be framed have to be laid down by the Legislature itself. Argued the learned counsel further that otherwise the power of the delegate will have to be so read down in the context of Sections 10, 12 and 17 of the main Act which constitutes inbuilt guidelines in the Act itself. The absence of the guidelines, it was contended, led to certain unjust consequences under the impugned scheme framed by the Government such as (i) where employees were getting 8.33 % (in P.F.) as capitable with interest, the Government has provided only the interest as pension and that too at rates far less than the interest on Provident Fund; (ii) persons for whom contributions are higher on account of longer service are made to get lesser rates of pension than those with lesser length of service and persons for whom contributions are higher on account of higher scales of salaries likewise get lesser rates of pension than those with lesser scales of salaries; (iii) There is no provision for return of the capital accumulations and the only return is out of the pension and not the capital accrued which would have been otherwise available as Providend Fund; (iv) the absence of classification or differentiation among those with longer years of service and higher scales of salaries as against those with lesser number of years of service and lesser scales of salaries, result in lack of uniformity in the rates of pension unlike in the cases of Government service or in Public Sector Banks, thus leading to unjust results; (v) the rates of pension is not linked and has no relevance with the cost of living index, thus eroding the very purpose of the beneficial legislation intended as a social security measure, particularly in the absence of any provision therein for revision of the rates of pension in future in respect of past retirees. .(d) The other sheet anchor of challenge is that the impugned Act and the scheme is discriminatory in that no option is given to the employees already covered by Family Pension Scheme, 1971 and having regard to the fact that Provident Fund and Pension being measures essentially different in nature, an option should have been given to all the past employees upto 16-11-1995 to join or not to joint in the impugned pension scheme. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that as necessary corollary, Family Pension Scheme, 1971 should be continued for the non-optees to the new scheme. Section 17(1C) as amended is also said to be discriminatory and arbitrary in so far as it denies to employees the right to seek for exemption from the operation of the provisions of the Act and the Scheme. Para 12 of the impugned Scheme is said to be ultra vires Section 6-A(iii) of the main Act in so far as it does not protect the benefits under the Family Pension Scheme, 1971 and the employees cannot be deprived of the pst accumulations and benefits under the Family Pension Scheme, 1971, since it constituted a right to property which cannot be taken away without a fair compensation the quantum of which cannot be anything less than the earlier benefit, the same being a benefit of a social security. The impugned scheme is also challenged on the ground that it is usurious and it is highly arbitrary in the absence of any added benefits to the widows and dependents than the one under the Family Pension Scheme, 1971. The marginally difference if any, between the Family Pension Scheme, 1971 and the impugned Employees Pension Scheme, 1995 is no justification, according to the petitioners, to increase the depletion from the Providend Fund to such a great extent as has been made under the impugned enactment and the scheme. The respondent-State has been accused of omitting to discharge their onerous burden to justify the appropriations from the Provident Fund and the need to make the employees to suffer by not get ting what they were already getting. The respondent-State has been accused of omitting to discharge their onerous burden to justify the appropriations from the Provident Fund and the need to make the employees to suffer by not get ting what they were already getting. It is also the submissions on behalf of the petitioners that though in Industrial Law, considerations as to financial constraints of the employer may justify such reduced benefits as long as the employer’s contributions remain unaffected, the State cannot, by a legislative measure, deny the fruits of the same to the employees and to that extent, the impugned amendment Act and the impugned Scheme are liable to be set aside. Finally, it has been contended that the impu gned amendment and the impugned scheme is a step backward in the area of socio-economic field and that the principles laid down and adopted for the scheme are not based on relevant considerations, but merely illusory. 6. Per contra, Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent-Central Government and Department assisted by Mr.K.Ramakrishna Reddy, contended that the Ordinance replaced by the impugned Act as also the impugned Scheme is quite in accordance with law, just and reasonable and in tune with the dictates of necessity of modern times as a social security measure to ameliorate conditions of the employees and their families by granting pension. It is contended that the Central Board of Trustees of the Employees Provident Fund Organisation have, on the recommendations made by the Board which consisted of a tripartite body comprising of representatives of the Central Government and the State Governments, the employers’ organisation and the trade unions of workers, decided to amend the Act to frame a suitable Pension Scheme for the Subscribers of the Employees’ Provident Fund that the validity of the impugned provisions could not be judged with reference to any individual case of difficulty or h ardship, but on the other hand, should be on the provisions themselves which is an improvement on the earlier Family Pension Scheme, 1971. It is contended that no one can claim that each and every employee must get back not only what he contributes but also the contribution of the employer and the Government towards the Provident Fund and inasmuch as the entire contribution made by the employees have been left untouched, there is no merit whatsoever in the challenge on the basis of either arbitrariness or alleged deprivation or violation of property rights as claimed by the petitioners. It is strenuously contended by furnishing illustrations and statements in contrast to the statements and dates furnished on behalf of the petitioners that in a matter of the nature dealing with social problems and the economic amelioration of the employees retired should be viewed on the generality of the situation and the over all benefits to the class of persons concerned as a whole. The challenge made to Section 17(lc) of the Act as amended is said to be misconceived and that it is for the petitioners to move the statutory functionaries to satisfy them that the pension scheme of the establishment or class of establishment of which many of the employees or members carry pensionary benefits at par or more favourable than the Pension Scheme under the Act. It is further contended that under the impugned Pension Scheme only in respect of new entrants short service pension is payable after he renders eligible service of 10 years or more and in the case of existing members who are already members of the erstwhile Family Pension Scheme, 1971, pension calculation is made taking into account the aggregate of two elements namely pension for the period of service rendered from 16-11-1995 and past service benefits and, therefore, even if an existing member has put in only one day service under the new Pension Scheme, he will be eligible for pension benefit. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents also highlig hted the drawbacks in the Company’s Pension Scheme. It is contended that the Company’s pension scheme is applicable only for confirmed employees belonging to the unionised category, but in the impugned pension scheme, an employee can opt to join the Employees’ Pension Scheme with effect from on or after 4. 1993 itself. It is contended that the Company’s pension scheme is applicable only for confirmed employees belonging to the unionised category, but in the impugned pension scheme, an employee can opt to join the Employees’ Pension Scheme with effect from on or after 4. 1993 itself. The provisions under Sections 10, 12 and 17 of the main Act, according to the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, do not stand in the way or disable or in any manner the Parliament from ushering in a new pension scheme and that the constitutional va lidity or the legality and propriety of the scheme cannot be and ought not to be based or judged in the context of the unamended provisions enacted earlier by the very same legislature and it is well within the legislative competence of the Parliament to effect reforms by making amendments introducing new innovations or providing for the framing of new schemes different from the one already in existence. It is also contended that the constitutional validity of such provision has to be considered vis-a-vis the provisions of the Constitution and not by comparison with the old scheme or old provision. The diversion of a portion of the contribution to the Provident Fund is said to be not in any manner violative of the provisions contained in Sections 10, 12 and 17 of the main Act. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Central Government also contended that the Act provides sufficient guidelines and indicates the policy for the framing of the new pension scheme and the manner and procedure inbuilt for the framing of the scheme and the requirement for placing the same before the Parliament in the manner envisaged under Section 7 of the main Act is sufficient safeguard and that, therefore, the challenge based on want of guidelines or excessive delegation has no merit or basis whatsoever. While contending that the impugned amendment as also the impugned scheme have been brought into existence after a careful study and analysis of the problems and in the interests of employees governed by the provisions of the Act, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Central Government also highlighted the various comparative benefits of the new pension scheme as also the proposal and the decision of the Government to bring about further improvements also. It is useful to advert to the comparative benefits under the Employees Family Pension Scheme, 1971 and Employees Pension Scheme, 1995 as analysed by the respondent-department which areas follows:- “Schemes framed under the EPF Act: Name of the Schemes Provisions under the Scheme EPF Scheme, 1952 The employees and employers are supposed to made contribution @ 8.33% or 10% whichever is applicable and get the interest @ 12% at the time of final settlement. Apart from terminal benefits advance for life insurance policies, house building, medical treatment, marriage and high education are also provided. Family Pension Scheme, 1971 This scheme has ceased to operate on introduction of Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 which has been explained in detail in subsequent paras. FPS-71 made room for Family Pension only ranging from Rs.250 to Rs.1050 p.m. which was payable to the widow of the