Judgment B.N.Agrawal, J. 1. The sole petitioner has moved this Court by filing the present writ application for quashing his prosecution under Section 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act"). 2. Short facts are that the complainant, who was appointed as Inspector by the Central Government under Section 28 of the Act, filed a petition of complaint in the court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chas, for prosecution of the petitioner and its Resident Engineer under Section 24 of the Act alleging therein that the accused persons were contractors of Bharat Coking Coal Limited and were engaged in the work of construction and commissioning of coal washery and on 30-3-1989 when the establishment of the accused was inspected, it was found that abstract of the Act and Rules in Engsish and Hindi in the approved form was not displayed. 3. Upon filing of the petition of complaint, the learned Magistrate took cognizance and summoned the accused persons to face trial. Hence this application. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in support of this application contended that in view of the provisions of Section 26 of the Act cognizance can be taken of any offence under this Act upon a complaint made by or with the previous sanction in writing of the Inspector which would mean Inspector appointed by the appropriate Government under Section 28 of the Act, and in the case of the petitioners establishment, the appropriate Government would be State Government and not Central Government, therefore, cognizance could have been taken only upon the complaint filed by Inspector appointed by the State Government, but in the case in hand, no complaint was filed by any such Inspector, rather same was filed by Inspector appointed by the Central Government 5. The question, which falls for consideration by this Court, is as to which is the appropriate Government in relation to establishment of the petitioner whether Central Government or State Government. Undisputedly, petitioners establishment was at the relevant time engaged in the work of construction of coal washery in the State of Bihar. Section 28 of the Act confers power upon the appropriate Government to appoint an Inspector for the purposes of this Act, and to define his local limits within which he shall exercise the power under the Act, viz. Undisputedly, petitioners establishment was at the relevant time engaged in the work of construction of coal washery in the State of Bihar. Section 28 of the Act confers power upon the appropriate Government to appoint an Inspector for the purposes of this Act, and to define his local limits within which he shall exercise the power under the Act, viz. inter alia, power to inspect, search and seize. Relevant portion of Section 28 of the Act runs as follows ; "28. Inspecting staff. (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be inspectors for the purposes of this Act, and define the local limits within which they shall exercise their powers under this Act. (2) Subject to any rules made in this behalf, an inspector may, within the local limits for which he is appointed, (a) enter, at all reasonable hours, with such assistance (if any) being persons in the service of the Government or any local or other public authority as he thinks fit, any premises or place where contract labour is employed, for the purpose of examining any register or record or notices required to be kept or exhibited by or under this Act or rules made thereunder, and require tht production thereof for inspection ; (b) examine any person whom he finds in any such premises or place and who, he has reasonable cause to believe, is a workman employed therein ; (c) require any person giving out work and any workman, to give any information, which is in his power to give with respect to the names and addresses of the persons to, for and from whom the work is given out or received, and with respect to the payments to be made for the work ; (d) seize or take copies of such register, record of wages of notices or portions thereof as he may consider relevant in respect of an offence under this Act which he has reason to believe has been committed by the principal employer or contractor ; and (e) exercise such other powers as may be prescribed." 6. The expression "appropriate Government" has been defined under Section 2(l)(a) of the Act to mean in relation to an establishment in respect of which the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as 1947 Act) is the Central Government, the Central Government and in relation to any other establishment appropriate Government is Government of State within which that establishment is situated and the same reads thus : "2(1)(a)."appropriate Government" means, (i) in relation to an establisment in respect of which the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), is the Central Government, the Central Government, (ii) in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situate," 7. According to Section 2(a) of 1947 Act, appropriate Government would mean in relation to any industrial dispute concerning inter alia, a mine Central Government, and in relation to any other industrial dispute the State Government. According to Section 2(a) of 1947 Act, appropriate Government would mean in relation to any industrial dispute concerning inter alia, a mine Central Government, and in relation to any other industrial dispute the State Government. For better appreciation, it will be useful to quote the aforesaid provision, which runs thus : "2(a) "appropriate Governments means (i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such control industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning (a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Worker s (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India established under Section 3 of