B. S. CHAUHAN, J. In all these writ petitions a common question of law is involved and thus all the writ petitions are disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The factual gamut of these cases reveal that the petitioners agricultural land was notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. (hereinafter called the Act ). On 23. 12. 1968 and declaration under Section 6 was made on 31. 3. 1971. Before making the award, possession of the said land was taken by resorting to the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the Act in 1971-1972. Instead of making an award under Section 11 (1) of the Act, an agreement was arrived at between the parties in the year 1978 under the provisions of Section 11 (2) of the Act. 3. Several Government Orders were issued from time to time i. e. 2. 1. 74, 2. 10. 75, 7. 9. 76, 20. 8. 90, 5. 1. 81 and 2. 9. 87 which provide for giving the employment to persons or dependents of persons whose land is acquired either under the Act or any other law for the time being in force. On 3. 11. 89 an agreement was arrived at between the parties to provide for employment to ten persons in electricity department and five persons in irrigation department under the said Government orders. 4. In pursuance of the said agreement, appointment letters were issued to the petitioners appointing them on daily wages. Their services terminated vide impugned orders dated 22. 9. 90, 24. 9. 90, 1. 10. 90, 6. 10. 90, 10. 10. 90 and 12. 10. 90. The said termination orders have been challenged in the aforesaid writ petitions and this Court vide orders dated 5. 11. 90 and 15. 11. 90 stayed the operation of the said termination orders. 5. Counter affidavits and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Heard Shri L. P. Naithani, learned Senior Advocate with Shri Ghildiyal and Shri M. S. Negi for the petitioners and Shri Ranjit Saxena and learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondents and perused the record. 7. 5. Counter affidavits and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Heard Shri L. P. Naithani, learned Senior Advocate with Shri Ghildiyal and Shri M. S. Negi for the petitioners and Shri Ranjit Saxena and learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondents and perused the record. 7. Shri Saxena contended that petitioners are not entitled to claim any relief under the said Government orders as no award had been made while acquiring their land under Section 11 (1) of the Act rather they have reached a compromise under provisions of Section 11 (2) of the Act. 8. The law is settled on this issue. Acquisition of the land under the Act is one of the modes of acquiring the land. Under the provisions of the Act the acquisition has been made compulsory, i. e. against the wishes of the land owners it is permissible as the land is sought to be acquired for the public purpose or acquisition of the land is in larger public interest but for the same the provision for providing solatium has been made. Act the same time the Act also provides for acquisition of land on agreed terms between the parties which would tantamount to sale by private negotiations and the award is to be made in terms of that agreement. The land owners cannot claim the benefit of the provisions for solatium or making a reference under Section 18 of the Act or go in further appeal because the acquisition would be deemed to have been made by private negotiations, (vide Ishwari Lal Pretn Chand Shah v. State of Gujarat, J. T. , 1996 (4) SC 208: 1996 (2) JCLR 682 (SC) and State of Gujarat v. Daya Shankar Bhai, 1995 (5) SCC 746 ). 9. There is no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the benefits of the said Government orders cannot be given to petitioners because the said Government order did not contemplate for such a situation. 9. There is no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the benefits of the said Government orders cannot be given to petitioners because the said Government order did not contemplate for such a situation. Moreover, there can be no discrimination whatsoever for granting the benefits under the said Government orders on the ground that the award was made under Section 11 (2) of the Act and not under Section 11 (1) because the award relates only to the compensation of the land acquired and it has nothing to do with other reliefs which can be granted under the Government orders issued from time to time. 10 Next submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that petitioners land had been acquired to some extent and they were not completely displaced from their total holdings. C. A. 2 filed along with the additional counter affidavit filed by Shri Sushil Kumar Madan reveals total area of the petitioners and acquired by the respondents varied from 27% to 42% their total holdings. 11. I am of the considered opinion that petitioners had been deprived of their substantial holdings and the said Government Orders do not suggest that the benefit of employment would be given only to those, whose total land had been acquired rather they suggest to the contrary. Paragraph 2 of the G. O. dated 15. 6. 85 contained in Annexure 1 to the writ petition No. 30852 of 1990 provides for giving preference in such employment in that following orders: (a) Persons whose total land had been acquired; (b) Persons whose substantial parts of the land had been acquired; and (c) Persons whose some parts of the land had been acquired. Thus, this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is also without any force. 12. Shri L. P. Naithani, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Karjan Galasay Yojana Assargrasth v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1987 SC 53 and Banwari Seva Ashram v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1992 SC 920 . 