deceased member and the retirement-cum-withdrawal benefits were also allowed to the members at the time of their retirement. Employees’ Deposit Linked Insurance Scheme, 1976 This Scheme was introduced to provide additional social security benefits equal to the average balance in P.F. account of the deceased employees to a maximum of Rs.35,000 EPFO : Profile 1. Total number of members served : 18.80 million 2. Total number of factories and business enterprises covered under the Act : 2,64,628 3. Total P.F. investment : Rs. 45,916 crores Employees’ Family Pension Scheme, 1971 Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 No provision for retirement/superannuation/short service pension A member can get retirement/superannuation/short service pension after putting in 20/10 years of service, as the case may be, at the age of 58 years (or discounted pension at an earlier age after 50 years) Monthly widow’s pension was payable if the employee had put in at least 3 months’ recknoable service Monthly widow’s pension is payable after one month’s reckonable service Monthly family Pension was payable to only one person at a time. Monthly Pension is payable to three parsons at a time i.e. widow/widower and two children. No benefits were paid in case of permanent and total disablement during employment. Monthly pension is given to disabled persons on one month’s recknoable service. Only withdrawal benefits were paid if a member expired after leaving the employment and no pension to the widow was payable in such cases. Even after leaving service, if a member expires, monthly pension is paid to the widow/widower and two children. Monthly pension is given to disabled persons on one month’s recknoable service. Only withdrawal benefits were paid if a member expired after leaving the employment and no pension to the widow was payable in such cases. Even after leaving service, if a member expires, monthly pension is paid to the widow/widower and two children. Maximum monthly family pension on a pay of Rs.5000 p.m. was Rs.1050 p.m. (Rs.1750 in case of 7 years’ minimum service) On pay of Rs.5000 monthly family pension would be upto Rs.1750 plus Rs.875 p.m. to two children No provision for nomination Persons both in and outside the family can be nominated. No provision for capital returns. 100 times equivalent to pension is payable as return on capital if the pensioner opts for reduced pension. No widow/children’s pension in case of death of the member whose account was not settled, if he was not in service. Pension is available to widow/children of a holder or certificate of contribution, even when he/she is out of employment Pension was available only to the eldest orphan aged below 25 years. Orphans get 75% of pension of the widow subject to a minimum of Rs.170 p.m. each. Capital returns: An important feature of the new scheme is to allow a member to choose any one of the following options providing for pension with return of capital : Option Normal Pension Revised Pension Return of Capital Revised pension during life time of the pensioner with return of capital on his death. Rs. 1,000 Rs.900 Rs. 100,000 Revised pension during member’s life, reduced pension during widow’s lifetime and then return of capital to nominee. In addition, the widow will be getting normal pension Rs. 1,000 Rs.9O0 Rs.800 Rs.90,000 Member opts for revised pension, after 20 years member gets return of capital. Rs. 1.000 Rs.875 Rs. 100,000 Comparative returns EPF Scheme, 52 and Employees’ Pension Scheme, 95. Initial salary Rs.1000 Salary increase @ At the end of 10 Years 15 years 20 years Salary 2,593 4,177 6,727 PF Accumulations @ 8.33% 25,606 64,816 1,45,935 Assuming interest @ 12% 256 p.m. 648 p.m. 1,459 p.m. Benefit under the new pension scheme 370 p.m. 895 p.m. 2,114 p.m. In case of capital return options: .(i) Reduced pension 333 p.m. 805 p.m. 1,903 p.m. .(ii) Capital return 37,000 89,000 2,11,000 7. The decisions said to have been taken by the Government, according to the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel, to bring about further improvements are as follows:- (i) The daughters of the employees would continue to get pension upto 25 years of age even in the event of their marriage before that age. .(ii) The widower/widow on remarriage would be treated on equal footing. (iii) The pensionable salary for piece rate workers would be determined on the basis of average of wages received on actual days of work during the last 12 months. .(iv) It would be possible for the members to opt for communication of pension to the extent of l/3rd of the eligible amount after the scheme has been in operation for three years. .(v) Such of the employees who have gone out on employment of account of voluntary retirement/retirement w.e.f. 1 -4-1993 onwards can also opt for pension scheme if they refund the benefits which they have already availed of. .(vi) Discounting rate in the case of optees for early pension has been reduced from 6% to 3% per year subject to maximum of 25%. (vii) The provision regarding discounting of pension in the case of short service pension (with service ranging from 10 to 20 years) has been deleted. (viii) In the event of any establishment, establish for its employees, its own pension scheme, comparable on superior to the Statutory pension scheme, the withdrawal benefit admissible to the employees under the ceased Family Pension Scheme will be paid back to facilitate establishment of such pension scheme. (ix) Arrangements will be made to ensure that pension to the members is not held up for want of payment of contributions by the employers without, at the same time absolving the employer of the liability to make the contribution”. It was also contended relying upon para 16(l)(a) of the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995 that even if one month’s contribution has been paid to the pension fund family pension becomes payable unlike the company’s pension scheme and even if the employee was a member of the erstwhile Family Pension Scheme, 1971 and if he had expired on or before 1-4-1993 the widow/widower can now opt for pensionery benefits under the new scheme, notwithstanding whether family pension was already sanctioned under the old scheme or not. In such cases, the family pension payable under the new schemes is much better than that paid under the old Family Pension Scheme. Instances of individual cases in respect of two from M/s.Ashok Leyland Limited have been illustrated to support their claim. It is also pointed out that under the Company’s Pension Scheme, even if the employee put in 15 to 27 years of service if only they resigns he will get only 50% of the pension eligible for retirement cases unlike the impugned pension scheme w hich does not make any such disparity or discrimination. These aspects have been urged for the respondents to show that the plea of arbitrariness or unreasonableness in new schemes is unfounded and baseless and that the impugned Act as well as the impugned scheme are beneficial and welfare oriented and are in the best interest of the employees who are contributories of the Provident Fund. Consequently, it is contended that there are no merits in the challenge made to the impugned amendment as also the impugned scheme. 8. The learned counsel appearing on either side invited our attention to some of the precedents which we consider it appropriate to be referred to them before undertaking an adjudication of the issues raised. The decision in Union of India v. Hira Devi , AIR 1952 SC 227 is that the Supreme Court while adverting to the provisions contained in Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 3(1) of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, held that the compulsory deposit in any Government or Railway Provident Fund cannot be assigned or charged and is not liable to any attachment. In Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and others , AIR 1971 SC 1409 the Apex Court held that payment of Pension under the rules does not depend upon the discretion of the State Government but is governed by the rules and a government servant, coming within those rules is entitled to claim pension and that the grant of pension does not depend upon any order also since it is only for the purpose of quantifying the amount having regard to the service and other allied matters that it may be necessary to pass an order to that effect, but the right to receive pension flows to an officer not because of any such order but by virtue of the rules. It was also held therein that the right of a person to receive pension is property under Article 31(1) as well as Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India as those provisions stood then. In M.M. Pathak v. Union of India , AIR 1978 SC 803 it was held that property within the meaning of Article 19(l)(f) of the Constitution and clause (2) of Article 31 comprised every form of property, tangible or intangible, including debts and choses in action, such as unpaid accumulation of wages, pension, cash grant and constitutionally protected Privy Purse. In Som Prakash v. Union of India , AIR 1981 SC 212 the Apex Court considered the claim for pension of employees in the context of Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act (2 of 1976) and it was held therein that the liability for the payment of full pension which was that of Burmah Shell under the trust deed of 1950 under which a pension fund was set up and regulations were made for its administration was held to have been statutorily continued by virtue of the provisions contained in Act 2 of 1976 and that the pre-existing liability to pay pension, provident fund or gratuity statutorily continued cannot be avoided. Adverting to Section 12 of the said Act, it was also observed that the total quantum of benefits in the nature of old age pension, gratuity or provident fund, shall not be reduced by reason only of the liability of the employer for payment of contribution to the fund, since the provident fund was held to accure by statutory force, Section 12 overriding any agreement authorising deductions. 