JUDGMENT Arun Madan, J. - This appeal has been preferred by the above appellants before this court under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") against the judgment and decree dated 23rd May, 1994 passed by learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Misc. (Arbitration) Case No. 58 of 1990 whereby the objections of the appellants against the award dated 5.3.1990 were dismissed and accordingly the impugned award was made the Rule of the Court. 2. It has been contended by the appellants that M/s. General Electric Company of India Ltd. (for short 'GEC') had submitted an application under Section 20 of the Act in the Court of learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur which was registered as Case No. 105/85. The said application came to be decided by the said Court on 6.8.1986. While deciding the said application the learned District Judge observed as under : "On the basis of the discussion the application is partly allowed with a direction that the subject matter of dispute between the parties with regard to paras 24(i), (ii) and (iv) of the application, Chairman of RSEB, Jaipur or his nominee is appointed as the sole arbitrator in the matter to decide the controversy between the parties. The said arbitrator shall submit his award within a period of four months from the date of his appointment. The parties are directed to appear before learned Arbitrator on 1.9.1986." 3. The relief which was sought for by the respondents from learned Trial Court was as follows : "24 (i) Wrongful withholding of a sum of Rs. 20,89,347.70 on account of price variation clause in the contract. (ii) Refund of a sum of Rs. 6,56,964.00 (penalty) deducted illegally and without any justification by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board from the dues of the General Electric Co. of India on account of illegally not extending the period of supply of 10 months. (iii) Interest @ 21% per annum from the date the amounts are being illegally withheld till the date of payment of the same." 4. In this context it will be pertinent to briefly narrate the background leading to the filing of the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act before learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur moved by the respondents GEC. In this context it will be pertinent to briefly narrate the background leading to the filing of the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act before learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur moved by the respondents GEC. On 27.11.1979 the respondents GEC entered into a contract for sale and supply of 11 units 10/2.5 HP transformers and load tapping gears for the ordered transformers and 10% extra oil per transformer weighing 8.40 kgs. at a total cost of Rs. 1,30,02,000/- on the terms and conditions as mentioned in the purchase order and the acceptance dated 31.10.1979. As per the terms and conditions of the purchase order, the delivery was to commence within 6 months from the date of receipt of purchase order and completion at the rate of 2 units per month. It has been contended by the appellants in the memo of appeal, that GEC failed to supply the ordered material within the stipulated period as provided in the purchase order. It has further been contended that the reason for not making the supplies within time was the alleged lockout declared by the management on account of strike resorted to by the workers on account of the period in question. Appellants have further contended in the memo of appeal that the lockout does not come under force majeure clause as the lockout is the act of the employer and on account of lockout it has been alleged that there was loss of production of 229 days from 9.11.1979 to 13.3.1980 - 130 days and on account of alleged strike from 13.6.1980 to 19.9.1980 - 89 days and 76 days were alleged to have been lost preceding and succeeding in lockout and closure and even then the Board after considering all the facts and circumstances and taking a very lenient view although the GEC was not entitled, has granted the extension for 176 days and for the remaining period the pre-estimated damages/penalty as per the agreed terms was levied. The GEC claimed the price variation for the entire period for which the GEC was not entitled and further as per the agreed terms the GEC was liable for the pre-estimated agreed damages. The GEC claimed the price variation for the entire period for which the GEC was not entitled and further as per the agreed terms the GEC was liable for the pre-estimated agreed damages. The said agreement contained a price escalation clause (clause 2(a)) and also a force majeure clause 11 in respect of unforeseen eventualities like lockout and strike as a circumstance beyond the control of a party which would entitle the said party to seek extension of time for delivery of the articles. After the execution of the aforesaid agreement some amendments were made to the same by the parties on 4.3.1980, 11.2.1981, 19.5.1981 and 2.4.1982 respectively. It has further been contended in the memo of appeal that thereafter the respondents company requested the appellant for release of the payments due to the Company and on 31.3.1984 part payment of the due amount was made by cheque by the RESB. In view of the differences having arisen between the parties as referred