Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal filed by the appellant J.S. Muthu under Section 54 of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (Act 46 of 1973). The only charge framed in this case is that the appellant had received a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in contravention of previsions of Section 9(1)(b) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. 2. The charge against the appellant is that he received a payment of Rs. 50,000/- on 1st June, 1974 from a person other than an authorised dealer in foreign exchange by order or on behalf of Shri J. Asirvatham of Kulalampur, a person resident outside India, which is a contravention of the provisions of Section 9(1)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the “Act”). According to the department, on receipt of reliable information that one J.S. Muthu had been to a foreign exchange racketeers place at Aminjikarai, Madras, on 1st June, 1974 and he had been directed to wait at a place on the Armenian Street, Madras-1 for receiving the amount, the officers of the Enforcement Directorate, Madras, kept surveillance at the area fixed for receiving the payment and after making sure that the payment was made to the suspect, the Enforcement Officers followed the suspect to the Broadway bus stand and he was stopped therein and his baggage was searched which resulted in the seizure of Indian currency of Rs. 50,000/-. On interrogation, the statement was recorded from him. It is further contended that in his voluntary statement dated 1.6.74 given before the Chief Enforcement Officer, Madras, the appellant inter-alia stated that his brother J. Asirvatham was working as a Fitter in Railway Carriage work-shop at Kulalumpur. He wrote to his brother Asirvatham to send Rs. 50,000/for the purpose of setting up two pump-sets in his village and he also received a letter from his brother that an amount of Rs. 50,000/- had been arranged and that the said letter contained coded words for the receipt of Rs. 50,000/-. He also confessed at the Broadway bus stop. After the receipt of the said sum, the officers of the Enforcement Directorate stopped him, searched his person and baggage and seized the said amount of Rs. 50,000/-. Again on 22.6.74 the appellant herein made a further statement and admitted that his brother J. Asirvatham, Kulalumpur had sent the amount through unauthorised channel on the ill-advice of some persons. After the receipt of the said sum, the officers of the Enforcement Directorate stopped him, searched his person and baggage and seized the said amount of Rs. 50,000/-. Again on 22.6.74 the appellant herein made a further statement and admitted that his brother J. Asirvatham, Kulalumpur had sent the amount through unauthorised channel on the ill-advice of some persons. With the above facts and circumstances, the Enforcement Directorate framed a charge against the appellant herein for contravention of the provisions of Section 9(1)(b) of the Act for having received payment of Rs. 50,000/- on 1.6.74 from a person in India by order or on behalf of his brother residing in Kulalumpur, a person, resident outside, India without the permission of the Reserve Bank of India. A show-cause notice dated 28.8.1974 was issued to the appellant for the above mentioned charge. He was required to show-cause as to why adjudication proceedings as contemplated in Section 51 of the Act should not be held against him for the aforesaid contravention and why the Indian currency of Rs. 50,000/- seized from him on 1.6.74 being the amount involved in the contravention should not be confiscated to the Central Government under Section 63 of the Act. 3. The appellant herein in his reply dated 20.9.74 to the show cause notice, has denied the charge and requested for personal hearing in the matter. It is seen from the records that a personal hearing was given to the appellant on 16.5.1977 at Madras. It is also seen that the appellant appeared through his counsel and filed a written submission on 16th May, 1977. The appellant herein before the adjudicating officer placed some documents to show that he was having funds of Rs. 29,750/-drawn from the Banks for which savings bank account passbooks have been produced. For the balance amount of Rs. 20,250/-, it was the case of the appellant herein that from the sale of agricultural produced periodically sold in shandy and retailers. 4. The appellant herein also denied the charge of contravention of Section 9(1)(b) of the Act and stated that he had never been to Ramlan Stores, Aminjakarai, nor received any letter from his brother J. Asirvatham of Kulalumpur, nor any one paid him a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in Madras as alleged in the show cause notice. But he asserted that he came to Madras with a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in Madras as alleged in the show cause notice. But he asserted that he came to Madras with a sum of Rs. 50,000/- for purchasing a small piece of land at Madras. He also added that the statements given on 1.6.74 and 22.6.74 to the officers of the Enforcement Directorate were taken under threat, assault, pressure and inducement. He also contended that the source of Rs. 50,000/- has been properly explained in his reply dated 20.9.74 to the show cause notice as the income from the property and also income from his brothers property which he was receiving as head of the family. He also relied upon two replies sent to the Joint Secretary to the Government, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi dated 15.9.75 and 5.12.75. 