DALIP SINGH v. NARENDER SINGH — 1996 DIGILAW 124 (HP)

JUDGMENT R. L. Khurana, J—This petition for revision has been directed under section 24 (5) of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act, against the order dated 5-12-1995 of the Appellate Authority (1), Sirmaur District at Nahan, affirming the order dated 21-9-1994 of the Rent Controller (II), Paonta Sahib. 2. For the purpose of convenience, Shri Amarit Singh Shah (respondent No. 1 before this Court), Shri Narender Singh (respondent No. 2 before this Court) and Shri Dalip Singh (petitioner before this court) are being referred to as the petitioner, respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 respectively hereinafter, as they were styled in the eviction petition in Rent Petition No. 3/2 of 1991 on the file of the Rent Controller (II), Paonta Sahib. 3. The tenanted premises comprise of one shop bearing Municipal No. 134/9 in Ward No 7, Paonta Sahib Bazar. Respondent No. 1 is the real brother of the petitioner, 4. The petitioner claiming himself to be the landlord/owner of the tenanted premises filed a petition under section 14 of the Rent Act seeking ejectment of the two respondents on the following grounds :— (a) Non-payment of rent with effect from 1-1-1987 at the rate of Rs 250 per month ; (b) Respondent No. 1, who was inducted as a tenant qua the tenanted premises in the year 1979, has without the written consent of the petitioner sub-let the tenanted premises in favour of respondent No. 2 ; and (c) The tenanted premises are required bona fide for the purpose of reconstruction which reconstruction cannot be carried out without the same being vacated. Subsequently, by way of an amendment of the petition an alternative plea was raised by the petitioner in the following terms :— "In alternative, in case it is found that neither the respondent No 1 is a tenant of the petitioner nor the respondent No. 2 sub-tenant of respondent No. 1 or that the respondent No. 1 created the tenancy in favour of the respondent No. 2 being agent or administrator or Manager or for the benefit of the petitioner, even then the petitioner is entitled to the ejectment of the respondents or respondent No. 2 on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent aforesaid and for bona fide requirement or reconstruction of the premises being owner and the landlord of the property in dispute and the reconstruction cannot be carried out without their ejectment.” 5. Respondent No. 1 vide his written statement dated 20-4-1991 admitted the petitioner to be the owner/landlord of the tenanted premises. He also admitted that the tenanted premises were let out to him by the petitioner in the year 1979 on a monthly rental of Rs. 250 and that he had sub-let the same in favour of respondent No. 2 with effect from 1-1-1982 vide rent-note dated 22-12-1981 on a monthly rental of Rs. 300. The rent was agreed to be increased by Rs. 25 after one year. He further admitted having received the rent from respondent No. 2 till March 1987. Rent upto December 1986 stood paid by him to the petitioner. Other averments as to bona fide requirement of the petitioner for reconstruction were denied for want of knowledge. 6. Respondent No. 2 while resisting the petition has denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the petitioner. It was averred that the tenanted premises were let out to him by respondent No. 1 who is the owner/landlord thereof It was further pleaded that one Beant Singh was the original owner of the tenanted premises and thereafter respondent No, I was recognised as owner thereof. It has also been averred that the building of which tenanted premises form a part was constructed jointly by all the brothers, that is, the legal heirs of Beant Singh. Other averments as to arrears of rent and bona fide requirement of the petitioner for reconstruction were denied. 7. It has also been averred that the building of which tenanted premises form a part was constructed jointly by all the brothers, that is, the legal heirs of Beant Singh. Other averments as to arrears of rent and bona fide requirement of the petitioner for reconstruction were denied. 7. As many as nine issues were framed by the Rent Controller on the pleadings of the parties. The Rent Controller came to the following conclusions :—- (a) The petitioner is the owner/landlord of the tenanted premises; (b) Respondent No. 1 is neither the tenant nor there has been any subletting on his part; (c) Respondent No. 2 is the tenant in respect of the tenanted premises having been so inducted by respondent No. 1 for and on behalf of the petitioner ; (d) Respondent No. 2 is in arrears of rent with effect from 1-1-1987 at the rate of Rs. 325 per month ; (e) The tenanted premises are required bonafide by the petitioner for the purpose of reconstruction which cannot be carried out without the same being vacated ; and (f) Since there exist a relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent No. 2, the Rent Controller had the jurisdiction. 8. The Rent Controller also held that the petition did not lack material particulars. The petitioner was not estopped from filing the eviction petition and that the petition was not bad for misjoinder of parties and/or misjoinder of causes of action Consequent upon such findings, the petition was allowed and an order of ejectment came to be passed on 21-91994 against the respondent No 2 on the ground of non-payment of rent and bonafide requirement of the petitioner for reconstruction, 9. On appeal having been carried before the Appellate Authority by respondent No. 2, the findings of the Rent Controller on all the issues were maintained and the order of ejectment passed against respondent No 2 was maintained vide the impugned order dated 5 12-1995. 