Judgment :- 1. C.R.P. No. 3270 of 1993 is directed against the order of the Seventh Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, in R.C.A. No. 1093 of 1991 reversing the finding of the 14th Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, in R.C.O.P. No. 2849 of 1986. 2. C.R.P. No. 3306 of 1995 is directed against the order of the Appellate Authority/Seventh Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, in R.C.A. No. 1094 of 1991 reversing the finding of the Rent Controller/14th Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, in R.C.O.P. No. 2849 of 1986. 3. C.R.P. No. 3307 of 1995 is directed against the order of the Seventh Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, in M.P. No. 850 of 1993 in R.C.A. No. 1093 of 1991. 4. By consent of both parties, all the three Revisions were heard together. 5. The petitioner in all the revisions is the landlady who was originally represented by her power of attorney holder Dr. Ratnavel Subramaniam and after his death, she is now represented by Dr. S. Abhirami. The cause title in all the revisions was amended as per order dated 17.10.1996 by the order of the Deputy Registrar in C.M.P. Nos. 14633 to 14635 of 1996. 6. The petitioner filed the eviction petition for evicting the respondents under Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, as amended by Act 1 of 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the ground of conversion of the building from residential to non-residential purpose. The 2nd respondent/The Steels and Metals Corporation is a partnership firm in which respondents 1 and 3 are partners. The petitioner has averred in the eviction petition that the 1st respondent is the tenant in respect of the demised premises on lease on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,300/- and the premises was let out for residential purposes. It was further stated that previous to the filing of the eviction petition, the petitioner filed O.S. No. 8535 of 1985 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras praying for eviction of the respondents since during the year 1985, residential premises with the rent of more than certain amount were outside the purview of the Act. However, pursuant to a ruling of the Supreme Court, all the residential premises irrespective of the quantum of rent received also came under the purview of the Act. However, pursuant to a ruling of the Supreme Court, all the residential premises irrespective of the quantum of rent received also came under the purview of the Act. Hence, the petitioner withdrew the suit O.S. No. 8535 of 1985 and filed R.C.O.P. No. 2849 of 1986. The petitioner further stated in the eviction petition that the electricity supply to the premises was for domestic purpose only but the tenant has been using the electricity for non-residential purpose. In the circumstances, the Electricity Board authorities threatened dis-connection of the electricity supply to the premises. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner for compelling the Electricity Board authorities to disconnect the electricity supply to the premises. The writ petition was dismissed. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the premises was let out to the 1st respondent only for residential purpose and therefore, the user of the premises for a non-residential purpose amounts to change of user of the building for a purpose other than for which it was leased out, thus exposing the tenant liable for eviction. The petitioner, therefore, filed the petition for eviction of the tenants on the ground that they are using the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out without the consent of the petitioner in writing. 7. Respondents 1 and 2 filed a common counter. In paragraph 2, they contended as follows; “The respondents deny the allegation that the 1st respondent is a tenant in respect of the petition premises. On the other hand, it is the 2nd respondent, i.e., the partnership firm as such of which the 1st respondent is only one of the partners is the tenant in respect of the premises.” In paragraph 3 of the counter, respondents 1 and 2 contended as follows: “These respondents emphatically deny the allegation that the premises was let out and taken on lease for a residential purpose only. On the other hand the premises was let out in connection with the business of the firm under the name and style of the Steels and Metal Corporation. The firm is having its factory at Villivakkam and the petition premises was taken on lease and it is being used as administrative office. On the other hand the premises was let out in connection with the business of the firm under the name and style of the Steels and Metal Corporation. The firm is having its factory at Villivakkam and the petition premises was taken on lease and it is being used as administrative office. In fact the rents are being paid from and out of the funds of the partnership firm as admitted by the petitioner himself in para 3 of the petition. Thus the lease being one for the non-residential purpose and the allegation that the premises had been put to a different use other than that for which it was let out does not arise and the respondents are therefore not liable to be evicted on this ground. As already stated from the inception of tenancy the petitioner has been receiving the rents in the name of the partnership firm, the 2nd respondent herein, which would amply prove the original purpose of the lease is for non-residential and the respondents are not guilty of any conversion to a different use as alleged”. 