M. C. AGRAWAL, J. By these two peti tions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners who have set industries in the hill regions of the Stale of U. P. , went the U. P. State Electricity Board and the State of U. P. to comply with the directions and assurances given in a Government Order dated 16th January, 1984. By the said letter No. 11340-AC-40/181 the Joint Secretary to the Govern ment of U. P. informed the Director of In dustries, U. P. of the decisions taken by the Government for the development of in dustries in the hill regions. The letter, inter alia, states that in respect of industries in stalled at a height of more than 2000 feet having a contract load up to 250 KVA will allowed fifty per cent development rebate for five years from the date of the grant of the connection and further such industries will be exempted from the minimum char ges for a period of two years. A copy of this letter was endorsed to the Secretary to the U. P. State Electricity Board. 2. Since both the petitions involve common points for determination, we state the facts and contentions raised in Writ Peti tion No. 3428 of 1990 first. 3. The petitioners case is that it set up a factory at Tehri Tapoban, Muni Ki Roti in district Garhwal and started manufacturing steel, rounds and plates in August, 1985. An electric connection was granted to the petitioner on its application made in the year 1985. The Government had issued the aforesaid order dated 16th January, 1984, and, therefore, the petitioner claimed that it be allowed fifty per cent development rebate instead of 33. 5% granted by the respondent No. 4 before whom the petitioner even placed a copy of the said Government Order. The Executive En gineer, respondent No. 4, however, refused to grant rebate to the extent of fifty per cent and also the exemption from minimum charges. The petitioner also approached the General Manager, Industries Department, lehri Garhwal, and also sent a notice dated 22nd November, 1986, to the Director of Industries, Kanpur and to the Chairman, U. P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow, but to no effect. The petitioner also approached the General Manager, Industries Department, lehri Garhwal, and also sent a notice dated 22nd November, 1986, to the Director of Industries, Kanpur and to the Chairman, U. P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow, but to no effect. It is alleged that the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh are backward and the said Government Order was issued for promot ing industrial development of the area and that the petitioner set up its industry only on coming to know of the said Government Order. The petitioner had filed a Writ Peti tion No. 2970 of 1987 in this Court which was disposed of vide order dated 18th August, 1987, directing the respondent No. 2 to decide the petitioners representation. A copy of the said order passed by this Court has been reproduced in para 18 of the writ petition which states that if the Govern ment Order is withdrawn, the petitioner will not get the benefit of the same. The Addi tional Director of Industries is alleged to have informed the petitioner by letter dated 17th October, 1987, that the said Govern ment Order dated 16th January, 1984, has not been withdrawn. The respondents did not decide the petitioners representation and the petitioner again filed a Writ Petition No. 7924 of 1988 which was disposed of on 2nd March, 1989. The Court found that the representation made by the petitioner did not give any details and it, therefore, directed the petitioner to make a fresh rep resentation and directed the respondent No. 3, namely, the Chairman, U. P. State Electricity Board, to decide the same. The petitioners representation is said to have been rejected by an order, a copy of which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure "13". The Chairman of the Board took the stand that the letter dated 16th January, 1984, issued by the Government was not a direction to the Board within the meaning of Section 78-A of the Act and that the Board has not given any benefit in ac cordance with the said letter to any con sumer in the hill areas. The Chairman of the Board took the stand that the letter dated 16th January, 1984, issued by the Government was not a direction to the Board within the meaning of Section 78-A of the Act and that the Board has not given any benefit in ac cordance with the said letter to any con sumer in the hill areas. It is, thereafter, that the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to implement the Government letter dated 16th January, 1984, and also to refund the excess charges that the respon dents have already collected from the petitioner in respect of old bills. 4. By an interim order dated 14th February, 1990, this Court made an interim order directing the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to give rebate to the extent of fifty per cent in the bills which maybe sent tor the electricity consumption by it hereafter. It was clarified that in the event of the failure of the peti tion, the petitioner shall make good the deficiency within the time to be specified by the Court while disposing of the writ peti tion. 5. In the counter-affidavit filed on be half of respondent Nos. 3 and 4, that is, the U. P. State Electricity Board and its Execu tive Engineer himself, it has been state that the power connection was sanctioned to the petitioner vide order dated 19th November, 1984, and the concession was released in 1985, after an agreement dated 27th June, 1985, was duly executed between the parties. It is averred that the Government Order dated 16th January, 1984, is not binding on the Board and the petitioner cannot claim any benefit on its basis. It is alleged that the said letter has been issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the Director of Industries, U. P. while the Board is a body corporate con stituted under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and