10. The respondent No 2 has now approached this court by virtue of present revision petition assailing the findings of the two courts below. 11. 10. The respondent No 2 has now approached this court by virtue of present revision petition assailing the findings of the two courts below. 11. At the very out set it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that this court may not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts below in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction which is not wide enough to enable this court to examine the same as an appeal It was contended that reappraisal of evidence was not permissible nor concurrent findings of fact could be set aside by this court in its revisional jurisdiction. Section 24 (5) of the Rent Act, reads :— "(5) The High Court may at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit.” 12. In Dev Kumar v. Smt. Swaran Lata, 1996 (1) RCR 40, the apex Court had the occasion to deal with the scope of revisional power of the High Court under section 15 (5), East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 which provision is similar to the provision contained in section 24 (5) of the Rent Act (quoted above) It was held :— “...The jurisdiction of the High Court under sub-section (5) of section 15 of the Act, therefore, would entitle the Court to examine the legality and propriety of a conclusion of the Appellate Authority and is thus much wider than the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it has to be exercised subject to the well known limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdictions and cannot be equated with an Appellate jurisdiction. This being the position, unless there is a perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority or unless the Appellate Authority has arrived at a conclusion which on the materials, no reasonable man can come, the High Court will not interfere with the same.” 13. This being the position, unless there is a perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority or unless the Appellate Authority has arrived at a conclusion which on the materials, no reasonable man can come, the High Court will not interfere with the same.” 13. Keeping the above limitations in mind, this Court has proceeded to examine the evidence in order to satisfy itself if the findings of the two courts below suffer from any illegality or impropriety. It is not disputed before me that the findings on the question of arrears of rent and bona fide requirement of the landlord for reconstruction are findings of fact. Before dealing with the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to deal with the application being C. M. P No. 232 of 1996 made by respondent No. 2 under Order VI, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure, for the amendment of his reply filed co the eviction petition. By virtue of this application, two fold prayer has been made. Firstly, the respondent No. 2 seeks to raise additional plea to the effect that the sale deed on the basis of which the petitioner claims title to the tenanted premises does not relate and pertain to the tenanted premises and that the inclusion of the name of petitioner in the Municipal record as owner of the tenanted premises on the basis of the said sale-deed is the result of mis-representation, fraud and collusion. Such pleas are sought to be raised by way of additions to preliminary objection No. 2, para 3 (a) and (b) of the reply on merits and in para 14 of the reply on merits. Secondly, the respondent No. 2 seeks to delete some pleadings as contained in para 3 (a) and (b) and para 18 (a) (iii) of the reply on merits. The portion sought to be deleted from para 3 (a) and (b) of the reply on merits reads :— "the premises were let out to respondent No. 2 by Shri Narender Singh respondent No. I with the consent of Shri Tarlochan Singh Shah." The pleadings sought to be deleted from para 18 (a) (iii) of the reply on merits read :— "It is a joint venture of all the brothers. Petitioner alone is not the owner of the said premises.” 14. Petitioner alone is not the owner of the said premises.” 14. The application is being opposed by the petitioner inter alia on the ground that an admission made cannot be allowed to be withdrawn by way of amendment and that the amendment, if allowed, would deprive the petitioner of a valuable right which has already accrued to him. 15. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that as per the case of the respondent No. 2 set up by him in his reply to the eviction petition, the petitioner is not the sole owner of (he tenanted premises. The same were previously owned by Beant Singh and after him the said premises have been succeeded to by his three sons, including the petitioner. The building of which tenanted premises form a part was constructed by the three sons of Beant Singh jointly and that he was inducted as a tenant by respondent No. 1, who was being recognised as landlord. 16. The effect of the present amendment sought for by respondent No. 2 would tantamount to withdrawal of the admission made by him with regard to the petitioner being the co-owner of the tenanted premises along-with his brothers, that is respondent No. 1 and one Tarlochan Singh. 