C. A. RAHIM, J. These two appeals arise out of the judgment and order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (1st Additional District Judge), Basti on 29-1-1982 in Claim Petition No. 27 of 1980 allowing the compensation to the dependents of the victim Sher Bahadur Singh alias Vinod Kumar Singh, who died in an acci dent when they were going on a motor cycle, with Bus No. U. T. A. 9100 of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation (U. P. S. R. TC. in short ). Learned Tribunal Judge allowed Rs. 63, 400 towards com pensation with 6% interest to the heirs of the deceased. 2. A claim petition under Section 110-A of Motor Vehicles Act was filed by Raj Mangal Singh, father of the deceased, aged about 48 years, Smt. Karma Devi, mother of the deceased, aged about 45 years and Sri Yogendra Bahadur Singh, brother of the deceased, aged about 27 years. Their case was that the victim was going on a motor cycle alongwith the rider, a motor mechanic from Basti to Faizabad. When they reached near village Shanker-pur a night Bus No. U. T A. 9100 came from opposite direction, went to extreme right in a very high speed and dashed the motor cycle which was on the proper side, with the result that both the riders of the motor cycle died at the spot after receiving fatal injuries on their person. The motor-cycle was also badly damaged. It is alleged that the said accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus. Compensation to the extent of Rs. 3, 84, 000 was claimed in all for the death of the victim Sher Bahadur Singh alias Vinod Kumar Singh. The break-up is Rs. 3, 60, 000/- as general compensation using 50 as multiplier, Rs. 12, 000/- towards the cost of the motor- cycle, Rs. 2, 000/- for funeral expenses and Rs. 10, 000/- for men tal shock. 3. U. P. S. R. TC. contested the suit by filing written statement stating, inter alia, that while bus was proceeding towards Deoria, at about mid night and reached the place of the incident, two buffaloes came in front of the bus fighting, one of them dashed against the bus for which head light was broken. 3. U. P. S. R. TC. contested the suit by filing written statement stating, inter alia, that while bus was proceeding towards Deoria, at about mid night and reached the place of the incident, two buffaloes came in front of the bus fighting, one of them dashed against the bus for which head light was broken. The driver took a turn and then the motor-cycle with two riders came on it and dashed against the bus. They died instantaneously at the spot. Then the bus dashed against a tree and stopped. It was contended that the bus was running at a normal speed and the accident caused due to fault of the motor-cyclist. Hence the claimant was not entitled to get any relief. It was also contended that the claim of the appellants was too excessive. 4. Considering the pleading of both the parties following issues were framed: (1) Whether the accident in question has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of bus No. U. T. A. 9100 an employee of U. P. S. R. TC. , Lucknow? (2) Whether the appellants are entitled for any amount of compensation, if so, to what amount and from whom? (3) To what relief, if any, are the applicants are entitled? 5. After considering the evidence and materials on record it was held by the learned Tribunal Judge that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driv ing of the bus driver. It has also been held that since the deceased was not an income tax payee his income was assessed at Rs. 600/- and his expense towards his parents was Rs. 300/- per month. Using 20 as multi plier the learned Tribunal Judge assessed the general compensation of Rs. 72, 000/-, but from that amount he deducted 20% for uncertainty of life with 10% for lump sum payment. So the amount comes to Rs. 0, 400. He allowed Rs. 3. 000/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 10, 000/- as compensation for the damage of the motor-cycle. He also allowed 6% interest being computed from the date of filing of the petition. 6. Being dis-satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal Judge the claimants preferred ap peal being First Appeal from Order No. 399 of 1982 claiming compensation at an enhanced rate. The U. P. S. R. TC. He also allowed 6% interest being computed from the date of filing of the petition. 6. Being dis-satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal Judge the claimants preferred ap peal being First Appeal from Order No. 399 of 1982 claiming compensation at an enhanced rate. The U. P. S. R. TC. has also preferred appeal against the said judgment and order of the learned Tribunal Judge, being First Appeal from Order No. 505 of 1982 on the ground that the accident was caused not due to rash and negligent act of the driver and that the amount is excessive. 