Honble GODARA, J. – This appeal has been filed u/s 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance against the judgment and decree dated1.9.1994 passed by the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur in Civil First Appeal No. 16/80. (2) Briefly stated, the facts of the plaintiff-appellants case giving rise to the appeal are that the plaintiff instituted a suit in the Court of District Judge, Balotra for recovery of Rs. 10,838.75 with interest till the date of institution of the suit, amounting to Rs.1,644/- and notice expenses of Rs. 17 .25, aggregating to Rs. 12,500/- against the defendant- respondents. The plaintiff entered into an agreement on 1.9.1975 with the Rajasthan Salt Authority thereby agreeing to purchase 20,000/- quintals of selt @ Rs. 2.80 per quintal in the months of January to March, 1975, who was required to lift this quantity of salt by 31.3.1975 and thereafter the rate of salt was agreed to be Rs. 3.25 per quintal. (3) The plaintiff applied for release of 17 wagons salt for being transported to the North Bihar in C-Class quota in the month of February, 1975 and deposited the amount @ Rs.2.80 per quintal on 29.4.1975 with the Salt Authorities. But, in the mea- nwhile, the Railway Authorities informed that no wagon could be released for transportation to North Bihar and, therefore, the quota of 17 wagons of salt could not be transported. However, on 28.4.1975, the Railways Authorities informed that the order of stoppage of allotment of wagons to North Bihar had been lifted for February and March,1975 quota and hence the salt could be loaded in the wagons upto 30.4.1975. On approaching the Salt Authorities for release of 17 wagons of salt to North Bihar,the plaintiff was asked to deposit the amount @ Rs. 3.25 per quintal and, accordingly, the plaintiff deposited the amount of difference working out between Rs. 3.25 and Rs. 2.80 per quintal for 17 wagons of salt with the Bank in the account of the respondents. He transported salt to North Bihar between 1.5. 1975 to 6.5.1975. 3.25 per quintal and, accordingly, the plaintiff deposited the amount of difference working out between Rs. 3.25 and Rs. 2.80 per quintal for 17 wagons of salt with the Bank in the account of the respondents. He transported salt to North Bihar between 1.5. 1975 to 6.5.1975. Lastly, on 18.8.1975, the plaintiff deposited price of 25 wagons of Salt @ 3.25 per quintal and sent the indent to the Salt Authorities and the same was accepted however, in place of 25 wagons of salt, Salt Authorities released two wagons of salt and so remaining 23 wagons of salt were not released inspite of its price having been so deposited with in the account of the Salt Authorities. On 29.6. 1975, the plaintiff was informed that the amount deposited towards release of 23 wagons of salt stood adjusted towards the balance of difference of salt price, which was to be lifted by the plaintiff @ Rs. 3.25 on the ground that at the time of release of salt earlier @ Rs. 3.25 per quintal, the plaintiff was required to deposit price of the salt @ Rs. 6.50 per quintal instead of @. 3.25 per quintal. This was seriously disputed by the plaintiff. Lastly, serving a notice on the respondents, the plaintiff filed the suit, as above. (4) The defendant-respondents defended the suit mainly on the ground during the relevant period, i.e. in the months of April, May and June, 1975, the price of salt was raised from Rs. 3.25 per quintal to Rs. 6.50 per quintal while the plaintiff depo- sited the price of 17 wagons of salt @ 3.25 per quintal and so the difference of amount was adjusted against the price of 23 wagons of salt. (5) The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit while admitting the defence of the defendants and hence, the plaintiff preferred Civil First Appeal in the High Court. (6) The Honble single Judge, vide impugned judgment, brushed aside the de- fence of the respondents and held that the agreed rate of salt to be supplied to the plaintiff appellant stood to be @ 3.25 per quintal and not @ Rs. 6.50 per quintal, as was the defence of the defendant-respondents and, consequently, while reversing the judgement and decree dismissing the suit, the appeal was accepted and the plaintiffs suit for amount totalling Rs. 6.50 per quintal, as was the defence of the defendant-respondents and, consequently, while reversing the judgement and decree dismissing the suit, the appeal was accepted and the plaintiffs suit for amount totalling Rs. 12,500/- as detailed hereinbefore,was decre- ed against the respondents.However, the learned single Judge passed no order as to costs. Besides no pendente lite and future interest on the principal amount was either allowed or disallowed and hence,being aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellant preferred this appeal, as above. (7) We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. (8) The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Bhandari, relying on the decisions rendered and reported in West Bengal Financial Corporation & Anr. vs. Bertram Scot(I) Ltd. (In liquidation) (1) and Gheesalal vs. Moolia & Anr. (2), has contended that the Honble Single Judge though rightly accepted the appeal thereby decreeing the principal amount besides the interest claimed @ 12% on the same amount for the period prior to the date of institution of the suit as well as the other expenses claimed in the suit but, at the same time, no order awarding any interest on the principle amount from the date of institution to the date of decree as well as from the date of decree to the date of payment of the principal amount has been passed nor there is any mention of either allowing or disallowing the same. That being so, according to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 34 of the CPC, when the ap- pellate decree is silent with respect to payment of further interest from the date of decree to the date of payment or other earlier, the appellate Court is deemed to have refused such interest. It was incumbents on the Honble Single Judge while passing the decree to have assigned reasons before omitting to pass any order for allowing or disallowing the same. Therefore, when the principal amount of decree dates back to the year 1975 and the interest claimed for the period prior to the date of institution of the suit has been rightly decreed, there was no justification for depriving the appellant of the interest for the period from the date of institution of the suit to the date of payment of the principal amount. (9) His next contention is that, similarly, accoding to the provisions of Sec. 35, CPC, the appellant ought to have been awarded costs of the trial court as well as the appellate Court and, in absence of reasons therefor, he