17. This court in Mathia v. Prem Lal and others, 1993 (1) SLJ 395, had the occasion of dealing with the question whether the defendants could be allowed to withdraw the admission made by them in the written statement by way of amendment of the pleadings, In the said case defendants 1 and 2 had pleaded that the property in question was given to defendant No. 3 as non-occupancy tenant on payment of rent who continued to remain in possession thereof as non-occupancy tenant and has become the owner thereof by operation of law. Defendants 1 and 2 then applied for amendment of their written statement seeking to omit the pleadings containing the admission of tenancy of defendant No. 3. The ground taken by defendants No. 1 and 2 while seeking the amendment was that defendant No. 3 got their signatures on the power of attorney and also on blank papers, so that certain admissions regarding tenancy were made in the written statement. The ground taken by defendants No. 1 and 2 while seeking the amendment was that defendant No. 3 got their signatures on the power of attorney and also on blank papers, so that certain admissions regarding tenancy were made in the written statement. It was held that the admissions made in the written statement could not be allowed to be withdrawn by way of amendment unless a case of fraud is made out. It was further held that the defendants could not be allowed to seek an amendment which was total inconsistent with their pleadings as that would amount to withdrawal of admissions made by them in their written statement. 18. In the present case also no case of fraud has been made out. It is not the case of respondent No. 2 that the admissions made by him in his reply to the eviction petition were as a result of some fraud. Therefore, the proposed amendments which would amount to withdrawal of admissions made by respondent No. 2 in his reply, in the absence of a case of fraud, cannot be allowed. 19. There is another aspect of the case. The deletion or addition of the pleadings by way of amendment as claimed by respondent No. 2 will not in any way affect the merits of the case, as set out earlier by him. If the portion sought to be deleted from para 3 (a) and (b) of the reply on merits, is allowed to be deleted, the amended para 3 (a) and (b) would read :— “......The premises were previously owned by Shri Beant Singh, who has since expired. Shri Amarit Singh Shah, Sh Narender Singh and Shri Tarlochan Singh are the sons of Shri Beant Singh and are brothers It appears that in order to obtain an ejectment of the replying respondent, the present petition has been filed in collusion.........." 20. The above pleadings would also show that the petitioner is admitted to be one of the co-owners of the tenanted premises. 21. Besides, respondent No. 2 while appearing as RW 1 has admitted that while taking the tenanted premises on rent from respondent No. 1, be knew that the petitioner was the owner of the same. 22. Therefore, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amendment as prayed for by respondent No. 2 cannot be allowed. 21. Besides, respondent No. 2 while appearing as RW 1 has admitted that while taking the tenanted premises on rent from respondent No. 1, be knew that the petitioner was the owner of the same. 22. Therefore, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amendment as prayed for by respondent No. 2 cannot be allowed. The proposed amendment even otherwise is not material for the determination of real controversy between the parties. The application, being C. M. P. No. 232 of 1996 is, accordingly, dismissed. 23. Coming to the merits of the case, the respondent No. 2 has been held by the two courts below not to be a subtenant. He has been found to be a tenant qua the tenanted premises. Such findings have not been challenged by the petitioner either before the Appellate Authority or before this Court. Therefore, the findings that the respondent No. 2 is a tenant qua the tenanted premises have become final. 24. Admittedly, the tenanted premises were let out to the respondent No. 2 by respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 2 has denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the petitioner. 25. Section 14 of the Rent Act empowers a "landlord” to seek ejectment of a tenant on any one or more grounds specified in the said section. “Landlord" has been defined under section 2 (d) of the Rent Act in the following terms :— “(d) "landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, a specified landlord, and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord.” 26. As stated above, respondent No. 2 has admitted the petitioner to be the owner/one of the co-owners of the tenanted premises, Therefore, being an owner/one of the co-owners, the petitioner is "the person for the time being entitled to receive rent on his own account and/or on behalf of and for the benefit of other co-owners He would, therefore, be a "land-lord” within the meaning of section 2 (d) of the Rent Act and entitled to maintain the petition under section 14 of the Rent Act for the eviction of the tenant, that is, respondent No, 2. [See : Miss Jit Kaur v. Mool Chand and others, (1983) 85 PLR (Delhi) 23 ; Smt. Ram Piari v. M/s. Delhi Fruit Company and others, 1980 PLR 363 and M/s. Purushotam Doss Dhoribhai and Co. v. Ramesh Prasad Sao, 1992 (1) RCR 499]. 