to above and since RSEB failed to settle the said dispute as referred to by GEC in view of the arbitration agreement, and since the appellant Board did not appoint the arbitrator, an application under Section 20 of the Act was moved before learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur by GEC, wherein the GEC claimed a sum of Rs. 20,89,347.70 and Rs. 1,56,964.00 and interest at the rate of 21% per annum on the said amount from due date till payment. The GEC claimed that the aforesaid amount had been wrongly withheld by the RSEB which included excise duty, CST and PVC amount freight and insurance and 5% of the pre-estimated damages. According to GEC the differences had occurred between the parties when the protest was made and a registered notice was served on the appellant on 23.10.1984 as per the disputes detailed in para 13 of the application. According to GEC the differences had occurred between the parties when the protest was made and a registered notice was served on the appellant on 23.10.1984 as per the disputes detailed in para 13 of the application. In reply to the application under Section 20 of the Act, it has not been disputed by the RSEB that the purchase order was issued on 27.12.1979 and after acceptance of its terms, a telegram was issued by GEC stating therein, delivery shall commence in 7 months and complete 2 units per month and this position was further clarified vide letter dated 4.3.1980 and accordingly supplies were to be completed by 3.10.1980 which admittedly were not made due to the circumstances beyond the control of the GEC as so stated in their defence. The appellants had contested the claim on the ground that the price variation had wrongly been made by the GEC and in this regard the appellants had disputed the force majeure clause as pleaded by the respondents, since the pre-condition of the agreement had not been followed. 5. On failure of the RSEB to appoint an arbitrator with a view to resolve the differences between the parties, GEC invoked the arbitration clause by moving an application under Section 20 of the Act before learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur for appointment of an arbitrator through the court. In the said application GEC claimed a sum of Rs. 20,89,347.70 and Rs. 6,56,964.00 and interest @ 21% per annum on the said amount from due date till the date of payment. The said application was hotly contested before the learned District Judge who, after giving full opportunity of hearing to the parties, directed the Chairman, RSEB or his nominee to act as sole arbitrator in the matter with a view to decide and adjudicate the disputes between the parties as narrated in the said application. 6. On 17.1.1987 RSEB appointed Shri R. S. Goyal, retired, Chief Engineer of the Board as sole arbitrator. On 11.2.1987 the said arbitrator directed the parties to file their respective claims. One Shri N. P. Motwani, a witness of RSEB who had filed an affidavit by way of evidence in support of RSEB, was cross-examined by GEC on 24.9.1988 and his cross-examination was continued on 25.9.1988. On 11.2.1987 the said arbitrator directed the parties to file their respective claims. One Shri N. P. Motwani, a witness of RSEB who had filed an affidavit by way of evidence in support of RSEB, was cross-examined by GEC on 24.9.1988 and his cross-examination was continued on 25.9.1988. After extension of time by learned Arbitrator on the next date of sitting i.e., 5.4.1989 the said witness who was present, declined to be further cross-examined and case was adjourned to 13.5.1989. Since the Arbitrator could not complete arbitration proceedings by giving his award within stipulated period, he sought extension of time from the Court which was granted on 20.1.1990, when learned Trial Court directed arbitrator to make his award. On 5.3.1990 learned arbitrator made his award holding that RSEB was liable to pay to GEC Rs. 16,75,816.43 and Rs. 10,45,590.00 as interest for the period upto 11.2.1987 till dated of award, viz., 5.3.1990 and further interest on the principal amount at 12% per annum from the date of award till the date of realisation of full amount. On 23.5.1994 objection petition to the award of RSEB was disposed of by learned District Judge and award was made a Rule of Court except that a payment of Rs. 2,00,000/- made by RSEB to GEC in 1988 was taken note of and accordingly amount of Rs. 16,75,816.43 was reduced to Rs. 14,75,816.43. Consequential changes were made with regard to interest amount. 7. The RSEB filed its objections to the award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act before the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. The said objection petition was finally disposed of by learned District Judge after giving due hearing to the parties vide his order, dated 23.5.1994 which has been challenged before this Court in appeal. Learned District Judge upheld the validity of the award dated 5.3.1990 and made the same the Rule of the Court subject to the modification that the payment of Rs. 2,00,000/- which had already been made by RSEB to GEC in 1988 was to be deducted from the principal amount and the said amount was reduced to Rs. 14,75,816.43 with consequential changes with regard to the interest amount. It was directed that on principal amount of Rs. 16,75,816.43 RSEB shall pay to the claimant interest @ 12% per annum w.e.f. 12.2.1987 to 4.4.1988 and on the amount of Rs. 14,75,816.43 with consequential changes with regard to the interest amount. It was directed that on principal amount of Rs. 16,75,816.43 RSEB shall pay to the claimant interest @ 12% per annum w.e.f. 12.2.1987 to 4.4.1988 and on the amount of Rs. 15,25,816.43 the Board shall pay interest @ 12% per annum for the period w.e.f. 5.4.1988 to 31.12.1988 and from 1.1.1989 to the date of award on the sum of Rs. 14,75,816.43 the Board shall pay to the claimant interest @ 12% p.a. On balance principal amount of Rs. 14,75,816.43 the Board shall pay to the claimant interest @ 12% per annum from the date of award till the date of decree and from the date of decree till realisation RSEB shall pay interest @ 12% p.a. to the claimant. 