9. In D.S. Nakara v. Union of India , AIR 1983 SC 130 the Apex Court held that the antiquated notion of pension being a bounty, a gratuitous payment depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not climbable as a right and, therefore, no right to pension can be enforced through court has been swept under the carpet by the earlier decision in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and others , AIR 1971 SC 1409 . In Bakshish Singh v. Darshan Engg. In Bakshish Singh v. Darshan Engg. Works , AIR 1994 SC 251 while dealing with the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, the Act was held to be a welfare measure introduced in the interest of General Public to secure social and economic justice to workmen to assist them in their old age and to ensure them a decent standard of life on their retirement. It was also observed therein that there was no provision in the Act for exempting any factory, shop etc., from the purview of the Act covered by it except where the employees are in receipt of gratuity or pensionary benefits which are no less favourable than the benefit conferred under the Act. The learned counsel invited specific reference to the observations in the following terms:- “The present Act is of the genre of Minimum Wages Act, the Payment of Bonus Act, the Provident Funds Act, Employees’ State Insurance Act, and other like statutes. These statues lay down the minimum relevant benefits which must be made available to the employees. We have solemnly resolved to constitute this country, among others, into a socialist republic and to secure to all its citizens, which, of course, include workmen, social and economic justice. Article 38 requires the State to strive to promote t he welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which, among other things, social and economic justice shall inform all the institutions of the national life. Article 39 states that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing, among others, that the citizens have the right to an adequate means to livelihood and that the health and strength of workers are not abused. Article 41 of the Constitution directs the State to make effective provision, among others, for securing public assistance in old age and in other cases of undeserved want. Article 42 enjoins the State to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work while Article 43 requires the State to endeavour to secure by (sic) conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. Article 42 enjoins the State to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work while Article 43 requires the State to endeavour to secure by (sic) conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. Article 47 requires that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and standard of living of its p eople and the improvement of public health as one of is (sic) primary duties.” In Brij Sunder Kapoor v. Addl. Dist. Judge , A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 572 while dealing with the delegation of a power to extend even future laws of another State will not be bad so long as, in the process and under the guise of alteration and modification, an alternation of the essential character of the law or a change of it in essential particulars is not permitted. In Ramesh Birch v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 560 while dealing with the delegation of powers under the Punjab. Reorganisation Act, 1966 to the Executive to extend any law in force in any State to Union Territory of Chandigarh, it was held that it was not necessary that the legislature should “dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s” and it is sufficient if it gives the broadest indication of the general policy of the legislature. Having regard to the history of this type of legislation, the power to extend the laws is a delegation, not of policy, but meticulous appraisal of which Parliament has no time and even if it is assumed that this involves a choice of policy, the restriction of such policy to one that is approved by Parliament or a State Legislature constitutes a sufficient declaration of guideline within the meaning of the “policy-guideline” theory. Similarly, it was observed that once it is held that the delegation of a power to extend a present existing law is justified, a power to extend future laws is a necessary corollary. 10. Reference has been made also to the observations of the Supreme Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564 in the following terms. “56. 10. Reference has been made also to the observations of the Supreme Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564 in the following terms. “56. We have carefully considered the weighty pronouncements of the eminent Judges who gave shape to the concept that the extent of protection of important guarantees, such as the liberty of person, and right to property depends upon the form and object of the State action, and not upon its direct operation upon the individual’s freedom. But it is not the object of the authority making the law impairing the right of a citizen, nor the form of action taken that determines the protection he can claim it is the effect of the law and of the action upon the right which attract the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief. If this be the true view and we think it is, in determining the impact of State action upon constitutional guarantees which are fundamental, it follows that the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is determined not by the object of the Legislature nor by the form of the action, but by its direct operation upon the individuals rights. 64. We have found it necessary to examine the rationale of the two lines of authority and determine whether there is anything in the Constitution which justifies this apparently inconsistent development of the law. In our judgment, the assumption in A.K. Gopalan’s case, 1950 SCR 88 : AIR 1950 SC 27 that certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters and in determining whether there is infringement of the individual’s guaranteed rights, the object and the form of the State action alone need be considered, and effect of the laws on fundamental rights of the individuals in general will be ignored cannot be accepted as correct. We hold that the validity of “law” which authorises deprivation of property and “a law” which authorises compulsory acquisition of property for a public purpose must be adjudged by the application of the same tests. A citizen may claim in an appropriate case that the law authorising compulsory acquisition of property imposes fetters upon his right to ho ld property which are not reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. A citizen may claim in an appropriate case that the law authorising compulsory acquisition of property imposes fetters upon his right to ho ld property which are not reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. It is immaterial that the scope for such challenge may be attenuated because of the nature of the law of acquisition which providing as it does for expropriation of property of the individual for public purpose may be presumed to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. 72. This Court is not the forum in which these conflicting claims may be debated. Whether there is a genuine need for banking facility in the rural areas, whether certain classes of the community are deprived of the benefit of the resources of the banking industry, whether administration by the Government of the commercial banking sector will not prove beneficial to the community and will lead to rigidity in the administration whether the Government administration will eschew the profit-motive, and even if it be eschewed, there will accrued substantial benefits to the public, whether an undue accent on banking as a means of social regeneration, especially in the backward areas, is a doctrinaire approach to a rational order of priorities for attaining the national objectives enshrined in our Constitution, and whether the policy followed by the Government in office or the policy propounded by its opponents may reasonably attain the national objectives are matters which have little relevance in determining the legality of the measure. It is again not for this Court to consider the relative merits of the different political theories or economic policies. The Parliament has under Entry 45 List I the power to legislate in respect of banking and other commercial activities of the named banks necessarily incidental thereto; it has the power to legislate for acquiring the undertaking of the named banks under Entry 42 List III. Whether by the exercise of the power vested in the Reserve Bank under the pre-existing laws results could be achieved which it is the object of the Act to achieve, is in our judgment, not relevant in considering whether the Act amounts to abuse of legislative power. This Court will not sit in appeal over the policy of the Parliament in enacting a law. This Court will not sit in appeal over the policy of the Parliament in enacting a law. The Court cannot find fault with the Act merely on the ground that it is inadvisable to take over the undertaking of banks which, it is said by the petitioner, by thrift and efficient management had set up an impressive and efficient business organization serving large sectors of industry. 73. By Section 15(2)(e) of the Act the Banks are entitled to engage in business other than banking. But by the provisions of the Act they are rendered practically incapable of engaging in any business. By the provisions of the Act, a named bank may, if it agrees to distribute among the shareholders the compensation which it may receive, be paid in securities an amount equal to half the paid-up share capital, but obviously the fund will not be availabteao the Bank. It is true that under Section 15 (3) of the Act the Central Government may authorise the corresponding new banks to make advances to the named banks for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 15(2). But that is a matter which rests only upon the will of the Central Government and no right can be founded upon it”. Though reference has been made to some other paragraphs also from the judgment referred to above in the context of acquisition and the principles for providing compensation for deprivation of property rights, we consider it unnecessary for the purpose of the case to advert to the same. 11. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305 it has been observed as follows : “45. The legitimacy of the result intended to be achieved does not necessarily imply that every means to achieve it is permissible; for even if the end is desirable and permissible, the means employed must not transgress the limits laid down by the Constitution. If they directly impinge on any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution it is no answer when the constitutionality of the measure is challenged that apart from the fundamental right infringed the provision is otherwise legal. 