Judgment : .1. This appeal is by the second claimant in L.A.C.P.No.30 of 1989, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga. 2. An area of 23 cents of land in Survey No.600/3-A was acquired by Government. Appellant as well as second respondent herein claimed right over the compensation amount. 3. Facts which have given rise to this Appeal may be summarized as follows:- The property originally belonged to one Chinnammal. Her husband’s name is Muthuraman. It is the case that Chinnammal has no issues, but she had a sister. That sister had a son, who is the father of appellant and second respondent. His name is Nallathambi. Second respondent is the only son of Nallathambi. While second respondent was about two years old, his mother died and thereafter Nallathambi married one Lakshmi through whom the appellant was born. As stated already, the property admittedly belonged to Chinnammal. She died sometime before 1965. Nallathambi also died sometime between 1975 and 1980. 4. In this case, the second respondent put forward a claim statement before the lower court contending that even while he was two years old, he was given in adoption to Chinnammal and he is the adopted son. It is his case that compensation amount had to be paid to him only. 5. As against the said claim, the appellant contended that Chinnammals legal heir can only be their father Nallathambi, and on his death, it devolved on second respondent, appellant and his second wife Lakshmi, i.e. her mother. 6. By the impugned judgment, the lower court found that Chinnammal has adopted the second respondent and, therefore, the entire amount of compensation must be paid to him. The correctness of the said decision is challenged in this appeal. 7. The only question to be considered in this Appeal, is whether the adoption pleaded by second respondent is true and whether the finding of the lower Court is correct. .8. Adoption is not proved by any documentary evidence. The case put forward is that when the second respondent was about two years old, his father wanted another alliance. Therefore, he was given in adoption to Chinnammal. It is his case that thereafter he was brought up by Chinnammal. If the adoption is not proved, the natural heirs will be as contended by the appellant. The burden of proving the factum of adoption is entirely on the second respondent. 9. Therefore, he was given in adoption to Chinnammal. It is his case that thereafter he was brought up by Chinnammal. If the adoption is not proved, the natural heirs will be as contended by the appellant. The burden of proving the factum of adoption is entirely on the second respondent. 9. As early as in Kishori Lai v. MtChaltibau A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 504 their Lordships said that ‘As an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations, it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicions of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth’. Their Lordships followed the earlier decisions of Privy Council in that regard. .10. In Musammat Lai Kunwar v. Chiranji Lai, 37 LA 1, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that in a case of adoption, it is for the person alleging it, to prove the same, and the plaintiff having failed to discharge the onus of proving adoption, his case was dismissed. The said decision was followed in Diwakar Rao v. Chandan Lai Rao and others, A.I.R.l 916 PC 81 herein their Lordships followed still a very early decision rendered in Swatrugun Sutputty v. Sabitrady, where it was held thus:- .“Although neither written acknowledgments nor the performance of any religious ceremonial are essential to the validity of adoptions, such acknowledgments are usually given, and such ceremonies observed, and notices given of the times when adoptions are to take place, in all families of distinction as those of Zamindars or opulent Brahmins, that wherever these have been omitted, it behaves this court to regard with extreme suspicion the proof offered in support of adoption. I would say, that in no case should the rights of wives and daughters be transferred to strangers, or more remote relations, unless the proof of adoption, by which that transfer is effected, be proved by evidence free from all suspicion of fraud, and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubt of its truth.” 11. In Padmalay Achariya and another v. Fakira Debya, A.I.R. 1931 PC 84 their Lordships said that even an admission by a widow regarding adoption is not conclusive. .12. In Padmalay Achariya and another v. Fakira Debya, A.I.R. 1931 PC 84 their Lordships said that even an admission by a widow regarding adoption is not conclusive. .12. In Harihar Pratap Bajrang Bahadur, AIR 1937 PC 242 their Lordships said at page 243 thus:- .“In the general case where it is sought to change the usual course of inheritance on the alleged ground of an adoption having been made it is clearly upon the party setting up that title against the entrance of the legal heir to prove the adoption both as regards the power of the adopter to adopt and also as regards the fact of the adoption if it be questioned.” 13. The same principles were reiterated in the decision reported in Durga Baksh Singh v. BrH Raj Kumar, AIR 1938 PC 40. 