8. Perusal of impugned order dated 23.5.1994 of the learned District Judge, reveals that the said Court had placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of State of Orissa v. Dandasi Sahu ( AIR 1988 SC 1791 = 1988 (2) Arb. LR 384), wherein it was held as under : "It is well settled that when the parties choose their arbitrator to be the judge in dispute between them, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it, object to the decision either upon law or on facs. Therefore, when arbitrator commits a mistake which does not appear on the face or the award and the documents appended to or incorporated so as to form part of it, the award will neither be remitted nor set aside." The District Judge also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India ( AIR 1989 SC 777 = 37 (1989) DLT 353 = 1989 (1) Arb. LR 306 (SC)), and U.P. Hotels etc. v. U.P. State Electricity Board ( AIR 1989 SC 268 = 1989 (1) Arb. LR 244), wherein it was held as under : "Even assuming that there was an error of construction of the agreement or even that there was an error of law in arriving at a conclusion, such an error is not an error which is amenable to correction even in a reasoned award under the law. LR 244), wherein it was held as under : "Even assuming that there was an error of construction of the agreement or even that there was an error of law in arriving at a conclusion, such an error is not an error which is amenable to correction even in a reasoned award under the law. In order to set aside an award, there must be a wrong proposition of law laid down in the award as the basis of the award." In Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (supra) it was held as under : "When a court is called upon to decide the objections raised by a party against an arbitration award, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited, as expressly indicated in the Act, and it has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal and examine the correctness of the award on merits." While finally disposing of the objections of the objector RSEB the District Judge observed that it could not be said that the order under Section 20 of the Act was invalid for the reason that RSEB had not only participated in the proceedings before the learned arbitrator but also had consented to extension of time to the arbitrator for making his award. The learned District Judge with regard to the objection of the board that the issues were not separately answered by the arbitrator, the learned District Judge held that it was not necessary to do so in view of the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Govt. of Orissa and others v. G. C. Roy ( AIR 1992 SC 732 = 1992 (1) Arb. LR 145). The Union of India v. Jai Narain Misra ( AIR 1970 SC 753 ), Hari Datt Kainthla and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others ( AIR 1980 SC 1426 ), and Smt. Santa Sila Devi and another v. Dhirendra Nath Sen and others ( AIR 1963 SC 1677 ). 9. With regard to the claim of price variation, the learned District Judge held that part of the claim was admitted by RSEB and in that event the finding of learned Arbitrator was not open to challenge as that would involve remissible. 9. With regard to the claim of price variation, the learned District Judge held that part of the claim was admitted by RSEB and in that event the finding of learned Arbitrator was not open to challenge as that would involve remissible. With regard to the grant of interest on the principal amount, the learned District Judge upheld the award of the arbitrator by placing reliance upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Govt. of Orissa and others v. G. C. Roy, (supra) Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir ( AIR 1992 SC 2192 = AIR 1983 SC 2464 = 1992 (2) Arb. LR 412 (SC)), and that there was no infirmity in the award of that account. 10. With regard to other objections of the RSEB regarding the payment of Rs. 2,00,000/- by the Board to GEC, learned District Judge held that since such plea was not raised before learned Arbitrator in the initial stage but since the amount has been paid to the respondent company, the appellant was within its rights to seek deduction of the said amount and which was accordingly allowed to be deducted from the award amount by the District Judge. With regard to the objection that the award was not sufficiently stamped, the learned District Judge relying upon the decision of Delhi High Court in the matter Darshan Singh v. Forward India (AIR 1984 Delhi 140 = 1985 Arb. LR 78 (Delhi)), held that since the reference was made through Court, it was not necessary to have the award stamped. On the point of limitation, learned District Judge has held that since the last supply of the Transformers was made in the year 1982 and the steps for appointment of the arbitrator were taken in 1985, the claim could not be held to be barred by limitation. 