is empowered to frame and revise the tariff under Section 5 of the said Act. It has been alleged that accord ing to the prevailing tariff, industries like the petitioner are being allowed develop ment rebate at the rate of 33-1/3% on the amount of the bill as incentive to the new industries for a period of five years from the date of commencement of the supply. It has been alleged that accord ing to the prevailing tariff, industries like the petitioner are being allowed develop ment rebate at the rate of 33-1/3% on the amount of the bill as incentive to the new industries for a period of five years from the date of commencement of the supply. It is claimed that the petitioner is entitled to rebate and other reliefs, if any only in ac cordance with the traiff framed by the Board and not in accordance with the said Govern ment Order which is not binding on the Board. It is also alleged that there was no consultation by the department of In dustries with the Board before issuing the said Government Order dated 16th January, 1984. It is also claimed that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 6. Almost similar are the averments by the parties in Writ Petition No. 6920 of 1990 in which M/s. Sanjay Industries is that petitioner. It has established a factory for manufacturing leaf springs and binding wire at Dhalwala, P. O. Muni Ki Reti, in the dis trict of Tehri Garhwal. It started running its unit on 30th December, 1988, on the grant of 0. 50 H. P. power connection which was, subsequently, enhanced to 100 H. P. It also claimed relief in accordance with the said G. O. dated 16th January, 1984. 7. The averments made in the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondent No. 4 are similar to those already stated. In this writ petition, the State of U. P. has also filed a counter-affidavit and its reply to the various averments made in the writ petition is merely that they need no comments. What is important to notice is that the State of U. P. does not dispute that it issued the directions, as contained in the aforesaid letter dated 16th January, 1984. 8. We have heard Sri Yatindra Singh representing the petitioners in both the cases and Sri S. C. Budhwar, Senior Advo cate, assisted by Sri Sudhir Agarwal, Advo cate who represented the U. P. State Electricity Board and its authorities in both the writ petitions, and Sri Sabhajeet Yadav, the learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh. 9. 8. We have heard Sri Yatindra Singh representing the petitioners in both the cases and Sri S. C. Budhwar, Senior Advo cate, assisted by Sri Sudhir Agarwal, Advo cate who represented the U. P. State Electricity Board and its authorities in both the writ petitions, and Sri Sabhajeet Yadav, the learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh. 9. The first question that arises is about the effect of Section 78-A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 which authorises the State Government to issue directions on questions of policy to the Board. The said section reads as under: "78-A.- Direction by the State Govern ment.- (1) In the discharge of its functions, the Board shall be guided by such directions on ques tions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government. (2) If any dispute arises between the Board and the State Government as to whether a ques tion is or is not a question of policy, it shall be referred to the Authority whose decision thereon shall be final. " 10. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the directions issued by the State Government in the letter dated 16th January, 1984, are directions on matters of policy that are binding on the respondent Board. On the other hand, Sri. S. C. Budhwar contended that the directions are only for the guidance of the Board and the Board is not bound to comply with the direc tions. 11. It was emphasised on behalf of the respondents that the Board is a statutory Authority independent of the State Govern ment and, therefore, the Board can take only such light from the guidance contained in the directions, as it may deem fit in its own wisdom. 12. In order to determine whether the directions are binding, we have to look to the nature of the Board constituted under the Act. No doubt, it is a statutory Corpora tion having its own legal entity. Yet the various provisions contained in the Act show that it is nothing, but a child of the State Government on whom the State retains effective control in spite of it being a Corporation having its own legal existence. The management of the Board is vested in a Board constituted by the members and a j Chairman. Yet the various provisions contained in the Act show that it is nothing, but a child of the State Government on whom the State retains effective control in spite of it being a Corporation having its own legal existence. The management of the Board is vested in a Board constituted by the members and a j Chairman. Under sub-section (2) of Section 5, the members are appointed by the State Government, the State Government ap points one of them to be the Chairman of the Board [see Section 5 (5) of the Act]. Section 10 gives power to the State Govern ment to suspend or remove from office any member of the Board. The Board has the power to appoint its Secretary, but such appointment is subject to the approval of the State Government. The assets and liabilities of the Board on its constitution come from the State Government by virtue of Section 60 of the Act. Under Section 63, the State Government cannot subventions, that is, State help or grant to the Board on such terms and conditions, as the State, Government may determine. The Boards power to borrow money is subject to the previous sanction from the State Govern ment and the State Government can stand guarantee for the loans raised by it by virtue of Section 66 of the Act. 13. Under Section 78, the State Government has the power to make rules, particularly in respect of various matters detailed in sub-section (2) relating to the functioning of the Board. Section 79 authorises the Board to make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the Rules made thereunder on matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (k) and the proviso the Sec tion 79 States that the regulations in clauses (a), (d) and (jj) shall be made only with the previous approval of the State Government. Section 78-A is sandwiched between Sec tions 78 and 79. The aforesaid provisions clearly show that in spite of a statutory identity having been conferred on the Board, it has not been given the independence of functioning as an entity independent of the State Govern ment. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of Sri S. C. Budhwar that the directions referred to in Section 78-A are merely words of guidance which the Board may or may not act upon. 14. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of Sri S. C. Budhwar that the directions referred to in Section 78-A are merely words of guidance which the Board may or may not act upon. 14. The effect of the directions came up for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in M/s. Real Food Products Ltd. and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and others, A. I. R. 1995 S. C. 2234 in which it was stated as under: "section 78-A uses the expression" the Board shall be guided by such directions on ques-ions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government. " It does appearing that the view expressed by the State Government on a question of policy is in the nature of a direction to be followed by the Board in the area of the policy to which it relates. In the context of the function of the Board of fixing the tariffs in accordance with Section 49 read with Section 59 and other provisions of the Act, the Board is to be guided by my such directions of the State Government. Where the direction of the State Government as in the present case, was to fix a concessional tariff for agricultural pump sets at a flat rate per H. P. , it does relate to a question of policy which the Board must follow. " (emphasis supplied) The apex Court has thus held that a direction about concessional tariff in respect of a certain segament of consumers is a matter of policy and also that it is bind ing on the Board. 15. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that by virtue of Section 50 of the Act which says that the Board shall carry on its operations and adjust its tariffs so as to ensure that the total revenues in any year of account shall after meeting all expenses properly chargeable to revenues. . . . . . . . . . leave such surplus as is not less than three per cent. . . . . . . . . . of the value of fixed assets of the Board in service at the beginning of such year. . . . . . . . . . leave such surplus as is not less than three per cent. . . . . . . . . . of the value of fixed assets of the Board in service at the beginning of such year. The Board is obliged to fix its tariffs in accordance with Section 59, and, therefore, it can ignore a direction that may lead to a surplus of less than three per cent. Such a contention is not acceptable in the face of the judgment of the Supreme Court, referred to above, Further, there is no pleading or proof whatsoever that the direc tion contained in the aforesaid Government letter dated 16th January, 1984, would cause such strain on the revenues of the Board that the surplus would be reduced to less than three per cent. Further, under Section 63, the State Government can made sub ventions to the Board and if for complying with any direction of the State Government, the Board is put to any financial loss, it has a legitimate claim to ask for sub-ventions under Section 63 of the Act. 16. In M/s Hindustan Zink Ltd. v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and others, AIR 1991 SC 1473 , While referring to the Governments duly to place the financial statements of the Electricity Board on the table of the House or the Houses of the State Legislature, the Honble Supreme Court observed that the Board is bound to take into consideration any comments on the said statement in the State Legislature. This also gives an idea about the binding character of the directions issued by the Government. 17. In Rajeshwar Singh and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1983 Pat 194 , it has been held that the directions issued by the State Government regarding supply of energy to small industries at a concessional rate is binding on the Electricity Board. 18. The Andhra Pradesh High Court also took the same view in Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Andhra Pradesh Carbides Limited, AIR 1985 AP 283 . It was held that the State Government can in terms of Section 78-A of the Act given direc tions to the State Electricity Board regard ing tariff rates at which the Board should make available the supply of electricity to any industry. 19. This Court also in Ram Hari Agrawalv. It was held that the State Government can in terms of Section 78-A of the Act given direc tions to the State Electricity Board regard ing tariff rates at which the Board should make available the supply of electricity to any industry. 19. This Court also in Ram Hari Agrawalv. State of U. P. and others, (1975) (1) ILR All 173 held that a diretion issued by the Government about absorption of the staff of the State Electricity department on deputation with the Electricity Board was binding on the Board in terms of Section 78-A of the Act. 20. In Sarvodaya Ispat Pvt. Ltd. v. U. P. State Electricity Board and others, 1993 (1) CRC 658 also, a similar view was taken. 