the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 (15 of 1948), or the Employees State Insurance Corporation established under Section 3 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of trustees constituted under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (45 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State Board of Trustees constituted under Section 5-A and Section 5-B, respectively, of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the "Indian Airlines" and "Air India" Corporations established under Section 3 of the Air Coporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953), or the Life Insurance Corporation of India established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or the Oil and Natural Gas Commissioner established under Section 3 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 (43 of 1959), or the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under Section 3, or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section 16 of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or the International Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3 of the International Airports Authority of India Act, 1971 (43 of 1971), or a Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India Limited ; or a banking or an insurance company, aa mine, an oilfield, a Cantonement Board, or a major port, the Central Government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, the State Gorvernment," (Emphasis added) From a bare perusal of the aforesaid definition, it would appear that petitioners establishment does not come in any of the categories of establishments enumerated therein, excepting mine. Whether the establishment in question will come within the expression "mine" has to be considered. The expression "mine" has been defined under sub-section (1-b) of Section 2 of 1947 Act to mean a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (hereinafter to be referred to as 1952 Act). 8. Section 2(1)(j) of is 1952 Act, which defines "mine", reads thus : "2(1)(j) "mine" means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on and includes: (i) all borings, bore, holes, oil wells and accessory, crude conditioning plants, including the pipe conveying minerals oil within the oilfields ; (ii) all shafts, in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine, whether in the course of being sunk or not ; (iii) all levels and inclined planes in the course of being driven ; (iv) all open cast workings ; (v) all conveyors or aerial ropeways provided for the bringing into or removal from a mine of minerals or other articles or for the removal of refuse therefrom ; (vi) all adits, levels, planes, machinery, works, railways, tramways, and sidings in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine ; (vii) all protective works being carried out in or adjacent to a mine ; (viii) all workshops and stores situated within the precincts of mine and under the same management and used primarily for the purposes connected with that mine or a number of mines under the same management ; (ix) all power stations, transformer sub-stations, convertor stations, rectifier stations and accumulator storage stations for supplying electricity solely or mainly for the purpose of working the mine or a number of mines under the same management ; (x) any premises for the time being used for depositing sand or other material for use in a mine or for depositing refuse from a mine or in which any operations in connection with such sand, refuse or other material is being carried on, being premises exclusively occupied by the owner of the mine ; (xi) any premises in or adjacent to and beloning to a mine on which any process ancillary to the getting, dressing or preparation for sale of minerals or of coke is being carried on ; (Emphasis added). From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions it would appear that establishment of the petitioner, which was engaged in the construction of coal washery, cannot be said to be a "mine", as in the process of construction of coal washery, no operation for the purpose of searching or obtaining minerals is carried out. The work undertaken by the petitioners establishment for construction of coal washery cannot come within clauses (i) to (x) of the said Section 2(1)(j). The only question, which has to be considered is as to whether such a type of establishment would come within the ambit of clause (xi) of the said Section 2(1)(j). According to said clause, if on any premises belonging to a mine on which any process ancillary to dressing etc. of coke or minerals is being carried on, then such premises shall be included within the inclusive definition of mine. The establishment of the petitioner was constructing coal washey at the relevant time for the purposes of dressing of coke and the process of dressing coke can be carried out only after the construction work of washery is completed. Can it be said that work of construction of coal washery is a process, which is ancillary to dressing of coke ? In this connection, reference may be made to Chambers English Dictionary, according to which, the expression "ancillary" means, inter alia, subsidiary. According to the Law Lexicon, ancillary means aiding. The ancillary process should be supplemental to and subsidiary to the process of dressing of coke. As for example, in a coal washery activity relating to disposal of sludge/slurry coming out from washery of coal mine can be said to be a process, which is ancillary to the dressing of coke. This matter fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, 1990(2) BLJR 1395, wherein question had arisen whether activity relating to disposal of sludge/slurry escaping from washery of a coal mine and deposited in the bed of river and other land would come within the definition of mine as the same is a process ancillary to dressing of coke. The apex court in that case laid down that the said activity would come within the sweep of definition of mine, under Section 2(1)(j) of 1952 Act. The apex court in that case laid down that the said activity would come within the sweep of definition of mine, under Section 2(1)(j) of 1952 Act. Thus, in my view, work of construction of coal washery cannot be said to be ancillary to the dressing of coke as the same has no co-relation with the dressing operation. Therefore, establishment of the petitioner cannot be said to be a mine within the meaning of the aforesaid sub-section. 