11. Perusal of the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge reveals that he has fully applied his mind to each and every aspect of the matter and decided objections of the Board after duly scrutinising the claim of the respondent company and thus upheld the validity of the award by making the same the Rule of the Court in accordance with law. 12. 12. During the course of hearing Shri G. C. Garg, learned Counsel for the appellant challenged the validity of the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur on the ground inter alia : (i) that the arbitrator had passed the award on 5.3.1990. As per para 24(i) of the claim a sum of Rs. 20,89,347.70 had been claimed by the respondent company on account of price variation clause in the contract, excise duty and central sales-tax. In reply to the claim, RSEB has admitted that a sum of Rs. 10,02,963.29 is payable against the PVC (price variation clause) with excise duty, central sales-tax etc. 13. With regard to all the supplies made by the claimant to RSEB, a sum of Rs. 7,56,995.78 has been paid and a sum of Rs. 2,45,967.51 remained payable at the time of submitting the reply and out this a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- had already been paid which stood adjusted and thus only a sum of Rs. 45,567.51 remains payable. 14. With regard to the purchase order clause 2(a) of the agreement which relates to price variation and which provides that in case of upward price variation, the increased amount will not be claimed alongwith 100% interest against presentation of R.R., the price variation claim, if any, will the submitted separately after completion of the supply, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the terms of the said clause are binding on the respondent company in view of the fact that it is specifically mentioned therein that the purchaser will not bear any financial liability on account of price variation due to any delay in supplies beyond stipulated period of delivery. It was contended in this regard that the purchaser, i.e. RSEB was not to bear the brunt of any financial liability on account of price variation due to any delay in supply beyond the stipulated period of delivery. 15. As regards the force majeure clause, it was contended that the respondent is entitled for the exact specified period of strike and lockout duly certified by the Labour Commissioner for which necessary certificates had been submitted by the respondent company. From the said certificates it is apparent that lockout was declared on 9.11.1979 and lifted on 17.3.1980. The purchase order is dated 27.12.1979 which was received on 31.12.1979. From the said certificates it is apparent that lockout was declared on 9.11.1979 and lifted on 17.3.1980. The purchase order is dated 27.12.1979 which was received on 31.12.1979. In this regard it was contended that learned Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award any amount due to the respondent company for the period prior to the purchase order, since the same cannot be allowed atleast for a period of 53 days even as per the case of the respondents. The appellant had also challenged the award for the reason that it is non-speaking since the arbitrator has not given reasons for the award. 16. As regards the force majeure, it has been contended that no financial liability due to increase in price variation is to be borne by the RSEB, since in the present case admittedly the GEC had failed to make the supplies as per the agreed terms. The said clause gives entitlement to the respondents for the purposes of penalty and not for price variation which means that only penalty will be levied on account of delay in delivery of the articles and there is mistake apparent in the award as no amount as per the terms should have been allowed on account of price variation during the period extending for the purpose of penalty and the award is invalid and further for the reason that the learned arbitrator had exercised his jurisdiction not vested in him. 17. The award has also been challenged on the ground that learned arbitrator had allowed a sum of Rs. 6,32,930/- which was withheld on account of penalty and as such the entire amount of penalty/pre-estimated damages which was imposed by the competent authority after considering the relevant material, has been allowed as against the terms of the agreement. 18. Admittedly there was a delay of 305 days in supply of articles and the board had allowed extension of the period by 176 days as per the force majeures and there was no justification in allowing further extension of 129 days which had been allowed by learned arbitrator without any justification. The decision of the Chief Engineer is final in view of the agreed terms and which is not open to challenge. 19. The decision of the Chief Engineer is final in view of the agreed terms and which is not open to challenge. 