21. For the above reasons, we held that any direction issued by the State Govern ment on a matter of policy is binding on the Board by virtue of Section 78-A of the Act. 22. The next question that arises is whether the order dated 16th January, 1984, is a direction on a matter of policy. Grant of concessional tariff to a certain type of con sumers can be nothing but a matter of policy and this was so held by the apex Court in the case of Mis Real Food Products Ltd. and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and others (Supra ). Therefore, this part of the controversy is not open to any further argument. 23. As regards the nature of direction, it was contended on behalf of the respon dents that the letter dated 16th January, 1984, is not addressed to the Board and is addressed to the Director of Industries though copies thereof had been endorsed to the Secretary of the State Electricity Board for information and necessary action. The letter states at the Governments decision on the subject the certain concessions, in cluding a rebate of fifty per cent in the tariff would be granted to industries set up in all areas above 2500 feet. This decision was communicated to the concerned depart ment for information and necessary action which means that it is a clear direction and it cannot be said that the decision was com municated to the Board only for its informa tion. This decision was communicated to the concerned depart ment for information and necessary action which means that it is a clear direction and it cannot be said that the decision was com municated to the Board only for its informa tion. There is no prescribed form for the issue of a direction and a communication in the maner in which the letter dated 16th January, 1984, has been issued amounts, in our view, to a sufficient direction in terms of Section 78-A of the Act. 24. The contention of the respondents, however, has been that the Electricity Board fixed its tariff keeping in view Sections 49 and 59 of the Act and that the petitioners entered into specific agreements with it to receive supply of energy at the rates specified in the tariff in which the Board had made a provision of 33-1/3 per cent develop ment rebate to industries set up in hill areas like those of the petitioners. Therefore, ac cording to the respondents, that agreement is binding on the petitioners and now the respondents cannot be forced to grant the concessions, as contained in the said letter dated 16th January, 1984. Section 49 provides that the Board may subject to the provisions of the Act and/or regulations supply electricity to any person upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs. It is not disputed that both the petitioners executed agreements with the respondent Board in connection with the supply of electrical energy to them. A copy of the agreement with M/s Maudakini Steel Engineering Company has been annexed to the counter-affidavit. This is an agreement executed on 27th June,1985, that is, after the letter dated 16th January, 1984. Clause 8 of the agreement is as under: "8 (a) The consumer shall pay for the supply of electric energy at the rates enforced by the supplier from time to time as may be applicable to the consumer. Provided that in the event of alternative rates being available for that tariff category of load, the consumer shall have the option to choose the tariff that suits him best. Provided that in the event of alternative rates being available for that tariff category of load, the consumer shall have the option to choose the tariff that suits him best. (b) The Rate Schedule applicable to the Consumer at the time of execution of this agree ment is annexed hereto Annexure-1 to the Sup plier, be revised by the Supplier from time to time and in the case of revision the rate Schedule so revised shall be applicable to the consumer from such date as may, by general or special order, be notified by the Supplier. " 25. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that supply of electricity is a matter of contract between the parties and the agreement arrived at between them is binding. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Board is charging anything more than what has been prescribed in the tariff or is not giving the development rebate, as prescribed therein. According to the respondents, therefore, the agreement overrides the direction and the petitioners cannot enforce the direction of the State Government against the Board. If any direction is not complied with by the Board, it is for the State Government to take necessary action in accordance with the provisions of the Act and it is the State Government that may force the Board to comply with a direction and not a consumer. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the direction being binding on the Board, can be enforced by any person who is to get the benefit under such direct and on the principles of promis sory estoppel, such a direction can be en forced by the Court against the State as well as the respondents. 26. We have our. careful consideration to the matter. A perusal of the petitions filed by the petitioners show that there is no proper pleading about the promissory es toppel. There is nothing in the petition of M/? 26. We have our. careful consideration to the matter. A perusal of the petitions filed by the petitioners show that there is no proper pleading about the promissory es toppel. There is nothing in the petition of M/? Maadakini Steels Engineering Com pany to the effect that it established its fac tory in the area mentioned in the aforesaid letter dated 16th January, 1984, for the reason that it knew of the concession or dered to be allowed by the Government in accordance with the aforesaid letter nor has it been stated that it was the concession mentioned therein that lured the petitioners to that place and if there was no offer of such concession, the petitioner might not have established its factor) there. There is nothing to State that when it ap plied for electrical energy to the Executive Engineer of the Board and was asked to executed the agreement, it raised any objec tion to the tariff that provided for a rebate of only 33 1/3 per cent as against fifty per cent announced by the Government. Similarly, in the petition of M/s Sanjay Industries also, there is no pleading on the basis of which a plea of promissory estoppel may be sus tained. 