could not be deprived of the same. (10) The learned counsel for the respondents opposing the same, contended that the Honble Single Judge, in exercise of its judicial discretion, did not think it just and proper to award interest from the date of the suit to the date of payment and, similarly costs were made easy and hence there is no illegality in the impugned decree in respect of non-awarding of interest and disallowance of costs to the appellant, warranting any interference or modification in the same. (11) We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the parties and have considered the judgment and decree under appeal. (12) As regards merits of the impugned decree, besides the aforesaid contentions,since the defendant-respondents have not challenged the same the same has acquired finality against them. As regards interest for the period prior to the date of the suit, a sum of Rs. 1,644/- was claimed on the principal amount of Rs. 10,838.75 and the same stands decreed by the first appellate Court. However, there is omission of mention of either allowance or disallowance of interest from the date of the suit to the date of payment of the principal amount decreed, in the appellate judgment and decree. 1,644/- was claimed on the principal amount of Rs. 10,838.75 and the same stands decreed by the first appellate Court. However, there is omission of mention of either allowance or disallowance of interest from the date of the suit to the date of payment of the principal amount decreed, in the appellate judgment and decree. (13) It is worthwhile to quote Sec. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as under : ``34 Interest : -(1) Where and insofar as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonalbe to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addi- tion to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest of such rate not exceeding six per cent, per annum, as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit: Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transanction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent, per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions. Explanation I - In this sub-section,`` nationalised bank means a corresponding new bank as defined in the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. Explantation II- For the purposes of this section,a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry,trade or business of the party incurring the liability. (2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such principal sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit shall not lie. (2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such principal sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit shall not lie. (14) Keeping in view the aforesaid provisions of sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 34,CPC, the Judgment/ decree under appeal is silent with respect to the payment of interest from the date of the decree to the date of payment or any other date and hence the same is deemed to have been refused. The learned single Judge held that an amount @ Rs. 3.25 per quintal for 25 wagons of salt, including the suit amount of Rs. 10,838.75 (to be called principal amount hereinafter) was deposited with and accepted by the Salt Authorities on 18. 8.1975 and same was wrongfully appropriated otherwise and the defence plea having been brushed aside, as being untenable, at the same time, though there was a clear demand of decree for payment of interest pendente lite and further till realisation of the decretal amount, no order therefor, was passed. (15) We are of the opinion that when the suit was decreed in toto including the amount of interest payable from 18.8.1975 to the date of the suit, in absence of clear and cogent reasons for disallowance of interest for pendente lite and further till payment or realisation of the principal decretral amount ought to have been assigned. In absence of reasons for its disallowance, as has also been held in the case of West Bengal Financial Corporation Ltd & Anr.(Supra) and Gheesa Lals case (supra), unless there are reasons for not awarding pendente lite and future interest, in absence of reasons for not awarding such interest , there is no justification for depriving the successful creditor of the interest.There is only discretion with regard to rate of interest as given in the Sec. 34, CPC but the same, in the aforesaid circumstances, does not vest with a discretion to disallow interest out-right without assigning reasons therefor. Presently, we are not confronted with any reasons. (16)The interest is premium paid for the use of the money by the defendants and so the plaintiff, presently appellant, is entitled to interest unless there are rea- sons in the impugned judgement for its disallowance. (17). Presently, we are not confronted with any reasons. (16)The interest is premium paid for the use of the money by the defendants and so the plaintiff, presently appellant, is entitled to interest unless there are rea- sons in the impugned judgement for its disallowance. (17). As and when question of allowing interest in a decree is under consideration, in respect of interest on the principal/decretal amount during the period from the date of the suit to the date of payment, it depends solely upon the provisions of the Sec.34, CPC. As regards allowance of interest for the period prior to the institution of the suit,the same depends upon the substantive law applicable to the same. Now, interest for the period prior to the date of the suit may be awarded if there is an agreement for payment of interest at a fixed rate, or is payable by the usages of trade having the force of law or under the provision of nay substantive law entitling the plaintiff to recover interest as for instance under the Negotiable Instruments Act etc. Similarly, the Court is competent to award interest u/s 3 of the Interest Act, 1978.But after institution of a suit, the Courts, including the appellate courts, can have resort to the provisions of Sec. 34 C.P.C. (18)The Honble Supreme Court while discussing the parameters for award of interest by an arbitrator, in an appeal, in relation to disputes u/ss. 14&29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940,intits decision in Secretary, Irrigation Department vs. G.C. Ray (3), summarised the principles in para 43 of the judgment in the following words: ``(i) A person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. This basic consideration is invalid for the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator ente- ring upon the reference. This is the principle of Sec.34,CPC and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of the