19. It has been contended that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest @ 12% per annum for the period prior to and upto 11.2.1987 which is a mistake apparent on the face of the award since the exact period has not been specified. It has further been contended that the amount mentioned at serial No. 6.1 of the award amount is of the interest and this is a mistake apparent on the face of the award. 20. In reply to the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant, Dr. Shankar Ghose, learned Counsel for the respondents company stated at the bar that the award which is a subject matter of question was passed by learned arbitrator after a due consideration of both, oral as well as documentary evidence and also the submissions made by the parties and further the award having been made the Rule of the Court by learned District Judge after duly considering the statements made by the parties, is not open to challenge on the grounds which the parties have already contested both, before learned arbitrator as well as the learned District Judge. The submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents company briefly stated were confined to the following questions : 1. Award in respect of price variation : (i) In respect of price variation a claim was made by the respondents for Rs. 20,89,347.70 and learned arbitrator gave an award for a sum of Rs. 16,75,816.43. It is well settled that in a non-speaking award the court does not speculate into reasons nor would be justified in probing the mental process of the arbitrator which impelled him to give the award unless the award is prima facie unconscionable or shocking to the judicial conscience which is not the case here. In this case the award was given by learned Arbitrator after due appreciation of evidence on the record and on perusal of the relevant documents and after hearing learned Counsel for the parties. (ii) The award was challenged by the appellant board by filing their objections under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act. In this case the award was given by learned Arbitrator after due appreciation of evidence on the record and on perusal of the relevant documents and after hearing learned Counsel for the parties. (ii) The award was challenged by the appellant board by filing their objections under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act. The said objections were duly considered by the learned Arbitrator and thereafter by learned District Judge and learned District Judge has recorded positive findings in favour of the claimant after dealing with each of the objections separately and then recording a finding in favour of the claimant. Learned District Judge by a well reasoned judgment has observed that there was no misconduct on the part of the arbitrator in having given the lumpsum award in favour of the claimant alongwith interest which has been assessed in accordance with law, hence in my view it is not open to the appellant to challenge, either the award or the judgment and decree of learned District Judge making the award the Rule of Court and the same is not open to challenge for any of the reasons as so contended by the appellant. (iii) Further contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that it is well settled law that non-speaking award cannot be set aside on the plea that the arbitrator has made any mistake of fact or made any erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the contract. In this case admittedly there is price variation clause in the contract which, in my view, is fully justified and on examination of the records I find that the arbitrator has not committed any mistake either of fact or any error in the interpretation of the contract, hence the award is not open to challenge before this court. I am fortified in my observations from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of State of Orissa v. Dandasi Sahu (supra) wherein the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was regarding the validity of non-speaking award which was subject-matter of challenge and was awaiting determination by a larger Bench of the Apex Court. The Apex Court while dealing with this appeal was of the view that it would not be justified in acceding to the request of the appellant. The Apex Court while dealing with this appeal was of the view that it would not be justified in acceding to the request of the appellant. Faced with a situation the appellants challenged the award on the ground that it was unreasoned one which objection he had neither raised before learned Trial Court nor before the High Court. This contention was also not raised in the objections to the award filed originally. It was only in Special Leave Petition that such a plea has been raised for the first time. It was the Apex Court while disposing of the appeal held that the contention of the appellant are not tenable for the reason that the law as it stands today is that award for not giving reasons is not bad per se. Indeed, an award can be set aside only on the ground of misconduct or on an error of law apparent on the face of the award being an unreasoned one is per se bad, has no place on this aspect as the law is now. This contention is rejected. It was further held as under : "It is well-settled that when the parties choose their own arbitrator to be the Judge in dispute between them, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it object to the