8. The 3rd respondent filed a separate counter stating that the 1st respondent was not the tenant and that it is not known in what capacity the 2nd respondent is impleaded. The petitioner has received the rent from the 2nd respondent but has not stated that the 2nd respondent was the tenant. Hence, the petition is liable to be rejected in limine. 9. On the aforesaid plea, the parties went to trial. On behalf of the landlady, her power agent Dr. S. Ratnavel Subramaniam (father) was examined as P.W.L and Exs. P-1 to P-5 were marked through him. On the side of the respondents, one Bhikarilal Kotharam, a person assisting respondents 1 and 2 and the power agent of the 3rd respondent was examined as R.W. I and Exs. R-1 to R-12 were marked before the Rent Controller. Exs. R-13 to R-15 were marked during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. 10. Ex. P-1 dated 20.2.1976 is the deed of power. Ex. P-3 dated 25.3.1986 and Ex. R-1 to R-12 were marked before the Rent Controller. Exs. R-13 to R-15 were marked during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. 10. Ex. P-1 dated 20.2.1976 is the deed of power. Ex. P-3 dated 25.3.1986 and Ex. P-5 dated 20.7.1985 were letters sent by the Electricity Board to the petitioner informing the power agent that the petition premises bear connection or domestic use and on domestic tariff whereas the power connection is being mis-used under commercial tariff, which was found out by the Assistant Engineer, Kilpauk, during his inspection on 2.4.1985. It is useful to reproduce Exs. P-3 and P-5. 11. Ex. P-3 letter from the Divisional Engineer, Egmore/MES/D/Central, 207, P.H. Road, Madras-7 addressed to Dr. R. Subramaniam, 23, Balfour Road, Madras-10 runs as follows: “Lr. No. DE/EGM/AE/R. 46/F/D319/86 dated 25.3.1986. Dear Sir, Sub:— Regarding Account No. 53/37/07 at premises 1/2, Taylors Road, Kilpauk, Madras-10. Ref:— Your Lr. No. Nil dated 20.3.86.— With reference to your letter dated 20.3.1986, I wish to state that the service account No. 53/37/07 in premises No. 1/2, Taylors Road, Kilpauk, Madras-10 was originally effected for Domestic Bulk Supply Tariff in OTR No. 9315 dated 12.9.1966. On 2.4.1985 when our Asst. Engineer/R. 46 inspected the above service account No. 53/37/07 it was found that the electricity was misused under Commercial Tariff and the Assistant Divisional Engineer/Kilpauk had issued notice in his Lr. No. ADE/West/CI/F. 118/D1363/85 dated 20.7.1985 for making penal levy. This is for favour of information.” 12. Ex. P-5, the Malpractice Assessment Notice issued by the Assistant Divisional Engineer, Kilpauk/MES/D/North, 110, Medavakkam Tank Road, Kelleys, Madras-10 to Mrs. Sucharita Subramaniam, 1, Taylors Road, Madras-10, in Lr. No. ADE/West/CI/F118/D1363/95 dated 20.7.1985 reads thus: “On 2.4.1985 your service bearing No. 53.37.07 Door No. 1, Taylors Road, Madras-10 was inspected by AE/R46/Egmore. It was then noticed that you had used electricity for Steel and Metal Corporation - Misused Tariff I to VIII. The above factors indicate that you are guilty of malpractice. An enquiry will be made into the matter by the superintending Engineer/Divisional Engineer who will fix the amount of loss sustained by the Board. You may make appropriate representation to him in this regard. I have provisionally estimated the value of energy misused by you at Rs. 1,060/-. If you are desirous of continuity of supply pending enquiry, you may pay Rs. 530/- (being half the estimated value) plus Rs. You may make appropriate representation to him in this regard. I have provisionally estimated the value of energy misused by you at Rs. 1,060/-. If you are desirous of continuity of supply pending enquiry, you may pay Rs. 530/- (being half the estimated value) plus Rs. 50/- towards supervision charges plus Rs. Nil for reseating charges within 15 days from the date of receipt of this notice to the Assistant Accounts Officer/Electricity Revenue/failing which, the supply will be disconnected without any further notice. You are requested to remove the unauthorised additional load.” 13. P.W. 1. who is a retired professor of Medicine, has stated in his evidence that the demised premises was let out by