7. Sri Govind Saran, learned Counsel appearing for the claimants has submitted that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus. He has submitted that the said night bus from Kanpur to Deoria was proceed ing at a high speed and it dashed against one buffalo which died at the spot, there fore, hit the motor-cycle for which the two riders also died at the spot and it then dashed against a tree which could not be uprooted and ultimately it was stopped. According to him the circumstances show, besides the evidence on record, that not only the bus was running at a high speed but also that the driver lost the control of the bus, crossed over the road to the other side, where on the patri it hit the motor cycle. He has referred the evidence of P. W. 5, Ram Deo, a passenger of the bus and the photographs, which, according to him, clearly indicate that the bus came to the wrong side of the road for which accident was caused. He has referred the case of Sushil Kumar v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 1981 ACJ 1. In that case the victim was going on cycle on its proper side. The bus came from opposite direction to the wrong side and dashed against the cycle. The victim was thrown off and sustained fatal injuries and ul timately succumbed. It was held that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving. 8. He has also referred the case of U. P. S. R. T. C. v. Raj Kumari and others, 1986 ACJ 699. In that case there was controver sy about the mode of accident. It was held that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving. 8. He has also referred the case of U. P. S. R. T. C. v. Raj Kumari and others, 1986 ACJ 699. In that case there was controver sy about the mode of accident. According to U. P. S. R. T. C. the bus skidded and dashed against the tree, which was controverted by the injured claimant, a passenger of the bus, by saying that the accident caused due to rash and negligent driving. 9. Reliance was also placed on the Division Bench case of this Court reported in 1995 (1) TAC 76 (All)- - Prem Lata and others v. Sri Sikandarah and others. In that case the driver was driving the vehicle without head light of the right hand side, came to the wrong side and dashed the scooter. After considering the circumstan ces it was held to be a rash and negligent act of the driver. 10. The above three cases have been referred by the learned Counsel for the claimant. But all those three cases had following circumstances in which the acci dent was caused. In the first case the driver crossed over to the wrong side without any reason. In the second case it was held that bus skidded due to speed, though it was raining, and dashed against the tree. In the last case the driver not only crossed over to the wrong side but was also running with the one head light at his left. In all the cases one thing was common that the vehicles were being driverl with speed for which it went out of control and caused accident. 11. Sri Samir Sharma, learned Coun sel appearing for U. P. S. R. T. C. has placed reliance on two cases and submitted that speed is not the only factor to gauze the rash and negligent conduct of the driver. In Nafis Ahmad v. State of UP, 1977 ACJ 268, it was held that "speed is not the only criteria for determining the rashness and negligence of the driver of the vehicle. " In that case density of the traffic and drivers crossing over to the wrong side were also considered. In Nafis Ahmad v. State of UP, 1977 ACJ 268, it was held that "speed is not the only criteria for determining the rashness and negligence of the driver of the vehicle. " In that case density of the traffic and drivers crossing over to the wrong side were also considered. In Deoki Devi Tiwari and others v. R. S. Chatrath and others, 1978 ACJ 169, it was held that running of oil tanker at a crossing of town at the speed of 20 Km. per hour was itself a careless act on the part of the driver of an oil tanker when reached near the crossing of the road. " In these decisions the Court wanted that other circumstances should also be con sidered along with the speed of the vehicle. 12. To consider the circumstances it is necessary to examine the evidence of the driver of the bus and also the evidence of P. W. 5 Ram Deo a passenger of the bus. The driver has stated that after the collision with the buffalo the bus proceeded 10 steps when the accident with motor-cycle took place. Thereafter it proceeded another 10 steps when it collided with the tree. 13. P. W. 5 Ram Deo has stated that the bus left Faizabad at about 11 p. m. It was running with high speed and before reach ing to Chawni town it collided with one buffalo. Two persons were riding on motor cycle and going towards Faizabad on proper side, the bus then dashed the said motor cycle alongwith riders. From the evidence of these persons of both sides it appears that the bus at the first struck the buffalo but did not stop. It proceeded fur ther (10 steps according to the driver) crossed over the road, descended on the patri, met with an accident with the motor cycle but did not stop. It went further (10 steps according to the driver) and dashed against a tree. 14. Learned Counsel for the U. P. S. R. T. C. has submitted that the bus was running towards mid night and when the buffaloes came on the road fighting suddenly and hit the bus, the driver had to cross over the road in order to save the motor cycle, which was coming from op posite direction, for which it went further and dashed against a tree. He has sub mitted that the motor cyclist also noticed the fighting buffaloes on the road, could have stopped it to avert the accident but it was not done. He has alleged that there was an act of contributing negligence on the part of the motor cyclist. He has em phasised the sudden appearance of-the buffaloes on the road and the Act con tributory negligence of the part of the motor cyclist which were responsible for the accident. 