decision either upon law or on facts. Therefore, when arbitrator commits a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matters, referred to him, where such mistake does not appear on the face of the award and the documents appended to or incorporated so as to form part of it, the award will neither be remitted nor set aside. The law on this point is well-settled." Relying upon the earlier judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1967 SC 1032 ), and Allen Berry & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India ( AIR 1971 SC 696 ). The law on this point is well-settled." Relying upon the earlier judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1967 SC 1032 ), and Allen Berry & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India ( AIR 1971 SC 696 ). I am of the view that since in the instant case the arbitrator has neither committed any mistake of law or of fact in determining the reference before him and since neither any error of law is apparent on the face of the award nor any misconduct has been committed by the arbitrator, the award in question which has been made the Rule of the Court is not open to challenge. In the matter of U.P. Hotels etc. v. U.P. State Electricity Board, (supra) the Apex Court while dealing with identical question regarding interpretation of the agreement between the parties for supply of energy and rates applicable in that connection held thus : "Even assuming that there was an error of construction of the agreement or even that there is an error of law in arriving at a conclusion, such an error is not an error which is amenable to correction even in a reasoned award under the law. In order to set aside an award, there must be a wrong proposition of law laid down in the award as the basis of the award." 21. In order to consider the veracity of the contention of the appellants regarding price variation, I scrutinised the judgment of the learned District Judge wherein in para 17 of the said order he has very rightly opined as follows : "As this stage, this court is not competent to reconsider the evidence adduced by the parties because no error is apparent from bare reading of the award and it is also not possible for this court to peruse the evidence and thereafter if not agreed with the award/order passed by the arbitrator, pass its own order in place of said award/order. In this case, the board itself has admitted the price variation and delay of 176 days was also condoned. In this case, the board itself has admitted the price variation and delay of 176 days was also condoned. In such circumstances, there is no ground to set aside the award passed in this regard." Force-Majeure clause 11 of the contract dated 27.12.1979 is as follows : "If at any time during the continuance of the contract the performance in whole or part be prevented or delayed, no reason of delay in delivery will be accepted Force Majeure conditions which include strike, lockout etc." It is clearly borne out from clause 11 of the aforesaid agreement that if for some unforceable circumstances the delivery of the article in question could not be completed within the stipulated period either on account of strike of the workers or on account of lockout by the management, out of extension of 305 days, the appellant had accepted extension for 176 days which was the period lost on account of strike. The remaining period of 129 days which was due to lockout was not accepted. In para 9 of the memorandum of appeal the appellant has inter alia contended that the aforesaid period of lockout does not come under force majeure clause since the lockout is the act of the employer and on that account it has been alleged that there was loss of production in the respondents company for a period of 229 days w.e.f. 9th November, 1979 to 17th March, 1980, i.e., 136 days and on account of alleged strike from 30.6.1980 to 19.9.1980, i.e., 99 days and 76 days were alleged to have been lost preceding and succeeding the lockout and closer and the board after considering all the facts and circumstance took the lenient view to which the GEC was not entitled and had granted extension for 176 days and for the remaining period the pre-estimated damage/penalty as per the agreed terms was levied. I am of the view that the aforesaid contention of the appellant is wholly contrary and inconsistent with clause 11 of the contract as reproduced herein above. 22. With regard to the next contention of the appellant that no financial liability can be fastened on the purchaser on account of price variation due to delay in delivery of the articles beyond the stipulated period. 22. With regard to the next contention of the appellant that no financial liability can be fastened on the purchaser on account of price variation due to delay in delivery of the articles beyond the stipulated period. I am of the view that the contention is wholly untenable, since the appellant has failed to appreciate that it was due to force majeure conditions that the delivery could not be made by the respondents company to the appellant within the stipulated period and it is for this reason that the appellant had by its own letter, dated 19.5.1981 approved the claim of the respondents for price variation stating inter alia that the case of the respondents for extension of time of delivery of the articles had been allowed on account of force majeure clause and the time for delivery of the Transformers in question was extended and was to commence from 23.1.1981. The appellants had further agreed that the price variation claim during the extended delivery period was to be borne out by the purchaser as per clause No. 2(a) of the purchase order. 