Judgment NAGENDRA RAI, J. 1. The defendant in eviction suit has filed the present revision application against the order dated 9-4-1985 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur, in Title Suit No. 46 of 1985, directing him to deposit the arrears of rent prior to theinstitution of the suit from February, 1980 to January, 1983 under Sec. 15 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The plaintiff-opp. party filed the aforesaid suit for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent for more than two months, personal necessity, expiry of the terms of the lease and other grounds. He also prayed for a decree of Rs. 7,200/ - being the arrears of rent for the period from Feb, 1980 to January, 1983. On 15-3-1984 the plaintiif-opp. party filed a petition under Sec. 15 of the Act for payment of arrears of rent from Feb. 1980 to January 1983, as well as current. and future rent. The Court below after hearing the parties, by order dated 21-5-1984, directed the defendant-petitioner to deposit the rent from the date of filing of the suit, i.e., from Feb, 1983 to May, 1984 and also the current rent in terms of the aforesaid section. The defendant deposited the same. 3. On 29-11-1994, the plaintiff again filed a petition for a direction to the defendant-petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit stating therein that due to over-sight no order could be passed in respect of arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit. A rejoinder was filed by the defendant-petitioner. The Court below, after hearing the parties, by the impugned order, has directed the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent for the said period. 4. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order in this Court on the ground that no order for depositing the arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit can be passed under Sec. 15 of the Act. He relied upon a judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Raghubir V. Surya Narayan Gupta, reported in 1985 Pat LJR 346 : ( AIR 1986 Pat 17 ), wherein, it was held that the Court has got no jurisdiction to allow arrears of rent on an application under Sec. 15 of the Act. He relied upon a judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Raghubir V. Surya Narayan Gupta, reported in 1985 Pat LJR 346 : ( AIR 1986 Pat 17 ), wherein, it was held that the Court has got no jurisdiction to allow arrears of rent on an application under Sec. 15 of the Act. The learned single Judge hearing the present application doubted the correctness of the aforesaid decision and referred the matter to the Division Bench. 5. While the matter was pending before the Division Bench, the aforesaid judgment of the learned single Judge stood overruled by a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Dwarika Pd. Kapri alias Dwarika Prasad V/s. Smt. Chandramania Devi, reported in 1987 Pat LJR 864 : ( AIR 1988 Pat 317 ). 6. During the hearing of the matter before the Division Bench, the petitioner contended that the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act, which confers power upon the Court to direct the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent in relation to the period prior to the institution of the suit, is ultra vires and in support of his submission he relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in the case of Sri Ratan Lal Nai V/s. State of Bihar reported in 1989 Pat LJR 1273 : ( AIR 1990 Pat 107 ). The Division Bench, to which two of us (B.N. Agarwal and Nagendra Rai, JJ.) were members, doubted the correctness of the law laid down in Ratan Lal Nais case (supra) and referred the matter to a larger Bench. That is how the matter has been placed before us. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has canvassed two points before this Court. Firstly, he submitted that the provision of Sec. 15 of the Act, which empowers the Court to direct the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent even for a period prior to the institution of the suit, is arbitrary, unjust and thus violative of Art, 14 of the Constitution of India. He relied upon the reasonings given in the case of Ratan Lal Nai, ( AIR 1990 Pat 107 ) (supra) in support of this submission. He relied upon the reasonings given in the case of Ratan Lal Nai, ( AIR 1990 Pat 107 ) (supra) in support of this submission. Secondly, he contended that deposit of arrears of rent is subject to law of limitation and the period of limitation (three years) is to be counted from the date of filing of the application tinder Sec. 15 of the Act. In the present case, the order has been passed to deposit arrears of rent for a period beyond three years from the date of filing of the application, which is impermissible in law and, thus, the Court has committed jurisdictional error. In support of his contention he relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Dwarika Prasad Kapris case AIR 1988 Pat 317 (supra). 8. The learned counsel appearing for the landlord-opp. party, on the other hand, combated the aforesaid propositions and contended that the provision of Sec. 15 of the Act empowering the Court to direct the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent even for the period prior to the institution of the suit, subject to law of limitation, does not suffer from arbitrariness. On the other hand, the said provision has been added to shorten the litigation or to prevent multiplicity of the suit and allowing the tenant to continue in possession of the premises during the pendency of the suit on the payment of the current rent as well as the arrears of rent lawfully recoverable. The direction to the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent is given by the Court after hearing the parties and as such the procedure provided under Sec. 15 of the Act is not unjust and unfair. He also contended that in a suit where arrears of rent is also claimed as one of the reliefs in the suit then after filing of the suit the running of limitation for the said relief remains suspended during the pendency of the suit and in such a situation the running of time under Sec. 15 of the Act shall remain suspended and the arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit or prior to the filing of the application under Sec. 15 of the Act can be ordered to be deposited under Sec. 15 of the Act. In support of this submission he has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Jeeban Kumar Sarkar alias Jia Sarkar V/s. M/s. Ramdar and Sons, reported in 1988 Pat LJR 532. 