27. The two courts below have held respondent No. 2 to be in arrears of rent since 1-1-1987. Respondent No. 1 who is alleged to have rented out the tenanted premises to respondent No. 2 and has been receiving rent from him, has admitted in his reply that rent upto March 1987 has been received by him from respondent No. 2. In view of such admission coming on the record, respondent No. 2 cannot be held to be in arrears of rent with effect from 1-1-1987. He is in fact in arrears since 1-4-1987. The findings of the two courts below, therefore, are modified to that extent. 28. Both the courts below have also arrived at concurrent findings that the tenanted premises are required bonafide by the petitioner for the purpose of reconstruction which cannot be carried out without the same being vacated. 29. The apex Court in Neta Ram and others v. Jiwan Lal and another. AIR 1963 SC <&99 while dealing with the question of eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlord for reconstruction of the tenanted premises under Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (8 of 2006 BK), has held :—- “..... The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. AIR 1963 SC <&99 while dealing with the question of eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlord for reconstruction of the tenanted premises under Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (8 of 2006 BK), has held :—- “..... The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on It is not enough that the landlord comes forward, and says that he entertains a particular intention, however strongly, said to be entertained by him. The clause speaks not of the bona fides of the landlord, but says, on the other hand, that the claim of the landlord that be requires the building for reconstruction and re erection must be bona fide, that is to say, honest in the circumstances, ft is impossible, therefore, to hold that the investigation by the Controller should be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord to reconstruct. This intention must be honestly held in relation to the surrounding circumstances..........." 30. In Panchmal Narayan Shenoy v. Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy, AIR 1971 SC 942. the apex Court had the occasion to deal with the question of ejectment of the tenant under the provisions of Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 on the ground that the tenanted premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for immediate demolition and erection of a new building in place of the old premises sought to be demolished. It was held that the requirement contemplated by Clause (j) of sub-section (I) of section 21, Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, was that of the landlord and it did not have any reference to the condition of the building, as such, what was necessary under the said clause was that the landlord mast satisfy the court that he reasonably and bona fide required the premises for immediate purpose of demolition and erection of a new building in its place. 31. 31. The ground for eviction as contained in Clause (b) of section 14 (1), Tamil Nadu Buildings (Leave and Rent Control) Act, I960, came up for consideration before the apex Court in Metalware and Company v. Bansilal Sarma, AIR 1979 SC 1559. Explaining and approving the earlier two decisions in Neta Ram s case and in Panchama ‘s case {supra), it was held :— “........ that the age and existing condition of the building—whether it is a recent construction or very old and whether it is in a good and sound condition or has become decrepit or dilapidated—are relevant factors forming part of all the circumstances that have to be considered while determining the bona fide requirement of the landlord under section 14 (I) (b) of the Act and in the totality of the circumstances these factors may assume lesser or greater significance depending upon whether in the scheme of the concerned enactment there is or there is not a provision for reinduction of the evicted tenant into the new construction Such a view would be in accord with the main objective of the benign legislation enacted with the avowed intention of giving protection to the tenant.” 32. Again in P. Orr and Sons (P) Lid, v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd, (1990) 2 Ren CR 648, while dealing with the same provision of the Tamil Nadu Act it was held by the apex Court that the ground of eviction in the Act was available only if the building was bonafide required by the landlord for the immediate, that is, direct, sole and timely purpose of demolishing it with a view to erecting a new building. The court after noticing the circumstances which could be termed as relevant circumstances to be taken note of by the Rent Controller in order to judge the bona fide requirement of the landlord, observed :— "..........Various circumstances such as the capacity of the landlord, the size of the existing building, the demand for additional space, the condition of the place, the economic advantage and other factors justifying investment of capital on reconstruction may be taken into account by the concerned authority in considering an application for recovery ; but the essential and overriding consideration which, in the general interests of the public and for the protection of the tenants from unreasonable eviction, the legislature has in mind is the