5. The adjudicating officer after giving full opportunity to the appellant herein in the light of the two confessional statements dated 1.6.74 and 22.6.74, rejected the explanation offered in the reply notice dated 20.9.74. The adjudicating officer-has further explained that if the statement dated 1.6.74 has really been taken under compulsion, the appellant would not have been given another statement on 22.6.74, that is, after 22 days on the same line as one given on 1.6.74. The retraction dated 20.9.74 was after 3 months. Since the explanation was not acceptable in the light of his own confessional statement on two occasions, namely, on 1.6.74 and on 22.6.74 the adjudicating officer rejected the plea that the statements were out of threat and coercion. After giving sufficient reasons, the adjudicating authority came to the conclusion that the appellant herein has contravened section 9(1)(b) of the Act and by invoking section 63, confiscated the entire amount of Rs. 50,000/- to the Central Government and by invoking section 50 of the Act, a penalty of Rs. 5000/- was levied on J.S. Muthu, the appellant herein. 6. Against the order of the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, Madras - 6 dated 21.5.77, the appellant herein preferred Appeal No. 995 of 1977 before the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board (Southern Zone). The very same contentions were raised before the appellate Board on behalf of the appellant herein. 7. The Appellate Board considered the case of the appellant herein, as well as the department in detail. After giving sufficient reasons, the Appellate Board rejected the appellants version that the amount of Rs. The very same contentions were raised before the appellate Board on behalf of the appellant herein. 7. The Appellate Board considered the case of the appellant herein, as well as the department in detail. After giving sufficient reasons, the Appellate Board rejected the appellants version that the amount of Rs. 50,000/- seized from my represented his joint familys means and the same were got ready for the purchase of properties for the family in Madras City. The Board has also rejected the contention of the counsel for the appellant that he was not given fair chance to defend the case. The Board has pointed out that from 1.6.74 to 16.8.75 the appellant herein was free and nothing prevented him from approaching the department either himself or through his legal practitioner for the inspection of the documents. Since he was given an opportunity to contest the case effectively, the Board has rejected the contention that the appellant herein was not given fair chance to defend his case. By order dated 21.5.77, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board after giving full opportunity to the appellant and after hearing the counsel on the basis of the evidence placed by both the parties, confirmed the findings arrived at by the Deputy Director of Enforcement. The Board has also confirmed the penalty of Rs. 5,000/- imposed on him and dismissed the appeal. 8. Against the concurrent findings of the authorities, the appellant has filed the present appeal before this Court. Section 54 of the Act says that “An appeal shall lie to the High Court only on questions of law from any decision or order of the Appellate Board under sub Section (3) or sub-Section (4) of section 52.” 9. Thiru G.K. Selvarajan, learned counsel for the appellant after narrating the entire case, pleaded that in the light of the retraction and explanation dated 20.9.74, the authorities ought not to have relied upon the confession statement of the appellant dated 1.6.74 and 22.6.74 which, according to him, came to be given on threat and coercion by the Enforcement Directorate. We have carefully perused the confessional statement given by the appellant dated 1.6.74 as well as dated 22.6.74. Admittedly the appellant herein was free from 1.6.74 till the statement of second confession made on 22.6.74. We have carefully perused the confessional statement given by the appellant dated 1.6.74 as well as dated 22.6.74. Admittedly the appellant herein was free from 1.6.74 till the statement of second confession made on 22.6.74. If his case as pleaded in the reply dated 20.9.74 to the show cause notice dated 28.8.74 is true, there was no need to give second confessional statement on 22.6.74 in the line of his first confessional statement dated 1.6.74. Another factor is that the retraction was made after about 3 months of the second confessional statement dated 22.6.74. If really the appellant had any grievance, he could have retracted immediately after 22.6.74. There is no. reason to wait for about 3 months to retract his earlier confessional statement. 10. The main submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that copies of the above referred to statements dated 1.6.1974 and 22.6.1974 were given to the appellant only on 16.5.1977, just at the time when arguments were heard by the first Authority, and not earlier, despite the fact that the appellant made applications for securing the said copies earlier. No doubt, learned Counsel also points out that the Appellate Board also has observed thus: “I agree that the department should have given him copies of the statements sufficiently early so that he could get ready with his defense of the charge levelled against him in the show-cause notice. The copies should have been furnished to him in time and the delay in doing so does not, in any way, help the department.” 11. But, it must be noted that the Appellate Board itself points out that the appellant has been really not prejudiced by the delay in obtaining the said copies. We also put a question to learned counsel for the appellant before us to point out as to how actually the appellant was prejudiced because the said copies were furnished only on 16.5.1977, while the order of the first Authority was passed on 21.5.1977. But, he could not actually point out any such prejudice. 