12. Shri L. P. Naithani, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Karjan Galasay Yojana Assargrasth v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1987 SC 53 and Banwari Seva Ashram v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1992 SC 920 . Appropriate orders, for giving employment to the persons whose land had been acquired, were issued by the Honble Supreme Court in both aforesaid cases in exercise of the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and thus, the said judgments cannot be treated as precedents and binding upon this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution as this Court has not been enclothed with the powers to pass such an order without referring to the Government orders or directions as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v, Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593 , wherein the Apex Court observed as under:- "the Constitution has, by Article 142 empowered the Supreme Court to make such order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with of a writ petition is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by the judicial decisions and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from judge to judge. " 13, Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Naresh Kumar Bali, 1994 (4) SCC 448 . 14. In J. & K. Public Service Commission etc. v. Dr. Narinder Mohan and others, AIR 1994 SC 1802 the Apex Court has observed asunder: "therefore, the High Court is not right in placing reliance on the judgment as a ratio to give the direction to the Public Service Commission to consider the cases of the respondents. Article 142 - Power is confined only to this Court. The ratio in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . is also not an authority under Article 141. " 15. Article 142 - Power is confined only to this Court. The ratio in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . is also not an authority under Article 141. " 15. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, 1995 (6) SCC 749 , in a separate judgment, one Honble Judge of the Apex Court placed reliance on Full Bench judgment of Orissa High Court in Krishan Chandra Pallai v. Union of India, AIR 1992 Ori. 261 and observed that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution has ample power to do complete justice, meaning thereby that power which the Supreme Court can exercise under Article 142 of the Constitution can also be exercised by the High Court, but the other two Honble judges did not express any opinion on this issue nor the said judgment refers to earlier judgments of the Apex Court which are to the contrary. 16. However, the said Government Orders had been enforced by this Court from time to time and reliance can safely be placed upon judgments of this Court in the cases of Mohammed Shamahad Ali and other v. State of U. P. 1992 (1) UPLBEC 128. Banwari Lal & others v. State of U. P. 1993 RD, 105 and Umesh Chandra Srivastava v, District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, 1994 (2) All CJ. 716. 17. Similar question arose regarding the enforcement of the Government orders before she Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Port Trust v. Deha Prasad Bag, AIR 1994 SC 2137 and subsequently between the same parties reported in 1995 Supple. 1 SCC 454 and the Apex Court has enforced the terms of the Government orders issued by the appropriate Government. 18. Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently urged that the land had been acquired and the petitioners had been paid the compensation and thus, the respondents are not under any obligation to offer the employment. The said submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is devoid of any merit and is rejected particularly, in view of the fact that the Government was not bound even to acquire the land for the present respondents. The said submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is devoid of any merit and is rejected particularly, in view of the fact that the Government was not bound even to acquire the land for the present respondents. Moreover, the Government could have asked the said respondents to enter into tripartite agreement containing the provision for such employment as the same is permissible under the provisions of Section 41 of the Act. 19. There is another aspect of the matter. In K. Krishna Reddy and others v. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, AIR 1988 SC 2123 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "after-all money is what money buys. . . . . . . . it is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupees is dwindling, with rising inflation, the delayed payment may loose all charms and utility of compensation. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interest of claimant. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation, they totally depend upon land, if uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no saving to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. (Emphasis added) 20. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Umesh Chandra Srivastava (supra) and this Court observed as under: "land is the source of livelihood of vast population of this country and if it is acquired by the Government, its owner is definitely deprived of the source of livelihood and grant of compensation under the Act, though may give him some solace, cannot be a substitute of the land, which has been acquired, it is on this ground that the Government which runs welfare state and is responsible for the well being of the people, has laid down the policy by the above D. O. providing for employment against inferior post to atleast one person of the family, whose land has been acquired. The decision of the Government is fully in consonance with the concept of the welfare State and the Provisions of the Constitution. Such a decision is liable to be respected by the Department or the Authority for whose benefit the land is acquired by the Government. Government is not bound to acquire the land under the Act. The decision of the Government is fully in consonance with the concept of the welfare State and the Provisions of the Constitution. Such a decision is liable to be respected by the Department or the Authority for whose benefit the land is acquired by the Government. Government is not bound to acquire the land under the Act. The