Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by three petitioners challenging inter alia the orders passed in consolidation proceedings under the provision of the Bihar Consolidation of holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The petitioners main grievance is against the order dated 20-6-1988 passed by Deputy Director of consolidation under Sec.35 of the said act in Consolidation Revision No.1285 of 1987 reversing the order dated 25-5-1987 passed in Consolidation Appeal no.366/86-87 in favour of the petitioner and confirming the order dated 8-4-1986 passed by Consolidation officer, Bhagwanpur, district Rohtas in case No.27/85-86. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of the orders, the one passed by revisional authority, contained in Annexure 1, and the other passed by original authority, contained in Annexure 2. 2. Various factual questions have been raised in this petition, but for the purpose of deciding the disputes in writ jurisdiction, this court proposes to record only those facts which are relevant. 3. The dispute relates to plots of land recorded in revisional survey khata no.112, plot Nos.144 and 145 having an area of 1.10 acre and 1.32 acre, respectively. The dispute is also extended to the plot of land recorded in revisional survey khata No.17, plot No.30, area 94 decimals, and the total area covers plot of land to the extent of 3.36 acres in village Maraicha P. S. Bhagwanpur, District Rohtas. 4. The case of the petitioners is that one Kurban Mian had three sons, namely, Asgar Mian, Hanif Mian and islam Mian. Both Islam Mian and Hanif mian are petitioners 1 and 2 respectively in the writ petition and respondents 5 to 7 belong to the group of Asgar Mian. It is stated that respondents 5 to 7 belong to the group of Asgar Mian. It is stated that respondents 5 to 7 are sons of Asgar Mian. The further case of the petitioners is that petitioner No.1 acquired land bearing revisional survey khata No.112, situate in Village maraicha, P. S. Bhagwanpur and then he transferred half of the aforesaid land to petitioner No.2 through a registered sale deed, and R. S. Khatian was accordingly prepared in the name of the petitioners. The further case of the petitioners is that petitioner No.1 acquired land bearing revisional survey khata No.112, situate in Village maraicha, P. S. Bhagwanpur and then he transferred half of the aforesaid land to petitioner No.2 through a registered sale deed, and R. S. Khatian was accordingly prepared in the name of the petitioners. The further case of The petitioners is that the claim of respondents about their share is based on a claim of ancestral property of the family and such a claim apart from being barred under Sec.10-A of the said Act is also, according to the petitioners, barred under the principle of Mohammedan Law where concept of joint property is not available. Therefore the petitioners relied on the finding given by appellate court where as a last court of fact, the appellate authority has accepted rent receipts and in absence of any documentary proof of the contrary also accepted the entries in the revisional record of rights. The appellate court also accepted the order passed in the mutation proceeding and the rent receipts in favour of the respondents during the pendency of the proceeding. The appellate court also accepted that the claim of the respondents is barred u/sec.10-A of the said Act. 5. The revisional authority by reversing those findings recorded by appellate court has, as it appears to this court, committed two errors for which its order cannot be sustained. It is, however, settled now that the exercise of jurisdiction under Sec.35 of the Act is not strictly barred under Sec.10-A but at the same time it is also settled that the authority concerned while exercising power under Sec.35 of the Act. . . . . . . will not operate. In other words, the authority exercising power under Sec.35 of the Act cannot just ignore the statutory finality given under Sec.10-A 6. In the instant case, this court is of the view that adequate reasons have not been given by the authority concerned while ignoring the bar under Sec.10-A of the Act. 7. The other legal infirmity in the order is that relying on the decision in the case of Asiruddin Mondol V/s. Latifunnesa Bibi, A. I. R.1925 Calcutta, page 1176, the revisional authority came to the conclusion that concept of joint property is also available in the mohammedan Law. This court is unable to agree with the said finding of the revisional authority. This court is unable to agree with the said finding of the revisional authority. The decision which has been referred to in the order of the revisional authority, namely, the case of Asiruddin Mondol (supra) does not expressly deal with the question relating to concept of joint property in Mohammedan Law. The judgment of the Division Bench of calcutta High Court in case case of asiruddin (supra) was primarily concerned with the question of adverse possession and while dealing with the question of law of limitation and adverse possession as between tenants-in-common, the learned Judges merely recorded the legal position and came to the conclusion that mere possession, however, exclusive of long continued, if silent, cannot give one co-tenant in possession, title as against the other co-tenant. Therefore, concept of joint family was not the question which was directly or even indirectly in issue between the parties in the said case. Therefore, reliance on the said judgment was wrongly placed by the revisional authority. 8. The preponderance of judicial opinion, on the other hand, is in favour of the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, namely, that in Mohammedan Law, the concept of joint family is not there. In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners in the case of Sk. Md. Zafir V/s. Sk. Amiruddin, AIR 1963 patna 108. In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, this point has been specifically dealt with. In Mullas Principles of mohammedan Law, 19th Edition, it has been stated in paragraph 57 at page 44 that in the Mohammedan Law, there is not, as in the Hindu Law, any presumption that the acquisitions of property by several members of a family living and messing together are for the benefit of the family. It is also stated that when the members of a Mohammedan family live in commensality, they do not form a joint family in the sense in which that expression is used in the Hindu Law. 9. Having regard to the aforesaid well-settled principles, this Court is of the view authority cannot be sustained and the same is fit to be quashed. 10. 9. Having regard to the aforesaid well-settled principles, this Court is of the view authority cannot be sustained and the same is fit to be quashed. 10. Learned counsel appearing for respondents 5 to 7 however tried to sustain the order passed by revisional authority, but he has also admitted that the revisonal authority has reversed the findings of the appellate authority without any new evidence or new material. Learned counsel for respondents 5 to 7 has, however, relied upon the judgment of the D. B. of the court in the case of Junaid Khan V/s. The Slate of Bihar, 1995 (2) P. L. J. R. , 301; 1995 (2) BLJ 214 , in order to contend that the principles of the evidence Act are not applicable to the authority exercising power u/sec.35 of the Act. The same position is beyond dispute. It goes without saying that the principles of Evidence Act are not to be strictly followed by an authority exercising quasi-judicial power as a statutory tribunal, even though such tribunal has the trappings of a court. It is equally well settled and also accepted by the D. B. in the case of junaid Khan V/s. State of Bihar (supra)that substantial principles emerging from Evidence Act are applicable to any enquiry by such tribunal. As the findings of fact recorded by appellate court have been reversed by the impugned order passed by revisional authority without any further consideration of factual materials, this court cannot uphold the impugned order, which is contained in Annexure-1. 11. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order contained in Annexure-1 is set aside and the matter is to go back to the revisional authority for reconsideration of the matter in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made in the judgment, after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce further evidence in support of their respective cases. Since the matter is pending in this Court for quite some time, the Director of Consolidation is directed to at as revisional authority u/sec.35 of the Act and dispose of the matter in the light of the observation made in the judgment within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. The writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition Allowed.