JUDGMENT R. L. Khurana, J.—The sole question for determination in the present second appeal arising out of the judgment and decree Dated 27-4-1989 of the Additional District Judge (I), Kangra, at Dharamshala, reversing the judgment and decree dated 22 11-1983 of the Sub-Judge 1st Class, Dehra, is-—whether Smt Santi was the full owner of the house property in dispute and, therefore, entitled to sell the same in favour of the respondent Bansi Lal, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff’, or else she had only a life interest therein. In other words, whether provisions of section 14 (1), Hindu Succession Act, 19S6 are attracted in the present case or it is to be governed by section 14 (2) thereof, 2. The house property in dispute which was earlier in the form of a "Gohran" (cattle-shed) was jointly owned by S/Shri Daya Ram and Kanshi Ram sons of Smt Santi. On 1-1-1952 both the brothers separated from each other. The joint residential houses were partitioned between them. The house property in dispute and agricultural lands were kept joint. The house in dispute was given by them to their mother Smt. Santi for residence and it was agreed that after her death the same would revert back to them and partitioned thereafter. Smt. Santi started living in the house in dispute since after 1-1-1952. 3. On 1-2-1977 she sold the same in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants (appellants before this Court) are the legal heirs of S/Shri Daya Ram and Kanshi Rant, abovenamed. They are alleged to have taken forcible possession of he house in dispute on 7-5-1978. Hence, a suit for possession thereof was filed by the plaintiff on the basis of title. 4. The defendants contested the suit. It was averred that Smt. Santi was not the owner of the house in dispute, which was given to her by her sons only for the purpose of residence during her life time. After the death of Smt. Santi. the house in dispute has reverted back to them and they are in possession thereof as owners. The sale made by Smt. Santi in favour of the plaintiff was denied for want of knowledge. It was averred that even if there be such a sale, the same was made by Smt. Santi without authority and as such, was null and void and not binding on their rights. 5. The sale made by Smt. Santi in favour of the plaintiff was denied for want of knowledge. It was averred that even if there be such a sale, the same was made by Smt. Santi without authority and as such, was null and void and not binding on their rights. 5. The trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 22-11-1985 dismissed the suit. It was held that Smt. Santi was not the owner of the house in dispute and as such, the sale deed executed by her did not confer any right or title on the plaintiff’ 6. The plaintiff appealed before the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala The appeal was heard by the learned Additional District Judge (I), Kangra at Dharamshala, who allowed the appeal, reversed the findings of the trial Court and granted a decree for possession of the house in dispute in favour of the plaintiff. The first appellate Court came to the conclusion that the he use in dispute was given to Smt. Santi by her sons in lieu of maintenance, therefore, she became the absolute owner thereof by virtue of section 14 (1), Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short : the Act). She had sold the house in dispute in favour of the plaintiff vide a valid sale deed and that the plaintiff was entitled to possession thereof. 7. The defendants have thus approached this Court by way of the present appeal. Section 14 of the Act reads :—- “4. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—(\) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation,—-In this sub-section, "property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property,” In case the rights acquired by Smt. Santi qua the house in dispute on 1-1-1952 vide document Ex. D-l are to be governed by sub-section (1) of section 14 (quoted above), she would be deemed to have become full and absolute owner of the house in dispute on the coming into force of the Act with effect from 17-6-1956, and, thus, competent to sell the same. In that event no fault can be found with the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and the present appeal will have to be dismissed. 8. On the other hand, if the case is found to be governed by sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, then Smt. Santi did not become the absolute owner of the house in dispute and, therefore, was not competent to dispose of the same by way of sale or otherwise. The sale made by her in favour of the plaintiff would be null and void. In such eventuality the appeal has to be allowed and the judgment and decree of trial Court are to be restored by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court. 9. The learned Counsel for the defendants has urged that right of maintenance, if any, which Smt. Santi had, was not a pre-existing right so as to enable her to become a full owner of the house in dispute under section 14 (1) of the Act. All that she had by way of rights was the one conferred upon her vide Ex. D-l. It was a "right of residence" for her life time. Therefore, the present case would fall within the ambit of section 14 (2) of the Act. She could not have transferred the house in dispute by way of sale nor could the vendee, the plaintiff, acquire any rights or title in the house in dispute so as to enable him to claim possession thereof. 