condition of the building that demands timely demolition by reason of the extent of damage to its structure making it uneconomical or unsafe to undertake repairs. While the condition of the building by itself may not necessarily establish the bona fide requirement under Clause (b), that condition is not only one of the various circumstances which may be taken into account by the Controller, but i. is the essential condition in the absence of which it would not be possible for the landlord to prove that he has a bona fide requirement which is timely, directly and solely for the purpose of demolition of the building. The Act does not accept the requirement by the landlord as a bonafide requirement within the meaning of the provision unless the condition of the building in the context of the relevant circumstances, requires demolition. These are matters which are to be proved by evidence.” 33. It was further observed that in order to satisfy the test as laid down in Clause (b) of section 14 (1) of the said Act, the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of the building being in danger of crumbling down, but the condition must be such as to indicate a bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and direct purpose of demolition and reconstruction. 34. 34. Under section 14 (3) (c) of the Rent Act, a landlord can apply for eviction of a tenant from the tenanted premises on one of the following grounds, namely :— (a) If he requires it to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme ; or (b) If the building has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation ; or (c) If the building is required bona fide by him for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated ; or (d) If the building is required bonafide by him for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions/alterations and that such building or rebuilding or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the building being vacated. 35. Dealing with the similar provision contained in the Rent Act of 1971, a Single Judge of this Court in Madhva Nand and others v. Nand Lal and others, 1987 Sim LC 247, has held that all the surrounding circumstances, such as, age and existing condition of the building, its situation and the possibility of its being put to more profitable use, after reconstruction, the means of the landlord and other similar circumstances have to be considered. 36. It was also held that the grounds of eviction that the building has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation, and, that the building is bonafide required for purpose of building or rebuilding are two separate and distinct grounds 37. In Smt. Dakhanu v. Hem Raj and others, 1990 (1) Sim LC 42, while dealing with the similar ground of eviction, a Single Judge of this Court has held that the position of the building is to be seen only for the purpose of ascertaining the bonafide requirement of the landlord which is entirely a different thing when the same building is seen from the angle of it having become unsafe or unfit for human habitation. The fact that the building is not In a bad shape is of not much consequence. 38. Again in State of H. P. v. Satwant Singh Kochhar and etc, AIR 1994 HP 71, while dealing with the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord for rebuilding, it was held by a Single Judge of this Court :— “.......... The fact that the building is not In a bad shape is of not much consequence. 38. Again in State of H. P. v. Satwant Singh Kochhar and etc, AIR 1994 HP 71, while dealing with the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord for rebuilding, it was held by a Single Judge of this Court :— “.......... In order to seek eviction of a tenant under the provisions of the Act on the ground of the landlord requiring the premises bona fide for the purposes of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations contained in Clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act, the Controller under sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act, has to record a finding that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. In order to reach this conclusion obviously, the Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, which can only be established by looking at the surrounding circumstances, namely, the condition of the building, its location, possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after rebuilding or reconstruction, the means of the landlord, steps, if any, taken by the landlord for putting his plans into action etc, While considering the factor of the condition of the building, the Act nowhere says that the building must be in such a condition that the same requires immediate demolition. It will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case In case the building has become pretty old and in the present state has outlived its utility and the landlord intends to rebuild a new structure, will also be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration. The building to be demolished for the purpose of reconstruction or for carrying out substantial additions or alterations should not be a recent construction, since in that case the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use by intending to demolish or reconstruct the building may not fall within the ambit of his claim being bonafide .” 