him to the 1st respondent Sudhir Ramchand in or about 1978 on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,300/- for residential purpose. No advance was collected. The 1st respondent put the demised premises to different use and that P.W. I came to know about the same from the notices received from the Electricity Board under Exs. P-3 and P-5. P.W. 1 categorically stated that the 1st respondent is the tenant and that he came to his house and negotiated for the lease of the premises with him. There was no written tenancy agreement. Since the 3rd respondent (mother of the 1st respondent) was stated to be the other partner of the 2nd respondent firm and she is stated to be in possession of the premises, she was also impleaded as a necessary and proper party to the eviction petition. 14. As already stated, one Biharilal Gotharam, a person assisting respondents 1 and 2 and the power agent of the 3rd respondent, was examined as R.W. 1 on behalf of the respondents. Exs. R-1 To R-11 viz., covering letters from the 2nd respondent addressed to the petitioner sent along with the cheques towards rent, postal acknowledgements and stamped receipts for payment of rent issued in the name of the 2nd respondent, were marked to prove payment of rent by the 2nd respondent. Ex. R-12 is the deed of power executed by the 3rd respondent in favour of R.W. I. Ex. R-13 is the two counterfoils of a cheque book bearing Nos. BZ/43 2236174 dated 29-3-1977 for Rs. 3,600/- drawn in favour of Mrs. Sucharita G. Sekharan and BZ/43 236180 dated 30-3-1977 for Rs. 300/- drawn in favour of Mrs. Ex. R-12 is the deed of power executed by the 3rd respondent in favour of R.W. I. Ex. R-13 is the two counterfoils of a cheque book bearing Nos. BZ/43 2236174 dated 29-3-1977 for Rs. 3,600/- drawn in favour of Mrs. Sucharita G. Sekharan and BZ/43 236180 dated 30-3-1977 for Rs. 300/- drawn in favour of Mrs. Sucharita, G. In the cheque counterfoil dated 29-3-1977 it is written as “Dr. Rent Deposit for office” In the cheque counterfoil dated 30-3-1977 it is written as “Rent Deposit for office premises”. I have closely and carefully scrutinized the above two cheques with the help of a magnifying glass in the presence of the counsel on either side. A closer and careful examination reveals that the words “For Office” and “Office Premises” were re-written after erasing the previous writing with a different ink. 15. It would be pertinent to mention here that under the counterfoil dated 30-3-1977, Rs. 300/- has been paid whereas under the counterfoil dated 29-3-1977, Rs. 3,600/- has been paid. In the counterfoils, there is no mention about the premises in respect of which the said amount has been paid or as to how such differing amount has been paid within a gap of one day during the same month and year. The said counterfoils (Ex. R-13) together with Exs. R-14 and R-15 were produced before the Appellate Authority for receiving them as additional evidence by filing M.P. No. 850 of 1993 in R.C.A. No. 1093 of 1991. 16. The reception of the said documents were objected to by the petitioner. The Appellate Authority, however, allowed the said petition and received those documents as additional evidence. It is pertinent to notice that these documents had not been marked by examining the author of these documents or through the person who would be in possession of the documents in the normal course since he alone can produce and speak about the contents of the said documents. R.W. I. who has nothing to do with the said documents, produced the same. He is neither the author nor the owner nor the recipient of these documents in the normal course. In my opinion, the failure to mark these documents through the proper person has deprived the petitioner of the right of cross-examination. 17. R.W. I. who has nothing to do with the said documents, produced the same. He is neither the author nor the owner nor the recipient of these documents in the normal course. In my opinion, the failure to mark these documents through the proper person has deprived the petitioner of the right of cross-examination. 17. R.W. I in his evidence has deposed that he has no personal knowledge as to who approached the owner of the premises and obtained the lease of the premises and about the terms and conditions of the lease. These aspects of the matter became very relevant in view of the fact that the lease was an oral one. Therefore, the 1st respondent who has got personal knowledge alone can speak about the negotiation and the terms and conditions relating to the lease. However, for the reasons best know to him, the 1st respondent has avoided the witness box. 18. R.W. I. has deposed in his evidence as follows: “There is no written agreement to show the nature of tenancy. It is false to say that the premises was let out to the 1st respondent. The petition premises was let out to Steel and Metal Corporation