15. Reliance was placed on the case of Jang Bahadur Singh v. Sunder Lal Man-dal and others, 1958 ACT 154, wherein it was held: "there is no liability for negligence unless there is in the particular case a legal duty to take care; and this duty must be one which is owned to the plaintiff himself and not merely to others. Thus, the ideas of negligence and duty are strict ly correlative, and there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract, negligence is simply neglect of some care which we are bound to exercise towards somebody. . . . The duty must be in respect of a particular conduct complained of. Where, therefore, there is no duty there can be no action for negligence. " 16. Referring the said decision learned Counsel has submitted that due to sudden appearance of the buffaloes on the road it cannot be said that there must be legal duty to take care in that circumstan ces. 17. In that decision it was also held that in paragraph 29 that a person must be at his left side. In a case of motor collision, therefore, the enquiry about reasonable care is reduced to the more precise and narrow one. "was the defendant on the left or right side of the road. " 18. In this case it appears that the motor-cyclist was on left side following rules of the road reducing the possibility of contributory negligence. But when the accident occurred the bus crossed over the road. The version of the learned Counsel is that it was due to the accident with the buffaloes and to save the motor cyclist, the bus had to be taken to wrong side. 19. With regard to contributory negligence learned Counsel has referred the case of Manjula Devi Bhuta and another v. Manjusri Raha and others, 1968 ACJ1. The version of the learned Counsel is that it was due to the accident with the buffaloes and to save the motor cyclist, the bus had to be taken to wrong side. 19. With regard to contributory negligence learned Counsel has referred the case of Manjula Devi Bhuta and another v. Manjusri Raha and others, 1968 ACJ1. In that case there was a stamp on the road and without taking care of it both the bus drivers drove the vehicle in normal speed for which the accident occurred. It was held that when the driver of the vehicle noticed that there is obstacle on the left of another vehicle coming from opposite direction, he necessarily anticipated that the latter will swerve a little towards the right to escape from the hurdle. This is ordinary sense which every driver acquire. 20. Learned Counsel referring the said decision has argued that when the motor-cyclist saw the buffaloes fighting on the road they should have slowed down their vehicle and took precaution. But in the instant case I find that such precaution if taken would have been useless when the driver of the bus was driving at such a speed and did not take precaution to stop the bus or if he took such precaution could not stop the bus due to high speed, there was no contributory negligence on the part of the motor-cyclist coming from opposite direction. There would have been no acci dent if the bus did not cross the road and come up on the motor-cycle. It was not that the motor-cycle hit the bus, but from the evidence of P. W 5 it appears that the bus did it. From the photographs it appears that the side-land of the road wash clear and there was no obstacle to notice the incoming buffaloes if head lights were in full bloom and if the vehicle was running at a normal speed. The evidence of the driver is that the bus was running at a speed of 45 kms. per hour and both lights were on as it was a night bus. If the bus was running in normal speed it could have been stopped before it dashed the buffalo or immedi ately after it. The evidence of the driver is that the bus was running at a speed of 45 kms. per hour and both lights were on as it was a night bus. If the bus was running in normal speed it could have been stopped before it dashed the buffalo or immedi ately after it. Learned Counsel for the claimants has rightly contended that suc cessive collision would raise adverse presumption against the driver that it was running at such a speed that he could not control it. The said fact finds corrobora-tion from the factthat it had to cross over the road after it hit the buffalo, dashed the motor-cycle on the patri and then it proceed along that side and hit the tree. Even after the accident with the motor cycle the bus driver could not bring the bus on the road. From the photograph it ap pears that the motor-cycle was lying m damaged condition on the patri and the condition of the bus when he struck the tree. 21. In the case of Shri Ram Partap v. Punjab Roadways, AIR 1962 Punj 540, it was held that the speed in itself does not lead ioprima facie inference of negligence but it can be so inferred if it is associated with bad, careless or fast driving. 