9. Before adverting to the respective submissions advanced at the bar, it would be useful to state briefly the history of legislation upon the subject, as the same will be helpful in finding out the intention of the legislature in enacting Sec. 15 of the Act in the present form. 10. The Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 came into force on 15-3-1947. In the original Act controller was vested with the power to order eviction. By Amending Act 1955, the Civil Court was vested with power to order eviction of the tenant. By the said amending Act, Sec. 11A was incorporated containing the provisions of deposit of the rent by the tenant in a suit for ejectment. The said section runs as follows:- - "11A. Deposit of rent by tenants in suits for ejectment.--If in a suit for recovery of possession of any building the tenant contests the suit, as regards claim for ejectment, the landlord may make an application at any stage of the suit for order on the tenant to deposit month by month rent at a rate at which it was last paid and also the arrears of rent, if any and the Court, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, may make an order for deposit of rent at such rate as may be determined month by month and the arrears of rent, if any, and on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of the order or the rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month, the Court shall order the defence against ejectment be struck out and the tenant to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment. The landlord may also apply for permission to withdraw the deposited rent without prejudice to his right to claim decree for ejectment and the Court may permit him to do so. The Court may further order recovery of cost of suit and such other compensation as may be determined by it from the tenant." 11. The landlord may also apply for permission to withdraw the deposited rent without prejudice to his right to claim decree for ejectment and the Court may permit him to do so. The Court may further order recovery of cost of suit and such other compensation as may be determined by it from the tenant." 11. The aforesaid section empowered the Court to pass an order for arrears of rent also apart from the current and future rent. The term "arrears of rent" was not free from ambiguity. This Court took the view that if the tenant wants to contest the suit for ejectment and remain in the building then he has to pay all the dues on account of arrears of rent, even if barred by limitation, current rent and future rents. (See 1967 BLJ R 397, Bhola Nath Tiwari V/s. Kuer Rupnarain Singh Tiwari). Later on, a Division Bench of this Court took the view in the case of Sashodhar Das V/s. Harihar Prasad, AIR 1973 Pat 361 that only such arrears of rent accrued due prior to the institution of the suit may be ordered to be deposited which can be legally recovered by the landlord and is not barred by any law. 12. In view of the divergent views the matter was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramnandan Sharma alias Ram Nandan Lohar V/s. Mostt. Maya Devi, 1974 BBCJ 818 : ( AIR 1975 Pat 283 ); wherein it was held that the arrears of rent occurring in Sec. 11A must be interpreted to mean the arrears of rent falling due during the pendency of the suit. To permit the expression to embrace within its ambit, the arrears of rent which accrued due prior to the institution of the suit will be highly unjust, unreasonable and incongruous. The 1947 Act lapsed on 31st March, 1976. Thereafter, the legislature enacted Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977, which remained in force till 31st March, 1981. Sec. 13 of the 1977 Act contained a corresponding provision without any change. This Court relying upon the Full Bench judgment of Ram Nandan Sharma (supra) held that even under Sec. 13 of the Act, the court has no power to pass an order for arrears of rent for the period prior to the institution of the suit. Sec. 13 of the 1977 Act contained a corresponding provision without any change. This Court relying upon the Full Bench judgment of Ram Nandan Sharma (supra) held that even under Sec. 13 of the Act, the court has no power to pass an order for arrears of rent for the period prior to the institution of the suit. (See 1987 Pat LJR 123, Prakash Kumar Sinha V/s. Gauri Shankar Prasad). Thereafter, the present Act came into force from 1st April, 1981. The provision for depositing rent by the tenant in a suit for ejectment has been incorporated in Sec. 15 of the Act, which runs as follows: - "Section 15. Deposit of Rent by tenants in suits for ejectment.-(1) If, in a suit for recovery of possession of any building the tenant contests the suit as regards claim for ejectment, landlord may move an application at any stage of the suit for order on the tenant to deposit rent month by month at a rate at which it was last paid and also subject to the law of limitation, the arrears of rent, if any, and the Court after giving opportunity to the parties to be heard may make an order for deposit of rent month by month at such rate as may be determined and the arrears of rent, both before and after the institution of the suit if any and on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of order or the rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month, the court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck off and the tenant to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment and further the Court shall not allow the tenant to cross-examine the landlords witnesses.