9. Reference in this connection may be made to two decisions of this Court one in the case of Jarwan Mistry v. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court No. 3 and others, 1987 PLJR 749, and the other in the case of Messrs McNally Bharat Engineering Company Limited and another v. The Rashtriya Colliery Majdoor Sangh, Rajendra Nath, Dhanbad and others, CWJC No. 56 of 1982(R), disposed of on 4th January, 1989. In the former case, an application was filed under Section 33-C(2) of 1947 Act before the Labour Court by a workman, who was engaged in construction of coal washery. The said application was rejected by the Labour Court on the ground that the same was not maintainable and when the matter was brought to this Court, the order was upheld and it was held that coal washery under construction cannot be said to be a mine within the meaning of Section 2(1)(j) of 1952 Act, as no process of dressing of coke is carried out therein. In the latter case, an application was filed under Rule 25 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971 before Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), New Delhi, by a Labour Union in relation to the demand of workmen engaged in construction of coal washery and preliminary objection was raised that the application was not maintainable, but the same was overruled by the Chief Labour Commissioner. When . the matter was brought to this Court by filing a writ application, the same was allowed, order passed by the Chief Labour Commissioner was quashed and it was held that the application was not maintainable as washery under construction cannot be said to a mine within the meaning of Section 2(1)(j) of 1952 Act 10. When . the matter was brought to this Court by filing a writ application, the same was allowed, order passed by the Chief Labour Commissioner was quashed and it was held that the application was not maintainable as washery under construction cannot be said to a mine within the meaning of Section 2(1)(j) of 1952 Act 10. From a conspectus of the aforesaid provisions it becomes plain that appropriate Government in relation to establishment of the petitioner would be State Government within the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) of the Act, therefore, Inspector appointed by the State Government under Section 28 of the Act can alone exercise powers conferred upon an Inspector under the Act. One of the powers exercisable by Inspector is under Section 26 of the Act to file complaint or grant sanction in writing for filing complaint if there is violation of the provisions of the Act. Section 27 prescribes period of limitation for launching prosecution. I may usefully quote the aforesaid two provisions, which read thus : "26. Cognizance of offences.No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act except on a complaint made by, or with the previous sanction in writing of, the inspector and no Court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this Act. 27. Limitation of prosecutions. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act unless the complaint thereof is made within three months from the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an inspector : Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a written order made by an inspector, complaint thereof may be made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed." (emphasis added) In Section 26 the expression used is "the inspector", whereas in proviso to Section 27, the expression used is "an inspector". In proviso to Section 27 the Legislature has deliberately used the expression "an inspector" as it intended that if an order passed by any Inspector, irrespective of fact whether appointend by the Central Government or State Government, is disobeyed, then period of limitation for filing complaint is six months from the date of commission of the offence. In proviso to Section 27 the Legislature has deliberately used the expression "an inspector" as it intended that if an order passed by any Inspector, irrespective of fact whether appointend by the Central Government or State Government, is disobeyed, then period of limitation for filing complaint is six months from the date of commission of the offence. On the other hand, in Section 26 instead of using the expression "an inspector" the Legislature has used the expression "the inspector", object of whch appears to be that in case of establishment in relation to which appropriate Government is Central Government, the Inspector appointed by Central Government alone can launch prosecution and nobody else ; whereas in relation to establishment like the petitioner "appropriate Government" is State Government and prosecution can be launched by Inspector appointed by the State Government. In my view, giving any other interpretation would frustrate very purposes of the legislation, therefore, I am clearly of the view that the inspector appointed by the Central Government, who has launched prosecution against the petitioner, was not competent to file the complaint, and accordingly, prosecution of the petitioner becomes unwarranted the same being in violation of the provisions of Section 26 of the Act. 11 Accordingly, this application is allowed and prosecution of the petitioner is hereby quashed. Ashish N.Trivedi, J. 12 I agree.