14. In Muthuswami Thevar v. Chidambara Thevar, AIR 1949 PC 18 in paragraph 7 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus:- “... The burden of proving an adoption rests on him who asserts it, and the burden is a heavy one. In Dal Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh, 57 I.A. 14 at p. 19 : AIR 1930 P.C. 79, Lord Buckmaster in delivering the opinion of their Lordships referred to the very grave ad serious onus that rests upon any person who seeks to displace the natural succession of property by allegation an adoption. ” (Italics supplied) 15. In A. Raghavamma and another v. A. Chenchamma and another , AIR 1964 S.C. 136 in paragraph 14, their Lordships said that ‘It is well settled that a person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity. Their Lordships went on and said that ‘ordinarily’ an only son is neither given nor taken in adoption.’ .16. In Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi , AIR 1970 S.C. 1286 their Lordships were considering the case of ancient adoptions and said that in the case of all ancient transactions, it is but natural that positive oral evidence will be lacking. Their Lordships went on and said that ‘ordinarily’ an only son is neither given nor taken in adoption.’ .16. In Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi , AIR 1970 S.C. 1286 their Lordships were considering the case of ancient adoptions and said that in the case of all ancient transactions, it is but natural that positive oral evidence will be lacking. In the case of an adoption said to have taken place years evidence is likely to be that the alleged adoptive father held out the person claiming to have been adopted as his son; the latter treated the former as his father and their relations and friends treated them as father and son. There is no pre-determined way of proving any fact. If after taking an overall view of the evidence adduced in the case, the court is satisfied that the adoption pleaded is true, it must necessarily proceed on the basis, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is a valid adoption as nearly 54 years prior to the date of suit. Being a very ancient adoption, their Lordships further said that the burden of proving satisfactorily that he was given by his natural father and received by the adoptive father as his adoptive son is on the alleged adopted son. But although the person who pleads that he had been adopted is bound to prove his title as adopted son, as a fact yet from the long period (nearly 54 years in this case) during which he had been received as an adopted son. every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact is to be favourably entertained. 17. In Daulatrao v. Harishchandra , AIR 1972 SC 2446 their Lordships said that ‘The burden of establishing that there was a valid adoption which deflected the ordinary course of succession is undoubtedly on the party who pleads the case of adoption. 18. In Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai , 1983 (1) SCC 35 their Lordships said that ‘The evidence in proof of the adoption should be free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubting its truth. .19. In Rahasa Pendiam v. Gokulananda Panda , 1987 (2) SCC 338 their Lordships considered the case of adoption and held thus:- .“An adoption would divert the normal and natural course of succession. .19. In Rahasa Pendiam v. Gokulananda Panda , 1987 (2) SCC 338 their Lordships considered the case of adoption and held thus:- .“An adoption would divert the normal and natural course of succession. Therefore the court has to be extremely alert and vigilant to guard against being enshared by schemers who indulge in unscrupulous practices out of their lust for property. If there are any suspicious circumstances, just as the propounder of the will is obliged to dispel the cloud of suspicion, the burden is on one who claims to have been adopted to dispel the same beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of an adoption which is claimed on the basis of oral evidence and is not supported by a registered document or any other evidence of a clinching nature, if there exists suspicious circumstances, the same must be explained to the satisfaction of the conscience of the court by the party contending that there was such an adoption.” 20. In ‘Hindu law’ by Sir Earnest John Trevelyan - 1913 Edition, at page 167, it is said thus:- “The fact of the adoption, and of the power (if any), and of the circumstances necessary to establish the validity of the adoption, must be proved in the same way as any other fact. There are no special rules of evidence applicable.” At page 168, it is further said thus:- “The court must carefully and strictly examine the evidence as to the completion of the act of adoption, and as to the facts which are necessary to validate it.” 21. In ‘Introduction to Modern Hindu Law’ by J. Duncan M. Derrett, 1963 Edition, at page 115. the learned Author says thus:- “...Every possibility of doubt as to the character of the transaction must be eliminated...” 