PALOK BASU, J. Ashok Kumar Jaiswal, petitioner has filed this writ petition (24893 of 1996) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying the following reliefs: 1. Writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 26-6-1996 and 27-6-1996 (Annexures land 2 ). 2. Writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to compel the petitioner for registration under the provisions contained in the U. P. Transit of Timber and other Forest Produce Rules, 1978 (In short rules) 2. When this writ petition was filed on 6-8-19% a counter affidavit was called. That having been filed a rejoinder affidavit has also been filed. 3. The other writ petition (24894 of 1996) is filed by Rajendra Kumar Agrahari with identical prayers. The distinction in the facts of the two writ petitions is that while Ashok Kumar Jaiswal claims to be having a mining lease for excavating sand in the State of Madhya Pradesh, the other petitioner Rajendra Kumar Agrahari claims to be haying a mining lease for excavating stone chips there. In this case also affidavits have been exchanged. As prayed by the learned counsel for the parties, these two petitions are being disposed of finally at the admission stage. 4. Before adverting to the relevant facts in these two petitions it may be noticed that the Indian Forest Act (in short, the Act) has been in force since the year 1927 and it applies to the State of Uttar Pradesh by virtue of notifications made by the Government of India under Section 1 (8 ). Section 2 of the Act defines various words used in the enactment and Sub-section (4) thereof defines "forest produce". Section 2 of the Act defines various words used in the enactment and Sub-section (4) thereof defines "forest produce". For ready reference Sub-section (4) is quoted here: " (4) "forest produce" includes: - (a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say - timber, charcoal caoutchoue, catechu, wood-oil, resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds, kuth and myrabolams, and (b) the following when found in, or brought from, a forest, that is to say: (i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, a dati other parts of produce not hearinbefore mentioned, of trees, (ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and cross), and all parts of produce of such plants, (iii) wild animals any skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey, and wax, and all other parts or produce of animals, and (v) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals including lime-stone, lateril mineral oils, and all products of mines or quarries)". 5. For the controversy in the instant case the language used in clause (b) sub-clause (iv) is relevant. As is obvious from the definition "forest produce" includes minerals and all products of mines or quarries. It has not been disputed, nor can it possibly be that stone chips ad well as sand (morrum) are product of quarries and are obviously Minerals within the meaning of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1967 under which the State of U. P. has framed Minor Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1963. 6. It may further be relevant to point out here that in the State of Madhya Pradesh also there are Minor Minerals Rules which have been referred to during the course of arguments as Madhya Pradesh Village Minning Rules, 1961 and winning Riyayat Rules, 1960. 7. In the State of Uttar Pradesh certain rules were promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred on the State by Sections 41,42,51 and 76 of the Act. These rules are called "u. P. Transit of Timber & Other Forest Produce Rules, 1978 (in short, Transit Rules ). It has been published in the Extraordinary Gazette dated 27-9-1978 and is in force since then. Rule 3 of the Transit Rules reads as under: "3. These rules are called "u. P. Transit of Timber & Other Forest Produce Rules, 1978 (in short, Transit Rules ). It has been published in the Extraordinary Gazette dated 27-9-1978 and is in force since then. Rule 3 of the Transit Rules reads as under: "3. Regulation of transit of forest produce by mean of passes: No forest produce shall be moved into or from or within the State of Uttar Pradesh except as hereinafter provided, without a transit pass in the form in Schedule A to these rules, an officer of the Forest Department or a person duly authorised by or under these rules to issue such pass or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of such pass or by any route or to only destination other than the route or destination specified in such pass: Provided that no transit pass shall be required for the removal - (a) of any forest produce which is being removed for bona fide consumption by any person in exercise of a privilege granted in this behalf by the State Govt. or of a right recoginsed under this Act, within the limits of a village in which it is produced; (b) of forest produce by contractors, agency from the forests managed by the Forest Department, in which case the movement shall be regulated by the relevant conditions of sale and terms of the corresponding agreement-deed executed by the buyer; (c) of such forest produce as may be exempted by the State Government from the operation of these rules by notification in the official Gazette. " 8. A perusal of the aforesaid rule makes it clear that there is an absolute prohibition brought about by the aforesaid rules concerning movement or import into the State of Uttar Pradesh of all forest produce which can be done only after obtaining transit pass. How the transit pass may be obtainable has been described in other provisions of the Transit Rules. 9. In short the question in these two writ petitions is whether the petitioners who allege themselves to be holding lease hold rights in the State of Madhya Pradesh can be asked to obtain registration under the Transit Rules in the State of Uttar Pradesh for importing forest produce i. e. sand (morrum), so far as petitioner Ashok Kumar Jaiswal is concerned and stone chips, so far as petitioner Rajendra Kumar Agrahari is concerned. 10. 10. Shri Bhagwati Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued the matters with great tenacity and Shri Nurul Huda has been heard in opposition. As stated above, the only question to be decided is whether the two others by which the petitioners have been asked to comply with the registration requirement under the Transit Rules has to be followed or not ? Shri Ashok Kumar Jaiswal has been asked by the letter dated 25-6-1996 issued by the office of the Conservator of Forest, Varanasi Range-II, Ram Nagar, Varanasi calling upto him to forthwith obtain registration in accordance with the provisions of the Transit Rules and was asked to deposit Rs. 100/-as the registration fees. By the letter dated 26-6-1996 (Annexure No. 2) the petitioner was granted a temporary registration for a period of fifteen days in anticipation of the petitioners obtaining a valid registration within the time allowed. Likewise the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Agrahari has also been asked to do and comply with similar requirements but the date of the letter are different though annexures numbers are same. 11. It was vehemently argued by Shri Bhagwati Prasad Singh that only one point emerges for determination and i. e. that since the petitioners have obtained lease in the State of Madhya Pradesh for excavating sand and stone chips respectively, those areas are not included in the forest and therefore, produce from those quarries cannot be termed as forest produce. The argument proceeds that such type of minerals may be found in forest areas as well as in areas which are not covered within the term forest area. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be said to be taking anything from the forest area because the lease deed, a copy of which has been filed in the writ petition, does not indicate that the petitioners are excavating for those minerals anything within the forest area of Madhya Pradesh. It is, therefore, contended strongly that the petitioners cannot be saddled with the responsibility of getting themselves registered under the Transit Rules. It may be mentioned that simultaneously it was sought to be argued that the forest authorities would be insisting upon clearance from the Income Tax Department. Sales Tax Department etc. once the registration was applied for. 12. It is, therefore, contended strongly that the petitioners cannot be saddled with the responsibility of getting themselves registered under the Transit Rules. It may be mentioned that simultaneously it was sought to be argued that the forest authorities would be insisting upon clearance from the Income Tax Department. Sales Tax Department etc. once the registration was applied for. 12. On the opposition side it was argued that once the produce itself, as it is, is included within the meaning of the word forest produce as noted above in the definition 2 (4) of the Act, its import or export by the persons who want to import and export forest produce is permissible only after they obtain registration within the Transit Rules as it is impossible to carve out a distinction regarding the produce being excavated from forest area and being excavated from non-forest area. It is, therefore, contended by Shri Nurul Huda that the petitioners must apply for registration and for that reason alone temporary registration has been made available to the petitioners. 13. It may be mentioned here that attention of the Court was drawn to annexure No. 5 which purports to be a certificate dated 17-7-1996 from Block Development Officer, Block Perhan, District Sidhi that Ashok Kumar Jaiswal is having contract of excavation over plot No. 557 which is not included in forest area. 14. To Judge the aforesaid arguments one cannot be oblivious of the practical aspects of the Transit Rules having been framed, keeping in view the broader background envisaged by Article 48-A and 51-A of the Constitution of India. While it is true that these amendment in the Constitution have been brought about later but the objectives sought to be achieved by the Transit Rules are well within the objectives sought to be achieved by these constitutional additions. In these days of high rate of environmental pollution, an admitted forest produce cannot be segregated physically as a forest produce as well as non-forest produce at the same time, and, in that event it would become impossible to apply the Transit Rules. It may then be that one contractor who has a right of excavation in one non- forest area need not necessarily be taken to be always importing or exporting sand/morrum which may be taken out of forest area. It may then be that one contractor who has a right of excavation in one non- forest area need not necessarily be taken to be always importing or exporting sand/morrum which may be taken out of forest area. There is no machinery or basis known which will prompt one to decipher sand excavated out of forest area and sand excavated from the non-forest area. Physical aspects and the quality of both shall always be identical. 