46. Finally it was said that one of its objects is to give some kind of protection to small or newly started newspapers and, therefore, the Act is good. 46. Finally it was said that one of its objects is to give some kind of protection to small or newly started newspapers and, therefore, the Act is good. Such an object may be desirable but for attaining it the State cannot make inroads on the right of other newspapers which Art. 19(1) (a) guarantees to them. There may be other ways of helping them and it is for the State to search for them but the one they have chosen falls foul of the Constitution”. The learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel has referred to some of the decisions in addition to relying upon the observations in some of the decisions relied upon for the petitioners. In R.G. Garg v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2138 in which the Apex Court was concerned with a challenge made to the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1981, it was held as follows :- “(7) Now while considering the constitutional validity of a statute said to be violative of Article 14, it is necessary to bear in mind certain well established principles which have been evolved by the Courts as rules of guidance in discharge of its constitutional function of judicial review. The first rule is that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutiona l principles. This rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognised and accepted, that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discrimination are based on adequate grounds. The presumption of constitutionality is indeed so strong that in order to sustain it, the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. (8) Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. (8) Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J., that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or straight jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud , 1957 (354) US 457 where Frankfurter, J. said in his inimitable style : “In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability”. The Court must always remember that “legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry” that exact wisdom and nice adaption of remedy are not always possible and that “judgment is largely a prophecy based on meager and uninterpreted experience”. Every legislation particularly i n economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. The Courts cannot, as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Secy, of Agriculture v. Central Roig. Refining Co. , 1950 (94) L ed. 381, be converted into tribunals for relief from such crudities and inequities. There may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care bestowed on its framing, it is difficult to conceiver of a legislation which is not capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore, adjudge the constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of p ragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues.” In Committee for Protection of Rights of ONGC Employees v. ONGC , 1990 (2) S.C.C. 472 the petitioners before the Apex Court were serving the department of “ONGC” on temporary basis. Subsequently, ONGC was established as an independent statutory body under the ONGC Act and when the services of the petitioners were also transferred and absorbed by the. ONGC under the Act, the petitioners started getting the benefit of contributory provident fund and they continued to avail of the same for 28 years. Writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution claimin g the benefit of pension apart from the benefit of provident fund on the basis that they were entitled under the relevant rules governing their service, to pension on their being made permanent and that the said right to pension, which was part of their conditions of service, was protected under Section 13(1) of the ONGC Act. While dealing with the above claim, the Apex Court observed as hereunder, while repelling the claim made relying upon Section 12 of the Provident Fund Act :- “(12) The said provision in our view is not applicable in the present case. The Provident Fund Act has been enacted with the object of providing social security to the employees in factories and other establishments covered by the said Act, after their retirement. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the said enactment it was mentioned as under: “The question of making some provision for the future of the industrial worker after he retires, or for his dependents in case of his early death, has been under consideration for some years. The ideal way would have been provisions through old age and survivors pensions as has been done in the industrially advanced countries. But in the prevailing conditions in India, the institution of a pension scheme cannot be visualised in the near future. Another alternative may be for provision of gratuities after a prescribed period of service.” The main defect of a gratutity scheme, however, is that the amount paid to a worker or his dependents would be small, as the worker would not himself be making any contribution to the fund. Taking into account the various difficulties, financial and administrative, the most appropriate course appears to be the institution compulsorily of contributory provident fund in which both the worker and the employer would contribute. Apart from other advantages, there is the obvious one of cultivating among the w orkers a spirit of saving something regularly.” (13) This indicates that the scheme of Contributory Provident Fund, by way of retiral benefits, envisaged by the Provident Fund Act, is in the nature of a substitute for old age pension because it was felt that in the prevailing conditions in India, the institution of a pension scheme could not be visualised in the near future. It was not the intention of Parliament that Provident Fund benefit envisaged by the said Act would be in addition to pensioner benefits. Section 12 of the Provident Fund Act seeks to protect the wages of an employee to whom the scheme framed under the said Act applies as well as the total quantum of certain specified benefits to which he is entitled under the terms of his employment. Section 12 of the Provident Fund Act seeks to protect the wages of an employee to whom the scheme framed under the said Act applies as well as the total quantum of certain specified benefits to which he is entitled under the terms of his employment. With that end in view, Section 12 prohibits an employer from reducing, whether directly or indirectly, the wages of an employee to whom the Scheme applies or the total quantum of benefits in the nature of old age pension, gratuity, provident fund or life insurance to which the employee is entitled under the terms of his employment express or implied. The said section proceeds on the basis that if an employee is entitled to any benefit in the nature of old age pension under the terms of his employment the said benefit would not be denied to him on the application of the Scheme. It is not the case of the petitioners that on June 30, 1961, when the Provident Fund Scheme was made applicable to the Commission, the petitioners had become permanent and were entitled to pension. It cannot, therefore, be said that on the date of the application of the Provident Fund Scheme to the Commission, the petitioners were entitled to pension under the terms of their employment. They cannot, therefore, invoke the provisions of Section 12 of the Provident Fund Act. .(14) In Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India , 1981 (1) SCC 449 on which reliance has been placed by Shri Ramaurthi, the petitioner before this Court was employed as a clerk in Burmah Shell Oil Storage Ltd. The undertaking of that company was statutorily acquired by the Government of India under the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India), Act, 1976, and subsequently the said undertaking was vested by the Central Government in the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, a Government Company. In the Burmah Shell, there was a voluntary ret irement scheme in force which was governed by the terms of a trust deed of 1950. The said petitioner was receiving pension under the said scheme. Certain deductions were made from the pension paid to the petitioner on account of Employees’ Provident Fund and Gratuity paid to him. In the Burmah Shell, there was a voluntary ret irement scheme in force which was governed by the terms of a trust deed of 1950. The said petitioner was receiving pension under the said scheme. Certain deductions were made from the pension paid to the petitioner on account of Employees’ Provident Fund and Gratuity paid to him. This Court held that in view of Section 12 of the Provident Fund Act, such deductions were not permissible and that the entire amount of pension should be paid to the petitioner without deduction. This decision has no applicati on to the instant case because in that case the petitioner before this Court was entitled to receive pension under the voluntary retirement scheme at the time when the provisions of the Provident Fund Act became applicable to Burmah Shell and the right to receive pension was part of the terms of employment of the said petitioner. In the present case, it cannot be said that on the date of the application of the Provident Fund Scheme to the Commission on June 30, 1961, the petitioners were entitled to rec eive pension and the benefit of pension was a part of the terms of employment of the petitioners on that date.” 12. In Mafatlala Group Staff Association v. Regional Commissioner, Provident Fund and others , 1994 (4) S.C.C. 58 the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the validity of the Employees’ Family Pension Scheme, 1971. The appeal before the Supreme Court was against the Division Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in 1994 (1) LLN 57. Initially, the matter was before a learned single Judge of the said High Court and his judgment is reported in 1967 (2) LLN 754. The Family Pension Scheme introduced in the year 1971 provided for three benefits to its members namely (a) Family Pensio n (pension payable to widow or minor children on the death of employee before attaining the age of 60 years); (b) Life assurance benefits (clause 31 of the Scheme); and (c) Retirement-cum-withdrawal benefits (clause 32 of the Scheme). The Family Pension Scheme introduced in the year 1971 provided for three benefits to its members namely (a) Family Pensio n (pension payable to widow or minor children on the death of employee before attaining the age of 60 years); (b) Life assurance benefits (clause 31 of the Scheme); and (c) Retirement-cum-withdrawal benefits (clause 32 of the Scheme). The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition holding the pension scheme to be discriminatory for the reason that the same did not provide for an option to employees who became members of the Provident Fund after 1-3-1971, while giving such an option to the employees who were members of the Provident Fund as on the said date. The learned single Judge also made certain observations regarding the meagreness of the return to the members of the Scheme as compared to their contribution. On appeal, before the Division Bench, the Judgment of the learned single Judge came to be reversed by holding as follows :- “8A. On behalf of the employees, Sri Grover the learned counsel submitted that by virtue of the pension scheme, an immense loss is caused to the employees, particularly in the matter of survival benefits. He complained that the return which tho employee received by way of interest on his contribution to the statutory provident fund was much higher than the return which the employee received after he became member of Family Pension Scheme, which was non-cumulative. Sri Grover further submitted that his l oss amounted to pensioners being deprived of their property under Article 300A of the Constitution. He further submitted that this loss amounted to appropriation of profits which accrued to the pensioners and similarly situated employees. Sri Grover also placed reliance on the report of the Actuary for the year 1985 and submitted that if one goes through the recommendations of the said report, it is clear that the workmen were entitled to higher return even under the Provident Funds Scheme, 1971. Sri Grover also placed reliance on the report of the Actuary for the year 1985 and submitted that if one goes through the recommendations of the said report, it is clear that the workmen were entitled to higher return even under the Provident Funds Scheme, 1971. He further submitted that there was no justification for creating two classes of employees and there was no nexus to the object sought to be achieved by not giving option to employees who joined after 1st March 1971, and in the circumstances it was submitted that by reason of refusal of option and by making joining of the Family Pension Scheme compulsory to employees after 1st March 1971, discrimination has resulted which is ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution, and the learned Single Judge was right in coming to the said conclusion. 