PALOK BASU, J. Sajjan Lal Shah has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the prayer that a writ of certiorari should issue quash ing two Recovery Certificates, on dated 7. 9. 1992 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 79,152/- and the other dated 4. 7. 1992 for recovery of Rs. 12,838/- issued by the Executive En gineer, Construction Division, P. W. D. , Al mora. 2. The petitioner admittedly was granted contracts by the Public Works Department (P. W. D.) for making certain constructions, the tender cost of which was Rs. 46,909/- and estimated cost was Rs. 47,141/ -. The conditions which were to govern the construction were specifically noted in State Government D. O. letter dated 9. 3. 1972. A copy of the conditions of contracts has been attached as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. According to the petitioners claim he had completed some work and the demand raised by the respon dents is wholly illegal. It is contended that as per the terms of the agreement the best that can be said for the present is that they can go in arbitration or filed a suit for recovery of any amount or for deciding the dispute about payment claimed. The argument is that the provisions of U. P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 shall not be attracted to the facts of the present case. 3. When the writ petition was filed on 15. 1. 1993 the learned Standing Counsel was directed to file a counter affidavit which has been done to which a rejoinder affidavit also been filed. By the interim order dated 15. 1. 1993 the recovery proceedings against the petitioner were stayed subject to filing of the security. As prayed by the learned Counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being heard and finally disposed of at the admission stage. 4. In counter affidavit sworn by Sri V. K. Sharma alleging himself to be an Assistant Engineer in the office of the Executive En gineer (Construction Division) P. W. D. , Bageshwari, Almora the factual execution of the contracts as noted above is admitted. However, it has been averred in the counter affidavit that enough materials were sup plied to the petitioner for making construc tions. A wall had fallen down. Some adjust ments were, therefore, to be made. However, it has been averred in the counter affidavit that enough materials were sup plied to the petitioner for making construc tions. A wall had fallen down. Some adjust ments were, therefore, to be made. It is again admitted that both contracts resulting in the two recovery certificate as noted above, were having the same type of agree ment as has been filed by the petitioner as exampler. 5. Sri Ashok Bhushan, learned Coun sel for the petitioner drew the attention of the Court to the entire proforma agreement which does not have any clause by which the parties may have agreed to permit the State Government to recover amount as arrears of land revenue. The point for considera tion, therefore, is whether Section 3 (1) (d) can be invoked by the State Government is order to issue the aforesaid recovery certifi cates to realise so called contractual money from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue or that the State Government shall have to take recourse to common law remedy of filling a suit or proceed under the Arbitration Act as envisaged under the agreement. 6. Sri Nural Huda, learned Standing Counsel has strongly contended that since at one point of time some materials were advanced to the petitioner for making con struction, this should be interpreted as "financial assistance" so as to permit invok ing of Section-3, referred to above. While it is true that "financial assistance" has been defined in Section 2 (b) of the said Act, none of the clauses (i) to (v) as defined in the aforesaid clause (b) of Section 2 can permit the amount claimed by the State Govern ment from the petitioner to be treated as such. For ready reference Section 2 (b) as well as Section 3 (1) (d) with its sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of the said clause (d) are quoted here: "2 (b) "financial Assistance" means any financial assistance - (i) for establishing expending, modernising, renovating or running any industrial undertakings; or (ii) for purpose of vocational training; or (iii) for the development of agriculture, hor ticulture, animal husbandry or agro-industry; or (iv) for purposes of any other kind of planned development; or (v) for relief against distress;" "3. Recovery of certain dues as arrears of land revenue.- (1) Where any person is party, and re questing that such sum together with costs of the proceedings be recovered as if it were an arrears of land revenue. " The aforesaid provisions contained in Section 2 (b) and Section 3 (1) (d) would per mit the State Government to invoke the provisions of realisation as arrears of land revenue only in case of existing agreement between the State Government and the per son concerned. In the absence of such an agreement the powers to make recovery as arrears of land revenue cannot be exercised. The reason for this analysis and conclusion is that primarily arrears of land revenue shall recoverable only when some person fails to pay land revenue. But by legal fiction and by enlarging scope of certain classes of loans, dues etc, the State Government has passed the aforesaid U. P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972. The preamble of the said Act says that it has been passed to provide for speedy recovery of "certain classes of dues payable to the State Government" and to validate certain acts done and proceeding taken in the past, and to provide for matters connected therewith (emphasis by Court ). The aforesaid objects and reasons classifies the State Government dues into two sets- normal dues and dues under "certain classes. " It is only a class of Public Money which the State has been authorised to realise as arrears of land revenue and exactly it is that class of dues which is stands delineated by Section 3 with Section 2 (b) as noted above. Any other in terpretation is likely to confer power upon the State Government to use the provisions of Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 indiscriminately without any jus tification. 7. Sri Nural Huda, learned Standing Counsel argued the matter with ability and drew the attention of the Court to three decisions, reference to which must find place here and now. 8. In M/s. J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P & Another, 1977 A. W. C. , 294, the provisions of Sections 5, 9 and of the Arbitration Act and Sections 3 (4) and (5) of the Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act were interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court. 