JUDGMENT - VISHNU SAHAI, J. :---Vide the judgment and order dated 21st July, 1992, passed in Sessions Case No. 318 of 1991, the VIII Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner stated hereinafter:- (i) Under section 302 I.P.C. to undergo life imprisonment; and (ii) Under section 436 I.P.C. to undergo two years R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to further undergo six months R.I. The sentences of the appellant were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case in brief, as emerging from the recitals contained in the testimony of the informant and three other eye witnesses of the incident, runs as follows:--- The deceased Vithu was the maternal uncle of the informant Keshav Kanha Kadam, P.W.6. On 30th December, 1990, at about 4.00 p.m. while the deceased was busy preparing baskets from bamboo sticks, the appellant Ramesh Nana Ghorpade, came and told him to send his daughter to him for one night. Understandingly, the deceased could not bear this and told the appellant whether his daughter had no parents. At that, the appellant is said to have got enraged and picked up a stick which was lying there and started assaulting the deceased with it. The appellant is alleged to have inflicted a large number of stick blows on the feet. face, chest and head of the deceased. As a result of the assault, the deceased is said to have succumbed to his injuries. Thereafter, appellant set fire to the house of deceased. Apart from the informant, this incident is alleged to have been seen by Rakhmabai Bagale P.W. 1, Sahikabai Kadam P.W. 4 and Gulab Kadam P.W. 5. 3. The F.I.R. of the incident was lodged the same day i.e. on 30th December, 1990 at 5.30 p.m. by P.W. 7 Keshav Kadam at Police Station Shahapur. On the basis of the F.I.R., Ex. 11, a case under sections 302/436/323/504 I.P.C. was registered against the appellant. 4. The investigation was conducted by P.W. 14 Senior P.I., C.I.D., Ashok Wankhede. He reached the place of the incident that very night. He found the corpse of the deceased lying infront of the door of his house. After some time, he arrested the appellant and took into his possession a blood-stained banian, a match-box and some bidis. 4. The investigation was conducted by P.W. 14 Senior P.I., C.I.D., Ashok Wankhede. He reached the place of the incident that very night. He found the corpse of the deceased lying infront of the door of his house. After some time, he arrested the appellant and took into his possession a blood-stained banian, a match-box and some bidis. The next day he interrogated some witnesses under section 161 Cr.P.C. On 2nd January, 1991, at the pointing out of the appellant, he recovered a blood-stained stick. The recovery was made at the instance of the appellant from the bushes situate towards the northern side of Kathodwadi. He sent the clothes of the appellant and some other articles to the Chemical Analyst. He also recovered earth mixed with blood from the place of the incident. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant. 5. In the instant case, the autopsy of the dead body of the deceased was conducted on 31st December, 1990 at 11.00 a.m. by P.W. 10 Dr. Keru More. On the dead body, the doctor found the following injuries :--- I. C.I.W. over skull 3 cm. x 2 cm. scalp deep, margins irregular, haematoma found. II. Abrasion contusion over scalp forehead 3 cm. x 3 cm. haematoma was found. III. C.L.W. over face left side of the mouth angle 3 cm. x 2 cm. margins irregular. Abrasion contusion on left side face and chin 5 cm. x 2 cm. IV. Contusion over back right side scapular region and below scapular region 10 cm. x 5 cm. black redish. three in number. V. Abrasion contusion on right auxiliary region and thoracic region 10 cm. x 5 cm. black, redish, haematoma was found. VI. Abrasion contusion both gluteal region and thigh 10 cm. x 5 cm. VII. Contusion over right mandibular region 5 cm. x 3 cm. haematoma found. In the opinion of the doctor, the deceased died on account of cardio respiratory failure due to shock and concussion and intracranial haemorrhage and intra thoracic haemorrhage. 6. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions in the usual manner where charges under sections 302, 323 and 436 I.P.C. were framed against the appellant. To the aforesaid charges, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. His defence was that of denial. 6. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions in the usual manner where charges under sections 302, 323 and 436 I.P.C. were framed against the appellant. To the aforesaid charges, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. His defence was that of denial. In the trial Court, apart from tendering some documentary evidence, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. Out of them four viz. Rakhmabai Bagale, Shaikabai Kadam, Gulab Kadam and Keshav Kadam P.Ws. 1, 4, 5 and 7 respectively gave an ocular account of the incident. The remaining witnesses included the autopsy surgeon P.W. 10 Dr. Keru More, the Investigating Officer P.W. 14 Senior P.I. Ashok Wankhede and some panch witnesses. The learned trial Judge believed the evidence adduced by the prosecution and passed the impugned order. Hence this appeal. 7. We have heard Miss Aruna Kamat for the appellant and Mr. S.R. Borulkar for the State of Maharashtra. Court has also perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, the material exhibits tendered by the prosecution and the impugned judgment. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter, Court is of the opinion that this appeal deserves to be partly allowed i.e. on the limited question as to what offence is made out and the quantum of sentence to be awarded to the appellant. 