Government being the Government of welfare State, can very will impose a condition of giving employment to a person, whose land is acquired. It is open to the authority not to accept such a condition and in that case it will not be obligatory on the Government to acquire the land for the benefit of that authority, such a condition can also be incorporated in an agreement, which is required to be executed under Section 41 of the Act. The policy decision of the Government is binding on the Authority and it is required to give employment to the person, whose land has been acquired. That apart, the Authority is also State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Such an Authority has also to act in accordance with the principles of welfare State. If it has taken over the land of a person and has deprived him of his sources of livelihood, it is its duty to provide him with alternative source of livelihood by giving him employment. It is open to it to say that it is not bound by the above policy decision of the Government. " 21. In this context reference may also be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi, AIR 1986 SC 2025 , wherein the Supreme Court observed that the provisions of Section 21 (2) of Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 which provides for allotment of a residential plot to person whose land is acquired, represents the wholesome principle which should be followed through out country. 22. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Grahak Sanstha Manch ana others v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1994 SC 231, however, observed that the State Government cannot be compelled to provide for the residential accommodation. "it is for the State Government to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing alternative accommodation to such of them as would be in the interest of administration. " 23. "it is for the State Government to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing alternative accommodation to such of them as would be in the interest of administration. " 23. In the instant cases the Government of U. P. has taken a decision to provide for their employment and to implement the Government policy, the Government Orders have been issued from time to time. Therefore, the plea taken by the respondents that they are not bound to provide for employment is preposterous as respondents are bound to comply with the terms of the said orders. 24. It is next urged by Shri Saxena that the Government order of 1985 does not operate retrospectively and thus petitioners cannot claim any benefit under the said Government order. There is no substance in this argument also as the 1985 G. O. only replaces the Government orders issued earlier, i. e. in 1974 onwards. 25. However, the issue worth considering in such cases is whether such employment can be claimed by the persons or dependents of the persons whose land had been acquired after a lapse of reasonable period as Government Orders did not provide for any limitation. It is settled law that where no limitation is provided for, the court/authority/tribunal are under no obligation to entertain the stale claim after the lapse of a reasonable period rather the stale claim should be rejected without any consideration whatsoever. In the instant cases the land was acquired in the years 1968 to 1978. There no document or material on record that the petitioners had agitated the issue before the appropriate forum in close proximity of acquisition. 26. In Calcutta Port Thist (Supra) a large number of persons whose land had been acquired in the year 1976 filed the petition before the Supreme Court in the year 1994 on the ground of parity claiming that they were similarly situated persons and were entitled to be considered for employment with other persons whose land had been acquired, and whose case was pending before the Apex Court. But the Supreme Court rejected their plea of parity holding that the plea of employment on compassionate ground cannot be entertained at such a belated stage. 27. The issue of employment on compassionate ground to the dependent of a person dying in harness has been considered by the Supreme Court from time to time. But the Supreme Court rejected their plea of parity holding that the plea of employment on compassionate ground cannot be entertained at such a belated stage. 27. The issue of employment on compassionate ground to the dependent of a person dying in harness has been considered by the Supreme Court from time to time. In Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1976 , the Apex Court observed that the employment on compassionate ground is made to mitigate the hardship of the family due to the death of bread earner. Thus it should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. 28. However, in Umesh Nagpal v. State of Haryana and others, 1994 (4) SCC138, the Apex Court observed as under :- ". . . . . . . . . . . . Compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable time. . . . . . . . . . . . The consideration for such employment, is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatsoever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over. " (emphasis added ). 29. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. State of bihar, 1996 (1) SCC 301 and Haryana State Electricity Board v. Naresh Tawar, 1996 (2) JT 542 . 30. In Mosammat Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar, 1996 (4) J. T. 637, the Supreme Court explained the meaning of "vested" as under:- "the word "vested" is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at page 1563 as "vested". Fixed, accrued, settled, absolute, complete. Having the character or given the right of absolute ownership not contingent, not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. "rights are "vested" when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest, mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, dose not constitute vested rights. " 31. In the instant cases, the said Government Orders, as explained above, themselves provide for criteria of preference and, therefore, the right of employment cannot be termed as vested right. " 31. In the instant cases, the said Government Orders, as explained above, themselves provide for criteria of preference and, therefore, the right of employment cannot be termed as vested right. Thus, it is settled law that compassionate employment cannot be claimed as a vested right and such employment cannot be given or asked after expiry of a period provided under the rule where rules do not provide for any limitation, after lapse of a reasonable period. 32. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as exactly what should be reasonable period as it would depend upon the facts of a particular case, but a period of more than three to five years in absence of statutory provisions providing for limitation cannot be deemed to be a reasonable period for seeking the compassionate employment. 33. Thus in the instant cases the petitioners were not entitled to compassionate employment, but the respondents had issued appointment letters in the year 1989 and allowed the petitioners to work, the issue of staleness has lost its significance and the respondent;, cannot be permitted to agitate this issue now. 34. Shri Ranjit Saxena next urged that petitioners had been given appointment on daily wages for a fixed period of 180 days, which was subsequently extended to 235 days and this petitioners were not entitled under the law to claim employment beyond the period of 235 days. It is settled law that an employee holding the tenure post cannot claim any right to hold the post beyond the period for which he has been appointed, (vide Director of Institute of Management Development v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070 ). The employees are bound by the terms and conditions of their appointment letters. In State of Punjab v. Surinder Singh (supra ). The State of U. P. and another v. Dr. Sunil Kumar Sinha, 1995 Suppl. 1scc456; 1995 (1) LBESR 487 (SC) and Jaswant Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 115 , it has consistently been held that there is no reason as to why the services of the employees cannot be terminated in consonance of the terms and conditions of their appointment letters. 35. Sunil Kumar Sinha, 1995 Suppl. 1scc456; 1995 (1) LBESR 487 (SC) and Jaswant Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 115 , it has consistently been held that there is no reason as to why the services of the employees cannot be terminated in consonance of the terms and conditions of their appointment letters. 35. Further more, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. M/s. Balwant Regular Transport Company, AIR 1969 SC 329 and State of U. P. v. U. P. State Law officers Association, AIR 1994, SC 1654, the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the termination orders as it has been held in those cases that if an order is passed, it is accepted by the other side and it is acted upon, benefits are taken out of it, he has no right to challenge the same after deriving the full benefits of the side order as the person is stopped from challenging the same by doctrine of acquiescence. 36. If the agreement arrived at between the parties on 3. 11. 89 is perused, it provides for offering the employment to the petitioners on daily wages as the posts were not available at the relevant time. Agreement further provided that the petitioners would be allowed to work on daily wages and would be regularized whenever the vacancies would occur in future. Moreover, the compassionate employment cannot be provided for a short period as it would not serve the purpose for which the employment is offered. Reference may be made to the directions issued by the Apex Court in Karjan Jalashya Yojana case (supra) where the Supreme Court has directed to offer "employment which is not temporary in character so that he and the members of his family did not remain without means of subsistence. " 37. In the instant cases, the respondents had offered the employment in contravention of the terms of the Government Orders and the purpose for which the compassionate employment is provided for. Moreover, terminating the services of the petitioners after completing the period of 235 days only for the reason that if the petitioners complete 240 days they would become entitled for seeking the benefit of the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is nothing bat a fraud upon the Statute itself. The respondents are State and instrumentalities of the State. The respondents are State and instrumentalities of the State. Being a welfare State the respondents are not permitted to play such fraud and make the appointment at their whims. The appointments made in such a manner do not refer to any rationality. Being the model employer, State and its instrumentalities are not supposed to pass order for such oblique motive and purpose. It is settled law that if an order is passed against the mandate of law, it can be ignored and read as having been passed in consonance of law. Petitioners in the instant cases are working for more than seven years under the orders of this Court and there can be no justification for throwing them out of employment after such a long time. 38. Thus, in view of the above, the petitions succeed and are allowed. Impugned orders dated 5. 10. 90, 24. 9. 90 1. 10. 90, 10. 10. 90, and 12. 10. 90 contained in Annexures 11 to 18 to the writ petition No. 29331 of 1990, the impugned order dated 22. 9. 90 contained in Annexure 11 to the writ petition No. 30852 of 1990, the impugned order dated 4. 12. 90 contained in Annexure 11 to the writ petition No. 33186 of 1990 and impugned orders dated 22. 11. 90 and 23. 11. 90 contained in Annexures 6 and 7 to the writ petition No. 33252 of 1990 are hereby quashed. 39. There shall be no order as to costs. Dr. B. S Chauhan, J.- In all these writ petitions a common question of law is involved and thus all the writ petitions are disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The factual gamut of these cases reveal that the petitioners agricultural land was notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. (hereinafter called the Act ). On 23. 