22. Learned Counsel for U. P. S. R. T. C. has submitted that this was a case of in evitable accident. He has referred the case of M. H. Lokre v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 221 , wherein it has been held: "if a pedestrian suddenly crosses the road without taking any note of approaching the bus there is every possibility of his dashing against the bus without the driver becoming aware of it. The bus driver cannot save accident however, slowly he may be driving and therefore he can not be held to be negligent in such a case. " Learned Counsel has submitted that had not the buffaloes come on the way suddenly in-fighting there would have been no accident. The said decision is not applicable in the instant case as not only that it hit the buffalo but there were suc cessive hit and dash which could be not done if the driver was in slow or normal speed. 23. The said decision is not applicable in the instant case as not only that it hit the buffalo but there were suc cessive hit and dash which could be not done if the driver was in slow or normal speed. 23. Having gone through the discus sion and reasons given by the learned Tribunal Judge and also perusing the evidence of the witnesses including the Investigation Officer and looking to the photographs I have no hesitation to hold that the driver was guilty of rash and negligence act. 24. Learned Counsel for U. P. S. R. T. C. has submitted that the compensation should be just and proper. He has referred the case of Managing Director Thiruval-luvar Transport Corporation, Madras v. M. Janardhanam and another, AIR 1987 Mad 151 , wherein it has been held when com pensation is awarded in lump sum it is with the sole intention of helping the depend ents of the deceased to get what they would have got through him, if he had been alive. If the money so granted would on a fair and normal expectation of the Court yield an income three times or four times of what deceased himself would have provided to the family, then it would be an un reasonable award of compensation to the claimants. 25. This decision has no force at present as because the Supreme Court in the case of U. P. S. R. T. C. and others v. Trilok Chandra and others, JT 1996 (5) SC 356 : 1996 (2) JCLR 714 (SC), has decided the scale by which the compensation is to be allowed. In para 17 it has been held that since Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been amended by Amendment Act 54 of 1994 introducing Section 163-A which provides compensation as indicated in second schedule wherein cases of fatal accident, according to the age, it has prescribed mul tiplier which varies from 15 to 18. In this schedule the maximum multiplier can be upto 18 and not more. In that case the accident was held in 1977 before the amended Act was given effect to. 26. It is admitted case that the victim expired at the age of 20. So according to second schedule the multiplier should be 17. 27. In this schedule the maximum multiplier can be upto 18 and not more. In that case the accident was held in 1977 before the amended Act was given effect to. 26. It is admitted case that the victim expired at the age of 20. So according to second schedule the multiplier should be 17. 27. In this connection the case referred to by the learned Counsel for the claimants, namely, Gur Saran Lal Srivas-tava and another v. U. P. S. R. T. C. , 1985 ACJ 1402, where multiplier 20 was made avail able to the claimant considering the age of the victim who was 20 years, has no ap plication in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision. 28. Sri Samir Sharma has submitted that the learned Tribunal Judge has al lowed special damage to the extent of Rs. 300 towards the loss of estate but it cannot be allowed without specific pleading in this regard. He has referred the case of Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. New Delhi and another v. Lalta Prasad Srivastava and another, AIR 1989 All 80 (D. B.), wherein it has been held: "in this case, the Tribunal has awarded general and special damages. Special damages require specific pleading and the defendant is to be put notice of details. The general damages are presumed to flow from the injuries and the defendant cannot claim any special notice. Loss of earnings, loss of expenses, money spent for treatment are to be specifically pleaded as spe cial damages. On the other hand, claim towards pain and suffering and loss of amenities (non- pecuniary loss) and also prospective loss of earnings fall under the category of general damages. " 29. It appears from the record that for the loss of estate there is no specific plead ing. The learned Judge was also not dis cussed about the reasons for such special award. There is pleading claiming com pensation for pain and suffering but that has been categorised as general damages and not special. Learned Counsel for U. P. S. R. T. C. has submitted that since there is an elder brothers of the deceased who can take up the charge of the business besides his father who was 48 years at the time of the accident there was no loss of estate for which compensation is required to be awarded. Learned Counsel for U. P. S. R. T. C. has submitted that since there is an elder brothers of the deceased who can take up the charge of the business besides his father who was 48 years at the time of the accident there was no loss of estate for which compensation is required to be awarded. There is substance in the argument and I find that the compensation on that count cannot be awarded to the claimant. 