22. In ‘Hindu Law of Adoption, Maintenance, Minority and Guardianship’ - 1970 Edition the learned Author S.V. Gupte has said thus (at pages 129 to 131):- “Burden of proof and evidence - The onus of proving an adoption is to be determined in the usual way but the person who seeks to displace the natural succession by claiming to succeed on the strength of an adoption, must prove the adoption. In such a case the onus is heavy and needs to be severely scrutinized.” In Dal Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh , 54 LA. In such a case the onus is heavy and needs to be severely scrutinized.” In Dal Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh , 54 LA. 14 : AIR 1930 PC 79 the Privy Council said: “Once rests upon a person who seeks to displace the natural succession of property alleging an adoption. In such a case the proof requires strict and almost severe scrutiny and longer the time goes back from the date when the power was given to time when it comes to be exercised, the mere necessary it is, having regard to the fallibility of human memory and the uncertainty of evidence after the lapse of so much time, to see that the evidence is sufficiently satisfactory.” In KishoriLal v. Mt. Chalibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 the Supreme Court observed: “As an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicions of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth.” Direct evidence is not necessary. An adoption may be proved by probabilities, by conduct and admissions of the father and other relations, the conduct and admissions of the persons whose adoption is in question and so on. The fact that the adopted son offered pinda to the natural father but not to the adoptive father is a circumstances against the adoption. An ex parte statement made by a widow in mutation proceedings that she had authority from her husband to adopt is not admissible in evidence against the reversioners in a subsequent suit challenging the adoption either under Sec.32(3) or Sec.33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. A statement made by a testator in his will to the effect that the legatee was the adopted son of the testator can be used as evidence by the legatee in a suit for a declaration of adoption. A statement in the Panchayat report is admissible although the adoption itself was not the subject matter of the enquiry. Lapse of time affects proof required; it may render little evidence sufficient; where long time has elapsed the burden may shift to the person disputing adoption especially where long recognition of adoption raises a presumption in favour of adoption. A statement in the Panchayat report is admissible although the adoption itself was not the subject matter of the enquiry. Lapse of time affects proof required; it may render little evidence sufficient; where long time has elapsed the burden may shift to the person disputing adoption especially where long recognition of adoption raises a presumption in favour of adoption. Absence of direct evidence may in such cases be favourably considered. Where there is evidence of gift and acceptance and of recognition for a number of years, formal proof of the performance of the ceremonies may be dispensed with. An assertion of her authority to adopt and her course of conduct which could only be described as equivocal are not sufficient to establish the validity of an adoption made by widow. A bare denial of adoption implied a denied only of the fact and not of the legality of adoption. Once the facts are ascertained, a presumption arising from conduct cannot establish a right which the facts themselves disprove. If the oral evidence shows that there was an adoption and there is nothing to show that valid adoption in accordance with law could not have taken place, evidence of conduct which went to show that the adoption was recognised by the family of the adoptive father for a long time would lend support to the inference that the adoption had in fact been made.” 23. In N.R.Raghavachariar’s Hindu Law - Principles and Precedents’ - Eighth Edition (1987), at page 143, the learned Author deals with proof of adoption. It is said that there is no presumption in favour of an adoption. A very heavy and serious onus rests on a person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by the act of an adoption. In such a case the proof of adoption as well as of the power to adopt of the adopter requires almost a strict and severe scrutiny. 24. On the basis of the above settled position of law, let us consider how far the case of adoption has been proved in this case. 25. I have already said that the second respondent is the only son of his father Nallathambi. Under normal circumstances, even though there is no legal prohibition in giving an only son in adoption, the same is not usually done. 26. 25. I have already said that the second respondent is the only son of his father Nallathambi. Under normal circumstances, even though there is no legal prohibition in giving an only son in adoption, the same is not usually done. 26. In Mayne’s Hindu Law & Usage - 14th Edition (1996), at page 434, it is said thus:- The Smritis undoubtedly prohibit the adoption of an only son, Vasishtha and Baudhyana say, “Let no man give or accept an only son, as he must remain for the aobsequies of his cestor”. Saunaka says “By no man having only son is the gift of a son to be ever made.” From these Nanda Pandita infers a prohibition against accepting also, and says that the offence of exenction of lineage, decounced by Vasishtha is incurred by both giver and receiver. The Mitakshara, while quoting the above text of Vasishtha expresses its opinion that an only son must not be given but it does not say ‘nor accepted. (Italics supplied) .27. I have already said that in A. Raghavamma and another v. A. Chenchamma and another, AIR 1964 SC 136 , their Lordships gave importance to one circumstance against adoption. That is, ordinarily an only son is neither given nor taken in adoption. 