D. K. SETH, J. The petitioner was ap pointed on ad hoc basis as Class IV employee (Farrash) in the Civil Court, Deoria on 1. 9. 1976. By an order date 1. 9. 1987 (Annexure 1 to the petition) passed by the District Judge, Deoria, the petitioners service was regularised alongwith five other employees, in which the petitioners name figured at serial No. 5 while that of one Sri Sachi tanand at serial No. 6. It is further alleged that the said appointment was made against clear vacan cies. By an order dated 12. 4. 1989 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) passed by the District Judge, Deoria, the petitioners service was terminated with immediate effect without assigning any reason. It is this order which has been challenged by means of present writ petition. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner having been senior to the said Sachitanand, his services cannot be terminated, retaining the said Sachitanand a junior person to the petitioner, on the principle of last come first go and, as such, the order is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In support of this contention Sri A. B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision in the case of Om Prakash Goel v. Himachal Pradesh Tourism Develop ment Corporation, (1991)2 UPLBEC 967 (SC); and Shivbaran Singh v. Sub Divisional Officer, Bindki, (1992)1 UPLBEC 583 (SC ). 3. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order was passed without any opportunity of hearing being given to the petitioner though the appointment was made against a clear vacancy. Thirdly, he contends that be cause there was certain allegation against the petitioner, as contended by the respon dents in the counter-affidavit it was even more necessary to afford opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, This contention of Sri A. B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner is sought to be supported by citing decisions in the case of Vinod Kumar Sharma v. State of UP. and others (1991)2 UPLBEC 1180. 4. Relying on the counter-affidavit the learned Standing Counsel contends that no reason for terminating the services of the petitioner is required to be given because of the provisions contained in Para 1099 of the Manual of the Government Order though the work and conduct of the petitioner was found unsatisfactory. and others (1991)2 UPLBEC 1180. 4. Relying on the counter-affidavit the learned Standing Counsel contends that no reason for terminating the services of the petitioner is required to be given because of the provisions contained in Para 1099 of the Manual of the Government Order though the work and conduct of the petitioner was found unsatisfactory. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Para 3 of the Temporary Government Servant (Termina tion of Services) Rules, 1975 ( here in after referred to as 1975 Rules) the services of the petitioner being temporary service can be terminated with the months notice or notice pay in lieu there of which has since been complied with. However, it was ad mitted that some of the juniors to the petitioner were still in service but the prin ciple of last come first go is not applicable, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. After the termination of service of the petitioner two courts of Addl. District Judge were transferred and shifted to the Courts of Additional District Judge at Agra and Ghaziabad, resulting in reduction of Class-III and Class-IV posts and by reason there of three more Class-IV employees were also retrenched during the period of two months after termination of service of the petitioner. In that view of the matter the grounds taken by the petitioner cannot be sustained. 5. By means of rejoinder-affidavit the petitioner has sought to contend that para 1099 of the Manual of Government orders, does not apply to the case of the petitioner. According to him with regard to the ter mination of service of a temporary employee 1975 Rules does not apply. The other Class IV employees whose services were dispensed with were not similarly situate w ta that of the petitioner. 6. The retention of the juniors to the petitioner was elaborated in the sup plementary-affidavit filed on 17th April 1992. 7. After having heard the learned counsel for both the parties, it appears that though the petitioner has contended that the persons junior to him have been retained and the said fact has been admitted in the counter-affidavit but the petitioner had never made such persons parties to the proceeding. Any order granting relief to the petitioner would affect adversely the inter est of such persons who have been retained in service. Any order granting relief to the petitioner would affect adversely the inter est of such persons who have been retained in service. Therefore, in absence of such persons having not been made parties to the prttceedings, the petitioner cannot espouse his cause on that score. The question of retrenchment following the principles of last come first go cannot be gone into in absence of those juniors, who have been retained while the services of the petitioner, has been dispensed with. Therefore, the decision cited in support of such contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not come to any help. In as much as the petitioner having been disentitled to espouse such cause of action as a ground to obtain relief is of no avail to him, for the reasons stated above. Therefore, he cannot be allowed to espouse the said grounds. On these grounds the petitioner has made this Court disentitled to enter into such ques tions. 