9. We find, considerable merit in the submissions advanced by Sri Sethna on behalf of the appellants. As indicated above, the statement of objects and reasons to the said scheme indicates that in addition to provident fund, the Government decided to introduce a Family Pension Scheme, particularly in view of the facts that industrial employees are prone to accidents in large number of cases while working in industrial establishments and their widows and family members many a time suffer losses and the lump sum payments received by way of provident fund are not adequate to enable those families to face inflation and their daily needs. In the circumstances, the object was to give benefits to such employees in addition to withdrawal benefits to those employees who ceased to be in service on their attaining the age of superannuation. Further, the object of such Family Pension Schemes, is to encourage savings, which in turn, provided a hedge against the exposure suffered by employees on account of fall in the rupee value and inflation. Further, such schemes provide long term financial security to the families of industrial employees and in the present case, as indicated above, the object is achieved by diverting a small portion of the employer’s/employees contribution to the provident fund, to the Family Pension Scheme. In addition to that, the Central Government also contributes towards the Family Pension Scheme. Taking into account the above objects of the Act, it is clear that large number of benefits hav e been provided under the Family Pension Scheme. In addition to that, the Central Government also contributes towards the Family Pension Scheme. Taking into account the above objects of the Act, it is clear that large number of benefits hav e been provided under the Family Pension Scheme. Broadly, the said benefits are-widow pension, life assurance benefit and withdrawal benefit. It is for these benefits that the cost is required to be taken into account and in order to value the cost of the benefits, an Actuary goes into various aspects like the salary-scale, the prospective number of employees to join the scheme, the mortality rate and the future projections with regard to the number of people who are likely to retire today and in future as also the interest rate which is payable on investments and after taking into account the said cost of benefits, the report is submitted as is done in the present case. Taking into account the steps taken by the Government to evaluate cost of the benefits, it is clear that the scheme has not only been proved to be viable, but over the years it has been generating surplus which is funded back into the scheme and large number of additional benefits including reduction in the rate of contribution has been given. It is also to be noted that the said surplus cannot be frittered away by distributing the said amount to the employees as of today without taking into account the future projections. It is in this light th at based on the said report, the Government has issued a notification also on 29th October, 1992, which also indicates that while calculating the survival benefits, the Government has taken into account “a factor” depending on the number of years of service which an employee puts in and other relevant factors. This factor is also based on the basis of interest which accrues to an employee under the Provident Funds Act, the reasons being that while calculating the said factor, the Government has to keep in mind the cost of the benefits and if those benefits are to be taken into account, then the employee cannot insist that he is entitled to the return to be calculated on the basis of the interest which accrues to the provident fund. Rate of interest has to be discounted for the said benefits like widow pension, life insurance benefit and the withdrawal benefit and taking an overall view of the matter, we find that the valuation of the benefits done by the Government are fully in consonance with the Sch eme, 1971. As indicated above, the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that the return under the scheme is into commensurate with the return under the Employees’ Provident Funds, and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The learned Single Judge has given individual illustrations to come to the said conclusion. We do not agree with the approach of the learned Single Judge for the reason that the Scheme covers 122 lakhs of workmen. Secondly, at the relevant time, the salary-scale is also requir ed to be taken into account. The illustration which the learned Single Judge has given deals with salary Rs. 1,000 payable to an employee who has put in service of 30 years in 1980. The affidavit filed on behalf of the Government clearly shows that during that period large number of industrial employees were covered in the salary scale of Rs. 300 to Rs. 400 and, therefore, it is not realistic to take into account the salary of Rs. 1,000 which, by 1980 standard, was on higher side. The learned Single Judge in the-resent case has failed to take into account the total package under the scheme and the cost of the benefit covered under the package. The learned Single Judge has also failed to appreciate that it is from the contribution to the provident fund that a portion is diverted to the Family Pension Scheme and taking into account the above three welfare funds like Provident Fund, Deposit Insurance Fund and the Family Pension Scheme as a whole, the Scheme 1971, is perfectly justified and it has nexus to the object sought to be achieved. As indicated hereinabove, the learned Single Judge has principally stuck down Para 3(a) of the said Scheme, 1971, on the ground that no reasons for creating such a class of employees has been given by the Government and, therefore, the classification between pre-March, 1971 and post-March, 1971 employees was unjustified and ultra vires Art, 14 of the Constitution. As indicated hereinabove, the learned Single Judge has principally stuck down Para 3(a) of the said Scheme, 1971, on the ground that no reasons for creating such a class of employees has been given by the Government and, therefore, the classification between pre-March, 1971 and post-March, 1971 employees was unjustified and ultra vires Art, 14 of the Constitution. This finding of the learned Single Judge is also required to be set aside for the reasons that the option was given for the reason that a statutory scheme came to be introduced from 1 March 1971, and such a scheme could not make it compulsory as a condition of service to contribute to the pension scheme by industrial employees who had joined the provident fund prior to 1st March, 1971. In industrial jurisprudence new condition of service of this nature cannot be introduced unilaterally. Secondly, it is also clear that part of the provident fund accumulation is diverted to the pension scheme which was not possible in the case of employees under the Provident Funds Act, 1952 See Som Prakash Rekh v. Union of India , 1981 (I) LLN 322. Thirdly, apart from the above two factors, the Family Pension Scheme has to proceed on the viability of the scheme which include large number of factors required to be taken into account and if the viability is to be included, then the Actuary as well as the Government has to consider the contributions which would flow into the fund from the optees as well as the contributions which would flow into the provident fund from the employees who would join or are likely to join in future periods. The scheme also takes into account future salary scales and all factors mentioned above, to make the Family Pension Fund viable. Viability depends on large number of factor. In the circumstances, after taking into account the above factors, the Government decided that an option be given to those who joined prior to 1st March 1971 and not to those who joined after 1st March 1971. In any event, the scheme is statutory in nature and we do not find any merit in the contention of the employees that they are entitled as a matter of right to the same rate of interest under the Family Pension Scheme as that which accrued to them under the Provident Funds Scheme. In any event, the scheme is statutory in nature and we do not find any merit in the contention of the employees that they are entitled as a matter of right to the same rate of interest under the Family Pension Scheme as that which accrued to them under the Provident Funds Scheme. The Government can always revise the rates, depending on large number of factors including economic factors. Secondly, there is no merit in the contention on behalf of the employees that they have been deprived of their property under Art. 300A of the Constitution inasmuch as the Government has appropriated their profits compulsorily to the Family Pension Scheme. It was submitted that the return is not in commensurate with the return under the Provident Funds Scheme and, therefore, the scheme is violative of his fundamental rights. As indicated above, there is no merit in the said submission for the reason that the said submission proceeds on the basis that the cost of benefits like widow pension, life assurance benefits and withdrawal benefits should not be taken into account. If cost of all the benefits are taken into account, then the return which accrues to the employees is fully in consonance with the object of the scheme. Further, the additional benefits which have been conferred by 1992 notification also indicate s that not only the Scheme is viable, but higher return is given to the employees. Thirdly, (we have to see) the total package by way of provident fund as well as pension which accrues to the person concerned is to be seen and if the totality of the benefits is taken into account then there is no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the employees that they have been deprived of their profits/return.” The matter was taken further on appeal before the Supreme Court and it is in dealing with the said appeal in the decision reported in Mafatlal Group Staff Association v. Regional Commissioner of Provident Fund , 1994(4) SC 58 it was also held as hereunder :- “11. Now coming to the other question, which happens to be the main contention urged before us, the reasoning of the counsel for the appellants runs thus: The manner in which the Family Pension Scheme is being operated is in effect prejudicial to the employee members. Now coming to the other question, which happens to be the main contention urged before us, the reasoning of the counsel for the appellants runs thus: The manner in which the Family Pension Scheme is being operated is in effect prejudicial to the employee members. The amount collected from the employees ist far more than the benefit provided to them. The deductions are being made on the basis of the present emoluments of the industrial employees while, for the purpose of calculating the pension and