12. Further, even after 16.5.1977 and before 21.5.1977, after going through the copies furnished to him, the appellant could have made any appropriate representation to the first Authority in the light of the contents of the said copies furnished to him. But, admittedly he has not done so. 13. But, he could not actually point out any such prejudice. 12. Further, even after 16.5.1977 and before 21.5.1977, after going through the copies furnished to him, the appellant could have made any appropriate representation to the first Authority in the light of the contents of the said copies furnished to him. But, admittedly he has not done so. 13. That apart, the above said copies related to his own statements made on 1.6.1974 and 22.6.1974. We have already come to the conclusion that particularly in view of the above said second confessional statement dated 22.6.1974 it cannot be believed at all that the earlier statement dated 1.6.1974 was not voluntary. 14. In the above circumstances, we are unable to sec any violation of principles of natural justice, and the decisions cited by learned Counsel for the appellant, like Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. D.K. Ratna ( AIR 1987 S.C. 71 ), Madras Metropolitan Development Authority v. The Special Tahsildar (1995) I.M.L.J. 664 = 1995 writ L.R. 10 = 1995-L.W. 31 S.N. and S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan ( AIR 1981 S.C. 136 ) to contend that if principle of natural justice is violated at the first stage, the right of appeal is not so much a true right of appeal or that the non observance of principles of natural justice itself is a prejudice to any man, have no application to the present case. In fact, as we have already stated, there is really no violation of principles of natural justice in the present case. Further in K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India ( AIR 1984 S.C. 273 @ 285) it has also been held that in order to sustain a complaint of violation of principles of natural justice, it has to be established that prejudice has been caused to the complainant. Further in Maneka Gandhi ( AIR 1978 S.C. 597 ) and in certain often Supreme Court cases, also it has been held that there may also be cases wherein nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording opportunity to a person for meeting the case. No doubt, learned counsel also sought to rely on Union of India v. Marcel Nevens (1978) II M.L.J. 122) on the aspect of degree of proof that is required for similar imposition of penalties under the abovesaid Act. But the said decision has no application to the present case. No doubt, learned counsel also sought to rely on Union of India v. Marcel Nevens (1978) II M.L.J. 122) on the aspect of degree of proof that is required for similar imposition of penalties under the abovesaid Act. But the said decision has no application to the present case. There was no confessional statement at all in the said case. In the present case, as already mentioned, there are two consecutive confessional statements. Further, the said learned counsel also sought to rely on S. Saleem Khan v. The Deputy Directorate, Enforcement Directorate, Madras and another (1985 (5) ECC 146). But the said decision turned on its own facts. In fact, the following observation found therein will only help the department: “We are of the view that so far as the retracted statements are concerned, though strictly there may not be any need for corroboration in law, it will all depend on the facts and circumstances in each case. When there is a retraction, we are put on caution in accepting such statements. Unless the circumstances clearly show that there is intrinsic truth in the statement itself, it would be advisable to need corroboration in such matters.” But, in the present case, the second confessional statement dated 22.6.1974 itself corroborates the previous confessional statement dated 1.6.1974. Thus, actually in the present case, it can be held that there are circumstances to show that there is intrinsic truth in the statement itself. The decision in Subramania Goundan v. State of Madras (1958) II M.L.J. 292) relied on by learned counsel for the appellant has also no application for the very same reason. 15. The Counsel for the appellant finally relied upon a decision in Nilratan Sircar v. Lakshmi Narayan Ram Niwas ( AIR 1965 S.C. 1 = 1965 M.L.J. (Crl.) Vol. IX page 411). The reading of the above referred judgment discloses that the adjudication proceedings arc not similar to criminal trial. Further, in as much as Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is a Special Act and it provides necessary safeguards to parties concerned, the parties are expected to follow the provisions of the said Act. Hence the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to such investigation by the authorities under the Act. Further, in as much as Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is a Special Act and it provides necessary safeguards to parties concerned, the parties are expected to follow the provisions of the said Act. Hence the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to such investigation by the authorities under the Act. Hence the contention of the learned Counsel on this aspect is also not acceptable and we are in agreement with the findings arrived at by the adjudicating officer as well as the Board. 16. Hence we are satisfied that the findings of both the authorities are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and there is no violation of natural justice as pleaded by the appellant. Consequently, the present appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.