10. Therefore, the present case would fall within the ambit of section 14 (2) of the Act. She could not have transferred the house in dispute by way of sale nor could the vendee, the plaintiff, acquire any rights or title in the house in dispute so as to enable him to claim possession thereof. 10. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff while supporting the findings of the first appellate Court has contended that Smt. Santi had a pre- existing right of maintenance and the house in dispute was given to her for residence in recognition of such pre-existing rights. Therefore, the present case would be governed by section 14 (I) of the Act. 11. The basic question which arises for determination is whether Scot. Santi, as mother of S/Shri Daya Ram and Kanshi Ram, could claim a right of maintenance as against the estate of her sons by way of a pre-existing right for the purpose of section 14 (1) of the Act. 12. One of the obligations upon a Hindu male recognised by Hindu law in respect of persons dependent upon him is to maintain his wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters and his aged parents whether he possesses any property or not. It is stated in paragraph 542 at page 640 of Mulla on Hindu Law (Fifteenth Edition) that the obligation to maintain the abovesaid relations is personal in character and arises from the very existence of the relation between the parties. Further in paragraph 548 at page 643 it is stated : "A son is under a personal obligation to maintain his aged father. He is also under a similar obligation to maintain his aged mother, and he is bound to maintain her, whether or not he has inherited property from his father.” A similar statement has been made in paragraph 722 at page 1008 of Maynes Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage (Twelfth Edition) It reads :— “The maintenance of wife, aged parents and a minor son is a matter of personal obligation arising from the very existence of the relationship and quite independent of the possession of any property, ancestral or acquired. A text of Manu cited in the Mitakshara and the Parasaramadhaviya says : "It is declared by Manu that the aged mother and father, the chaste wife and an infant child must be maintained even by doing hundred misdeeds". A text of Manu cited in the Mitakshara and the Parasaramadhaviya says : "It is declared by Manu that the aged mother and father, the chaste wife and an infant child must be maintained even by doing hundred misdeeds". So the Mitakshara lays down that where there may be no property but what has been self acquired, the only persons whose maintenance out of such property is imperative are aged parents, wife and minor children." 13. The Hindu womens right to maintenance as found in the ancient texts of Hindu Law also received statutory recognition with the coming into force of Hindu Married Womens Right to separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946, with effect from 23-4 1946. 14. The apex Court in K Tulasamma v. V Sesha Reddi, AIR 1977 SC 1944, has held that with the enactment of Hindu Womens Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946, there appears to be complete unanimity of various schools of Hindu law on the important incidents and indicia of the Hindu Womens right to maintenance which has now received statutory recognition and which now shows that the right to maintenance though not an indefeasible right to property is undoubtedly a preexisting right. (Emphasis supplied) 15. The law with regard to maintenance as applicable to Hindus has further come to be codified in Chapter III of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The scheme of this chapter has been noticed in Mulla on Hindu Law (Fifteenth Edition) at page i081 in the following terms :— "Chapter III of the Act codifies the law of maintenance applicable to Hindus A Hindu is under the legal obligation to maintain his wife, his minor sons, his unmarried daughters and his aged parents. The obligation is personal. It arises from the very nature of the relationship and exists whether he possesses any property or not The Act gives statutory form to that obligation and goes further than that and rules that a female Hindu as well as a male Hindu is now under a legal obligation to maintain legitimate or illegitimate children and aged or infirm parents." Further it has been noticed at pages 1082 and 1033 to the folio wins effect :— “A Hindu male or female is bound, during his or her lifetime to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children and his or her aged or infirm parents. The obligation of a person to maintain aged or infirm parents or an unmarried daughter, extends in so far as the parent or daughter is unable to maintain himself or herself out of his or her own property or earnings. Section 19 of the Act states the circumstances in which a daughter-in-law is entitled to claim maintenance from her father-in-law. The right of dependents of a male Hindu such as for instance a wife, minor children and aged parents to maintenance by him did not come to an end on his death and it was well settled law that an heir was legally bound to provide out of the estate which descended to him, maintenance for those persons whom the late proprietor was legally or morally bound to maintain........ The law on the subject of the rights of the dependants was fairly well-settled but it was necessary that the law should be declared by the Legislature in statutory form in view of the changes brought about by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1953, and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. ...........As a general rule it may be stated that this right of a dependant is enforceable when the dependant is unable to obtain maintenance from the estate of any other person when he or she has a prior right to claim maintenance as a dependant of such other person.” 16. A Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Namo Devi v. Rattan Chand and others, 1989 (2) Sim LC 277, had the occasion to deal with the right of maintenance of a Hindu woman as against her son. It was held : “The right of a mother for her maintenance is in the nature of a personal obligation upon the son on account of the relationship between them. The obligation of the son to maintain the mother attaches to his estate. Those inheriting the estate do so with the burden of maintaining the mother of the deceased coparcener. The right of the mother for maintenance is in the nature of a pre-existing right for the purpose of section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956." 17. In view of the settled position of law, as enumerated above, Smt. Santi being the mother of S/Shri Daya Ram and Kanshi Ram, had a preexisting right of maintenance as against her sons and the house in dispute which was given to her vide Ex. In view of the settled position of law, as enumerated above, Smt. Santi being the mother of S/Shri Daya Ram and Kanshi Ram, had a preexisting right of maintenance as against her sons and the house in dispute which was given to her vide Ex. D-l will be deemed to have been given to her in lieu of maintenance within the meaning of section 14 (1) of the Act, 18. The learned Counsel for the defendants has contended that a bare perusal of Ex D-l shows that the house in dispute was given to Smt. Santi not in lieu of maintenance, even if she was having a pre-existing right of maintenance. The same was given to her only for the limited purpose of residence inasmuch as she was granted cash maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10 per month which amount was to be contributed equally by her two sons, Daya Ram and Kanshi Ram. 19. The question, thus, which arises for consideration is as to what is the meaning of maintenance. 20. According to Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3, (Third Edition —1953), page 1712, "maintenance" denotes the regular supply of food, clothing and lodging ; the provision of the necessaries and of the conveniences of life Sir Hari Singh Gaur in his work on Transfer of Property Act Vo.-1, Ninth Edition, at page 248 has commented that "maintenance” in ordinary parlance means and includes provision for food, provision for shelter, provision for clothing, etc. 21. Section 3 (b), Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, defines 4maintenance" in the following terms :— " maintenance includes— (i) in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment ; (ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, also the reasonable expenses of and incident to her marriage” 22. Thus, maintenance under the law also includes provision for residence. In the present case as per the defendants own case the house in dispute was given to Smt. Santi for residence vide Ex. D-l in addition to cash maintenance of Rs. 10 per month. Therefore, the house in dispute will be deemed to have been given to Smt. Santi in lieu of maintenance within the meaning of section 14 (1) of the Act. There is no denying that Smt. Santi was in possession of the house in dispute on the date of the coming into force of the Act. 10 per month. Therefore, the house in dispute will be deemed to have been given to Smt. Santi in lieu of maintenance within the meaning of section 14 (1) of the Act. There is no denying that Smt. Santi was in possession of the house in dispute on the date of the coming into force of the Act. She had, therefore, become the full owner of the house in dispute on the coming into force of the Act by virtue of section 14 (1) thereof. Having become the full owner, she was fully competent to convey the house in dispute in favour of the plaintiff. The sale made by her on 1-2-1977 in favour of the plaintiff is thus valid and binding. The plaintiff who is out of possession is as such entitled to recover the possession of the house in dispute from the defendants, 23. The first appellate Court has, therefore, rightly granted a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff. Such findings do not call for any interference. 24. No other point was urged before me by the learned Counsel for the parties. Consequently, the present appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. No orders as to costs. Appeal dismissed.