15. Under the circumstances, the Transit Rules have safeguarded that anyone who deals with forest produce will obviously have to be registered so that clandestine business by some one who may opt not to follow the law is prevented. The Transit Rules, therefore, postulates in planned manner preventive measures by requiring compulsory registration. Moreover, these rules cannot be interpreted in one way while dealing with sand or stone-chips and in another for wood and timber. There is thus a well chalked out scheme in the framing of the Transit Rules and under no circumstances it breaches any of the rights of the respectable citizens. 16. It was argued by Shri Singh that the petitioners have personal right to export and impor sand and stone chips because of the rights they gather from the lease-deeds executed in their favour by the concerned State. That may be so. There is no quarrel with the right of the petitioners which the petitioners are enjoying because of the lease hold rights of excavation. On holding of lease right to excavate in Madhya Pradesh does not entitle them to bye-pass the provisions applicable in Uttar Pradesh through the Transit Rules. The rule is within the powers to indicate regulatory measures for permitting produce or articles to come into the State after obtaining registration under the Transit Rules. 17. On holding of lease right to excavate in Madhya Pradesh does not entitle them to bye-pass the provisions applicable in Uttar Pradesh through the Transit Rules. The rule is within the powers to indicate regulatory measures for permitting produce or articles to come into the State after obtaining registration under the Transit Rules. 17. In the State of U. P. v. District Judge, Bijnor reported in AIR 1981 Allahabad 205 fish was held to be a forest produce and it was further held therein by Honble K. M. Singh, J. (as His Lordship then was) that: "if the definition of "forest produce" as contained in Section 2 (4) of the Act is considered, bearing in mind the provisions of Section 26 (1) (i) of the Act, the legislative intent would be clear that no person can carry on fishing within the reserved area unless the same is permitted by the Forest Settlement Officer or by the State Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act. If fish is not a forest produce, no restrictions could be placed by Section 26 on fishing rights within the reserved forest. Ordinarily fish is a natural produce of pond, water channel, lake or river situate within the forest, it has to be treated as forest produce for the purposes of the Act otherwise the State Government will have no right to prohibit fishing in a pond, lake, water channel or river situate within a reserved forest. Fish is, therefore, a forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 12 of the Act and as such the Forest Settlement Officer has jurisdiction to grant fishing right in favour of the fishermen. " 18. In Yeshwant Menu Dadamani and others, 1962 (1) Cr. LJ 832 a Division Bench of Mysore High Court held that: "surface soil removed from private malki land is not "forest produce" within the meaning of Section 2 (4) of the Forest Act and therefore licence was not necessary under Rule 66 of Bombay Rules for its transit through forest area. Hence conviction and sentence of accused for contravention of these rules was set aside. " 19. It may be mentioned here that in the cited case the evidence was gone into and the High Court did not place reliance on the evidence produced. The finding recorded was: " We are. Hence conviction and sentence of accused for contravention of these rules was set aside. " 19. It may be mentioned here that in the cited case the evidence was gone into and the High Court did not place reliance on the evidence produced. The finding recorded was: " We are. therefore, of the opinion that there is no clear or firm basis for holding either that these accused by themselves or in the company of several others constituted themselves into an unlawful assembly or that they were acting with any common object which was unlawful. . . . . . . . . . . . . . They can, therefore, be held to be guilty only of a technical offence of theft and nothing more. " 20. In Kasi Prasad Sahu v. State of Orissa and another reported in AIR 1963 Orissa 24 a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has held that: "the definition of: forest produce in Section 2 (4) (a) and Section 43 read with Section 41 would by necessary implication show that in