23. With regard to the contention of the appellants that the period of lockout prior to purchase order could not be allowed and the respondents were not entitled to the benefit on account of price variation for a period of 53 days, I am of the view that this contention is highly erroneous and contrary to amended clause 3 of the purchase order and the said amendment as contained in the appellants' letter dated 4th March, 1980 provides as under : "In advertantly it had been mentioned in the subject cited purchase order at clause No. (3) - Delivery has to commence in 7 months from date of receipt of the detailed purchase order and completion @ 2 units per month thereafter. In this regard your attention is invited vide No. RSEB/SE/SSPC/E.3/D.8433 dated 31.10.79 from which it is clearly mentioned that the supplies are to commence in 7 months and complete @ 2 units/month from the date of letter of acceptance i.e. 21.10.1979". In this regard your attention is invited vide No. RSEB/SE/SSPC/E.3/D.8433 dated 31.10.79 from which it is clearly mentioned that the supplies are to commence in 7 months and complete @ 2 units/month from the date of letter of acceptance i.e. 21.10.1979". It is thus evident from the above that as per the aforesaid amendment supplies were to commence within 7 months form the date of letter of acceptance i.e. 31.10.1979 which admittedly was prior to 9.11.1979 i.e., when lockout was declared and, therefore, the price variation to cover the said period between 9.11.1979 to 17.3.1980 was correctly and validly awarded. With regard to the appellants' contention that the claim for additional 76 days was not allowable on account of strike or lockout which was not certified, the respondents were not entitled for any benefit for the said period, I am of the opinion that this contention of the appellants is wholly untenable in view of force majeure clause 11 of the agreement which provides as under : "Provide further that the deliveries under the contract shall be resumed as soon as practicable after such event(s) has/have ceased to exist." I am fortified in my observations from the findings recorded by learned District Judge wherein it is stated that period of 229 days as certified by Labour Commissioner were lost due to strike and lockout for which it was not practicable to commence the production immediately after the events had ceased to exist i.e., after 19.9.1980. Thereafter a reasonable period of 76 days was calculated to resume the production. I am of the view that the claim of the respondent cannot be said to be unreasonable, since it is entirely covered under the force majeure clause 11 of the agreement and the learned arbitrator had duly considered this aspect on the basis of documentary evidence tendered by the parties and thus allowed the claim of the respondents. Hence, there is no mistake or error apparent on the record in passing the impugned award which had been made the Rule of the Court by learned District Judge. Ground of interest : In this regard the appellants have contended inter alia that the arbitrator was entitled to grant simple interest on the principal interest at the rate of 12% upto 12.2.1987. The arbitrator is fully entitled to grant interest upto the date of reference. Ground of interest : In this regard the appellants have contended inter alia that the arbitrator was entitled to grant simple interest on the principal interest at the rate of 12% upto 12.2.1987. The arbitrator is fully entitled to grant interest upto the date of reference. The subject contract was a contract for sale of goods. The Sale of Goods Act provides for the grant of such interest. This would appear from the following : "That in terms of the provision contained in Section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act, interest can be awarded even in the absence of any specific stipulation in the agreement/contract as the right to such interest is statutorily conferred by the Section. The arbitrator is empowered to award interest. Interest by way of damages and special damages : (2) in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the court may award interest at such rates as it thinks fit on the amount of the price - (a) to the seller in a suit by him for the amount of the price from the date of the tender of the goods or from the date on which the price was payable ............" I am fortified in my observations from the provision contained in Section 61 of the Sales of Goods Act which permits the award of interest by the arbitrator even in absence of any specific stipulation in the agreement/contract, since the right interest has been statutorily conferred by the said provision and the arbitrator is empowered to award interest. Reference may be invited to Section 61 as quoted hereinabove : (b) Regarding the grant of interest for the period up to the date of reference, I am of the view that learned arbitrator is fully empowered to award the same and in this regard I am a fortified from the observations of the Apex Court in the matter