i.e., 2nd respondent. I have seen the petition premises at No. 1, Taylors Road. There is no business being carried at the petition premises. The petition premises was used as residence. There are ground floor and first floor. In the front portion there is a common passage. In the ground floor there is a room which is being used as a sit-out and there is a kitchen and there is a doorway which leads to the interior. There is a pooja room. No portion in the ground floor is used for non-residential purpose. There are three bed rooms with attached bathroom. The tenancy is in the name of the firm, viz., Steels and Metals Corporation. The partners of the 2nd respondent company are residing there. Sit out portion is being for visitors. The factory is in A2 Sidco Industrial Estate, Villivakkam. Steels and Metal Corporation is owned by Sudhir Ramchand, Mani Ramchand. It is incorrect to say that electricity is being used for commercial purpose but it is used only for domestic purpose. The office of the 2nd respondent is at A2 SIDCO Industrial Estate. He does not have any office at the petition premises. Steels and Metal Corporation is owned by Sudhir Ramchand, Mani Ramchand. It is incorrect to say that electricity is being used for commercial purpose but it is used only for domestic purpose. The office of the 2nd respondent is at A2 SIDCO Industrial Estate. He does not have any office at the petition premises. It is incorrect to say that the respondent has converted the petition premises for different use. I am associated with the respondents. The petition premises was occupied by the 2nd respondent. I dont remember when Sudhir Ramchand occupied the petition premises. I dont remember that the 1st petitioner was residing in the petition premises since 1978. The petition premises was used as a residence. The petition premises was an Administrative Office. It is incorrect to say that Sudhir Ramchand was the tenant and not the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent is not occupying the premises in his personal capacity and he is a partner in the 2nd respondent company.” 19. The Rent Controller placed reliance on the evidence of P.W. I and Exs. P-3 and P-5 and also on the admission of the respondents in their counter that the premises has been used only for non-residential purposes and held that the user of the premises has been converted from one of residential to non-residential. The Rent Controller declined to place any reliance on the evidence of R.W. I since he has deposed during chief examination that the premises has been used for residential purpose only whereas in the counter it is stated by the respondents that the premises has been used for non-residential purpose viz., as an administrative office. The Rent Controller, on a consideration of the evidence placed before him, both oral and documentary, allowed the petition and ordered eviction of the respondents. 20. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller, respondents 1 and 2 preferred R.C.A. No. 1093 of 1991 whereas the 3rd respondent filed separate appeal in R.C.A. No. 1094 of 1991. Both the appeals were heard together and a common judgment was delivered by the Appellate Authority on 22-9-1993. As already stated, during the pendency of the appeals, M.P. No. 850 of 1993 in R.C.A. No. 1093 of 1991 was filed by respondents 1 and 2 for reception of additional documents viz., Exs. R-13 to R-15, which was also allowed by the Appellate Authority by the same common order. 21. As already stated, during the pendency of the appeals, M.P. No. 850 of 1993 in R.C.A. No. 1093 of 1991 was filed by respondents 1 and 2 for reception of additional documents viz., Exs. R-13 to R-15, which was also allowed by the Appellate Authority by the same common order. 21. In the affidavit filed in support of M.P. No. 850 of 1993 it is stated that Exs. R-13 to R-15 are sought to be filed to show that prior to the 2nd respondent was inducted as a tenant in the petition premises, the said premises was occupied by Arkays National Engineering Foundry Company by proprietor Ashok Ramchand as a tenant during the period 1977-1978, for office/business purposes. It is also stated that the said documents Could not be filed before the Rent Controller since they were not available during the course of trial. A detailed counter affidavit was filed opposing the said petition. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the tenants cannot be permitted to let in evidence on matters which have not been pleaded by them in their counter statement in the eviction petition and that the documents which are sought to be filed are totally irrelevant and have no bearing on the facts of the case. 22. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeals on the ground that P.W. I was not able to state clearly as to the commencement of the lease and that he places reliance regarding conversion of the use of the premises from residential to non-residential purpose only on Exs. P-3 and P-5. Further, no one from the Electricity Board was examined to speak about these documents. The Appellate Authority propounded a new defence which was not the case of the tenants. According to the Appellate Authority, since the rent was paid by the 2nd respondent, it is usual for business houses to take residential premises on rent and to use the same as such Guest Houses, and in such Guest Houses, there would be an office for the use of the care-taker with telephone, passenger car, etc. The Appellate Authority further placed reliance on Exs. R-13 to R-15 and came to the conclusion that the premises was let out previously to Arkay International Engineering Foundry for its business use and therefore, the allegation of conversion from residential to non-residential cannot be accepted. The Appellate Authority further placed reliance on Exs. R-13 to R-15 and came to the conclusion that the premises was let out previously to Arkay International Engineering Foundry for its business use and therefore, the allegation of conversion from residential to non-residential cannot be accepted. The Appellate Authority also held that in view of the fact that rent for the premises had been paid by the 2nd respondent, there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenants between the petitioner and the 1st respondent since the 2nd respondent could only be the tenant, it having paid the rent. On the aforesaid findings, the appeals were allowed. Similarly, M.P. No. 850 of 1993 for reception of additional documents viz., Exs. R-13 to R-15, was also allowed holding that if these documents are received in evidence, the nature of the user of the demised premises prior to the commencement of the tenancy of the respondents could be known. Aggrieved by the common order of the Appellate Authority, the landlady has preferred the three revisions. 23. I have heard the arguments of Mr. G. Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Narottam Jain and Mr. N. Gyanchand Jain for the respondents, and perused the pleadings of both parties, the evidence, both oral and documentary, and also the judgments impugned in these revisions. 24. The ground of eviction urged in this case is Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of Act, viz., conversion of residential premises into a non-residential premises without the consent of the owner. In the petition for eviction it is stated that the demised premises is a residential premises and the same has been let out to the 1st respondent for residential use on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,300/-. Respondents 1 and 2, who are the son and mother, are the two partners of the 2nd respondent firm. Therefore, the partnership firm was impleaded as 2nd respondent since the 2nd respondent has been sending the cheques towards the rent. The 3rd respondent was also later impleaded since in the counter of respondents 1 and 2 it was contended that the 3rd respondent was a necessary and proper party. 25. Therefore, the partnership firm was impleaded as 2nd respondent since the 2nd respondent has been sending the cheques towards the rent. The 3rd respondent was also later impleaded since in the counter of respondents 1 and 2 it was contended that the 3rd respondent was a necessary and proper party. 25. Section 2(6) of the Act defines landlord as “includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant”. An Explanation was added to Section 2(6) of the Act. It states that a tenant who sub-lets shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the subtenant. In this case, P.W. I. who is the power agent of the petitioner and who has been managing the property, is admittedly receiving the rent. He has clearly stated in his evidence that the 1st respondent approached him personally seeking for the lease of the demised premises, that it was P.W. I. who had leased out the said premises to the 1st respondent for residential purpose on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,300/- and that no advance was received. He has further deposed that he received letters from the Electricity Board informing him that the power connection in the premises has been mis-used for commercial purpose when the power connection was only on domestic tariff. The two letters received from the Electricity Board were also produced and marked as Exs. P-3 and P-5. 