other benefits, the emoluments in force in 1971 are taken as the basis, with the result that while the contribution of the employees is substantially high, the return to them and their families is negligible. Certain facts and particulars from the judgment of the learned Single Judge are brought to our notice and on that basis it is contended that while the total contributions (employers, employees and Government) to the Pension Fund was Rs. 142 crores in the year 1983-84 upon which interest of Rupees sixty crores was earned during that year, the disbursements on account of the three benefits provided for by the said Scheme totalled to Rupees seven crores only. Certain statements are placed before us to show how much an employee drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 1,000 would contribute to the Fund over a period of forty years and how much does he get out of it by way of several benefits on his retirement or death. From these figures, it is sought to be established that the return is too low and bears no relation to the amount contributed by the employees. In short, the argument is that the scheme is not really to the benefit of the employees but has operated as a deprivation. The appellants rely upon a report made by the Pension and Provident Fund Manager of the Grindlay’s Bank-who, it is stated, was appointed by the respondents to examine the working of the Pension Fund in 1985, wherein it is stated inter alia: “Currently, contribution is paid at a rate of three and a half per cent of pay. Accordingly, actual contribution exceeds actuarial by 0.44% of pay ... although the contribution income has increased, corresponding increase in pension has not taken place. This would partially explain the huge accumulation of fund”. Accordingly, actual contribution exceeds actuarial by 0.44% of pay ... although the contribution income has increased, corresponding increase in pension has not taken place. This would partially explain the huge accumulation of fund”. The report opined that “the amount of contribution paid to the fund by a member should at all times be regarded as members’ property. At least this would be returned on exit of a member whether it is by way of death benefit or by survival benefit. We have already ensured bigger benefits on death by of widow pension and life assurance benefit way that contribution warrants. Therefore, survival benefit would be an amount equal to return of contribution with a realistic rate of interest”. Certain other recommendations are also made. 12. The facts and figures and particulars furnished by the petitioners are disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents, the respondents have furnished a statement (Annexure-A) showing the number of subscribers and the number of pensioners from the year 1971-72 to 1991-92. The said statement shows that while in 1971-72, when the Family Pension Scheme originated, the total number of subscribers was 9.34 lakhs and there were no pensioners, the situation has changed dramatically by 1991-92 while the number of subscribers has gone up to 136.68 lakhs, the number of pensioners has risen to 1,29,362. It is pointed out that the widows get the pension for whole of their life or until they remarry, as the case may be. The respondents have also filed a chart to show that, under the Scheme, an employee gets more than what he really contributes. By way of illustration, the case of an employee is taken whose salary is Rs. 1,000 per month for a period of eleven years and Rs. 1,600 per month for the next three yea rs and so on. In the course of twenty one years, it is pointed out, his share of contribution would be Rs. 4,803, to which is added an equal amount being the employer’s contribution, making a total of Rs. 9,606. The interest on the said amounts for the period of twenty-one years is calculated at Rs. 6,868 on each of the employer’s and employee’s contribution thus making a total of Rs. 23,342. As against this, his withdrawal benefit, according to the rates applicable from 1-4-1992, it is stated, would be Rs. 9,606. The interest on the said amounts for the period of twenty-one years is calculated at Rs. 6,868 on each of the employer’s and employee’s contribution thus making a total of Rs. 23,342. As against this, his withdrawal benefit, according to the rates applicable from 1-4-1992, it is stated, would be Rs. 18,235 which is far more than the contribution made by him, namely, Rs. 4803 + Rs. 6868 = Rs. 11,671. It is submitted that since several benefits are provided including a long-term benefit like Pension Fund to a large number of widows/minor children, the employees cannot insist upon the entire amount contributed by them, their employers and the Government being paid to them as the withdrawal benefit. It is just not possible, say the respondents. Another statement brought to our notice is the one made in the reply- affidavit filed in Civil Appeal No. 5159 of 1993. It is stated therein: “The rate are so designed as to ensure that the employee gets back the amount of his own contribution with certain additional amount of interest. The amount of contribution by the employer and the Central Government and interest of employees’ contribution is retained and utilised to provide for payment of other two benefits, namely, monthly Family Pension Fund and Life Assurance benefit, to the widows or minor sons or unmarried daughters of those unfortunate members who die prematurely during employment. Thus the entire amount of contributions to the Family Pension Scheme is utilised for giving benefits to the member of the Fund himself or to his destitute in case of his death in one of the surviving family members/aforesaid four ways and no part of it is utilised for any other purpose”. 13. Annexure-IV to the said affidavit gives certain particulars in support of the said averment. With respect to the report of the Manager of the Grindlay’s Bank, it is submitted by the respondents that it was a report made in 1985 and that since then the Government has revised the benefits to the employees. It is submitted that according to the rates of 1992, the benefits to the employees are larger than their contribution. 14. With respect to the report of the Manager of the Grindlay’s Bank, it is submitted by the respondents that it was a report made in 1985 and that since then the Government has revised the benefits to the employees. It is submitted that according to the rates of 1992, the benefits to the employees are larger than their contribution. 14. While it is not possible for us to embark upon an enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the rival statements and particulars furnished by the parties, the fact remains-which we should emphasise that there should be a broad correspondence between what the employees contribute and what they get in return. We have already expressed ourselves on this aspect while dealing with the plea of discrimination, which we do not think it necessary to repeat here. The benefits to be provided to them under the several schemes should broadly approximate to and be commensurate with what they contribute. This is what Clause 34-D of Pension Scheme provides, in particular sub-clause (2) thereof. Though, worded as an enabling provision, it contains a salutatory and an obligatory principle-which the Government should always keep in view. We agree, as already emphasized hereinbefore, that no conclusions should be drawn by taking any single instance and that the matter must be decided taking an overall view, yet the inescapable test remains, viz., there must be a broad correspondence between what the employees pay and what they and their families get ultimately. It cannot be that while the Fund accumulates, the employees-and their families-decay. The scheme is one conceived in their interest and for their benefit and it should prove so in practice. It is the statutory duty of the respondents to ensi-.e that both the contributions by employees and the benefits flowing to them must be broadly commensurate. Since actuar ial appraisal is done every three years, as provided by the statutory scheme itself, we are sure that the observations made herein will be kept in mind and necessary adjustments made.” 13. In Union of India v. P.N. Menon and others , 1994 (4) S.C.C. 68 while dealing with a challenge made by some retired Government Servants to the validity of Office Memorandum No. F- 19(4) - E.V./79 dated 25. In Union of India v. P.N. Menon and others , 1994 (4) S.C.C. 68 while dealing with a challenge made by some retired Government Servants to the validity of Office Memorandum No. F- 19(4) - E.V./79 dated 25. 1979 treating a portion of the dearness allowance as pay for the retiral benefits of Government servants who retired on or after 30-9-1979, the Apex Court held and follows :- “14. According to us, for the reasons disclosed on behalf of the appellant-Union of India for fixing 30.9.1977 as the cut-off date, which date was fixed when the price index level was 272, cannot be held to be arbitrary. The decision to merge a part of the dearness allowance with pay, when the price index level was at 272, appears to have been taken on basis of the recommendation of the Third Pay Commission. As such it cannot be held that the cut-off date has been selected in an arbitrary manner. Not on ly in matters of revising the pensionary benefits, but even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut-off date on some rational or reasonable basis, has to be fixed for extending the benefits. This can be illustrated. The Government decides to revise the pay scale of its employees and fixes the 1st day of January of the next year for implementing the same or the 1st day of January of the last year. In either case, a big section of its employees are bound to miss the said revision of the scale of pay, having superannuated before that date. An employee, who has retired on 31st December of the year in question, will miss that pay scale only by a day, which may affect his pensionary benefits throughout his life. No scheme can be held to be foolproof, so as to cover and keep in view all persons who were at one time in active service. As such, the concern of the court should only be, while examining any such grievance, to see, as to whether a particular date for extending a particular benefit or scheme, has been fixed on objective and rational considerations. 19. As such, the concern of the court should only be, while examining any such grievance, to see, as to whether a particular date for extending a particular benefit or scheme, has been fixed on objective and rational considerations. 19. In yet another case of All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers’ Association v. Union of India , AIR 1992 SC 767 , the Retired Officers’ Association of the Reserve Bank of India questioned the validity of introduction of pension scheme in lieu of Contributory Provident Fund Scheme. The Bank employees, who retired prior to 1. 1986, had not been given benefit of the said Pension Scheme. It was held that the said cut-off date was neither arbitrary nor artificial or whimsical.” In S.P. Ganguly v. Union of India and others , 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 595 the Apex Court once again held as follows :- “The appellant retired from service on 111. 