arbitrator. (ii) An arbitrator in an alternative form (sic form) for resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences arising between the parties. This is the principle of Sec.34,CPC and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of the arbitrator. (ii) An arbitrator in an alternative form (sic form) for resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences arising between the parties. If the arbitrator has no power to award interest pendente lite, the party claiming it would have to approach the Court for that purpose, even though he may have obtained satisfaction in respect of other claims from the arbitrator. This would lead to multiplicity of procee- dings. (iii) An arbitrator is the creature of an agreement. It is open to the parties to confer upon him such powers and presecribe such procedure for him to follow, as they thik fit, so long as they are not opposed to law. (The proviso to Sec. 41 and Sec. 3 of Arbitration Act illustrate this point.) All the same, the agreement must be in conformity with law.The arbitrator must also act and make his award in accordance with the general law of the land and the agreement. (iv)Over the years, the English and Indian Courts have acted on the assumption that where the agreement does not prohibit and a party to the reference makes a claim for interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award interest pendente lite. Thawardas has not been followed in the later decisions of this Court. It has been explained and distinguished on the basis that in that case there was no claim for interest but only a claim for unliquidated damages. It has been said repeatedly that observations in the said judgment were not intended to lay down any such absolute or universal rule as they appear to, on first impression. Until a Jena case almost all the Courts in the country had upheld the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendent lite. Continuity and certainty is a highly desirable feature of law. (v) Interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive law,like interest for the period anterior to reference (preference period). for doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always been inferred. Continuity and certainty is a highly desirable feature of law. (v) Interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive law,like interest for the period anterior to reference (preference period). for doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always been inferred. (19) Presently, we, are concerned with the scope, intent and purport of Sec. 34, CPC and the Constitution Bench of Honble Supreme Court has clearly laid down, as above sub-para(i) supra that a person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. It was fur- ther observed that this basic consideration is valid for the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator entering upon the reference. This is the principle of Sec. 34, CPC and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator. (20) Therefore, though a power of award of interest pendente lite and future may be accepted to be discretionary one but the discretion has to exercised in the light of all facts and circumstances of the case, keeping the ends of justice in view. (21) In the decision rendered in Joginder Singh Wasu vs. State of Punjab (4), the Honble Supreme Court while disposing of the Civil Appeal, while awarding interest @ 12% per annum on the amount of arrears if bill of the fees claimed by the appellant from the State of Punjab, observed that the Government had the benefit of use of the said amount for a long number of years so, is liable to pay in- terest. Consequently, we find that the Honble Single Judge was not justified in not awarding pendente lite and future interest in the appeal. (22) As a result of above discussion, we are of the opinion that since the respondent-State received the principal amount of Rs. 10,838.75 as early as on 18.8.1975 and the same was used for its benefit while, on the contrary, the plaintiff stood deprived of its use. (22) As a result of above discussion, we are of the opinion that since the respondent-State received the principal amount of Rs. 10,838.75 as early as on 18.8.1975 and the same was used for its benefit while, on the contrary, the plaintiff stood deprived of its use. He was running a business by trading in salt and so the decretal principal amount was deposited with the Salt Authorities of the respondent State in respect of commercial transaction of salt and hence, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the demand of the appellant, award of interest @ 12% per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 10,838.75 be justifiably allowed and the appeal also be allowed accordingly. There is no substance in the arguments opposed to this conclusion. (23) Next, adverting to the question of refusal of award of costs in the appeal, Sec.35,CPC,inter alia, provides that subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the costs of and incident to all suits shall be in the discretion of the Court, and the Court shall have full power to determine by whom or out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary discretions for the purposes aforesaid. (24) So the costs awardable u/s 35, CPC are in the discretion of the Court whi- ch is to be a judicial one to be exercised on sound legal principles and not by caprice or chance or humour. No hard and fast rule can, however,be laid down and the exercise of such judicial discretion depends upon circumstances of each particular case. (25) In the present case, the Honble Single Judge made the costs easy. The transaction out of the suit culminating into appeals arose, took place on 18.8.1975 and an interest @ 12% per annum right from the said date has been allowed and we have necessarily taken into consideration this aspect of costs as well as while awarding interest throughout at an even rate and, therefore, we do not find any illegality or unfairness or infirmity in the exercise of discretion by the learned single Judge in disallowing costs to the either party. (26) Therefore, we are also not prompted to arrive at a different conclusion than the one held by the learned single Judge and we find no merit in this contention and reject the same. (27) On the basis of facts and circumstances discussed hereinbefore, this ap- peal merits acceptance in part. (28) As a result, we accept this appeal in part thereby modifying the judgment and decree under appeal to the extent that the plaintiff appellant shall also be entitled to pendente lite and future interest @ Rs. 12% per annum on Rs. 10,838.75. However, in the circumstances already narrated hereinbefore, costs of this appeal are also made easy.