26. This version of the petitioner has been specifically incorporated in the pleadings as well as deposed by P.W. I. in his evidence. This version of the petitioner has been admitted in the counter filed by respondents 1 and 2. It is staled in the counter that the premises has been used for non-residential purpose as the administrative office of the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent who had approached P.W. 1 and got the premises on an oral lease, has coolly avoided the witness box even though the eviction petition has been pending on the file of the Rent Controller from 3-9-1986 to 26-8-1991 for almost five years. The 1st respondent who had approached P.W. 1 and got the premises on an oral lease, has coolly avoided the witness box even though the eviction petition has been pending on the file of the Rent Controller from 3-9-1986 to 26-8-1991 for almost five years. Similarly, the other partner, viz., the 3rd respondent, who is none other than the mother of the 1st respondent, has not chosen to enter the witness box to controvert the averments contained in the petition and also the specific evidence of P.W. I. No explanation whatever has been given as to why respondents 1 and 3 have not been examined whereas R.W. 1 who is the power of attorney agent of the 3rd respondent and a person who is attending to the case on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 and who has no personal knowledge about the 1st respondent approaching P.W. I and getting the premises for lease and the terms and conditions of such lease, has been examined on the side of the respondents. In my considered opinion, he is not competent to speak about the terms of the lease. During the course of his examination, R.W. I has deposed totally contrary to the averments made in the counter to which I have already made reference in paragraphs supra. 27. In the counter it has been stated categorically that the premises was used for non-residential purposes as an administrative office of the 2nd respondent whereas R.W. I has stated in his evidence that the premises is used for residential purpose only and not for non-residential purpose. In these circumstances, the evidence of R.W. I, which is completely contrary and totally inconsistent to the pleadings in the counter cannot be accepted and hence, in my opinion, no reliance can be placed on the same. The Appellate Authority, in my opinion, has failed to note that though initially in the counter filed by respondents 1 and 2 it was contended that the premises was let out for non-residential purposes, it was the evidence of R.W. 1 that the premises was let out used only for residential purpose. 28. The case of the petitioner in this context is clearly and convincingly supported by the oral evidence of P.W. 1 and corroborated by the letters Exs. P-3 and P-5 written by the Electricity Board, a public authority. 28. The case of the petitioner in this context is clearly and convincingly supported by the oral evidence of P.W. 1 and corroborated by the letters Exs. P-3 and P-5 written by the Electricity Board, a public authority. No case is made out by the respondents to eschew these two letters. Further, Ex. R-13 viz., the two cheque counterfoils of the erstwhile tenant do not, in my view, advance the case of the respondents since they contain erasers and over-writing in crucial aspect viz., the purpose for payment of money viz., “Office purpose” and hence they are not reliable. 29. It was contended by Mr. Narottam Jain, learned counsel for the 1st respondent that the name of the landlady was not erased in Ex. R-13 and the cheques were realised and cleared by the bank. The learned counsel further urged that the petitioner and P.W. 1s agent Sundaramurthi were not examined, which according to him, goes to the root of the matter. I am unable to accept the said contention. The eviction petition itself was filed by the power of attorney agent of the petitioner viz., P.W. 1. When the power of attorney himself was examined as P.W. 1, there is no need or necessity to examine the petitioner who is residing in United States, and also the agent of P.W. 1 Sundaramurthi. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the documents filed at the Appellate stage and marked as Exs. R-13 to R-15, were rightly allowed to be marked by the Appellate Authority since those documents are marked to prove the nature of the tenancy. This apart, according to the learned counsel, these documents were filed to show that the demised premises was let out to the previous tenant for non-residential purposes. I am unable to countenance the contentions of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent for the reasons stated supra and also to be stated infra. 30. In my opinion, Exs. R-13 to R-15 ought not to have been accepted and marked at the Appellate stage since neither the owner nor the author, nor the person who in the course of business would be entitled to the custody of the counterfoils of the cheque book was examined to prove those documents. The non-marking of those documents by examining the person connected with the documents, as rightly pointed out by Mr. The non-marking of those documents by examining the person connected with the documents, as rightly pointed out by Mr. G. Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has deprived the petitioner of an opportunity to cross-examine the witness concerned. As already stated, R.W. 1 is the agent who is attending on the business affairs of respondents 1 and 3. He is in no way connected with Ex. R-13. Therefore, he cannot produce the same. If Ex. R-13 is excluded from consideration, Ex. R-14, which is the current account statement of Arkays National Engineering Foundry with the State Bank of India, Ambattur Industrial Estate, Madras, and the current account passbook of the said company with the Punjab Natioal Bank (Ex. R-15) have no relevance at all. Under these circumstances, I am of view, that the additional evidence marked as Exs. R-13 to R-15, has to be rejected as unacceptable and also since it did not help to disbelieve the case of the landlady/petitioner. The attempt of the respondents in producing Ex. R-13, that too without examining the concerned person as a witness, is reprehensible. The Appellate Authority has totally erred in allowing the petition and marking those documents as additional evidence. The reasoning given by the Appellate Authority on this aspect is not at all convincing. 31. It was urged by Mr. Narottam Jain and Mr. Gyanchand Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, that the tenant of the premises was only the 2nd respondent viz., the partnership firm and not the 1st respondent as claimed by the petitioner. In this regard, the petitioner has clearly stated that in the eviction petition that the tenant was only the 1st respondent and the purpose of lease was only residential. P.W. 1, who is the power of attorney agent of the petitioner, a retired Professor of Medicine and respectable person, has specifically stated in his evidence that it was the 1st respondent who approached him for securing the lease of the premises and that it was he who leased the premises to the 1st respondent for residential purposes on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,300/-, that too, without receiving any advance. This specific, version of P.W. 1, both in pleadings and also in the oral evidence, was not dislodged in any manner by the cross-examination of the said witness. 1,300/-, that too, without receiving any advance. This specific, version of P.W. 1, both in pleadings and also in the oral evidence, was not dislodged in any manner by the cross-examination of the said witness. Further, the 1st respondent, who negotiated the lease and secured the premises has not chosen to get into the box to deny the averments of P.W. 1. Similarly, the 3rd respondent has also not chosen to examine herself as a witness. Except R.W. 1, who had no personal knowledge about the negotiation and the terms of the lease, no one has been examined on the side of the respondents. Further, no reason whatever was given for the non-examination of respondents 1 and 3. 32. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, that the 1st respondent was employed abroad. However, there are no materials on evidence to show as to how long he was abroad and during what period. Even if he was abroad, he could have come to India once during the course of five years when the eviction petition was pending to give evidence in this case especially to deny and controvert the specific evidence of P.W. 1. The non-examination of the 1st respondent without any justifiable cause, in my opinion, cannot be ignored. I am of the view that it is fatal to the case of the respondents. The 2nd respondent being a partnership firm, if at all it had taken the premises on lease, it should have approached the petitioner either through the 1st respondent or the 3rd respondent, who are admittedly the partners of the 2nd respondent firm. Neither of them has come forward to speak about the same. 33. Mr. Narottam Jain submitted that the 2nd respondent firm was the tenant of the demised premises and not the 1st respondent and in support of his contention reliance was placed on the letters addressed by the 2nd respondent regarding payment of rent by way of cheque and the receipts issued therefor. The 2nd respondent firm might have paid the rent on behalf of the 1st respondent, who is admittedly its partner, and the unsuspecting landlord had received the same. The 2nd respondent firm might have paid the rent on behalf of the 1st respondent, who is admittedly its partner, and the unsuspecting landlord had received the same. Merely because the 2nd respondent has sent the cheques towards rent it cannot be accepted as proved that the 2nd respondent is the tenant especially when P.W. 1 has stated that it was the 1st respondent who approached him for lease and that he leased out the premises to the 1st respondent for residential purposes, which evidence was not controverted and disproved by examining the 1st respondent. Even if a presumption arises in favour of the 2nd respondent as tenant on account of payment of rent by it, such a presumption could only be rebuttable by positive evidence. The said presumption stands rebutted by the evidence of P.W. 1 and the non-examination of the material witness viz., the 1st respondent. In these circumstances, the evidence of P.W. 1 carries more weight and deserves to be accepted and on that basis it should be held that the 1st respondent is the tenant bf the demised premises and not the 2nd respondent partnership firm as claimed by the respondents. 