12. 1968 and declaration under Section 6 was made on 31. 3. 1971. Before making the award, possession of the said land was taken by resorting to the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the Act in 1971-1972. Instead of making an award under Section 11 (1) of the Act, an agreement was arrived at between the parties in the year 1978 under the provisions of Section 11 (2) of the Act. 3. Several Government Orders were issued from time to time i. e. 2. 1. 74, 2. 10. 75, 7. 9. Instead of making an award under Section 11 (1) of the Act, an agreement was arrived at between the parties in the year 1978 under the provisions of Section 11 (2) of the Act. 3. Several Government Orders were issued from time to time i. e. 2. 1. 74, 2. 10. 75, 7. 9. 76, 20. 8. 90, 5. 1. 81 and 2. 9. 87 which provide for giving the employment to persons or dependents of persons whose land is acquired either under the Act or any other law for the time being in force. On 3. 11. 89 an agreement was arrived at between the parties to provide for employment to ten persons in electricity department and five persons in irrigation department under the said Government orders. 4. In pursuance of the said agreement, appointment letters were issued to the petitioners appointing them on daily wages. Their services terminated vide impugned orders dated 22. 9. 90, 24. 9. 90, 1. 10. 90, 6. 10. 90, 10. 10. 90 and 12. 10. 90. The said termination orders have been challenged in the aforesaid writ petitions and this Court vide orders dated 5. 11. 90 and 15. 11. 90 stayed the operation of the said termination orders. 5. Counter affidavits and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Heard Shri L. P. Naithani, learned Senior Advocate with Shri Ghildiyal and Shri M. S. Negi for the petitioners and Shri Ranjit Saxena and learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondents and perused the record. 7. Shri Saxena contended that petitioners are not entitled to claim any relief under the said Government orders as no award had been made while acquiring their land under Section 11 (1) of the Act rather they have reached a compromise under provisions of Section 11 (2) of the Act. 8. The law is settled on this issue. Acquisition of the land under the Act is one of the modes of acquiring the land. Under the provisions of the Act the acquisition has been made compulsory, i. e. against the wishes of the land owners it is permissible as the land is sought to be acquired for the public purpose or acquisition of the land is in larger public interest but for the same the provision for providing solatium has been made. Under the provisions of the Act the acquisition has been made compulsory, i. e. against the wishes of the land owners it is permissible as the land is sought to be acquired for the public purpose or acquisition of the land is in larger public interest but for the same the provision for providing solatium has been made. Act the same time the Act also provides for acquisition of land on agreed terms between the parties which would tantamount to sale by private negotiations and the award is to be made in terms of that agreement. The land owners cannot claim the benefit of the provisions for solatium or making a reference under Section 18 of the Act or go in further appeal because the acquisition would be deemed to have been made by private negotiations, (vide Ishwari Lal Pretn Chand Shah v. State of Gujarat, J. T. , 1996 (4) SC 208: 1996 (2) JCLR 682 (SC) and State of Gujarat v. Daya Shankar Bhai, 1995 (5) SCC 746 ). 9. There is no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the benefits of the said Government orders cannot be given to petitioners because the said Government order did not contemplate for such a situation. Moreover, there can be no discrimination whatsoever for granting the benefits under the said Government orders on the ground that the award was made under Section 11 (2) of the Act and not under Section 11 (1) because the award relates only to the compensation of the land acquired and it has nothing to do with other reliefs which can be granted under the Government orders issued from time to time. 10 Next submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that petitioners land had been acquired to some extent and they were not completely displaced from their total holdings. C. A. 2 filed along with the additional counter affidavit filed by Shri Sushil Kumar Madan reveals total area of the petitioners and acquired by the respondents varied from 27% to 42% their total holdings. 11. I am of the considered opinion that petitioners had been deprived of their substantial holdings and the said Government Orders do not suggest that the benefit of employment would be given only to those, whose total land had been acquired rather they suggest to the contrary. 11. I am of the considered opinion that petitioners had been deprived of their substantial holdings and the said Government Orders do not suggest that the benefit of employment would be given only to those, whose total land had been acquired rather they suggest to the contrary. Paragraph 2 of the G. O. dated 15. 6. 85 contained in Annexure 1 to the writ petition No. 30852 of 1990 provides for giving preference in such employment in that following orders: (a) Persons whose total land had been acquired; (b) Persons whose substantial parts of the land had been acquired; and (c) Persons whose some parts of the land had been acquired. Thus, this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is also without any force. 