30. Sri Govind Saran appearing for the claimant has submitted that the deduc tion made for uncertainty of life and for lump sum payment is not permissible under law. He has referred the case of Urmila Pandey and others v. Khalil Ahmad and others, (1994) 2 UP Civil & Revenue Cases Reporter 641 (SC), wherein in para graph 13 it has been held that "the Tribunal also fell into error in making 33 per cent deduction for the lump sum pay ment. " In Gur Saran Lais case (supra) it was held that when a multiplier is applied there does not arise any question of deduc tion. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court I find that 20% deduction made for uncertainty of life and 10% deduction made for lump sum payments are illegal. 31. As regards the interest awarded by the learned Tribunal Judge learned Counsel for the U. P. S. R. TC. has referred the extract of Accident Claims Journal Digest of 1981 to 1985 wherefrom it ap pears that several High Courts have granted 6% interest during that period. In this regard learned Counsel for the claimant has referred the case of Jagbir Singh and others v. Punjab Roadways and others, AIR 1987 SC 70 , and the case of Urmila Pandey and others (supra ). In both the cases Supreme Court has awarded 12% interest. It appears that in the former case the accident occurred in 1971 and in latter case accident occurred in 1970. So there is no scope of argument that the rate of inter est in the instant case where accident oc curred in 1971 be otherwise. So I find that the learned Tribunal Judge has erred in granting interest at the rate of 6% which should be at the rate of 12% from the date of filing of the application. 32. So there is no scope of argument that the rate of inter est in the instant case where accident oc curred in 1971 be otherwise. So I find that the learned Tribunal Judge has erred in granting interest at the rate of 6% which should be at the rate of 12% from the date of filing of the application. 32. To award general compensation income of the deceased is a relevant matter to be determined. As per claim the deceased was earning Rs. 800/- per month. He owned a taxi and tempo plying on hire. According to the claimants he used to spend R. 200/- for self and Rs. 600/-towards parents. Learned Judge assessed the income of the deceased at Rs. 600/- for the reason that he was not an income tax payee. But this assumption was on sup position and not based on evidence and materials on record. He also held that he spent 50% of his income upon himself, which does not appear to be correct. 33. Reliance was placed in case of Smt Rajendri Kumari v. Smt. Shanta THvedi, AIR 1989 SC 1073, wherein it was held that evert at modest computation con tribution of the deceased towards his fami ly would not be less than Rs. 500/- or Rs. 6, 000/- per annum. 34. In case of U. P. S. R. T. C. and others v. Trilok Chandra and others, JT 1996 (5) SC 356:1996 (2) JCLR 714 (SC), in deter mining the compensation the formula ad vocated by Lord Rights in this was ac cepted wherefrom it appears that in cal culating the actual dependency each adult should be counted two units and each minor should be counted as one unit. So the parents and the deceased, forming three units, the dependency of the parents should be assessed equivalent to 2/3 of the income. 35. I consider that the amount claimed as earning of the deceased is quite reasonable. So considering that the deceased was earning Rs. 800/- per month the actual dependency of the parents being 2/3 of the said amount, the figure would be Rs. 532/ -. If personal expenses of the vic tim is deducted it should come down to Rs. 500/- and not below. Using 17 as multi plier, according to second schedule, the compensation which the parents are en titled would be Rs. 1, 02, 000. 36. 532/ -. If personal expenses of the vic tim is deducted it should come down to Rs. 500/- and not below. Using 17 as multi plier, according to second schedule, the compensation which the parents are en titled would be Rs. 1, 02, 000. 36. The learned Judge has not con sidered the claim of Rs. 2. 000/- as funeral expenses. No reason has been ascribed to that Sri Samir Sharma has fairly conceded. Accordingly it is held that the claimants are entitled to Rs. 2. 000/- as funeral expen ses. 37. Rs. 12, 000/- was claimed for the damage of the motor cycle. Learned Judge has considered the extent of damage and allowed Rs. 10, 000. Sri Samir Sharma has disputed the claim and submitted that the motor cycle was not totally damaged for which the amount awarded is too exces sive. But considering the evidence I con sider that the award of Rs. 10, 000 towards the cost of badly damaged motor-cycle is just and proper. 38. To sum up, the claimants shall be entitled to general damage at Rs. 1, 02, 000/-, Rs. 10, 000/- towards costs of the motor-cycle, Rs. 2, 000 for funeral expen ses of the deceased. So the claimants are entitled to Rs. 1, 14, 000, in all with 12% interest from the date of filing of the ap plication till the date of payment. There should not be any deduction towards un certainty of life and for payment of lump sum money. No damage is awarded towards the loss of estate. 39. Both the appeals are, therefore, allowed in part. The judgment and award of the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dated 29-1-1982 is modified to the extent mentioned above. The amount of compensation so awarded by this judg ment shall be paid within two months from this date. . . . 40. With the above observations, both the appeals are disposed of. Appeal disposed of. .