(2) If in any proceeding referred to in subsection (1) there is any dispute as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the court may direct the tenant to deposit in Court the amount payable by him under subsection (1) and in such case no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same.(3) If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in Sub-sec. (2) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous the court may order the defence against the eviction to be struck off and proceed with the hearing of the suit as laid down in Sub-sec. (1)." 13. From the perusal of the provision of Sec. 11A of 1947 Act, 13 of 1977 Act and the present section it would appear that the words "subject to the law of limitation" and "both before and after institution of the suit" were not in the earlier sections. 14. The question to be considered is as to whether the addition of these two expressions has made any difference and has enlarged the scope of the section to the extent that the court can also pass an order for payment of arrears of rent even prior to the institution of the suit subject to the law of limitation. It is not challenged and in my view, rightly by learned counsel for the petitioner that there is lack of legislative competence in the legislature to make a law on the subject. Sec. 15 of the Act in clear words empowers the court to pass an order even with regard to arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit. Thus, the aforesaid provision cannot be said to be beyond the legislative competence. 15. The first ground of attack, as stated above, is that the provision for deposit of arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit is ultra vires, as it is visited with arbitrariness and, as such, it should be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution of India embodies the ideal of equality expressed in the preamble. In other words, it contains equal protection clause and provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of law within the territory of India. If a provision of the Act or any action of the State Government is arbitrary or unreasonable, then the same would violate the equality clause as contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as reasonableness is one of the essential elements of equality and absence of reasonableness will make the provision of the Act arbitrary. Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. When act is arbitrary, it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has considered the scope and requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in the case of Smt. Maneka Gandhi V/s. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 and held as follows (at p. 624 of AIR) :- "Now, the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of Article 14; what is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We bust reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in E. P. Royappa V/s. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 2 SCR 348 : ( AIR 1974 SC 555 ) namely, that "from a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14."Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. " 16. It is to be stated that there is presumption of constitutionality/validity of a statute and burden of proving constitutional invalidity is upon whom who challenges the validity. 17. " 16. It is to be stated that there is presumption of constitutionality/validity of a statute and burden of proving constitutional invalidity is upon whom who challenges the validity. 17. The Act has been enacted to protect the tenant from unreasonable eviction. However, certain provisions have been incorporated for the benefit of the landlord. Sec. 15 is one of such provision which entitles the landlord to claim arrears of rent as well as current and future rent during the pendency of the suit for ejectment. The legislature has enacted the said provision to give some relief to the landlord. A tenant cannot be evicted unless a decree for eviction is passed against him on any of the grounds mentioned under Sec. 11 of the Act. The disposal of cases takes long time and if the tenant is allowed to continue in possession without paying lawfully recoverable arrears of rent and current rent then the same will cause hardship and prejudice to the landlord. To meet such situation the provision has been made under the Act in regard to deposit of rent, so that the tenant may not go on fighting litigation without payment of rent. The order for payment of arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit is not passed in a mechanical manner and on the other hand the Court after giving an opportunity of hearing to the landlord and the tenant passes an order, In my view, the said provision cannot be attacked or challenged on the ground of unreasonableness or arbitrariness. 18. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dwarika Pd. Kapri ( AIR 1988 Pat 317 ) (supra) has held that Sec. 15 empowers the Court to order for the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent even for the period prior to the institution of the suit subject to law of limitation and the said view taken by the Division Bench, in my view, is a correct one. Kapri ( AIR 1988 Pat 317 ) (supra) has held that Sec. 15 empowers the Court to order for the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent even for the period prior to the institution of the suit subject to law of limitation and the said view taken by the Division Bench, in my view, is a correct one. In Ratanlal Nais case ( AIR 1990 Pat 107 ) (supra), this Court declared the said provision ultra vires only on the ground that on a prima facie determination a direction to pay the arrears of rent before institution of the suit will be unfair and arbitrary as the Act has got no provision to get such arrears of rent realised by a petition u/S. 15 of the Act recovered from the landlord. If the said reasoning will be treated to be a ground for declaring the provision of Sec. 15 of the Act ultra vires with regard to arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit then in that situation the provision in the said section for payment of arrears of rent after institution of the suit, current rent and future rent shall be also arbitrary and ultra vires, as there is no provision under the Act for recovery of the aforesaid amounts from the landlord after disposal of the suit in favour of the tenant. 