Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This Revision has been preferred by the above named petitioner, who happened to be the defendant in Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1988 before the Munsif at Daltonganj. 2. The suit for eviction was filed but the Opposite party-plaintiff for ejectment of the petition-defendant from the suit premises on the ground of bonafide necessity as contemplated under Sec. 11(1)(c) of the B.B.C. Act. The suit proceeded under Sec. 14 of the B.B.C. Act. In contesting the suit, the defendant took the plea that the contiguous north shop remained vacant belonging to the plaintiff-Opposite party and as such his son Ajay could have started his business in that adjacent shop room north to the suit premises and as such it was pleaded that there was no bonafide necessity of the plaintiff rather with such plea of necessity, he had filed the suit for ejectment of the defendant-petitioner. From the plaintiffs side, it was contended that the contiguous north room of the said shop house was not vacant but it was given in settlement to one Sashi Bhusan Shukla, who was in occupation of the same. To ascertain that fact, a Pleader Commissioner was appointed and his report was marked as Exhibit and both the Pleader Commissioner and PW-5 had adduced evidence to the effect that the adjacent north shop house was not vacant rather it if was in occupation of others and as such the plaintiff has the bonafide necessity to get the shop house in occupation of the defendants-petitioner be evicted for opening a business for his son, Ajay. In original court, it was held that the plaintiff had the necessity of getting a vacant space for starting business of his son, Ajay, but it was held that the adjacent north shop was vacant at the time of filing of the suit and only to defeat the plea raised on behalf of the defendant-tenant, papers were created showing induction of tenant i.e. one Sashi Bhusan Shukla in that vacant adjacent north shop house, but he has totally disbelieved the story of the plaintiff regarding filing up of the adjacent vacant north shop house through one Sashi Bhusan Shukla and only on that point it was doubted about the bonafide of the plaintiff landlord for the purpose of ejectment of the defendant-tenant. The suit was dismissed. The suit was dismissed. Against that dismissal of the ejectment suit, which proceeded under Sec. 14 of the B.B.C. Act, a Revision petition was preferred by the plaintiff-landlord in Civil Revision No. 356 of 1989 (R), but the same was returned to plaintiff-Opposite party for filing an appeal before the appropriate forum vide order dated 31.7.1990 basing on a Full Bench decision in Civil Revision No. 45 of 1988(R). Accordingly, the plaintiff-Opposite party filed Eviction Appeal No. 2 of 1990 and the same was heard by 2nd Addl. District Judge, Palamay at Daltonganj, and by the impugned judgment and decree dated 12.12.1994 the appeal was allowed, this Civil Revision has been, preferred by the defendant-petitioners, when appellate court had reversed the finding of dismissal and granted decree of eviction against the defendant-petitioner. 3. There was necessity for getting a vacant space for the purpose of running of business of the son of the plaintiff, Ajay Kumar Mishra was maintained by the appellate court also as was done by the learned Munsif, but the appellate court had not reversed the finding the vacancy or otherwise regarding the adjacent north shop house or being up filled up by one Sashi Bhusan Shukla as claimed by the plaintiff-landlord. He has neither set aside the findings of the learned Munsif nor had given any finding as regards the vacancy or otherwise, but the appellate court maintained that this point, was not required to be decided as the option always lies with the landlord to choose as to which shop house is necessary for opening of a business of his son. The appellate court had observed in the following manner: Learned Munsif has unnecessarily made his judgment lengthy and cumber some in discussing the evidence lead by the parties on this point. The defendant-respondent adduced evidence to support his assertion that the plaintiff has a vacant shop room just adjacent norm to the suit shop, which is equally suitable to fulfill his alleged personal necessity. The plaintiff on the other hand, took out a commission to disprove the same and also adduced evidence, oral as well as documentary. The Commissioner (PW-7) found that PW-5 was running his own shop in the room adjacent north to the suit premises. The plaintiff on the other hand, took out a commission to disprove the same and also adduced evidence, oral as well as documentary. The Commissioner (PW-7) found that PW-5 was running his own shop in the room adjacent north to the suit premises. I do not wish to detain myself any longer in discussion of evidence, on this point, when the law is as stated earlier well settled that it is for the landlord to chose between two or more of his premises as to which one would fulfil his personal necessity. 4. It is not known where from the learned appellate court had inferred such settled principles of law. It is the bounden duty as contemplated under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act to prove to the hilt of that the personal necessity alleged by him as a bonafide one and it is also the duty of the court to see that whether the defendant-tenant in being harrassed only with a plea of bonafide necessity without any reality that there was no bonafide on the part of the landlord regarding the personal necessity of the tenanted pre-premises being vacated. For that purpose, under the explanation even there is provision enumerated for partial eviction to show as to whether by partial eviction itself, the necessity as contemplated by the plaintiff can be satisfied or not. I find that the learned appellate court has committed an error of law in side tracking the main issue regarding the bonafide of personal necessity as alleged from the side of the plaintiff-landlord, when there is a specific finding by the original court that the north adjacent shop house was lying vacant and the same can very well suffice the purpose of necessity of opening a business by the son of the plaintiff then the appellate court in reversing such judgment must have given a finding as to how the adjacent north shop house was not vacant and even after vacation the same would not suffice the need of the plaintiff. I do not want to go deep into the matter for the Order. I am going to pass in this Revision petition. 5. I do not want to go deep into the matter for the Order. I am going to pass in this Revision petition. 5. All other findings except the point referred to, are concurrent findings of both the courts regarding, even the personal necessity of the plaintiff to set up his son in business and siting as a Revisions Court, I have got no scope to interfere with such concurrent finding of fact, but there is no specific finding regarding the vacancy or otherwise of the adjacent north shop house of the suit premises or whether of the vacant shop house even if that be so, to suffice the need of the personal necessity of the plaintiff-landlord. The Appellate judgment of eviction is here by set aside and the matter is sent back to the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj to give a specific finding regarding the point as mentioned above and pass a judgment on the materials available on record itself. If is deciding such issue, the learned appellate court feels difficulty to arrive at a concrete finding, he may allow the parties to adduce additional evidence. 6. This Revision petition is thus allowed and the matter is sent back on remand to the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj to proceed, according to law and to dispose of the Eviction Appeal No. 2 of 1990 within three months next from the date of communication of this Order. In the nature and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.