12. Shri L. P. Naithani, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Karjan Galasay Yojana Assargrasth v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1987 SC 53 and Banwari Seva Ashram v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1992 SC 920 . Appropriate orders, for giving employment to the persons whose land had been acquired, were issued by the Honble Supreme Court in both aforesaid cases in exercise of the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and thus, the said judgments cannot be treated as precedents and binding upon this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution as this Court has not been enclothed with the powers to pass such an order without referring to the Government orders or directions as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v, Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593 , wherein the Apex Court observed as under:- "the Constitution has, by Article 142 empowered the Supreme Court to make such order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with of a writ petition is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by the judicial decisions and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from judge to judge. " 13, Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Naresh Kumar Bali, 1994 (4) SCC 448 . 14. " 13, Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Naresh Kumar Bali, 1994 (4) SCC 448 . 14. In J. & K. Public Service Commission etc. v. Dr. Narinder Mohan and others, AIR 1994 SC 1802 the Apex Court has observed asunder: "therefore, the High Court is not right in placing reliance on the judgment as a ratio to give the direction to the Public Service Commission to consider the cases of the respondents. Article 142 - Power is confined only to this Court. The ratio in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . is also not an authority under Article 141. " 15. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, 1995 (6) SCC 749 , in a separate judgment, one Honble Judge of the Apex Court placed reliance on Full Bench judgment of Orissa High Court in Krishan Chandra Pallai v. Union of India, AIR 1992 Ori. 261 and observed that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution has ample power to do complete justice, meaning thereby that power which the Supreme Court can exercise under Article 142 of the Constitution can also be exercised by the High Court, but the other two Honble judges did not express any opinion on this issue nor the said judgment refers to earlier judgments of the Apex Court which are to the contrary. 16. However, the said Government Orders had been enforced by this Court from time to time and reliance can safely be placed upon judgments of this Court in the cases of Mohammed Shamahad Ali and other v. State of U. P. 1992 (1) UPLBEC 128. Banwari Lal & others v. State of U. P. 1993 RD, 105 and Umesh Chandra Srivastava v, District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, 1994 (2) All CJ. 716. 17. Similar question arose regarding the enforcement of the Government orders before she Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Port Trust v. Deha Prasad Bag, AIR 1994 SC 2137 and subsequently between the same parties reported in 1995 Supple. 1 SCC 454 and the Apex Court has enforced the terms of the Government orders issued by the appropriate Government. 18. Similar question arose regarding the enforcement of the Government orders before she Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Port Trust v. Deha Prasad Bag, AIR 1994 SC 2137 and subsequently between the same parties reported in 1995 Supple. 1 SCC 454 and the Apex Court has enforced the terms of the Government orders issued by the appropriate Government. 18. Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently urged that the land had been acquired and the petitioners had been paid the compensation and thus, the respondents are not under any obligation to offer the employment. The said submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is devoid of any merit and is rejected particularly, in view of the fact that the Government was not bound even to acquire the land for the present respondents. Moreover, the Government could have asked the said respondents to enter into tripartite agreement containing the provision for such employment as the same is permissible under the provisions of Section 41 of the Act. 19. There is another aspect of the matter. In K. Krishna Reddy and others v. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, AIR 1988 SC 2123 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "after-all money is what money buys. . . . . . . . it is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupees is dwindling, with rising inflation, the delayed payment may loose all charms and utility of compensation. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interest of claimant. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation, they totally depend upon land, if uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no saving to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. (Emphasis added) 20. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation, they totally depend upon land, if uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no saving to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. (Emphasis added) 20. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Umesh Chandra Srivastava (supra) and this Court observed as under: "land is the source of livelihood of vast population of this country and if it is acquired by the Government, its owner is definitely deprived of the source of livelihood and grant of compensation under the Act, though may give him some solace, cannot be a substitute of the land, which has been acquired, it is on this ground that the Government which runs welfare state and is responsible for the well being of the people, has laid down the policy by the above D. O. providing for employment against inferior post to atleast one person of the family, whose land has been acquired. The decision of the Government is fully in consonance with the concept of the welfare State and the Provisions of the Constitution. Such a decision is liable to be respected by the Department or the Authority for whose benefit the land is acquired by the Government. Government is not bound to acquire the land under the Act. The Government being the Government of welfare State, can very will impose a condition of giving employment to a person, whose land is acquired. It is open to the authority not to accept such a condition and in that case it will not be obligatory on