8. In M/s. J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P & Another, 1977 A. W. C. , 294, the provisions of Sections 5, 9 and of the Arbitration Act and Sections 3 (4) and (5) of the Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act were interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court. It was held that in view of Section 3 (4) no arbitration proceeding can lie at the instance of either party for recovery of any sum claimed to be due under agreement or for disputing the correctness of the claim. In another para graph it has been said that proviso to Sec tion 3 (4) does not confer any right on the State Government to enforce the agree ment of arbitration. 9. It is not understandable how this Ruling supports the argument advanced by Sri Nural Huda. With respect, there is ab solutely no confict between the opinion ex pressed in the cited case and the view being taken by this Court. In other words the Ruling expresses exactly what this Court is laying down. Arbitration proceeding are covered by the special reference made sub section (4) of Section (3) of the said Act. But the first sentence in sub-section (4) reads :" In the case of any agreement referred to in sub-section (1) between any person referred to in that sub-section and the State Government to the corporation, no arbitration proceedings shall lie at the instance of either party. . . " Therefore, what is necessary is that the agreement should be referrable to an agreement as envisaged by sub-section (1 ). It has already been noted above that Section 3 (1) talks of no other agreement. Therefore, the aforesaid Ruling is of no help to Sri Nurul Huda. 10. In the case of M/s. Sterling Hides and Skins India Private Ltd. v. U. P State Leather Development and Marketing Cor poration and Others, 1988 U. P. L. B. E. C. , 1184, a Division Bench of this Court has said that on the facts of the said case where the petitioner had taken a shed on rent on demand of Rs. 32,5007- per month, the remaining amount was not paid; the con tract was ultimately cancelled and the amount fell due on the terms of the agree ment; it was said that issuing a certificate of recovery of dues under the provisions of U. P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 was valid. In this perspective it was held in para-8 of the judgment that the petitioner in that case should be held to nave obtained financial assistance from the State Government and having done so it did not refund the same. Consequently, it was held that Section 3 would stand attracted. The facts in the instant case, as noted, have no application to the facts and circumstances involved in the instant writ petition. Consequently, the said Ruling also is distin guishable and does not lend support the argument of Sri Huda, learned Counsel for the State. 11. In the case of M/s. Lavkush Carpet v. Financial Controller, Varanasi and others, 1988 UPLBEC 1445 a Division Bench of this Court has Court has held that where some goods are sold on credit and the pay ment is not made, recourse may be taken to Section 3 of the U. P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 for realisation of the arrears. But ultimately the matter was sent back to the authority concerned to decide the representation of the petitioner. Consequently, but for a bare observation which appears to be obiter dicta no decision has been laid down in the instant case. This case also does not support Sri Huda. 12. Sri Ashok Bhushan, learned Coun sel for the petitioner, however, drew the attention of the Court to two decisions which also have to be dealt with here. 13. In the case of Mahesh Chandra v. Zila Panchayat Mainpuri, 1996 (3) UPLBEC 1586 it has been held that where a contract was entered into between Zila Panchayat and a citizen for realising fees on its behalf through bid amount by auction sale, proceedings for realisation of the balance of bid amount by recovery certifi cate under Section 3 of the aforesaid Act was not permissible. In the cited case the provisions of Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam were extensively searched for to find out whether the power for realisation stood vested in the Zila Panchayat or not for recovery of arrears as land revenue. In the cited case the provisions of Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam were extensively searched for to find out whether the power for realisation stood vested in the Zila Panchayat or not for recovery of arrears as land revenue. It was held that there was no power with the Zila Panchayat to make recovery proceedings in the manner it was attempted. Consequently, Mahesh Chandras case does help partially Sri Ashok Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner as it is distinguishable on facts. 14. In case of Indraj Sarup v. U. P. Electricity Board, Moradabad, 1980 A. L. J. 231, the Honble Satish Chandra, C. J. had held that "agreement not containing any clause as to the recovery of Govt. dues as land revenue - such agreement contempla ted by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of S. 3. " Consequently, it was held that those arbitra tion proceedings which were pending were saved and not get obliterated by recourse to the recovery certificate under the provisions of the Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act. In para 4 it has been observed that sub-section (d) applies to a case where the agreement between the parties provides that any money payable there-under shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenues. Clause (d) obviously cannot apply to an agreement when there is no such clause. Sri Ashok Bhushan gets full support from the observations of the learned Chief Justice. 15. The provisions of the act noted above do not permit the State Government to issue recovery certificates which have been challenged in the instant writ petition. Therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the present mode of recovery has to be quashed. A close examination of the con tents of the agreement indicates that the parties can go to arbitration. In view of this specific clause it will be open to the State Government to go arbitration also, if so advised, instead of completing formalities of filing a suit. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned recovery certificates are quashed, but this will not debar the respon dents to take recourse to such recovery proceedings as may be available realising the amount claimed. 17. Parties will bear their own costs. Petition allowed. .