27. Though the Board is a Corporation of the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Government has effective control on its management yet the fact remains that it is an independent legal entity capable of entering into contracts. 28. In Mis Sarvodaya Ispat Pvt. Ltd. v. U. P. State Electricity Board and others, (Supra), it was observed by this Court as under: "the Board being a creation of the Supply Act for carrying out duties and functions assigned to it under the said Act is subject to the control of the State Government as provided therein, the said Act also gives it the powers both legislative and others for the effective discharge of those functions and for carrying out its those duties. It does not draw anything, including powers from the State Government outside the provisions of the Act as such it cannot be said to be the part or parcel of the State Government. State Govern ment is a creation under the Constitution of India, while the Boards existence is out of the Supply Act. It does not draw anything, including powers from the State Government outside the provisions of the Act as such it cannot be said to be the part or parcel of the State Government. State Govern ment is a creation under the Constitution of India, while the Boards existence is out of the Supply Act. Both have independent status, simply be cause the board is also State within the meaning of the term under Article 12 of the Constitution, it does not get merged with the State Government Board being an independent entity in itself wholly independent of the State Government it has not to be misunderstood as a department or organ of the State Government Departments of State Government have no independent entity from that of the State Government. All the depart ments taken together form an unit which is known as the State Government. 14. Thus, the representation if any made to the petitioner by the State Government cannot bind the Board as the Board is neither the State Government nor the State Government is Board. The Board is answerable for its own repre sentations while State Government is answerabte for its own. In our opinion, therefoes, except for the order if any issued by the State Government uader Section 78-Aof the Supply Act, the Board is not at all bound by any promise or representation if any made by the State Government to the petitioner. In the present case, the State Govern ment while offering concession to the industries did not issue any direction to the board within the meaning of Section 78-A of the Act. Thus, the plea of estoppel on the facts pleaded in the writ petition is not available to the petitioner against the Board. " We are in agreement with the aforesaid views. From the provisions of the Act, we notice that apart from the power that the Act confers on the State Government to take disciplinary action against the mem bers (including the Chairman) of the Board, the Government has not been conferred with any direct powers for the enforcement of its directions under Section 78-A of the Act. From the provisions of the Act, we notice that apart from the power that the Act confers on the State Government to take disciplinary action against the mem bers (including the Chairman) of the Board, the Government has not been conferred with any direct powers for the enforcement of its directions under Section 78-A of the Act. A direction issued under Section 78-A of the Act, is not statutory in character in the sense that the direction does not become the law of the land so as to required com pliance by all concerned and to be enforced by any one who is adversely effected by the Boards failure to comply with them. 29. In the case of M/s Pawan Alloy and Casting Pvt. Ltd. v. U. P. State Electricity Board and others, (1992) 1 CRC 491, it was held that the power conferred by Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act is not in the nature of delegated legislation. On the same analogy, a direction issued by the State under Section 78-A of the Act is not legisla tive in character and if such directions are not complied with, it is only the State Government that may get the directions complied with by taking disciplinary action against the officers of the Board in accord ance with the Act. In an appropriate case where on account of the principles of promissory estoppel or otherwise, it be comes necessary for a Court to get the direc tions enforced, it would direct the State Government to enforce compliance of the directions and a direct order against the Board may not be appropriate. 30. It is unfortunate that, as the facts of this case disclosed, there was no proper co ordination between the State Government and the Board and the State having taken a policy decision, as contained in the letter dated 16th January, 1984, did not enforce its directions and ensure that the repre sentations made by it and the assurances iven tp entrepreneurs to attract setting up of industries for the development of hill areas of U. P. are truly adhered to. Such a lack of will is bound to adversely affect the reputation and the reliability of the State Government and may be the reason why U. P. continues to be industrially backward. 31. In the result, we find that the writ petitions cannot succeed and have to be dismissed. Such a lack of will is bound to adversely affect the reputation and the reliability of the State Government and may be the reason why U. P. continues to be industrially backward. 31. In the result, we find that the writ petitions cannot succeed and have to be dismissed. The writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs. 32. The petitioner shall make good the deficiency in the electricity charges on ac count of the extra rebate, if any, allowed to them in pursuance of the interim orders of this Court within three months from today. Petition dismissed. .