of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Govt. of Orissa and others v. Secretary to Govt. of Orissa and others, (supra) wherein the Apex Court had held as under : "A person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. of Orissa and others v. Secretary to Govt. of Orissa and others, (supra) wherein the Apex Court had held as under : "A person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. This basic consideration is as valid for the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator entering upon the reference. This is the principle of Section 34, CPC and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator. An arbitrator is an alternative form for resolution of disputes arising between the parties." The Apex Court further held in this context that if the arbitrator has no power to award pendente lite interest, then the party would have to approach the Court which evidently would lead to multiplicity of proceedings and since the arbitrator is a creature of the agreement, it is open to the parties to confer such power upon him and prescribe such procedure for him to follow so long as it is not opposed to law. It was further held by the Apex Court that even if the arbitrator does not give any reason, the award is not open to challenge merely on that ground, since the arbitrator is not obliged to give reasons unless so stipulated in the agreement itself. It was further held by the Apex Court as under : "Where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute (along with the claim for principal amount or independently), is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest pendente lite. This is for the reason that in such a case it must be presumed that interest was an implied term of the agreement between the parties and therefore, when the parties refer all their disputes-or refer the dispute as to interest as such-to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest. This does not mean that in every case the arbitrator should necessarily award interest pendente lite. This does not mean that in every case the arbitrator should necessarily award interest pendente lite. It is a matter within his discretion to be exercised in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping the ends of justice in view." Likewise in the matter of Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (supra), the Apex Court while relying upon the observations of the Constitution Bench in the matter of Secretary, Irrigation Department v. G. C. Roy, (supra) held thus : "The arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period commencing with the date of award to the date of decree or date of realisation whichever is earlier. This is also quite logical for, while award of interest for the period prior to an arbitrator entering upon the reference is a matter of substantive law, the grant of interest for the post-award period is a matter of procedure. Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure provides both for awarding of interest pendente lite as well as for the post-decree period and the principle of Section 34 has been held applicable to proceedings before the arbitrator, though the section as such may not apply." 24. With regard to the plea of the appellants regarding the cross-examination of Mr. Motwani its witness, I am of the opinion that there is no substance in this contention for the reason that the said witness was cross-examined for number of days and the respondents had not raised any plea that sufficient opportunity was not given to it to cross-examine the said witness. The respondents have also not complained that any prejudice was caused to them and, therefore, the question of appellants claiming that sufficient opportunity was not given to cross-examine the said witness, does not arise. This aspect has also been elaborately dealt with by the learned District Judge in para 19 of his judgment and as such I do not find any misconduct on the part of learned arbitrator in holding the proceedings in accordance with law. I am further of the view that the question regarding appreciation of evidence cannot be raised by a party in appeal before this Court, since such questions have already been dealt with and examined at length by learned District Judge. 25. I am further of the view that the question regarding appreciation of evidence cannot be raised by a party in appeal before this Court, since such questions have already been dealt with and examined at length by learned District Judge. 25. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and also examined the relevant documents on the record and also the legal position on the subject. I am of the considered opinion that there is no illegality committed either by learned arbitrator or by learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur while deciding the controversy between the parties which has already been culminated by making the award a Rule of the Court by a well reasoned Judgment and decree dated 23rd May, 1994. 26. As a result of the above discussions the appeal preferred by the appellant RSEB is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 23.5.1994 passed by learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case No. 58/90 is confirmed. There will be no order as to costs. The summoned record by sent back forthwith. Appeal dismissed.