Judgment :- 1. Aggrieved against the order of the Urban Land Tax Tribunal (Subordinate Judge), Kancheepuram, dated 11.7.1994 and made in CMA. Nos. 36 and 38 of 1993. The Special Tahsildar, Urban Land Tax, Kancheepuram, has filed the above two revisions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, before this Court. 2. The respondent herein in both the cases is Kancheepuram Co-operative House Building Society. The facts leading to the filing of the above revisions as seen from the pleadings of both parties are narrated hereunder. 3. The respondent herein is a registered Housing Society and its primary object is to acquire lands, lay out and re-distribute to the needy houseless persons as per the policy and schemes of the Government of Tamil Nadu in the Co-operation Department. The said society after acquiring certain lands for the above said purpose laid out the area into a housing colony by name Dr. Arignar Anna Nagar and got the approval from Director of Town and Country Planning by dividing it into 161 plots after allocating almost 1/3rd of the entire area for public purposes such as street, play-ground, park etc., for the use of plot owners even as early as in the year 1985. It is further averred that the society has already allotted the said plots to its various members as early as on 30.3.1988 by the resolution No. 145 and necessary allotment orders along with delivery of possession to the allottees was done. The public roads and public places are being maintained and prepared for further improvement for the use of the allottees. The allottees right from 1988 are entitled to construct their own houses with then own funds or can obtain a no objection certificate and get loan from Governmental Agencies or can themselves apply for loan from the Society. An order of allotment coupled with the delivery of possession of the site to the respective allottee is the mode of transfer and accepted in the Co-operative Department and its Governmental Agencies in respect of such allotments. A regular immediate transfer deed executed and registered was not given to the allottees to see that the allottee himself construct the building instead of speculating and alienating to third parties and defeating the purpose of housing under Co-operative schemes. A regular immediate transfer deed executed and registered was not given to the allottees to see that the allottee himself construct the building instead of speculating and alienating to third parties and defeating the purpose of housing under Co-operative schemes. Hence, the absence of formal usual registered sale deed in not fatal to the case of the Society and it cannot be said to be the owner of the 202 grounds on the date of impugned owner. 4. It is seen from the order of the first authority viz., Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, that the Society has to pay a sum of Rs. 47,932 towards Urban Land Tax for Fell 1401 onwards with penalty for not filing the returns in time. 5. Aggrieved against the said order, the Society has filed appeals viz., CMA. Nos. 36 and 38 of 1993 before the Appellate Authority, viz., Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Tribunal, Kancheepuram. Before the Tribunal, the Society put forth their case regarding the object of the said Society, the manner and mode of distribution of various plots after laying out to the houseless members of the said Society. The Society has also pleaded that as per the provisions of the Urban Land Tax Act more particularly in the light of S. 2 Sub-clause 10 contended that Society is not the owner of the said lands, hence the impugned order levying urban land tax on the entire holding of the lands by the first authority is contrary to law and prayed to set aside the said order. Even though notice has been served on the Special Tahsildar Urban Land Tax, Kancheepuram, nobody appeared before the Appellate Authority. By order dt. 11.7.1994 after considering the case of the appellant and in the light of the provisions referred above allowed both the appeals and set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, Kancheepuram. Aggrieved by the said orders, the Special Tahsildar, Urban Land Tax, who fail to appear before the Appellate Authority has been approached this Court by way of present revisions. I have heard Mr. Ravi Raja Pandian, learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) and Mr. S.D.N. Vimalanathan, learned counsel for the respondent society. 6. Aggrieved by the said orders, the Special Tahsildar, Urban Land Tax, who fail to appear before the Appellate Authority has been approached this Court by way of present revisions. I have heard Mr. Ravi Raja Pandian, learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) and Mr. S.D.N. Vimalanathan, learned counsel for the respondent society. 