28. Necessary ingredient for adoption is giving of the child by the natural parent to the adoptive parent who takes the child. The giving and taking is the most important feature in adoption, for, without it, there cannot be any valid adoption. The same is sought to be proved by two witnesses. The lower court has simply believed the case. 29. P.W.2 is one Subbiah. At the time of his examination, he was aged 74. In chief examination he has said that at the time of adoption, second respondent was two years old. His mother was dead. Nallathambi, i.e., father of the second respondent gave the child to Chinnammal in adoption. At the age of 2 itself, second respondent was given in adoption. He personally knows about it, and from that date second respondent was brought up by Chinnammal. He is residing two houses away from their house. This witness does not speaking anything about the giving and taking of the child. The authority of Chinnammal to take the child in adoption is also not proved. Whether Chinnammal’s husband was alive on that date is also not spoken. He is residing two houses away from their house. This witness does not speaking anything about the giving and taking of the child. The authority of Chinnammal to take the child in adoption is also not proved. Whether Chinnammal’s husband was alive on that date is also not spoken. If her husband was not alive, the authority of Chinnammal to take the child in adoption, must also be proved. In cross-examination, he said that at the time of adoption, he was present, and it must have taken place 52 years prior to his giving evidence in court. He gave the deposition in June 1993. So, approximately, the alleged adoption must be in 1941. He further said that various other persons were present at that time, but he did not remember who were all present. At that time, Chinnammal was aged about 50 years. Chinnammal is also dead. According to him, she must have died 25 years before, as on the date of his evidence. He further said that because Chinnammal had no issue, she brought up Nallathambi. He is the father of the second respondent. He further said that Chinnammal was looking after the affairs of Nallathambi. Chinnammal was looking after the properties. He denied the suggestion that Nallathambi was looking after the properties of Chinnammal. The suggestion that Nallathambi was looking after Chinnammal was denied. Finally he said that he is not in talking terms with the appellant or her mother Lakshmi. From the cross- examination, it is seen that a suggestion was made that C.W.2 was residing in one of the houses belonging to the appellant, and he was evicted, and that they are not on good terms. Even though the suggestion was denied, one thing is clear that the appellant and C.W.2 are not on talking terms. 30. C.W. 3 is one Raju, who was aged 70 when he was examined. He also said that at the age of 2, Chinnathambi’s mother died, and at that age, he was given in adoption by Nallathambi to Chinnammal. The details are not spoken to by him. He also said that at the time of adoption, he was present. As on that date he was aged 18. At that time, Nallathambi was about 40 years old. He is also not sure as to who were all the persons who were present at the time of adoption. The details are not spoken to by him. He also said that at the time of adoption, he was present. As on that date he was aged 18. At that time, Nallathambi was about 40 years old. He is also not sure as to who were all the persons who were present at the time of adoption. One statement in his cross-examination is very relevant. He said that the father of second respondent gave the child to Chinnammal and nothing more happened. The relevant portion in tamil reads thus:- 31. C.W.I second respondent, has said that he was given in adoption. Further details he was not in a position to say. When he was alleged to have been given in adoption at the age of two, naturally he could not give the details of adoption, and that is why two witnesses have been asked to speak about it. These two witnesses do not speak about the compliance of legal requirements of an adoption. The giving and taking, which is considered to be the most important feature in an adoption when transferring a child from one family to another, was not spoken to by any of the witnesses. From the evidence of C.W. 2 itself, it is clear that even Chinnammal was looking after the affairs of Nallathambi, he being none other than her sister’s son. If the child of Nallathambi is brought to Chinnammal’s house, it can be for various purposes. As a member of the family, and as his only son, out of love and affection, the child could have been brought to ChinnammaFs house. But, that is not a proof of adoption. 32. It is difficult to swallow what the witnesses speak about a matter which is alleged to have taken place 50 yeas back. .33. One big circumstances against the second respondent is that from the date of the so called adoption, till Chinnammal’s death, no evidence has been filed by him to show that atleast they were living together as mother and son. No evidence has been let in to show that the members of the public treated the second respondent as the son of Muthuraman and Chinnammal. From the various documents that have been filed in this case, he is even now known only as the son of Nallathambi, and not as the son of Muthuraman, husband of Chinnammal. No evidence has been let in to show that the members of the public treated the second respondent as the son of Muthuraman and Chinnammal. From the various documents that have been filed in this case, he is even now known only as the son of Nallathambi, and not as the son of Muthuraman, husband of Chinnammal. There is also no evidence to show that the second respondent treated Chinnammal as his mother, or Muthuraman as his father, and vice versa. All the documents that are filed in this case are after the dispute began. 