the Government to acquire the land for the benefit of that authority, such a condition can also be incorporated in an agreement, which is required to be executed under Section 41 of the Act. The policy decision of the Government is binding on the Authority and it is required to give employment to the person, whose land has been acquired. That apart, the Authority is also State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Such an Authority has also to act in accordance with the principles of welfare State. The policy decision of the Government is binding on the Authority and it is required to give employment to the person, whose land has been acquired. That apart, the Authority is also State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Such an Authority has also to act in accordance with the principles of welfare State. If it has taken over the land of a person and has deprived him of his sources of livelihood, it is its duty to provide him with alternative source of livelihood by giving him employment. It is open to it to say that it is not bound by the above policy decision of the Government. " 21. In this context reference may also be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi, AIR 1986 SC 2025 , wherein the Supreme Court observed that the provisions of Section 21 (2) of Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 which provides for allotment of a residential plot to person whose land is acquired, represents the wholesome principle which should be followed through out country. 22. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Grahak Sanstha Manch ana others v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1994 SC 231, however, observed that the State Government cannot be compelled to provide for the residential accommodation. "it is for the State Government to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing alternative accommodation to such of them as would be in the interest of administration. " 23. In the instant cases the Government of U. P. has taken a decision to provide for their employment and to implement the Government policy, the Government Orders have been issued from time to time. Therefore, the plea taken by the respondents that they are not bound to provide for employment is preposterous as respondents are bound to comply with the terms of the said orders. 24. It is next urged by Shri Saxena that the Government order of 1985 does not operate retrospectively and thus petitioners cannot claim any benefit under the said Government order. There is no substance in this argument also as the 1985 G. O. only replaces the Government orders issued earlier, i. e. in 1974 onwards. 25. 24. It is next urged by Shri Saxena that the Government order of 1985 does not operate retrospectively and thus petitioners cannot claim any benefit under the said Government order. There is no substance in this argument also as the 1985 G. O. only replaces the Government orders issued earlier, i. e. in 1974 onwards. 25. However, the issue worth considering in such cases is whether such employment can be claimed by the persons or dependents of the persons whose land had been acquired after a lapse of reasonable period as Government Orders did not provide for any limitation. It is settled law that where no limitation is provided for, the court/authority/tribunal are under no obligation to entertain the stale claim after the lapse of a reasonable period rather the stale claim should be rejected without any consideration whatsoever. In the instant cases the land was acquired in the years 1968 to 1978. There no document or material on record that the petitioners had agitated the issue before the appropriate forum in close proximity of acquisition. 26. In Calcutta Port Thist (Supra) a large number of persons whose land had been acquired in the year 1976 filed the petition before the Supreme Court in the year 1994 on the ground of parity claiming that they were similarly situated persons and were entitled to be considered for employment with other persons whose land had been acquired, and whose case was pending before the Apex Court. But the Supreme Court rejected their plea of parity holding that the plea of employment on compassionate ground cannot be entertained at such a belated stage. 27. The issue of employment on compassionate ground to the dependent of a person dying in harness has been considered by the Supreme Court from time to time. In Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1976 , the Apex Court observed that the employment on compassionate ground is made to mitigate the hardship of the family due to the death of bread earner. Thus it should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. 28. However, in Umesh Nagpal v. State of Haryana and others, 1994 (4) SCC138, the Apex Court observed as under :- ". . . . . . . . . . . . Compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable time. . . . . . . . 28. However, in Umesh Nagpal v. State of Haryana and others, 1994 (4) SCC138, the Apex Court observed as under :- ". . . . . . . . . . . . Compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable time. . . . . . . . . . . . The consideration for such employment, is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatsoever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over. " (emphasis added ). 29. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. State of bihar, 1996 (1) SCC 301 and Haryana State Electricity Board v. Naresh Tawar, 1996 (2) JT 542 . 30. In Mosammat Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar, 1996 (4) J. T. 637, the Supreme Court explained the meaning of "vested" as under:- "the word "vested" is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at page 1563 as "vested". Fixed, accrued, settled, absolute, complete. Having the character or given the right of absolute ownership not contingent, not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. "rights are "vested" when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest, mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, dose not constitute vested rights. " 31. In the instant cases, the said Government Orders, as explained above, themselves provide for criteria of preference and, therefore, the right of employment cannot be termed as vested right. Thus, it is settled law that compassionate employment cannot be claimed as a vested right and such employment cannot be given or asked after expiry of a period provided under the rule where rules do not provide for any limitation, after lapse of a reasonable period. 32. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as exactly what should be reasonable period as it would depend upon the facts of a particular case, but a period of more than three to five years in absence of statutory provisions providing for limitation cannot be deemed to be a reasonable period for seeking the compassionate employment. 33. 32. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as exactly what should be reasonable period as it would depend upon the facts of a particular case, but a period of more than three to five years in absence of statutory provisions providing for limitation cannot be deemed to be a reasonable period for seeking the compassionate employment. 33. Thus in the instant cases the petitioners were not entitled to compassionate employment, but the respondents had issued appointment letters in the year 1989 and allowed the petitioners to work, the issue of staleness has lost its significance and the respondent;, cannot be permitted to agitate this issue now. 34. Shri Ranjit Saxena next urged that petitioners had been given appointment on daily wages for a fixed period of 180 days, which was subsequently extended to 235 days and this petitioners were not entitled under the law to claim employment beyond the period of 235 days. It is settled law that an employee holding the tenure post cannot claim any right to hold the post beyond the period for which he has been appointed, (vide Director of Institute of Management Development v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070 ). The employees are bound by the terms and conditions of their appointment letters. In State of Punjab v. Surinder Singh (supra ). The State of U. P. and another v. Dr. Sunil Kumar Sinha, 1995 Suppl. 1scc456; 1995 (1) LBESR 487 (SC) and Jaswant Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 115 , it has consistently been held that there is no reason as to why the services of the employees cannot be terminated in consonance of the terms and conditions of their appointment letters. 35. Sunil Kumar Sinha, 1995 Suppl. 1scc456; 1995 (1) LBESR 487 (SC) and Jaswant Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 115 , it has consistently been held that there is no reason as to why the services of the employees cannot be terminated in consonance of the terms and conditions of their appointment letters. 35. Further more, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. M/s. Balwant Regular Transport Company, AIR 1969 SC 329 and State of U. P. v. U. P. State Law officers Association, AIR 1994, SC 1654, the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the termination orders as it has been held in those cases that if an order is passed, it is accepted by the other side and it is acted upon, benefits are taken out of it, he has no right to challenge the same after deriving the full benefits of the side order as the person is stopped from challenging the same by doctrine of acquiescence. 36. If the agreement arrived at between the parties on 3. 11. 89 is perused, it provides for offering the employment to the petitioners on daily wages as the posts were not available at the relevant time. Agreement further provided that the petitioners would be allowed to work on daily wages and would be regularized whenever the vacancies would occur in future. Moreover, the compassionate employment cannot be provided for a short period as it would not serve the purpose for which the employment is offered. Reference may be made to the directions issued by the Apex Court in Karjan Jalashya Yojana case (supra) where the Supreme Court has directed to offer "employment which is not temporary in character so that he and the members of his family did not remain without means of subsistence. " 37. In the instant cases, the respondents had offered the employment in contravention of the terms of the Government Orders and the purpose for which the compassionate employment is provided for. Moreover, terminating the services of the petitioners after completing the period of 235 days only for the reason that if the petitioners complete 240 days they would become entitled for seeking the benefit of the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is nothing bat a fraud upon the Statute itself. The respondents are State and instrumentalities of the State. The respondents are State and instrumentalities of the State. Being a welfare State the respondents are not permitted to play such fraud and make the appointment at their whims. The appointments made in such a manner do not refer to any rationality. Being the model employer, State and its instrumentalities are not supposed to pass order for such oblique motive and purpose. It is settled law that if an order is passed against the mandate of law, it can be ignored and read as having been passed in consonance of law. Petitioners in the instant cases are working for more than seven years under the orders of this Court and there can be no justification for throwing them out of employment after such a long time. 38. Thus, in view of the above, the petitions succeed and are allowed. Impugned orders dated 5. 10. 90, 24. 9. 90 1. 10. 90, 10. 10. 90, and 12. 10. 90 contained in Annexures 11 to 18 to the writ petition No. 29331 of 1990, the impugned order dated 22. 9. 90 contained in Annexure 11 to the writ petition No. 30852 of 1990, the impugned order dated 4. 12. 90 contained in Annexure 11 to the writ petition No. 33186 of 1990 and impugned orders dated 22. 11. 90 and 23. 11. 90 contained in Annexures 6 and 7 to the writ petition No. 33252 of 1990 are hereby quashed. 39. There shall be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed. .