6. The learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) after pointing out that no sale deeds have been executed in favour of the successful allottees and of the fact that in the event of non-fulfilment of certain conditions the land revert back to the Society, it is deemed to be the owner of the said lands, hence those lands attract urban land tax under the provisions of Urban Land Tax Act 1966 (hereinafter called as the ‘Act’). No doubt it is true that the reading of the order of the Special Tahsildar, Urban Land Tax, Kancheepuram, shows that the road and the places for the public purposes are not handed over to the Municipality, Kancheepuram and since all the plots are kept vacant, after finding the market value for the “case land” is Rs. 11,950/- per ground as on 1.7.1981 and after adding 10% notional increase per year has fixed a sum of Rs. 47,932/- from Fasli 1401 onwards together with penalty of Rs. 68/-. Now, we are concerned with the urban land tax imposed at the said rate for Faslis 1401 and 1402. 7. It would be seen from the appeal grounds filed by the Society before the Appellant Tribunal as well as from the argument of the learned counsel for the Society, in this revision, the main object of the housing society is to acquire lands, lay out and re-distribute to the needy houseless persons as per the policy of the Government of Tamil Nadu, Co-operative department. In pursuance of the said policy lands were acquired by the Society lay out for sanction and got the approval of the Director of Town Planning. As per the proceedings of the Director of Town Planning 1/3rd of the total area has been ear-marked for public purposes such as street, play-ground, park etc. for the use of the plot owners. It is further seen that the Society has already allotted the said plots to various members as early as on 30.3.1988 as per the resolution No. 145. for the use of the plot owners. It is further seen that the Society has already allotted the said plots to various members as early as on 30.3.1988 as per the resolution No. 145. It is further seen that necessary allotment orders along with the possession of delivery orders were done. In other words the allottees right from 1988 are entitled to construct their own houses with their own funds or can obtain no objection certificate and get a loan from Governmental Agencies or can themselves apply for loan form the Society. The order of allotment coupled with delivery of possession of the site of the respective allottees is a mode of transfer accepted and followed in Co-operative Department as well as its Governmental Agencies. The learned counsel for the Society has also brought to my knowledge, that regular-immediate transfer deed executed and registered is not give to the allottees to see that the allottee himself construct the building instead of speculating and alienating to their parties and defeating the purpose of housing under co-operative schemes. Hence absence of formal usual registered sale deed is not a defect or fatal to the case of the Society, hence the Society cannot said to be the owner of 202 grounds on the date of the order of the Special Tahsildar. 8. Before the Appellate Tribunal four documents have been marked as Exhibits A.1 to A.4. Exhibit A.1 is the Xerox copy of draft lay out. It shows the acquired land has been divided into 160 plots or so and the same has been approved by the competent authority viz., the Director of Town Planning, Madras. Exhibit A.2 dated 30.3.1988 shows details regarding allotment of plots to its members (numbering about 182), Exhibits 2 clearly shows membership number, address, plot number and the area of the plot allowed to the particular person. Exhibit A.3 dated 31.3.88 is a document which shows that the plot belonging to the society has been allotted to one Selvi V.S. Vellivethiar, D/o. V. Subramaniyam, Exhibit A.4 is a letter written by the Commissioner, Kancheepuram Municipality, request the Society (respondent herein) to execute a gift deed with regard to areas-earmarked for street, play ground, park etc., All those documents have been considered by the Appellate Tribunal. As a matter of fact the revision petitioner did not appear and raise any objection before the Appellate Tribunal. As a matter of fact the revision petitioner did not appear and raise any objection before the Appellate Tribunal. On the basis of the above referred documents which clearly prove that the plots have been allotted to various members after an approval by the competent authority viz., the Director of Planning and some of the allottees have also constructed their houses with their own funds and some of them applied for loan through Governmental Agencies. In those circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the revision petitioner is not entitled to impose urban land tax, holding that the Society is the owner of the said plots. 9. Apart from that, when the above said revisions are pending hearing, the respondent-Society filed CMP. No. 16160 of 1996 for reception of two documents viz., resolution dated 30.3.88 and ledger extract as additional documents in support of its case. Even though the petition, affidavit and the copies of the said documents have been served on the revision petitioner, no counter affidavit opposing the said petition has been filed in this Court. However, the learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) submitted that even those documents does not improve the case of the Society. It is true that the first document viz., copy of the resolution dt. 30.3.1988 has already been marked before the Tribunal as Exhibit A.2. Hence in those circumstances the said document is unnecessary. Likewise, the details furnished in the ledger extract as document No. 2 in the said petition are also find place in the very same Exhibit A.2. In those circumstance, I do not found any need to receive the said documents at this stage, since according to me the society has already proved its case before the Tribunal with Ex. A.1 to A.4. Hence, CMP. No. 16160 of 1996 is unnecessary and dismissed. 10. In those circumstance, I do not found any need to receive the said documents at this stage, since according to me the society has already proved its case before the Tribunal with Ex. A.1 to A.4. Hence, CMP. No. 16160 of 1996 is unnecessary and dismissed. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent society has also brought to my notice, definition section in the Act viz., S. 2 sub-clause 10 which is extracted hereunder:— “Owner” includes— (i) any person (including a mortgagee in possession) for the time being receiving or entitled to receive, whether on his own account or as agent, trustee, guardian, manager or receiver or another person or for any religious or charitable purposes, the rent or profits of the urban land or of the building constructed on the urban land in respect of which the word is used: (ii) any person who is entitled to the Kudiwaram in respect of any inam land; but does not include- (a) .. or (b) .. ..” After going through the above said definition in the light of the factual position as demonstrated by the Society and uncontroverted by the revision petitioner before the appellate Tribunal, I am of the view that by no sketch of imagination, the Society could be construed as a owner of the said plots. The expression of “owner” occurring in S. 2 Sub-clause 10 of the Act is quite wide in its amplitude and it is not restricted in the sense it is used in the Contract Act or under Motor Vehicles Act or in the dictionary. The definition “owner” includes all such persons for the time being, receive or entitle to receive, whether on their own account or as agent, trustee, guardian or manager or even an assignee. The mere clause of resumption in the deed of allotment is not sufficient to take out the allottee from the concept of an “owner” of the land for the purpose of Section 5 of the Act. The imposition of the conditions including the condition of resumption in the contingencies contemplated in the deed of allotment does not militate against the concept of the allottee being the “owner” of the land for the purpose of S. 5 of the Act. The imposition of the conditions including the condition of resumption in the contingencies contemplated in the deed of allotment does not militate against the concept of the allottee being the “owner” of the land for the purpose of S. 5 of the Act. Since the definition of an “owner” is an inclusive one and not an exhaustive one there appears to be no justification to treat an allottee not to be an owner. The building constructed thereon for t he time being is, not withstanding the existence of the resumption clause in the deed which clause, as already observed does not militate against the concept of ownership for the purpose of the Act. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondent viz. 1990(2) M.L.J. Page 152 ( Dunlop India Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax and Another ) strengthen the above view. Even though the said decision relate to assignment of the land, as already stated Exhibits A.1 to A.4 produced by the society before the Tribunal amply show that allottees have every right in respect of the plots allotted to them and the existence of resumption clause in the deed of allotment does not take away their right in the plot. 11. In those circumstance, I am in entire agreement with the conclusion reached by the Urban Land Tax Tribunal and I do not find any substance in both the revisions. As a matter of fact the petitioner in both the cases failed to appear before the Tribunal and did not take any step to participate in the proceedings when the appeals are pending before the Appellate Tribunal. In these circumstance, at rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent/society, it is not open to the petitioner viz., The Special Tahsildar, Urban Land Tax to agitate the matter in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hence, looking at any engle I do not find any merit or substance in both the revisions, accordingly they are dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 1,000/-. CMP. No. 16160 of 1996 is dismissed as unnecessary.