34. How the relations and friends treated the second respondent is also material piece of evidence. That gives him a social status and recognition as member of the family of Chinnammal. Such evidence is also lacking in this case. As held in Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi, AIR. 1970 SC 1286, being an ancient adoption, direct evidence may not be possible. But, in this case, C.Ws 2 and 3 have come before court to speak about adoption, by direct evidence. If their evidence does not prove the factum of adoption, atleast some evidence would have been produced to show that the second respondent has ceased to be a member of the family of his father. If he retains his connection with his natural family, that is a big circumstances against the adoption. The evidence that he has no connection with his natural family, that is a big circumstance against the adoption. The evidence that he has no connection with his natural family is a matter which could be produced even now. That evidence is also lacking in this case. The lower court has relied on certain exhibits filed on the side of the second respondent. All of them are of the years after 1980. A patta book is also filed as Ex.A-11. There also, he declares himself as the son of Nallathambi. Other documentary evidence also declares him only as son of Nallathambi, and not as the son of Muthuraman. Even while he gave evidence before court he gave his name only as son of Nallathambi. So, this circumstances creates a great suspicion in the mind of court, whether the case of adoption pleaded is true at all. .35. The Court below has not taken note of one circumstance while disposing of the case and giving a decree to the second respondent. So, this circumstances creates a great suspicion in the mind of court, whether the case of adoption pleaded is true at all. .35. The Court below has not taken note of one circumstance while disposing of the case and giving a decree to the second respondent. Before the Land Acquisition/Court, second respondent has no case of adoption. Before that court, his only case was that after Chinnammal’s death, his father Nallathambi inherited the property, and, between himself and the appellant there was already division and the schedule property was allotted to his share. His deposition before the Land Acquisition Collector is among the records. In his deposition, he had further said that his father Nallathambi was the son of Chinnammal, and he alone inherited Chinnammal’s properties, and the oral partition among the brother and sister was disputed. The matter was referred for adjudication. But when the matter was referred, before the sub court, an entirely different case was put forward claiming that he is the adopted son of Chinnammal. This sole circumstance is sufficient to discard the entire case put forward by the second respondent. Without taking into consideration these circumstances, a decree has been granted, believing the evidence of C.Ws 2 and 3. 36. While considering a case of adoption, the oral evidence will have to be very seriously scrutinized. That was not the approach made by the Court below. The circumstances which belie the case of adoption were not taken into consideration. 37. As held in Rahasa Pandiam v. Gokulananda Panda, 1987 (2) SCC 338 Experience of life shows that just as there have been spurious claims about execution of a will, there have been spurious claims about adoption having taken place. And the court has therefore to be aware of the risk involved in upholding the claim of adoption if there are circumstances which arouse the suspicion of the court and the conscience of the court is not satisfied that the evidence preferred to support such an adoption is beyond reproach.” 138. 36.After evaluating the entire evidence, it can never the doubted that the case put forward by second respondent is also a spurious claim to deprive his sister and step mother of their rightful claim. 139. 36.After evaluating the entire evidence, it can never the doubted that the case put forward by second respondent is also a spurious claim to deprive his sister and step mother of their rightful claim. 139. In the written statement filed by appellant, it is early stated that her mother, i.e., the second wife of Nallathambi, also died in the year 1989, after the land acquisition proceedings. If so, under the Hindu Succession Act, the property of Chinnammal has to devolve on her sister’s son Nallathambi, who is the father of the appellant and second respondent. Nallathambi dies after the Hindu Succession Act came into force. At the time of his death, his second wife, Lakshmi, appellant and second respondent will be the legal heirs. Lakshmi also died after the land acquisition proceedings. If so, the second respondent will be entitled to only one third share in the compensation amount. Deceased second wife’s (Lakshmi’s) share can devolve only on the appellant, being her only daughter. The appellant will be entitled to 2/3rd share in the compensation amount. 140. In the result, the Appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment of the lower court, I hold that the appellant is entitled to 2/3rd share and the second respondent is entitled l/3rd share in the compensation amount. Since the second respondent has come to court with a false case, I hold that he is liable to pay costs to the appellant, both in this Court as well as in the court below.