19. Thus, I find myself unable to agree with the law laid down in the case of Ratan Lal Nai ( AIR 1990 Pat 107 ) (supra) and, accordingly, hold that the provision of Sec. 15 of the Act regarding direction to the tenant to deposit arrears of rent even prior to the institution of the suit subject to law of limitation does not suffer either from arbitrariness or unreasonableness and the same is a valid piece of legislation and the Court has power to direct the tenant to deposit the rent even prior to the institution of the suit subject to law of limitation. 20. Answer to the second point depends upon the determination of two questions, namely, as to from which date the period of limitation is to be counted with regard to arrears of rent and as to whether the law of limitation is applicable to the claim if arrears of rent both before and after the institution of the suit. 21. 20. Answer to the second point depends upon the determination of two questions, namely, as to from which date the period of limitation is to be counted with regard to arrears of rent and as to whether the law of limitation is applicable to the claim if arrears of rent both before and after the institution of the suit. 21. Before adverting to the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act with a view to find out answer to the said question it will be apt to state, in brief the law regarding interpretation of the statute. The intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language itself, if the language or words are plain, clear, unambiguous and explicit and the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible and admits of only one meaning then no question of construction arises, as the provision speaks for itself. However, when the plain meaning results in absurdity, inconsistency or ambiguity or defeats, the purpose or the object of the provision, then the rule of interpretation can be applied to find out the intendment or the object of the relevant provision. If two views are possible, one effectuates the purpose or intendment of the provision and the other frustrates it the former must be preferred. Every efforts should be made to have a purposive construction with a view to effectuate the purpose and object of the statutory provision. 22. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) at page 228, it is said : "WHERE the language of a Statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structures of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a, Statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsmans unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule : " the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution. 23 Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. V/s. Asher, (1949) 2 All ER 155 at p. 164 observed as follows :"When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament .....and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature...... A Judge should ask himself the question how if the makers of the Act had themselves come across, this ruck in the texture of it, they would have strengthened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." 24. The aforesaid observation regarding interpretation by Lord Denning were adopted and approved by the Apex Court in several cases. He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." 24. The aforesaid observation regarding interpretation by Lord Denning were adopted and approved by the Apex Court in several cases. Reference in this connection may be made to the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement V/s. Deepak Mahajan, AIR 1994 SC 1775 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows (at p. 1785 of AIR) : "True, normally Courts should be slow to pronounce the legislature to have been mistaken in its constantly manifested opinion upon a matter resting wholly within its will and take its plain ordinary grammatical meaning of the words of the enactment as affording the best guide, but to winch up the legislative intent, it is permissible for Courts to take into account of the ostensible purpose and object and the real legislative intent. Otherwise, a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of the legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose and object will render the legislature inane. ..... " 25. When the words in a statutory provision are capable of bearing two or more constructions, the well-established rule laid down in Heydons case, 1584 (3) Co-Rep 7a, 7b, which is also known as mischief rule, has been applied by the Court. This rule of interpretation requires the Court to ascertain what was the law before making of the Act, what were the mischiefs or defects in such law and how the Parliament intended to cure it. The Apex Court in Bengal Immunity, Co. Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 , has approved the rules of interpretation in Hey-dons case (supra). 26. Firstly, the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act itself should be read to find out as to whether the language is clear and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning which serves the purpose of the provision. Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 , has approved the rules of interpretation in Hey-dons case (supra). 26. Firstly, the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act itself should be read to find out as to whether the language is clear and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning which serves the purpose of the provision. Sec. 15, as quoted above, provides, inter alia, that when the tenant contests the suit for the recovery of possession as regards claim for ejectment then the landlord may move the application for payment of month to month rent and also subject to law of limitation the arrears of rent, if any, and the Court after hearing the parties will pass an order to deposit the rent month to month and the arrears of rent both before and after the institution of the suit. So far as arrears of rent is concerned, it provides that the landlord may claim arrears of rent subject to law of limitation but it does not provide as to from which date the period of limitation is to be counted. An application for a direction to deposit the rent cannot be filed unless the tenant contests the suit as regards claim for ejectment. The tenant can only contest when he appears and files written statement and as such before the tenant contests, the landlord cannot file an application under the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act for payment of rent and arrears of rent. No doubt, this section provides the Court may pass an order both for arrears of rent prior to and after the institution of the suit, but the said expression is of no help to determine the question as to from which date the period of limitation is to be counted for the purpose of arrears of rent. Thus, the provisions of Sec. 15 are not clear, on the other hand, it is ambiguous, i.e. open to diverse meaning. On the basis of the same it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to from which date the period of limitation is to be counted for the purpose of deposit of arrears of rent. Thus, the provisions of Sec. 15 are not clear, on the other hand, it is ambiguous, i.e. open to diverse meaning. On the basis of the same it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to from which date the period of limitation is to be counted for the purpose of deposit of arrears of rent. It is also not possible to come to a definite conclusion from the reading of the said section as to where the period of limitation governs the claim of arrears of rentof both prior to and after the institution of the suit or only prior to the institution of the suit. 27. In such a situation rules to interpretation have to be resorted to find out the intendment, object or the purpose of the Act. 28. Sec. 1lA of the 47 Act contained the provision empowering the Court to pass an order for payment of arrears of rent without stating as to whether the arrears of rent is with regard to the period prior to institution of the suit or after the institution of the suit. The said provision gave rise to a conflicting judgments and this Court, as stated above, held in some cases that the order can be passed for payment of arrears of rent even prior to institution of the suit even beyond the period of limitation. Some of the decisions took the views that the orders for depositing only such arrears of rent prior to institution of the suit can be passed which is not barred by limitation or any other law. The Full Bench ultimately held that no direction to be made for payment of arrears of rent prior to institution of the suit. So far as arrears of rent after the institution of the suit and prior to filing of the application under Sec. 11A is concerned there was no controversy, in the sense that this Court consistently held that the arrears of rent occurring during the pendency of the suit is not circumscribed by any period of limitation and on an application 11A order can be passed for payment of arrears of rent during the pendency of the suit. Thus, the controversy was with regard to payment of arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit in the provisions of Sec. 11A,was defective in this regard. Thus, the controversy was with regard to payment of arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit in the provisions of Sec. 11A,was defective in this regard. As a result of decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case, the landlord was deprived of the lawfully recoverable arrears of rent for a period prior to the institution of the suit. The legislature, in my view, has incorporated the aforesaid expressions regarding limitation only with regard to arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit with a view to effectuate the object and purpose of Sec. 15. The legislature has intended that the tenant should pay all the arrears of rent legally recoverable even or a period prior to institution of the suit along with the rent occurring during the pendency of the suit. 29. The expression "subject to law of limitation does not cover the arrears of rent occurring during the pendency of the suit. If the aforesaid expression is also interpreted to include the arrears of rent during the pendency of the suit that would frustrate the object and purpose of Section 15 of the Act. The right of the landlord to file an application arises only after the tenant appears and contest the suit for ejectment, before that he cannot file an application. An unscrupulous tenant will evade the appearance for a time beyond the period of limitation as a result of which the landlords claim with regard to arrears of rent during the pendency of the suit beyond the period of three years will be barred. Thus, the landlords right to get arrears of rent even during the pendency of the suit will be frustrated by the act of the tenant. Non-fixing a time for filing an application under Sec. 15 also indicates that so far as arrears of rent