39. In the light of the above proposition of law, this court has examined all the material aspects of this case including the evidence as well as the findings arrived at by the two courts below, 40. In the light of the above proposition of law, this court has examined all the material aspects of this case including the evidence as well as the findings arrived at by the two courts below, 40. It is not disputed that the tenanted premises are about 30/35 years old As per the experts evidence the condition of the premises is not very good and it cannot bear the load of a second storey, The adjoining two shop premises belonging to the petitioner, have been got vacated for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction. The bona fide requirement of the petitioner is ascertainable by the fact that he applied for the sanction of the plan which has been sanctioned by the Municipal Committee, Paonta Sahib. He has the necessary means for constructing the proposed new building. It is also brought out that the reconstruction cannot be carried out unless and until the tenanted premises are vacated and demolished. In case new construction is raised, it will be a profitable use of the premises by the petitioner since by renting out the new premises the petitioner will get more income and have more tenants. Therefore, his claim cannot be said to be just an excuse to through away respondent No 2 and then let out the same to other person without resorting to the plan of reconstruction. 41. It hardly needs to emphasis that a tenants rights are fully safeguarded under section 14 (5) of the Rent Act and he would be entitled to restoration of premises in the event of the landlord putting the tenanted premises to any use or letting it out to any other tenant. 42. Considering the entire evidence coming on the record, this court is satisfied that the findings of the two courts below as to the bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises by the petitioner for the purpose of reconstruction do not suffer from any illegality and/or impropriety. Such concurrent findings, therefore, do not call for any interference, 43. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 has lastly contended that under the law the burden to make a full and fair disclosure of the ma trial facts was on the petitioner and on his failure to make a full and fair disclosure of material facts, the eviction petition is bad and liable to be rejected on this short ground alone. In support of his contention the learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Tata Chand Sharma v. Baij Nath and others, 1994 (Suppl) Sim LC87, 44. According to the learned Counsel, the petitioner failed to disclose that respondent No 2 was let out the tenanted premises by respondent No. 1 for and on behalf of the petitioner. Therefore, there has been no fair and full disclosure of material facts 45. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 has no application to the facts of the present case. In the said case the landlord had failed to plead the necessary facts which were required to be pleaded and disclosed under section 14 (3) (a) of the Rent Act while seeking the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the tenanted premises were bonafide required by him for his own use and occupation. 46. In the present case, there is no statutory requirement of disclosing the facts that the tenanted premises were let out by respondent No. 1 on behalf of the petitioner, 47. In the case of Miss Jit Kaur v. Mool Chand (supra), the tenanted premises were let out by the father, though his son was the owner. In the eviction petition filed by the son it was stated that he was landlord-owner of the premises. In the written statement an objection was taken that the premises were let out by the father and he alone was the landlord. The point which arose for consideration was whether it was incumbent for the son to disclose in the eviction petition initially the facts showing that he had locus standi to institute the eviction petition. It was held that it was not necessary to describe all the facts which gave locus standi to sue, in the petition It was sufficiently pleaded by the landlord that the premises were let out for residence, that he was owner-landlord thereof and that he bona fide required the same for his family members. If the title of the person who files the suit or takes action is disputed, those facts could be disclosed subsequently and gone into. 48. To the similar effect is the ratio laid down by the apex Court in Amrit Sagar Gupta and others v. Sudesh Behari Lal and others, AIR 1970 SC5. 49. If the title of the person who files the suit or takes action is disputed, those facts could be disclosed subsequently and gone into. 48. To the similar effect is the ratio laid down by the apex Court in Amrit Sagar Gupta and others v. Sudesh Behari Lal and others, AIR 1970 SC5. 49. In the present case as well, the petitioner has disclosed that he is the owner/landlord in the tenanted premises, that the tenanted premises were let out for commercial purposes, the tenant was in arrears of rent and that the premises were required bona fide for reconstruction. He was not required to state that respondent No 2 was inducted as a tenant by respondent No, 1 on his behalf. The petition, therefore, cannot be said to be bad on this score. 50. In view of the foregoing reasons the present revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed being devoid of any merit. No orders as to costs.