1985. At the time of his retirement, he was holding the post of Commissioner-cum- Secretary in the Finance Department of the Government of Tripura. His grievance in this appeal is with regard to the denial of Dearness Relief on the basis of the Office Memorandum dated 14. 1987 whereby relief has been given with effect from 1. 1986 to certain categories of pensioners but has been denied to pensioners, including the appellant, who retired between 33. 1985 an d 312. 19S5. The case of the appellant is that as result of the said denial he is losing Rs. 146 per month. From the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents before this Court, it appears that the total amount of pension which is being paid to the appellant is more than what is being paid to the three categories of pensioners who have been given the benefit of the dearness relief under Office Memorandum dated 14. 1987. This would show that in substance, the appellant is not worse off. As pointed out by this Court, no scheme of pension can be held to be foolproof so as to cover and keep in view all persons who are retired from service. (See: Union of India v. P.N . Menon, 1994(4) SCC 68 (S.C.C. at p. 76). 1987. This would show that in substance, the appellant is not worse off. As pointed out by this Court, no scheme of pension can be held to be foolproof so as to cover and keep in view all persons who are retired from service. (See: Union of India v. P.N . Menon, 1994(4) SCC 68 (S.C.C. at p. 76). Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not consider that a case is made out warranting interference with the impuged order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal.” In Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Mis. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 239 in dealing with a challenge made to Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, it was held as hereunder : “26. Shri Ashok Sen drew pointed attention to the earlier affidavits filed on behalf of Bharat Coking Coal Company and commented severally on the alleged contradictory reasons given therein for the exclusion of certain coke oven plants from the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act. But, in the ultimate analysis, we are not really to concern ourselves with the hollowness or the self-condemnatory nature of the statements made in the affidavits filed by the respondents to justify and sustain the legisla tion. The deponents of the affidavits filed into Court may speak for the parties on whose behalf they swear to the statements. They do not speak for the Parliament. No one may speak for the Parliament and Parliament is never before the Court. After Parliament has said what it intends to say, only the Court may say what the Parliament meant to say. None else. Once a statute leaves Parliament House, the Court is the only authentic voice which may echo (interpret) the Parliament. This the Court will do wit h reference to the language of the statute and other permissible aids. The executive Government may place before the Court their understanding of what Parliament has said or intended to say or what they think was Parliament’s object and all the facts and circumstances which in their view led to the legislation. When they do so, they do not speak for Parliament. No Act of Parliament may be struck down because of the understanding or misunderstanding of Parliamentary intention by the executive government or because their (the Government’s( spokesmen do not bring out relevant circumstances but indulge in empty and self-defecting affidavits. When they do so, they do not speak for Parliament. No Act of Parliament may be struck down because of the understanding or misunderstanding of Parliamentary intention by the executive government or because their (the Government’s( spokesmen do not bring out relevant circumstances but indulge in empty and self-defecting affidavits. They do not and they cannot bind Parliament. Validity of legislation is not to be judged merely by affidavits filed on behalf of the State, but by all the relevant circumstances which the Court may ultimately find and more especially by what may be gathered from what the legislature has itself said. We have mentioned the facts as found by us and we do not think that there has been any infringement of the right guaranteed by Art. 14”. 14. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. There is no challenge to the competence of the Parliament to enact the law in question and in our view, there could not be any such challenge having regard to the fact that the power to enact any measure for the welfare of labour including conditions of work, Provident Funds, employers’ liability, workmen’s compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits would squarely fall under Entries 23 and 24 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, and consequently by virtue of Article 246(2), the legislative competence of the Parliament remains unquestionable, too. .15. The sum and substance of the challenge for the petitioners, therefore, was mobilised using Article 14 as the sheet anchor and drawing support and sustenance from Articles 21, 39 (a), 39 (e), 41 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. It is trite truism that while considering the constitutional validity of a Statute said to be violative of Article 14, there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a Statute and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles and the presumption is said to be so strong that in order to sustain the Courts are entitled to take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may even assume every state of facts which can be conceived to be existing at the time of legislation. Equally, Courts were held to be obliged to view with greater latitude laws relating to measures for economic and social policy than laws touching fundamental human rights since it is for the State to decide what economic and social policies the legislature should prefer to effectuate and the preference in favour of a chosen system cannot be questioned on the ground of lack of legislative wisdom, appropriate need or necessities of time, or that the method adopted is not the best or that there are better ways and means of adjusting the competing interests and claims. Courts were cautioned and advised to feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in such areas since it is by now well settled that lack of perfection in a legislative measure alone does not necessarily imply its consitutionality as no economic or social measure has so far been discovered which is free from uncertainties, crudities and inequities and in such complex and sensitive areas no fool-proof device can said to exist and, therefore, Courts should be slow in imposing strict and rigorous standard of scrutiny by reason of which all economic and social schemes involving complicated experimentation may be subjected to criticism under the equal protection clause. Every legislation particularly in economic and social matters is essentially based on experimentation too or what may be called as trial and error method and if any inequities or abuse in practical application come to light the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. .16. So far as the petitioners are concerned, the challenge to the impugned provisions of the Act and the Scheme is on the alleged violation of Articles 14, and 21 as also the Preamble and the Directive Principles in Part ?TV of the Constitution in that according to the petitioners they are not only unreasonable but confiscatory and deprivatory in nature and impact and that the benefits secured under the impugned provisions are lesser than those available at present and there is really no proper return for the capital accumulations of the contributions made to the Fund. All these was rendered possible, according to the petitioners, on account of excessive delegation and lack of proper statutory guidelines in the statute by the legislature to the executive in the matter of formulation of the pension scheme. All these was rendered possible, according to the petitioners, on account of excessive delegation and lack of proper statutory guidelines in the statute by the legislature to the executive in the matter of formulation of the pension scheme. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side in this regard. The charge and challenge made of excessive delegation or the alleged lack of proper guidelines has no merit whatsoever. The provisions contained in Section 6-A as introduced by the Central Act 25 of 1996 and the newly substituted Schedule III declares sufficiently the policy and objectives as well as the aim of the legislation and the broad basis and outlines as also the chore and frame of the Pension Scheme to be, are delineated in Section 6-A and Schedule III and the charge of excessive delegation or absence of guidelines has no basis and is wholly misconceived. It cannot be said successfully, on the basis of the law as it stands amended by virtue of the Central Act 25 of 1996, that the Parliament has delegated any essential legislative functions which has been entrusted to it by the Constitution. The provisions of the Act, the subject matter and the objects and aims disclosed therein constituted by themselves sufficient guidelines for formulating the pension scheme newly ushered in. That part, sub-section (7) of Section 6-A also mandates that the scheme as framed shall be laid, as soon as it is made, before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a period of thirty days in the manner envisaged therein, with liberty to the Parliament to modify or reject the same in its entirety and this constitute sufficient safeguard to answer even any possible scope for abuse or sufficiently meet the challenge of alleged excessive delegation. We are of the view that since in the case on hand, the broad features and outlines of the scheme to be with their avowed objects and aims have been sufficiently indicated and what was left to be decided is the details of the scheme to carry out the purpose, there is no credence, whatsoever in the plea made of the alleged excessive delegation or alleged lack of guidelines. The delegation of subsidiary and ancillary matters to another authority can never be and at any rate in this case can be said to be vitiated or unconstitutional, as claimed for the petitioners. 