8. In the instant case as many as four eye witnesses viz. Rakhmabai Bagale, Shaikabai Kadam, Gulab Kadam and Keshav Kadam P.Ws. 1, 4, 5 and 7 respectively have been examined by the prosecution. After going through their depositions we are firmly of the opinion that their evidence inspires confidence. The manner of assault deposed to by these witnesses viz. that of the appellant assaulting the deceased with a stick is corroborated by a large number of blunt weapon injuries found on the corpse of the deceased by P.W. 10 Dr. Keru More. The statement of the witnesses to the effect that the appellant after assaulting the deceased set fire to his house is corroborated by the recitals in the spot panchanama wherein it is mentioned that the house of the deceased was burnt, the clothes in his house and also the household articles were burnt. Keru More. The statement of the witnesses to the effect that the appellant after assaulting the deceased set fire to his house is corroborated by the recitals in the spot panchanama wherein it is mentioned that the house of the deceased was burnt, the clothes in his house and also the household articles were burnt. Again, corroboration is forthcoming to the testimony of the four eye witnesses by the fact that the F.I.R. of the incident was promptly lodged the same day at 5.30 p.m. i.e. within 1½ hours of the incident taking place. Criminal Courts attach great significance to the lodging of prompt F.I.R. The same substantially reduces chances of embellishment in the prosecution story and the possibility of false implication of accused persons, a possibility which is reduced to the barest minimum in this case because we possibly cannot believe that the informant who had no animus against the appellant would have excluded the real assailant and falsely nominated him. Another circumstance which inspires confidence in the prosecution story is that one of the eye witnesses viz. P.W. 5 Gulab Kadam, a neighbour of the deceased, is a wholly independent witness and had no axe to grind against the appellant. In our view, the learned trial Judge rightly accepted the appellant's involvement in the instant crime. 9. Miss Aruna Kamath, learned Counsel for the appellant made a large number of submissions. She firstly vehemently contended that it would not be safe for us to accept the testimony of P.W. 1 Rakhmabai Bagale, P.W. 4 Shaikabai Kadam and P.W. 7 Keshav Kadam because being the wife, the niece and the nephew of the deceased respectively they are highly interested witnesses. We regret that it would not be possible for us to accede to her contention. Way back in the year 1965, the Apex Court in decisions reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 202, (Masalti and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh)1, and A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 328, (Daryao Singh and others v. State of Punjab)2, held that there is no rule which requires that the testimony of a related witness should be mechanically rejected. In those cases, the Apex Court held that the testimony of an interested witness has only to be evaluated with caution. In those cases, the Apex Court held that the testimony of an interested witness has only to be evaluated with caution. We have exercised that caution while evaluating the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses and we find that there is no such infirmity in their evidence which would make us discard the same. Hence the first submission canvassed by Miss Kamath fails. Miss Kamath secondly contended that the evidence shows that a large number of persons, apart from the four eye witnesses examined by the prosecution, had assembled at the place of the incident. The names of some of these persons have been furnished by Rakhmabai Bagale P.W. 1 in her statement, they being Gulab, Sitya, Parshya, Dundya and Keshav. Miss Kamath urged that had the prosecution story been true, then the prosecution would have adduced the evidence of some of these witnesses. The answer to the submission of Miss Kamath is to be found in the statement of Rakhmabai herself. In her examination-in-chief she stated that the appellant was a bad element in the village and he was harassing people in the village. We feel that on account of this dare-devil reputation of the appellant no one wanted to incur his wrath, and therefore, we are not surprised that no independent witness was prepared to depose against him. Consequently, the second submission of Miss Kamath also fails. Thirdly, Miss Kamath contended that even if the prosecution story is accepted by us to be true, the liability of the appellant would not fall within the ambit of section 302 I.P.C., but only within that contemplated by section 304 Part II of I.P.C. To substantiate her submission Miss Kamath placed before us three circumstances. She firstly urged that even on the own case of the prosecution, there was no background of any malice or ill-will between the appellant on the one hand and the deceased on the other. She secondly urged that the appellant did not go to the place of the incident armed with any weapon and emphasised that the case of the prosecution itself is that when the deceased refused to send his daughter for one night to live with the appellant, the appellant got enraged and picked up a stick which was lying there and proceeded to assault the deceased with the same. She thirdly contended that although the autopsy surgeon found as many as seven injuries on the person of the deceased, but none of these injuries was accompanied by any internal damage, fractures etc. She invited our attention to the fact that the death in the instant case does not appear to be the direct result occasioned of the damage emanating from injuries, but was caused on account of respiratory failure due to shock and concussion and intracranial haemorrhage and intra thoracic haemorrhage. Miss Kamath urged what at the best, which can be canvassed by the prosecution is that when in the aforesaid circumstances the appellant proceeded to assault the deceased he could be fastened with the knowledge of the death of the deceased as contemplated by Second Part of section 304 I.P.C. On the other hand, Mr. Borulkar urged that looking to the large number of injuries inflicted by the appellant on the deceased and the circumstance that the deceased succumbed to his injuries on the spot, the act of the appellant would clearly fall within the mischief contemplated by section 300 I.P.C., the breach of which is punishable under section 302 I.P.C. 10. We have carefully examined the contentions canvassed by learned Counsel for the parties. We regret that we cannot accede to Mr. Borulkar's contention, and in our view, there is ample substance in the contention canvassed by Miss Kamath. The circumstances and the manner in which the incident took place has been detailed by us in the