JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner Narayan Dutt Gupta, on 4.12.87, was appointed as Surveyor on daily wages basis @ Rs. 30/- per day for a period of one month in the Office of the Assistant Engineer, Sub Division I (T.M.C.), I.G.N.P., Mohangarh (District Jaisalmer). This fixed term appointment of the petitioner was extended from time to time up to 8.3.89 vide Annexure 2 to Annexure 6. Thereafter his services were terminated. The petitioner made several representations but they were of no avail. The petitioner therefore, filed the writ petition challenging his retrenchment by the respondents. 2. The case of the petitioner, as set-out in the writ petition, is that his services have been terminated without following the procedure provided under Section 25-F (a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, `the Act') and, therefore, the termination of his services falls within the definition of `retrenchment' and amounts to unfair labour practice. The petitioner, though appointed as the Surveyor but was posted as the Junior Drafts man and though the initial appointment of the petitioner was for a fixed term but after completion of the fixed term he was allowed to continue in service and, therefore, he is entitled to be regularised on the post of junior Drafts man. The validity of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act was, also, challenged. In the reply filed on behalf of the respondents it was stated that the petitioner was appointed on daily wages basis for a fixed term as and when the work was available. He worked under two different Divisions and, therefore, he has not worked for a continuous period of more than 240 days in a calendar year. Even when he was granted extension on the post for six months on 6.1.88 vide Annexure. 2, he did not work for the complete period of six months. In the months of March, May and June, 1988 he did not work for a single day and on 1.7.88 he moved an application for his re-appointment which was acceded to and he was given one month's appointment. 2, he did not work for the complete period of six months. In the months of March, May and June, 1988 he did not work for a single day and on 1.7.88 he moved an application for his re-appointment which was acceded to and he was given one month's appointment. As and when the appointment was made for a fixed term, the appointment came to an end and during that period of fixed term of appointment the petitioner did not work for the full period and he was given re-appointment on the applications moved by him for re-appointment and the last extension given to the petitioner was up to 8.3.89. The appointment given to the petitioner was purely on daily wages basis and for a fixed term and after the expiry of the period of fixed term appointment which was given up to 8.3.89, his services automatically came to an end as the term of his appointment was not extended and, therefore, the case of the petitioner squarely falls within the ambit of the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and it cannot be said to be a retrenchment'. Section 25-F (a) and (b) of the Act has no application in the case of petitioner. A rejoinder has, also, been filed by the petitioner controverting the averments made in the reply. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act are arbitrary and unreasonable being violative of Article 14 of the constitution of India. It is, also, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner continued in the service after the expiry of the fixed term appointment without any order of renewal or extension of services and he worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and, therefore, his services cannot be terminated without following the procedure provided under Section 25-F (a) and (b) of the Act and as the services of the petitioner have been terminated without following the procedure provided under Section 25-F (a) and (b) of the Act, which are mandatory in nature, he should therefore be reinstated and the services of the petitioner, therefore, deserve to be regularised. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over: Khangar Singh v. State of Raj. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over: Khangar Singh v. State of Raj. & Ors., 1992 (1) WLN 384 ; Shiv Kumar v. State of Raj. & Ors., D.B. Civil writ Special Appeal No. 15 of 1991 and Gujraj v. Rajasthan Agriculture University, Bikaner & Anr., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 555 of 1992 . It has, also, been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the appointment to the petitioner was given on the post of Surveyor but he discharged the duties of the post of Junior Drafts man and, therefore, on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' he is entitled for the pay of the post of junior Drafts man as well as regularisation of his services on the post of junior Drafts man. Lastly, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that thought an alternative remedy was available to the petitioner to approach the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court for redressal of his grievances under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but the availability of the alternative remedy is no Bar to grant a relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when once the writ petition has been admitted and has been heard on merit. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over: L. Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 33 and Dr. Bal Krishna Agrawal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1995 Allahabad Law Journal 454 . The learned Additional Government Advocate, on the other hand, has submitted that the petitioner was given a fixed term appointment on daily wages basis and even during this fixed term appointment he did not work for the full period and he worked for 25 days in the month of December, 1987, 26 days in the month of February, 1988 and 25 days in the month of March, 1988. The petitioner did not work for a single day in the months of March, May and June, 1988 and he worked for 27 days in April, 1988 and for 71 days between 1.7.88 to 25.9,88. The petitioner never worked after the expiry of the fixed term period and as and when he moved the applications for re-appointment, the petitioner was given appointment on the vacant post for a fixed term. The petitioner never worked after the expiry of the fixed term period and as and when he moved the applications for re-appointment, the petitioner was given appointment on the vacant post for a fixed term. The fixed term appointment given to the petitioner came to an end on 8.3.89 and his services were not extended thereafter and after the expiry of the fixed term appointment his services automatically came to an end and the case of the petitioner is neither a case of removal from service nor it falls within the definition of `retrenchment' and the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. It is, also, contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that no work on the post of junior Drafts man was ever taken from the petitioner and he was appointed as a Surveyor and worked on this post. It is, also, contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner did not work continuously for a period of 240 days in a calendar year and ever during the period he actually worked, he worked in two different Divisions and, therefore, he is not entitled for regularisation of his services as there is no continuity of service. It is, also, contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has an alternative remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act and the writ petition involves the disputed questions of facts which cannot be gone into in the writ jurisdiction and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. In support of his contention, learned Additional Government Advocate has placed reliance over : Vijay Singh v. State of Raj. & Anr., 1987 RLR (1) (71) ; State of Haryana & Ors. etc. etc. v. Piara Singh & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 2130 and Gopi Lal Teli v. State of Raj. & Ors., 1995 (2) WLC 1 . 4. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 5. The first contention, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is the challenge to the validity of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act on the ground of its being arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The validity of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act came-up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Prasad & Ors. The validity of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act came-up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Prasad & Ors. v. State of Raj. & Ors., 1992 (1) WLN 389 and the Division Bench, after considering the law on the point, upheld the validity of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and held that "the Provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) cannot be said to be arbitrary or being violative of Articles 14, 19, 21, 23 or 39(d) of the Constitution of India. Since the validity of the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act has been up-held by the Division Bench of this Court and we agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Prasad's case (supra), therefore, in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench, it is not necessary to again consider the validity of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. The contention, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is, therefore, devoid of any force. 6. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that though initially the appointment was given to the petitioner for a fixed term but he continued in service without any formal order by the respondents extending the fixed term and he worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and, therefore, he deserves to be regularised in the service on the post of junior Drafts man as he worked on this post during the relevant period. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, is that the petitioner was given a fixed term appointment and during this fixed term appointment, also, he did not work for the complete period; the services rendered by the petitioner were not the continuous service and after the expiry of the period he was not allowed to continue in service. As and when the petitioner moved the applications for re-appointment, he was given re-appointment for the fixed term and the fixed term came to an end on 8.3.89 and thereafter neither his services were extended nor the petitioner worked on any post under the respondents. During this period the petitioner worked on the post of Surveyor and he never worked on the post of Junior Drafts man. 7. During this period the petitioner worked on the post of Surveyor and he never worked on the post of Junior Drafts man. 7. Whether the petitioner continuously worked for this period as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, or with some breaks as argued by the learned counsel for the respondents; whether the appointment given to the petitioner was the fixed term appointment and whether after the expiry of that fixed term the petitioner continued in service; whether the petitioner worked on the post of Junior Drafts man and as such he is entitled for the pay of this post on the basis of principle of `equal pay for equal work' and whether the provisions of Section 25-F (a) and (b) of the Act have been complied with or not: are the disputed questions of facts and no material is available on record, on the basis of which these disputed questions of facts can be gone-into or decided by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction. The equitable jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is for the enforcement of the right and not for the establishment of the rights. The determination of these questions requires detailed investigation and is the matter of evidence which cannot be gone-into and decided in the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner had an alternative remedy available to him under the Act which he did not avail. Though we are conscious of the fact that when the matter has already been admitted, the writ petition should not be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy provided the dispute raised may be a pure question of law, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Dr. Bal Krishna Agrawal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1995 A1l LJ 454 . But where the disputed questions of facts are involved and the evidence is not available on record, on the basis of which the matter could be decided, the Court has no alternative except to dismiss the writ petition. Bal Krishna Agrawal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1995 A1l LJ 454 . But where the disputed questions of facts are involved and the evidence is not available on record, on the basis of which the matter could be decided, the Court has no alternative except to dismiss the writ petition. A question: whether the writ petition for violation of the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or violation of the principles of natural justice, should be directly entertained as a matter of course ignoring the statutory remedy provided by that Act, came-up for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court in: Gopi Lal Teli v. The State of Raj. and Ors., 1995 (2) WLC 1 and the Full Bench of this Court, in para No. 10 of the judgment, held that: "From a perusal of the provisions contained above, it is crystal clear that whether the conditions prescribed under Section 25-F of the Act for retrenchment of a workman have been fulfilled or not, is a pure question of fact and in order to arrive at a conclusion/ recording finding, some investigation/inquiry/ has to be embarked upon, which, in our opinion, would be beyond the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 8. The Present writ petition raises certain disputed questions of facts which cannot be gone-into and decided on the basis of the material available on record. The decision on these questions is a matter of evidence. The petitioner has yet to establish his right by way of leading evidence in support of his case. In the absence of any.evidence it is not possible for this Court to decide the matter: whether the petitioner worked continuously for a period of 240 days or he worked with some breaks in service; whether the appointment of the petitioner was for a fixed term which was extended from time to time on the applications made by him for re-appointment and he was re-appointed on the post; whether the petitioner worked as Junior Drafts man or the Surveyor. These are the disputed questions of facts which cannot be decided in the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner has statutory alternative remedy available with him which he did not avail. These are the disputed questions of facts which cannot be decided in the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner has statutory alternative remedy available with him which he did not avail. The writ petition, filed by the petitioner, therefore, deserves to be dismissed as it involves disputed questions of facts which cannot be adjudicated by this Court in its writ jurisdiction in the absence of sufficient material available on record. 9. In the result, we do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******