during the pendency of the suit is concerned, the legislature never intended that same should be subjected to law of limitation. The order for payment of rent during the pendency of the suit for any period even beyond the period of limitation if found due is neither unjust nor oppressive to the tenant, as he is required to pay the same in lieu of his occupation of the building during the pendency of the suit. The order for payment of rent during the pendency of the suit for any period even beyond the period of limitation if found due is neither unjust nor oppressive to the tenant, as he is required to pay the same in lieu of his occupation of the building during the pendency of the suit. The law laid down by this Court in the case of Ramnandan Sharma (AIR 1975 Patna 283) (FB) (supra) that the claim for arrears of rent during the pendency of the suit is not circumscribed by law of limitation still holds the field and the addition of the aforesaid expression has not made any change with regard to the said law. There is nothing in Sec. 15 of the Act to show that legislature intended to unsettle the law on this point. If the legislature wanted to make the arrears of rent accruing during the pendency of the suit also subject to law of limitation then it could have expressed its intention by saying that the period of limitation for arrears of rent be counted with from the date of application or from the date of passing of the order. Absence of this provision clearly indicates that legislature never intended to bring within the sweep of limitation the arrears of rent after the institution of the suit. 30. This Court in the case of Dwarika Pd. Kapri (AIR 1988 Patna 317) (supra), held that the period of limitation with regard to arrears of rent should be calculated with reference to the date of filing of the application under Sec. 15 of the Act and the period may include the period before and after the institution of the suit. In other words, this Court held that the period of limitation from the date of application is to be counted with regard to the arrears of rent whether accrued before or after the institution of the suit. For the reasons stated above, in the preceding paragraph, I am of the view that the said decision does not lay down the correct law. The view taken in the said case will defeat the purpose or the object of the provision. There is no rationale to count the period of limitation from the date of filing the application. 31. For the reasons stated above, in the preceding paragraph, I am of the view that the said decision does not lay down the correct law. The view taken in the said case will defeat the purpose or the object of the provision. There is no rationale to count the period of limitation from the date of filing the application. 31. In the case of Jeeban Kumar Sarkar (1988 Pat LJR 532) (supra), which has been relied upon by the respondent, this Court held that the period of limitation for claiming arrears of rent under Sec. 15 of the Act is not applicable in a suit where arrears of rent is claimed in the suit itself. This Court took the said view on the ground that when a suit is instituted claiming particular relief then the limitation for the said relief remains suspended during the pendency of the suit. This view is also not correct for the reason that no distinction can be made between the suit of one nature or the other for the purpose of deciding the period of limitation under Sec. 15 of the Act. Sec. 15 of the Act applies to the suit filed for eviction on all the grounds. It does not make any difference as to the nature of the suit. Even in a case where no rent is claimed in the suit, an order for payment of arrears of rent as well as current and future rent can be passed under Sec. 15 of the Act. In such a situation, no different period of limitation can be applied with regard to suits founded on different grounds. The said decision also does not lay down the correct law. 32. Thus, after having considered the past history of the legislation, mischief in the previous legislation, the intention of the legislature in adding the aforesaid expressions in Sec. 15, the purpose and object of the provision, I hold that Sec. 15 of the Act empowers the Court to pass an order for arrears of rent even prior to the institution of the suit for a period not barred by limitation as well as for arrears of rent and rent by month to month during the pendency of the suit. The expression "subject to law of limitation" applies only with regard to claim of arrears of rent prior to the institution of suit. The expression "subject to law of limitation" applies only with regard to claim of arrears of rent prior to the institution of suit. The claim for arrears of rent during the pendency of the suit is not controlled or circumscribed by period of limitation. I may add here that while construing the provision, I have not lost sight of the fact that the primary object of the Act is the protection of the tenant. The view taken by me does not defeat the said object as it does not cause injustice to the tenant, on the other hand, it effectuates the purpose of Sec. 15 of the Act. 33. Coming to the facts of this case, it is evident that the plaintiff in the suit has claimed arrears of rent for the period to the institution of the suit from Feb. 1980 to June, 1983. He has filed an application under Sec. 15 of the Act for depositing the aforesaid arrears of rent. The arrears of rent claimed is within the period of limitation from the date of filing of the suit and is legally recoverable and, as such, the Court has rightly passed the impugned order which does not suffer from any jurisdictional error requiring interference by this Court. 34. In the result, there is no merit in this application and the same is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 35. B. N. AGRAWAL, J. :- I entirely agree. 36 S. K. HOMCHOUDHARI, J. :- I agree.Petition dismissed