preceding portion of our judgment. The prosecution case is that infuriated by the refusal of the deceased to send his daughter to spend one night with the appellant, the appellant picked up a stick which was and lying nearby and assaulted deceased with it. The prosecution case is that infuriated by the refusal of the deceased to send his daughter to spend one night with the appellant, the appellant picked up a stick which was and lying nearby and assaulted deceased with it. On these facts and bearing in mind that there was no background of malice or ill-will between the appellant on the one hand and the deceased on the other, in our view, the act of the appellant cannot fall in any of the four Clauses contained in section 300 I.P.C. It cannot be said that the appellant intended to cause death as contemplated by the First Clause of section 300 I.P.C. or intended to cause such injury as was likely to cause death as contemplated by Second Clause of section 300 I.P.C or intended to inflict such injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death as contemplated by the Third Clause of section 300 I.P.C. or did an act which he knew was so imminently dangerous as would in all probability cause death as contemplated by Clause Fourthly of section 300 I.P.C. In our view, the manner in which the incident took place coupled with the absence of any previous enmity between the appellant and the deceased would exclude the act of the appellant from falling in the first two Clauses of section 300 I.P.C. In our view, the act of the appellant would also not fall in Third Clause of section 300 I.P.C. because there is no medical evidence to the effect that the injuries inflicted by the appellant were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased. The Apex Court has times out of number held that in order to bring an act within the mischief of Third Clause of section 300 I.P.C., the prosecution has to adduce the evidence that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the instant case, we find that Dr. Keru More P.W. 10 who performed the autopsy of the deceased nowhere stated that the injuries of the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the instant case, we find that Dr. Keru More P.W. 10 who performed the autopsy of the deceased nowhere stated that the injuries of the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. We should not be understood to mean that if there is no medical evidence to the effect that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and the Court feels looking to the nature of injuries that they were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the Court cannot convict an accused under the aforesaid clause. This has been held by the Apex Court in its decision reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 474, (Brij Bhukhan and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh)3, wherein the Apex Court has held that if the Court objectively looking to the nature of the injuries comes to the conclusion that they were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the Court can hold that the act falls within the mischief of Third Clause of section 300 I.P.C. Bearing this in mind, we examined the antemortem injuries suffered by the deceased. We found to our dismay that neither individually nor cumulatively none of the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In fact, all the seven injuries sustained by the deceased were simple in nature. In this view, Miss Kamath is perfectly justified in submitting that a bare perusal of the injuries sustained by the deceased per se shows that they were incapable of causing death in the ordinary course of nature. In this view of matter, the act of the appellant would not fall in Third Clause of section 300 I.P.C. The act of the appellant also would not fall within the mischief of Fourth Clause of section 300 I.P.C. viz. an act which is so imminently dangerous as would in all probability cause death. No one can say that if a person causes seven injuries, all of them being simple in nature, then his act was so imminently dangerous as would in all probability cause death. For the aforesaid reasons, in our view, there is no merit in the submission of Mr. Borulkar. No one can say that if a person causes seven injuries, all of them being simple in nature, then his act was so imminently dangerous as would in all probability cause death. For the aforesaid reasons, in our view, there is no merit in the submission of Mr. Borulkar. In our view, Miss Kamath is perfectly justified in submitting that the worst which can be said against the appellant is that when he chose to inflict a large number of stick injuries on the person of the deceased, the bulk of them being on vital parts of his body, he had knowledge of the death of the deceased as contemplated by the Second Part of section 304 I.P.C. 11. Pursuant to the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Judge erred in convicting the appellant under section 302 I.P.C. Consequently, we set aside his conviction and sentence on that count and instead sentence the appellant to undergo five years R.I. under section 304 Part II I.P.C. However, we uphold the conviction of the appellant under section 436 I.P.C. and the jail sentence of two years R.I. and fine of Rs. 500/- imposed on him on that count, but we reduce the sentence in default of payment of fine from six months R.I. to one month R.I. The substantive sentences of the appellant on both the counts shall run concurrently. We are informed by Miss Kamath that the appellant has served out his sentence. If that be so, he shall be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case. If the appellant has not served out the sentence, he shall be released only after the remaining sentence is served out by him. Office is directed to forthwith communicate the operative portion of our judgment to the trial Court and to the Superintendent of the jail wherein the appellant is detained. Thus, this appeal is partly allowed and partly dismissed. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to put on record our appreciation for the counsel for the parties for arguing this brief with great diligence and fairness. Inspite of being an appointed brief, Miss Kamath left no stone unturned. Appeal partly allowed.