Section 41 also forest produce includes not only forest produce grown on or collected from the property of Government, but also that grown on or collected from the property of private individual. " 21. Honble Narasimham, C. J. , presiding over the Division Bench further held that: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . There are many Sections specially those in Chapter VII which confer regulatory power on Government to control movement of forest produce even though the produce may not be the property of the Government. It is well known that Government may exercise regulatory power over movement of property even though property may not belong to the Government. " 22. It may be mentioned here that the last case i. e. Kasi Prasad is in line with the arguments raised on behalf of the State counsel in the instant writ petitions. 23. Before concluding, two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court may be usefully referred to may be the points arising in those two decisions were though different. 24. In T. P. Balakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 236, it has been held that Timber Transit Rules, 1968 as framed in Tamil Nadu did not create any prohibitory provision but contained only regulatory measure. 24. In T. P. Balakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 236, it has been held that Timber Transit Rules, 1968 as framed in Tamil Nadu did not create any prohibitory provision but contained only regulatory measure. 25. To use the exact word of Honble Supreme Court : "even otherwise a bare reading of Sections 35 and 36 make it clear that there is ample authority with the State Government to make rules imposing regulatory measures on the movement of timber within the State. " 26. Incidentally. in the aforesaid case the Tamil Nadu High Court did go into the question of difficulty created in the Governments way in preventing illicit felling of trees. The Honble Supreme Court has, therefore, in this decision, approved the finding of the High Court. Consequently, this Court can do nothing better than to reproduce that authority of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court wherein the observation of the High Court has found approval. It has been observed that: "the High Court further found that the impugned Rules were only regulatory and did not in any manner infract the right of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The High Court rejected the argument on the following reasoning. "when the rules as framed are intended to subserve the aims of the Act which was meant to consolidate the law relating to the forest produce, the transit thereof and the duty leviable thereon; and hence those rules were meant to effectuate the same or all of these objects: Having noticed the uphill task faced by the Government in preventing illicit felling of trees over large extents with limited manpower, and checking at check-posts at forest frontiers having been found to be insufficient, ineffective and being no match to the swift manner in which they are carried away by lorries ; and on raids conducted in places like Mettupllayam, Tambaram and elsewhere large stocks of illicit timber having been found in saw mills and with dealers, the impugned rules, which insist on a From II pass to accompany during every movement of timber, and hammer mark being affixed on the transported timber, are absolutely necessary for the protection and management of forest wealth in the State of Tamil Nadu. Hence, the impugned rules are not violative of Article 19 (1) (g) Having found that the rules were regulatory and not prohibitive, the High Court also rejected the argument based on Article 301-304 of the Constitution of India. So far as the enhancement of fee is concerned, the High Court examined the scheme and operation of the rules and came to the conclusion that the State Government was providing sufficient services to the timber merchants at every check-point and as such the principle of guid pre quo was satisfied. " 27. It may be mentioned here that what holds good for illegal felling of trees, also holds good for illegal transporting of minor minerals excavated through permit or clandestinely. In order to stop the clandestine and illegal transporting of minor minerals such regulatory measures are imperative. 28. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Korrapati Subrahmanvam and others reported in AIR 1995 SC 961 the controversy arose as to what was should mean forest produce in transit. The Supreme Court was considering the penal provisions in the A. P. Forest Act and A. P. Sandalwood and Red-sanders Wood Transit Rules. In this connection it was held that: "rule 2 (3) of the Rules provides that: "forest produce in transit" includes forest found stored in any place or in the margin of any public road or cart tract or footpath whether or not loaded in carts or other vehicles and forest produce found in any river, canal or water course whether in rafts or not. " The definition clearly states that a forest produce found stored in any place or in the margin of any public road or a cart track or footpath whether or not loaded in cart or other vehicle is a forest produce in