Judgment :- Abdul Hadi, J. These two original side appeals arise out of the same order dated 10. 1996 in O. A. No.420 of 1996 in C.S. No.49 of 1995 on the file of this Court. O.S.A. No.258 of 1996 is by defendants 1 and 2 in the said suit and O.S.A. No.290 of 1996 is by the plaintiff in the said suit. The said suit is for partition of the suit properties. The plaintiff is the brother and defendants 1 and 2 are his sisters, all the three being the children of one R.M.Basha, who died on 210. 1993 and his wife Rahima, who died on 16. 1994. The applicant in the abovesaid O.A. No.420 of 1996, who is the 1st respondent in O.S.A. No.258 of 1996 and 3rd respondent in O.S.A. No.290 of 1996, is the first wife of the plaintiff and the said O.A. prayed for an order of appointment of Receiver in respect of the suit properties and the said application has been allowed by the impugned order dated 10. 1996, whose material portions run as follows: “...I consider it just and proper to appoint a receiver to take charge of all the properties that have been set out in the schedule to the plaint. The proposed party (applicant)... is appointed as Receiver initially for a period of six months. She is empowered to collect all the rents from all the tenants but she shall not let out or encumber any property except with the leave of this Court. She shall maintain accounts of the realisation and file accounts into court before 10th of every month in respect of the transactions of the preceding month. She shall be entitled to retain 25% of the rental collection, if that sum is less than Rs.10,000 for the purpose of her maintenance. The balance amount shall be deposited by her into court on or before 10th of each month.” The reasoning for coming to the abovesaid conclusion that it is “just and proper to appoint a Receiver” appears in the preceding paragraphs of the impugned order, thus: “Admitted the husband (plaintiff) of the proposed respondent (sic: proposed party) gave an undertaking before the Division Bench of this Court undertaking to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per month. It is now submitted that he (plaintiff) is not above to fulfil his commitment. 10,000 per month. It is now submitted that he (plaintiff) is not above to fulfil his commitment. He pleads inability to pay the maintenance on the ground that most of the properties are not in his possession. It is also alleged by him that the properties which had been purchased by his father in the name of mother, have been, after institution of this suit, settled in favour of his sisters (defendants 1 and 2) and they are receiving the rents. That settlement deed is said to have been executed during the pendency of this suit. The impression conveyed by the husband of the proposed respondent (sic: proposed party) is that he and his sisters (defendants 1 and 2) are acting together with a view to deprive the first wife of the plaintiff from receiving her rightful maintenance. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the appointment of receiver is not warranted on the facts of this case, as according to him, the properties are not wasted. It is clear from what has been stated above that the pleas now putforth are meant to shield the properties from the liability for maintenance which the plaintiff has to pay, and to shield the properties, by alleging that it is with the sisters, who in turn lay their claim on the strength of a settlement deed said to have been executed long after the plaintiff’s claim was brought to the court.” 2. In the light of the relevant features of the case and in the light of the argument we have heard from learned Counsel for the appellants in O.S.A. No.258 of 1996, learned counsel for the appellant in O.S.A. No.290 of 1996 and learned counsel for the said proposed party, we are unable to appreciate the abovesaid reasoning of the learned trial Judge for coming to the abovesaid conclusion that it is just and proper to appoint a Receiver to take charge of the suit properties. First of all, it must be noted that the said proposed party, the first wife of the plaintiff in the suit, is admittedly not entitled to any share in the suit properties. In the suit, the plaintiff no doubt prays for partition of his alleged 20-27th share in all items of suit properties. First of all, it must be noted that the said proposed party, the first wife of the plaintiff in the suit, is admittedly not entitled to any share in the suit properties. In the suit, the plaintiff no doubt prays for partition of his alleged 20-27th share in all items of suit properties. According to him, his sisters, defendants 1 and 2, in their common defence, claim exclusive ownership to certain items of the suit properties, while with reference to other properties, they together claim half share in them. At any rate, admittedly, the said proposed party does not claim any share in nay of the suit properties. 