34. Mr. Gyanchand Jain, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Narottam Jain, has contended that the 3rd respondent is not a necessary party to the Rent Control proceedings and that she has been unnecessarily dragged. I am unable to accept the said contention. Since the 3rd respondent Manibai Ramchand was said to be a partner of the 2nd respondent firm and is also in possession of the premises, she was also impleaded as a necessary and proper party to the eviction petition. 35. The Appellate Authority has failed to see that a partnership firm is merely a compendium of partners and hence the question whether the firm or a partner was a tenant in the petition premises had no bearing whatsoever on the issue at hand. Exs. P-3 and P-5 issued by the Electricity Board clearly establish that the premises which was let out for residential purposes had been used for non-residential purposes. Exs. P-3 and P-5 issued by the Electricity Board clearly establish that the premises which was let out for residential purposes had been used for non-residential purposes. In this context, the Appellate Authority has failed to note the admission of R.W. I. that the premises was let out only for residential purposes and that the notice issued by the Electricity Board clearly establishes that the premises had been put to a different use thus warranting eviction. The finding of the Appellate Authority that there was no jural relationship between the parties is not correct. 36. Looking at from another angle, it could be seen that the 2nd respondent is a partnership firm consisting of two partners viz., respondents 1 and 3, who are closely related to each other, as son and mother. The firm name is only a compendious name for all the partners. If the 2nd respondent is a tenant, it would only mean that respondents 1 and 3, who are the partners of the said firm, are the tenants. In this case, all the three parties are before Court, The gravamen of the charge in this case is the conversion of residential premises into non-residential premises. Therefore, the question whether it is the 1st respondent or the 2nd respondent or respondents 1 and 3 are the tenants pales into insignificance, since whoever had committed the conversion of the premises from residential to non-residential, he or she shall be liable to be evicted. Therefore, by contending that it is not the 1st respondent but it is the 2nd respondent is the tenant, one cannot frustrate the operation of law and escape from the consequences of mis-deeds. Once the conversion is proved, the respondents, who claim to be in possession of the demised premises as tenants, shall be liable to be evicted and the Rent Controller shall have jurisdiction to try and dispose of the case as against the respondents. 37. In my opinion, the case of the petitioner is to be accepted on a mere reading of the counter of P.W. 1 and on the evidence of P.W. I, and on the basis of Exs. P-3 and P-5, which are official letters from the Electricity Board. Even in the cross-examination of P.W. I, no serious infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents. P-3 and P-5, which are official letters from the Electricity Board. Even in the cross-examination of P.W. I, no serious infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents. In my opinion, the petitioner has satisfactorily proved that the demised premises has been converted from residential to non-residential use by the respondents and there fore, all the there respondents are liable to be evicted from the premises. In this view, all the revisions are liable to be allowed. 38. For the fore-going reasons, all the three Civil Revision Petitions are allowed and the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and the order of the Rent Controller is restored, thereby confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent controller. However, there will be no order as to costs. Since this case is more than a decade old, the respondents/tenants are given five months time from to-day to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the demised premises to the petitioner subject to the condition that they file an affidavit of undertaking within four weeks from to-day undertaking to deliver vacant possession to the petitioner at the expiry of the aforesaid five months period, failing which the petitioner is at liberty to proceed in execution of the eviction order in accordance with law.