transit. The distinction, preparation or completion of the act of forest offence bears no relevance. The prohibition contained in Rule 3, namely, that no forest produce shall be moved into or from or within the State by land or water, unless such produce is accompanied by a permit therefor, issued under Rule 5 and produced for check immediately on demand is a contravention under Section 20 read with Section 29 of the Act which is a forest offence. Therefore, the High Court was not right in holding that it is not in transit and that, therefore, the offences under Rule 3 read with Sections 20 and 29 of the Act have not been made out. Accordingly, we hold that the loading of 18 logs of red-sandal wood and storage of 118 red-sander wood on the road margin for loading into the lorry, but for the interception, would be forest produce in transit within the meaning of Rule 3 (2) of the Rules. Admittedly, no permit was issued by the competent authority for transit of the red-sanders wood seized from the lorry owner and persons were found in possession at the time of loading. Thereby the offence under Rule 3 read with sections 20 and 29 of the Act was rightly found by the Court below. " 29. It maybe stated here that one of the grounds taken in the writ petition is that the respondents are not entitled to levy registration fee or transit fee on the transportation of forest produce. The argument is fallacious. In order to give effect to the regulatory measures many services have to be rendered by the State Government including establishment of Check Posts, employing officials and also making other arrangements for facilitating the transporting of the produce itself from one check post to inside Uttar Pradesh. Consequently it cannot be said that no service is rendered in exchange of the fees that may be collected by the State. 30. It was contended during the course of argument that the petitioner was wrongly asked to pay Rs. 50/-per truck as levy and to which effect averments exist in paragraph 5 of the writ petition. It may be mentioned here that in the objections being raised that the petitioner cannot import-export forest produce in and from the State of U. P. without registration, a temporary registration was granted to the petitioners. Consequently in view of the Rules the petitioners have paid the aforesaid fee. It may further be mentioned that having already held that such regulatory measures can be taken by the Government through the Transit Rules, enough support can be found from the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Ashok Kumar Dinesh Chandra and another reported in JT 1996 (7) SC 545. It may further be mentioned that having already held that such regulatory measures can be taken by the Government through the Transit Rules, enough support can be found from the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Ashok Kumar Dinesh Chandra and another reported in JT 1996 (7) SC 545. In that decision their Lordships \quoted their earlier decision in M. C. D. and others v. Mohd. Yasin and another, 1983 (3) SCC 229 at 235. The following observation has been quoted with approval: ". . . . . . . . . . . Though a fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. Further neither the incidence of the fee nor the service rendered need be uniform. That others besides those paying the fees are also benefited does not detract from the character of the fee. In fact, the special benefit or advantage to the payers of the fees may ever be secondary as compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Nor is the court to assume the role of a cost accountant. It is neither necessary nor expedient to weigh too meticulously the cost of the services rendered etc. against the amount of fees collected so as to evenly balance the two. A broad co-relationship is all that is a necessary quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the one and only true under of a fee nor is it necessarily absent in a tax. " Likewise reliance was also placed on the decision of City Corporation of Calicut v. Thachamabalath Sadalinan and others reported in 1985 (2) SCR 1008 - Their lordships quoted with approval the following observation : "it is thus well settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee. " 31. In view of the latest pronouncements of their Lordships of Honble Supreme Court, the demand of Rs. 50/-as fee cannot be said to be illegal and is rightly charged by the respondents which is permissible under the Transit Rules. 32. Before concluding it may be mentioned that in one Writ Petition No. 13462 of 1992 Virendra Singh v. D. F. O. and others), similar questions have been raised in which an interim order has been passed by a learned Single Judge on 30-4-1992 which is still operating. Learned Standing Counsel informed the Court that there are several other writ petition of the nature pending in this Court which can be covered by this decision. 33. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Registrar to immediately bunch out those cases and list them appropriately as early as possible for disposal. 34. In view of what has been stated above both these writ petitions lack merit and are dismissed. Petition dismissed. .