3. Secondly with reference to the abovesaid certain items of properties, in which defendants 1 and 2 claim exclusive ownership, it must be noted that they so claim under registered documents, which came into being long prior to the filing of the suit and not during the pendency of the suit as mentioned by the learned trial Judge. The said documents are: (1) sale deed dated 22. 1981, got by them from a third party in relation to one item of suit properties (2) two settlement deeds, both dated 23. 1991, executed by their father, the abovesaid R.M.Basha in their favour in relation to certain other items of suit properties and (4) four settlement deeds, all dated 3. 1994, executed by their mother, the abovesaid Rahima, in their favour in relation to certain other items of suit properties. Thus, these deeds in their favour have come into being even prior to the suit, and not during the pendency of the suit, as mentioned by the learned trial Judge. 4. Thirdly, in relation to the observation of the learned trial Judge that the plaintiff gave an undertaking before the Division Bench of this Court to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per month to his wife, the abovesaid proposed party, it is represented by the learned counsel for the abovesaid proposed party that the said undertaking was given before a Division Bench of this Court in O.S.A. No.92 of 1991, which was filed by the plaintiff herein and his wife, the proposed party herein, against the plaintiff’s parents and the said O.S.A. was filed against the order in Application No. 1418 of 1991 in O.P. No. 163 of 1990, relating to custody of the plaintiff’s two daughters who were then minors. The representation of the learned counsel for the proposed party that the abovesaid undertaking for payment of Rs. 10,000 as maintenance, was given in the said O.S.A. No.92 of 1991 and was recorded in order dated 112. 1991 therein. But, what we find in the said order dated 112. 1991, in relation to the abovesaid undertaking is only as follows: “The mother (the abovesaid proposed party) volunteered that she would live in a rented house, No.37, Karpaga Vinayagar Koil Street, Alandur, Madras-16, and the father (Plaintiff herein) agreed to pay a sum of Rs.10.000 per month by deposit in a Nationalised Bank, to his wife (mother of the children).... We are of the opinion that it is in the interests of the children that they are given to the custody of their mother (proposed party)... who shall live at No.37, Karpaga Vinayagar Koil Street, Alandur, Madras-16, along with the children, and take care that they are sent to a good school... and the father (Plaintiff herein) to pay a sum of Rs.10,000 each month, beginning from the month of December, 1991 (the first month deposit has already been made in the State Bank of Mysore, St.Thomas Mount Branch, Madras-16) until further orders in O.P. No.163 of 1990 ... Of the sum of Rs. 10,000 to be deposited in the name of Mrs.Shamsad Begum (proposed party) by her husband M.B.Buhari (Plaintiff herein) each month, Shamsad Begum shall appropriate only Rs.5,000 each month... She will not be entitled to appropriate any amount above Rs.5,000 without the previous order from the Court in O.P.No.163 of 1990.” [Italics supplied] In this regard, it must be first of all noted that the abovesaid order dated 112. 1991 only states that the plaintiff herein agreed to deposit a sum of Rs.10,000 every month “beginning from the month of December, 1991 until further orders in O.P.No. 163 of 1990.” The said O.P.No. 163 of 1990 was finally disposed of on 12. 1991 by a consent order. If that is so, normally, the said undertaking to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000 per month may not enure subsequent to the said date, unless the Court has passed any subsequent order therefor. Further, it must be noted that even as per what is recorded in the abovesaid order dated 112. 1991 by a consent order. If that is so, normally, the said undertaking to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000 per month may not enure subsequent to the said date, unless the Court has passed any subsequent order therefor. Further, it must be noted that even as per what is recorded in the abovesaid order dated 112. 1991, the abovesaid proposed party could only appropriate a sum of Rs.5,000 per month towards her maintenance and she cannot appropriate more than the said sum of Rs.5,000 without the previous order from the Court in O.P.No. 163 of 1990. In the light of above features, we are unable to appreciate the impugned order of the learned trial Judge purporting to base his order (appointing a receiver) on the footing of the abovesaid “undertaking to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per month.” 5. That apart, simply because of the abovesaid “undertaking” and his inability to fulfil the said undertaking, a Receiver cannot be appointed for all the suit properties, particularly in the light of the abovesaid rival contention in the suit between the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants 1 and 2 on the other hand and particularly when the abovesaid proposed party has admittedly no share in the suit properties and particularly in the light of the fact that there is no finding in the impugned order that there is any commission of waste of the abovesaid properties and particularly when there is no evidence that the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are trying to deprive the abovesaid proposed party from receiving her maintenance amount. Therefore, for the abovesaid reasons, we are unable to see any justification for appointment of a Receiver for the suit properties. 6. We may also point out the following significant observations in some decided cases in this connection. In Muniammal v. Ranganatha Nayagar, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 571 the observation is as follows: “The principles which should guide Indian Courts in the appointment of a Receiver are three in number. First of all, a plaintiff applying for the appointment of a Receiver must show prima facie that he has a strong case and good title to the property or a special equity in his favour and that the property in the hands of the defendant is in danger of being wanted Muhammed Qasim Ravather v. Nagaraja Moopanar, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. First of all, a plaintiff applying for the appointment of a Receiver must show prima facie that he has a strong case and good title to the property or a special equity in his favour and that the property in the hands of the defendant is in danger of being wanted Muhammed Qasim Ravather v. Nagaraja Moopanar, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 813 at p.814” Further in State Bank of India v. Jayashree Ceramics Pvt. Ltd, A.I.R. 1987 Cal. 194 (DB) it has been held that even though the agreement for credit facilities provides for the appointment of a receiver, yet if there is no material showing that the securities are in imminent danger of being wasted or disposed of etc., it is not convenient to appoint a receiver. It has also been held in Kunhan Menon v. Kannan Menon, A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 482 (DB) that there must be some substantial ground for interfering with existing rights of possession, for the appointment of a Receiver in a suit and that the fact that no harm would be done by such appointment is not a sufficient ground, especially where there is no danger of waste. 7. It is indeed strange that in this case a proposed party to the suit, seeking appointment of Receiver for the various suit properties, in which she has no share at all, gets herself appointed so. As already pointed out, even the above referred to undertaking would enure only until further orders in the abovesaid O.P.No.163 of 1990, which actually ended in a consent order on 12. 1991 itself. In fact, it should also be noted that even though the said learned Counsel for the proposed party submits that even beyond 12. 1991, the plaintiff was paying maintenance at the rate of Rs.10,000 per month, there is no such allegation either in her affidavit in support of her receiver petition or in any of her other affidavits. All that she vaguely purports to say is that form about 1995, maintenance has not been paid to her. In the light of all these features, the impugned order has to be set aside. 8. All that she vaguely purports to say is that form about 1995, maintenance has not been paid to her. In the light of all these features, the impugned order has to be set aside. 8. However, we find that as per the statement given by defendants 1 and 2 a sum of Rs.7,650 is received by way of rent from those suit properties, which are, as per the claim of both the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants 1 and 2 on the other hand, common properties belonging to both the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2. Whileso, we feel that it would be proper if some direction is given for the abovesaid proposed party getting at least a portion of the said rents as for her maintenance, since it is also said that not only her maintenance has to be taken care of, but also the maintenance of one of her above referred to two daughters, who still remain a minor, aged about 17 or so. It is also said that she has also one more minor child. In the above circumstances, the plaintiff himself has come forward to pay a sum of Rs.3,500 every month at least from now, towards the maintenance of the abovesaid proposed party and her children. Learned counsel for the plaintiff represented before us that the plaintiff would be paying the said sum of Rs.3,500 to the abovesaid proposed party every month. In the circumstances, we direct the plaintiff to do so beginning from the month of December. 1996. The said monthly sum shall be paid every month beginning from the month of December, 1996. The amount payable for the month of December shall be paid on or before 20th December and accordingly, thereafter also, it shall be paid every month. 9. With the above direction, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeals. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P.Nos.14572 and 16688 of 1996 are dismissed.