17. The charge of arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the impugned provisions of the Act and the Scheme is leveled mainly on the ground that economically the pension scheme introduced is not profitable to the employees/subscribers and there is not proper or equitable return to the subscriptions or contributions made to their account. As noticed earlier, the gravamen of the charge of arbitrariness in the impuged scheme as also the alleged deprivation of property rights of the employees is based on the comp laint that the return which the employee received by way of interest on the contribution to the statutory provident fund was much higher than the return which the employee may receive under the impugned Pension Scheme. Apart from the denial of benefits arising out of the employer’s share of contribution to the employees that the employees had no vested rights over the contributions made by the employers has become the settled position of law after the decision of the Apex Court in Mafatlal Group Staff A ssociation Case, 1994 (4) SCC 58 . Equally, the manner of approach by the Courts to a grievance of the nature has also been highlighted in the very same judgment of the Apex Court by emphasising that the Government have to keep in mind the cost of totality of the benefits that accrue under the Scheme and the employee cannot insist that he is entitled to the entire return to be calculated on the basis of the interest which accrues on the contributions to the Provident Fund. The State, under the Constitution, has an obligation to provide for the welfare of labour in respect of the conditions of work to protect them after retirement and superannuation by providing for a scheme which ensures decent conditions and minimum standards of living during old age not only of the working class concerned but the members of their families as a whole. This, in our view, necessarily involves the formulation and implementation of appropriate schemes for old age pension apart from other provisions for provident funds, gratuity etc. This, in our view, necessarily involves the formulation and implementation of appropriate schemes for old age pension apart from other provisions for provident funds, gratuity etc. The questions concerning the volume and extent of such benefits under various heads or different categories or class to be ensured to the beneficiaries are matters of policy over which the State and the Legislature must, in our view, be allowed a liberal latitude to achieve the ultimate goal of effectively implementing the various social security and social insurance schemes. The fact that a particular pattern of these schemes prevailed at a particular point of time is not to be viewed as a matter of any vested right in any one for the continuance forever of such pattern so as to constitute and embargo for all times in future on the power of the State and the Legislature to introduce innovations and undertake an overhauling and reorientation of the existing schemes in the best possible manner as the Legislature proposes by adjusting equities and rights to achieve the ultimate goal of social security and insurance in the form of old age pension and other benefits. As a matter of fact, the E mployees’ Provident Funds Scheme when it was initially introduced was thought of only as a step towards the ultimate goal of providing a social welfare scheme to protect the workers and the members of their families not only during the period of employment but even after superannuation as also at times of calamities in the family resulting in the loss of bread-winner. This is obvious from the statement of objects and reasons for the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, wherein it is found stated that the question of making some provision for the future of the industrial worker after he retires or for his dependents in case of his early death, had been under consideration for some years and the ideal way would have been provisions through old age and survivors’ pensions as has been done in industrially advanced classes, though in the prevailing conditions in India the institution of a pension scheme cannot be visualised in the near future. If the State, as a matter of policy, and the legislature in the implementation thereof, considered the stage to have reached for such impleme ntation of a pension scheme which was ever the ambitious goal towards social welfare security measure to be achieved, it is not for the Courts to weigh the proprieties of the scheme with microscopical miniature of distinctions and discriminations to find loop-holes to liquidate or annihilate the same even at the threshold without allowing a trial to be made even to gain and reform to more and better advantage out of experiences that may be gained in the process of such implementation. 18. The grievance of the alleged deprivation of property rights and benefits has no basis in law. Apart from the fundamental rights secured under the Constitution or the basic human rights as they are called, no one can claim to be entitled to any right, natural or inherent or vested right to a particular position merely because under the provisions of law as it stood at a particular point of time, some benefits or rights are conferred therein so as to claim such rights to be immutable even to prevent a change or alteration or modification of such rights by the very same process or the law under which originally such rights came to be recognised. Only such legal rights as the law expressly provides can be claimed in any Court of law and the law should have relevance and means not only the law as it is in existence at a particular point of time but also as it takes shape and undergoes changes from time to time. Courts, in our view, have a duty in dealing with assertion of a claim of individual rights concerned for consideration of larger general and societal interest as well as public interest. The need for social reforms partly in response to and partly in stimulation of felt social needs, is the province of the State and the wisdom of such measures is not normally a matter open to Judicial Review unless they are so obnoxious and revolting to judicial conscience or take away any constitutionally protected rights or appears to be so arbitrary and demonstrably unreasonable that it must be struck down. So far as the impugned scheme visualised for family pension under the provisions of the impugned Act and the Employees Pension Fund Scheme, 1995, is concerned, they cannot be said to be unconstitutional or so arbitrary that they should be struck down at the instance of the petitioners. 19. The respondent/State, as against the attempt made on behalf of the petitioners to project a grievance of the denial of the benefit of Employers’ contribution as has been hitherto allowed to them and the alleged reduction of the return which the employees were said to have been receiving by way of interest on contribution to the Provident Fund, have chosen to compare and contrast the benefits of the existing and the impugned pension scheme by making a/ailable the comparative statements as also furnishing details of individual cases and the overweighing advantages accruing out of the new scheme. Two tables of comparative statements of investment income with pension assumption both in respect of existing staff and the new entrants who may become members hereinafter prepared by an Actuary who is said to be an expert in statistics and probability theories certifying about the pension at all ages exceeding in respect of both investment income and interest income. On a comparison of those statements with those provided on behalf of the petitioners and also on a careful analysis and comparison of the various benefits that accrue to the employees and the members of their families on the implementation of the new pension scheme, we are of the view that the new scheme of the year 1995 as a whole and in totality of benefits offered by it, is definitely and positively more social welfare oriented than the schemes hitherto in force and this by itself would be sufficient to decline to interfere in the matter at the instance of the petitioners. It is not for this Court, as observed earlier, to weigh in scales and to impose the views of the Courts in such matters in preference to that of the felt social needs as assessed by the Legislature. It is not for this Court, as observed earlier, to weigh in scales and to impose the views of the Courts in such matters in preference to that of the felt social needs as assessed by the Legislature. The 4th respondent in W.P.No. 17208 of 1995 has filed an affidavit containing two statements said to have been prepared on a hypothetical basis and a third statement said to contain details of a few final statements made during the period between 1992 and 1996 with samples of persons who have joined the services between 1958 and 1970. The respondent/State has filed a counter sworn to by Mr.A.N. Roy, Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner at New Delhi, demonstrating by reasons as to how and in what manner the statements appear to be unrealistic and reflect the incorrect and unnatural position while dealing with statements filed as annexures 1 and 2 by the fourth respondent. The infirmities in the method of working adopted in the statement contained in Annexure 3 also and the glaring omissions therein pointed out, in our view, go to show that they cannot be of any assistances to support the claim of the petitioners. We have adverted to all these aspects on merits not with the object of adjudicating the correctness of those on merits, but only to highlight the position that those aspects or details aloe are not sufficient in law to undermine the efficacy, over all advantages and usefulness of the 1995 scheme in achieving the target of social-welfare objectives aimed therein as also the proposed further improvements to the schemes disclosed as having been decided to be taken. That apart, the respondent/State has expressed its preparedness to take such steps as are necessary or considered to be essential in plugging any serious loop-holes which may also come to light in the course of implementation of the scheme to make the scheme more efficient and effective in achieving the object proclaimed under the scheme. 20. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the challenge made on the basis of the alleged violation Articles 14, 21, 39 (a) and (e), 41 and 300-A of the Constitution has no merits of acceptance and are hereby rejected. 21. 20. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the challenge made on the basis of the alleged violation Articles 14, 21, 39 (a) and (e), 41 and 300-A of the Constitution has no merits of acceptance and are hereby rejected. 21. The further claim made, as a grievance, about the omission to accord exemption under Section 17 of the main Act, as was said to have been projected by the management of the Ashok Leyland Limited, we are of the view that the delay, if any, in passing orders on such claim seems to be on account of the omission on the part of the management in not disclosing al’ the relevant materials to the competent authority to come to a proper decision. As such, there is no merit whatsoever in the grievance made in thi s regard. Consequently, we are of the view, that the challenge made to Section 17(1) (c) of the main Act has no merit and and we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the grievance which, in our view, is more an apprehension and surmise than a real and genuine one. 22. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that there are no merits in the above writ petitions and they shall stand dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. It is made clear that the dismissal of these writ petitions shall not stand in the way of any of the managements concerned, approaching the appropriate and competent authorities for according exemption by satisfying such authorities with particulars relating to their own schemes and substantiating that such benefits are on the whole not less favourable to the employees than the benefits provided under the Act or the Family Pension Scheme in relation to employees in any other establishment of similar character. Consequently, W.M.Ps. also shall stand dismissed.