8. So far as the question of appoint ment against the clear vacancy is concerned since been regularised as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner in para 3 is concerned, the same has not been dis puted in the counter-affidavit. Now the only question remains to be decided on that score is as to whether the petitioners ser vices is temporary service as defined in Rule 2 of the Temporary Government Ser vant (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. The temporary service in the said rule has been defined to mean: "in these rules temporary service11 means officiating or substantive service on a temporary post, or officiating service on a permanent post under the Uttar Pradesh Government. " 9. According to the said rule tem porary service means officiating and substantive service in a temporary post or officiating service in a permanent post. In order to define temporary service different nomenclature has been adopted in the said definition. The posts have been qualified as temporary and permanent. Whereas the services in the post has been qualified as officiating and substantive. In the case of service against temporary post both sub stantive and officiating service is included. But in case of permanent post only officiat ing service has been mentioned. It is note worthy that the word temporary service has not been used either it is temporary post or against permanent post. In the case of service against temporary post both sub stantive and officiating service is included. But in case of permanent post only officiat ing service has been mentioned. It is note worthy that the word temporary service has not been used either it is temporary post or against permanent post. Therefore, the legislature has made a distinction with regard to the word temporary while defining temporary service in the matter of post and service. While the post has been described as temporary and permanent. The service has been described as substantive and of ficiating. 10. Now officiating service means ser vice which is not substantive. A person may serve substantively against temporary post, meaning thereby that he had lien on the said post and that he would continue on the temporary post with all nomenclature of substantive service. Whereas the officiating service means a service which has been placed temporarily to serve the post without having any lien there in and without having any claim to the post unless he is confirmed there in. Officiating in a permanent post means a person appointed without any lien and right to the post subject to confirmation which indicates that the service is not per manent and thereby officiating and is tem porary in the sense of officiating. The word officiating means to carry on the office tem porarily subject to confirmation or replace ment as the case may be. 11. The petitioners claim of regularisation does not have any implica tion when the question of temporary service crops up. One may be regularised in service against temporary post or substantive post temporarily. It depends on the question as to whether the person was appointed tem porarily even on regularisation namely, meaning to carry out the work temporarily or in other word to officiate until further orders are being issued confirming or replacing or discharging him. 12. Thus the appointment on tem porary basis after regularisation against a clear vacancy does not take away the case of the petitioner from the ambit and definition of temporary service as defined in 1975 Rules. Therefore the petitioner was very much subject to Rule 3 of 1975 Rules. 13. Now this rule enables the Govern ment to dismiss a Government servant with one months notice or with notice pay in lieu of notice. Therefore the petitioner was very much subject to Rule 3 of 1975 Rules. 13. Now this rule enables the Govern ment to dismiss a Government servant with one months notice or with notice pay in lieu of notice. In the counter-affidavit it has not been stated that there was serious com plaint. On the other hand a case has been made out that the petitioners work was not satisfactory but even then it was not the reason, so given. The petitioners services was dispensed with under Rule 3 of 1975 Rules pure and simple. The said rules does not postulate granting of any opportunity of hearing or assigning any reason whatso ever. 14. Then again even if the petitioners service is restored but in absence of the post, he cannot be placed any where. If he is to be placed by replacing any of his junior in that event in absence of any of his junior as party to the proceeding such relief cannot be granted. At the same time if there is no vacancy the Court cannot direct for creation of the post for accommodating the petitioner. On account of abolition of the post this Court is helpless to grant any relief to the petitioner which would be futile and infructuous relief unless the same is fol lowed by a direction to create the post, which power is absent in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. In the case of State of U. P. and another v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (sic), it has been held: "5. There is no dispute that the respondent was an ad hoc and temporary employee and the terms and conditions of his employment were regulated by the U. P. Temporary Government Servant (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. The contract of service as contained in the ap pointment letter also stipulated the terms and conditions of the respondents employment that his services were liable to be terminated at any time without assigning any reason or compensa tion. In the counter affidavit filed before the High Court the order of termination was defended on the ground that the respondents work and con duct were not satisfactory and he was unsuitable for the service, therefore his services were ter minated. In the counter affidavit filed before the High Court the order of termination was defended on the ground that the respondents work and con duct were not satisfactory and he was unsuitable for the service, therefore his services were ter minated. To support that contention the appellant placed reliance on the adverse entry awarded to the respondent in the year 1977-78 and also on the allegations made against him with regard to the suit of Boys Fund of Raja Raghubir Dayal Inter College. The High Court held that since junior persons to the respondent in service wore retained, the order of termination was rendered illegal. In our opinion the principle last come first go is applicable to a case where on account of reduction of work or shrinkage of cadre retrench ment takes place and the services of employees are terminated on account of retrenchment. In the event of retrenchment the principles of last come first go is applicable under which senior in service is retained while the juniors services are terminated. But the principle is not applicable to a case where the services of a temporary employee are terminated on the assessment of his work and suitability in accordance with terms and condi tions of his service. If out of several temporary employees working in a department senior is found unsuitable on account of his work and con duct it is open to the competent authority to terminate his services and retain the services of juniors who may be found suitable for the service. Such a procedure does not violate principles of equality, enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. If a junior employee is hard working efficient and honest his services could not be terminated with a view to accommodate the senior employee even though he is found un suitable for the service. If this principle is not accepted there would be discrimination and the order of termination of a junior employee would be unreasonable and discriminatory. On the ad mitted set of facts the order of termination in the instant case could not be rendered illegal or unjus tified on the ground of juniors being retained in service. The view taken by the High Court is not sustainable in law. "6. On the ad mitted set of facts the order of termination in the instant case could not be rendered illegal or unjus tified on the ground of juniors being retained in service. The view taken by the High Court is not sustainable in law. "6. Under the service jurisprudence a tem porary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accord ance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service. If on the perusal of the character roll entries or on the basis of preliminary inquiry on the allegations made against an employee, the competent authority is satisfied that the employee is not suitable for the service whereupon the services of the temporary employee are terminated no exception can be taken to such an order of termination. " The facts of the said case are identical with that of present one and fits in with the facts of the case of Kaushal Kishore (supra ). 16. So far as the case of Om Prakash (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the same is distin guishable on the facts since in the said case the juniors were retained, which on facts was held to be a discrimination and it was not alleged there in that the petitioners ser vices was found unsatisfactory and then again the juniors having not been made par ties in the present case and the post having subsequently been abolished the ratio decidendi there in cannot be attracted. 17. Similarly, the ratio decidendi in the case of Sheobaran Singh (supra) also does not help the petitioner in view of the facts and circumstances of the said case which are altogether distinguishable inasmuch as in the said case the petitioner having been ap pointed in 1974 continued till 1990 and he was retrenched while his juniors were retained. It was not a case where the junior was not made party or where a post was abolished and, therefore, ihe ratio decidendi there in can not be applied in the present case. 18. It was not a case where the junior was not made party or where a post was abolished and, therefore, ihe ratio decidendi there in can not be applied in the present case. 18. Similarly, the ratio decidendi in the case of Vmod Kumar Sharma (supra) also has no application, in the facts and cir cumstances of the present case, since in the said case termination was brought into being as a measure to punish the petitioner for his habit of absenting from duty without obtaining leave. In the present case the order of termination was not issued as a measure of punishment. Therefore, the ratio decidendi there in also cannot help the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 19. For all these reasons the writ peti tion can not succeed and, as such, fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be, how ever, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .