Judgement ORDER :- I dispose of all the above Civil Rules by a common judgment and order as these involve common questions of law and similar facts. 2. Petitioners in the above Civil Rules carry on business, inter alia, of manufacture and sale of veneer. Plywood factories are the sole customers of the veneer manufactured by the petitioners. Petitioners in the course of their business of sale of commercial veneer are required to transport those from their factories by truck etc, to various places. For transportation of such veneer they are required to cross check gates in Assam, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh etc. 3. Veneer is manufactured from logs. Trees felled in the forest are cut into pieces and tops are removed. These pieces of timber are called logs. The Forest Department measures these logs, enters the measurement in the log measurement book, collects the royalty as per the approved rate on those and thereafter releases the same by putting hammer marks to various contractors for free sale. Some times such logs are also disposed of by the Forest Department itself. 4. For manufacturing Veneer, these logs are taken to the factory where the logs are peeled by some machines with the help of power. First the logs are cut into sections according to the required size of veneer. Barks of the logs are removed, naked sectioned logs are fitted in the peeling machines and with the help of power the logs are moved in circular motion and with the help of knife fitted in the machine thin layers of timber come out and these thin layers are, thereafter, cut into different sizes which make veneer. For the purpose of making veneer, mechanical process is required to be applied. For manufacturing veneer joint effort of human labour and machinery are required to be used. 5. According to the petitioners veneer is commercially a distinct product. It can be used for the purpose of manufacturing plywood, block board, etc. Apart from this it is not normally used for any other purpose. 6. The case of the petitioner is that the veneer is neither timber nor wood and it is not found in the natural state like timber or wood. Veneer is a finished product and is the outcome of manufacturing process. Apart from this it is not normally used for any other purpose. 6. The case of the petitioner is that the veneer is neither timber nor wood and it is not found in the natural state like timber or wood. Veneer is a finished product and is the outcome of manufacturing process. As it is an outcome of manufacturing process, for taking out veneer from the factory Central Excise Duty is required to be paid on the spot or in advance before bringing out the same from the factory premises as per the provisions of the Central Excise Act and Rules. The petitioners are required to transport veneer into Assam by only a Mill Challan and without any interference from any quarter. Forest Department also never used to put any obstacle in the movement of veneer. This was also clarified by the Divisional Forest Officer, Sibsagar Division, Jorhat by his Memo No. B13994-95/ 18 dated 23-11-1983 issued to the Range Officer, Mariani Range with reference to the application dated 8-11-1983 of M/s. Friends Plyood, Tinsukia to the effect that since veneer was a finished product no transit pass was necessary for transportation of veneer. All the Divisional Forest Officers under Eastern Assam Circle, Jorhat in response to the letter No. FC-38/ Sib/EAC dated 17-7-1986 of the Chief Conservator of Forests, Eastern Assam Circle Jorhat submitted that veneer was all along treated as finished product and, therefore, transit pass for transportation of the same was not required. But the Chief Conservator of Forests did not agree with this and, therefore, issued Circular No. FG-38/VENEER/EAC dated 12-9-1996 directing all the Divisional Forest Officers under his circle to treat veneer as Forest produce and to control its movement under Section 40(2) of the Assam Forest Regulations VII of 1891 with immediate effect. 7. Contention of the petitioners was that the view taken by the Chief Conservator of Forest was wholly untrue and contrary to the provisions of law. They further state that though obligation to obtain transit passes for movement of veneer was imposed nevertheless the petitioners and other veneer manufacturers were not required to obtain transit passes for movement of veneer from their mills for certain period. Thereafter, the petitioners and other manufacturers of veneer were required to obtain transit passes for movement of veneer though they were not required to pay any fee or tax for the transit passes. Thereafter, the petitioners and other manufacturers of veneer were required to obtain transit passes for movement of veneer though they were not required to pay any fee or tax for the transit passes. Some times petitioners and others were forced by, the Forest Department to halt at the revenue stations in connection with formalities relating to transit passes. In the process the petitioners had to bear additional expenses for haltage of truck. Besides, in the rainy weather veneer some times got damaged. Heavy losses had been incurred by the petitioners. Over and above, the delay caused at the revenue stations made it difficult for the petitioners to make reasonable profit and some times even losses were incurred for such delay. In spite of several representations nothing was done and the petitioners were made to suffer for insistence to obtain transit passes which, according to the petitioners, were not at all necessary. The petitioners also felt that the authority has no jurisdiction to insist on transit passes. 8. The petitioners and other manufacturers of timber, therefore, approached this Court by filing a series of writ petitions praying for an order to quash the direction given by the authorities for obtaining transit passes for transportation of their veneer. The writ petitions were finally heard and disposed of by this Court by a common judgment dated 2-7-1993 holding that veneer could not be treated as timber and could not be termed as forest produce and, as such, for movement and transportation of veneer obtaining transit passes and production thereof at the check gates was not at all necessary and the said judgment has also been reported in (1993) 2 GLJ 153. Thereafter, according to the petitioners, the Governor of Assam made and promulgated an Ordinance under the name of Assam Forest Regulations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994 (the Assam Ordinance No. XI of 1994) to amend the Assam Forest Regulations, 1891. The said Ordinance was published on 23rd November, 1994 and it came into force (immediately) from the date of publication. By the said Ordinance definition of timber was amended. The earlier definition of timber in Assam Forest Regulations, 1891 prior to the Ordinance was as follows : " "Timer" includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled, and all wood, whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not." 9. By the said Ordinance definition of timber was amended. The earlier definition of timber in Assam Forest Regulations, 1891 prior to the Ordinance was as follows : " "Timer" includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled, and all wood, whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not." 9. In the Ordinance the timber has been defined thus- " "Timer" means trees when they have fallen or have been felled or all wood, whether cut out or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not and includes trees when cut into pieces of sizes or peeled out or sliced out (veneer) for manufacturing of plywood, block board or any other purposes or not." 10. By the present definition, the definition of "timber" has been given wider meaning. In the definition of timber it includes peeled out or sliced out wood (veneer) which are used for the manufacture of plywood or block board or any other purposes. This was not there in the earlier definition. The aforesaid Ordinance was replaced by an Act known as Assam Forest Regulations (Amendment) Act, 1995. The said Act was published in the Assam Gazette Extra ordinary on May 2, 1995. The Act was made during the pendency of some of the petitions and accordingly on the prayer of the petitioners, they were allowed to amend the writ petition challenging the provisions of the Amendment Act particularly Sections 3, 24, 25, 35, 40, 41, 49, 49A, 50, 59, 62, 64 and 70 contending that the Act have been substantially amended. 11. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the State Government in Civil Rule No. 165 of 1995. 12. Heard Ms. Hazarika, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners in Civil Rule Nos. 233/95, 486/96, 363/95, 361/95, 588/95, 714/95, 195/95 and 4629/94 and Mr. S. N. Bhuyan, learned Advocate General, Assam assisted by Dr. B. P. Todi, learned Government Advocate, Assam. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in other Civil Rules adopted the arguments advanced by Ms. Hazarika. 13. Ms. Hazarika submitted that the aforesaid amendment was bad in law and it was repugnant to an existing law in view of the fact that it was opposed to the existing law. The second contention of Ms. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in other Civil Rules adopted the arguments advanced by Ms. Hazarika. 13. Ms. Hazarika submitted that the aforesaid amendment was bad in law and it was repugnant to an existing law in view of the fact that it was opposed to the existing law. The second contention of Ms. Hazarika was that the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to make any law regarding veneer under Entry No. 17A of the concurrent list. Mr. Bhuyan, on the other hand, submitted that the amended Act has not made any law which was opposed to the existing law. Mr. Bhuyan also contended that inclusion of veneer in the definition of timber was very much within the legislative competence inasmuch as Entry 17A also included veneer which was ancillary to the main subject. 14. On the rival contentions of the parties the questions fall for determination are :- (1) whether the amendment made in the Assam Forest Regulations Amendment Act, 1995 is repugnant to any of the provisions of existing law ? and (2) Whether the State Legislature has jurisdiction to make law relating to venner by including within the definition of timber ? 15. Article 254 deals with repugnancy of an Act made by the State Legislature which is inconsistent to the Act made by the Parliament or the existing law. The question of repugnancy arises only in connection with subjects enumerated in the concurrent list which both the Union and the State Legislatures have concurrent powers to make law. The question of conflict between laws made both the Legislatures relating to the same subject necessarily arises. Under clause (1) of Article 254 if a State law relating to a Concurrent subject is repugnant to a Union law relating to that subject, then, whether the Union law is prior or later in time, the Union law will prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. However, it is to be noted that the State law does not become void as soon as the Union Parliament legislates with respect to the same subject. There is nothing to prevent the State Legislature to make law with respect to a Concurrent subject merely because there is Union law relating to the same subject. However, it is to be noted that the State law does not become void as soon as the Union Parliament legislates with respect to the same subject. There is nothing to prevent the State Legislature to make law with respect to a Concurrent subject merely because there is Union law relating to the same subject. Article 254(2) is attracted only if the State law is repugnant to the Union Act, which means that the two cannot stand together. In Shyamakant v. Rambhasan, AIR 1939 FC 74, the Federal Court held that the doctrine of occupied field had no application in the interpretation of this theory. A State law may be repugnant when there is direct conflict between the provisions of two Laws made by both State and Union. The Supreme Court in Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752 held that where one cannot be obeyed without disobeying the other the law made by the State Legislature shall be void. Again two enactments may be inconsistent although obedience to each of them may be possible without disobeying the other. Statutes do more than impose duties; they may, for instance, confer rights; and one statute is inconsistent with another when it takes away a right conferred by the other even though the right be one which might be waived or abandoned without disobeying the statute which conferred the right. The repugnancy is not confined only to the case where there is a direct conflict between two legislatures, viz., if one law says do and the other says dont. It may also arise where both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together. In Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., 1956 SCR 393 : ( AIR 1956 SC 676 ) the Apex Court held that though there may not be any direct conflict between the Union and the State Legislation, where it is evident that the Union Parliament intends its legislation to be a complete and exhaustive code relating the subject, it shall be taken that the Union law has replaced State Legislation relating to the subject. However, if the Union law itself permits or recognises other laws restricting or qualifying the general provision made in it the special provisions of such local law cannot be said to be repugnant to the Union law. However, if the Union law itself permits or recognises other laws restricting or qualifying the general provision made in it the special provisions of such local law cannot be said to be repugnant to the Union law. Say for instance where the Central Act applies only where there is no local law to the contrary or contemplates State legislation on matters not dealt with by it. The position is similar as regards those provisions of the State Act which deal with a subject matter other than that of the Central Act. The doctrine of pith and substance has been applied to determine whether the State law substantially repugnant on the field occupied by the law of Parliament. 16. The Apex Court in a very recent decision in Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Education and Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 15 : (1996 AIR SCW 926) in para 20 of the judgment held thus :- "Clause (1) of Article 254 gives overriding effect to the provisions of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact or to any provision of any existing law in respect of one of the matters enumerated in List III and if a law made by the legislature of the State is repugnant to the provisions of the law made by Parliament, the law made by the ligislature of the State is to be treated as void to the extent of repugnancy. Clause (1) is, however, subject to clause (2). Under clause (2), the law made by the legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in List III will prevail over the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter if the law made by the legislature of the State has been reserved for consideration by the President and has received the assent. The proviso to clause (2) curtails the ambit of clause (2) by providing that Parliament can enact a law with respect to the same matter on which the State legislature has made the law by such law Parliament can add to, amend, vary or repeal the law made by the legislature of a State. The provision corresponding to Article 254 was contained in Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The provision corresponding to Article 254 was contained in Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The only difference between that provision and Article 254 is that there was no provision similar to the proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 in Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935. As a result of the proviso in Article 254, the legislative power of Parliament has been enlarged in the sense that it can add to, amend, vary or repeal the law made by the legislature of the State." 17. It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one says do and the other dont, there is no true repugnancy, if it is possible to obey the laws. The reason is that this is too narrow a test; there may well be cases of repugnancy where both laws say dont but in different ways. 18. In State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch and Co. ( AIR 1964 SC 1284 ) it has been observed by the Apex Court that repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. Two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly indicates to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature shall be repugnant. 19. In Thirumurga Kirupananda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996 AIR SCW 926) (supra) in para 26 the Apex Court held thus :-- "It cannot, therefore, be said that the test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is the only criterion of repugnance. Repugnancy may arise between two enactments even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field. Repugnancy may arise between two enactments even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field. The contention of Shri Sanghi that there is no repugnancy between the proviso to Section 5(5) of the Medical University Act and Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act because both can be complied with, cannot, therefore, be accepted. What has to be seen is whether in enacting Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act, Parliament has evinced an intention to cover the whole field relating to establishement of new medical colleges in the country." 20. From the above decision it is clear that repugnancy may arise between the two enactments even though, obedience of each of the enactments may be possible. However, if the superior authority intends to cover the whole filed, the provisions of the other legislation which are in conflict shall be repugnant. 21. In the present case the Assam Forest Regulations is a piece of legislation in respect of Forest and the legislation was made prior to the commencement of the Constitution and the subject of Forest is now included in the concurrent list by 42nd amendment. Therefore, there is no doubt that forest (law) is an existing law. There is no difficulty to hold that timber is a forest produce; as it is found in almost in the natural state. However, after the amendment veneer has been included in the definition of Timber. In my opinion in the earlier definition of "Timber" in the existing law the legislature did not contemplate that it would be an exhaustive and also did not intend to exclude any other material. Besides the inclusion of "Veneer" cannot also be said to be one opposed to the definition of Timber. Therefore, in my opinion, the inclusion of veneer in the definition is not repugnant to the existing law. 22. The next submission of Ms. Haza rika is that the State Legislature has no competence to make law by including "veneer" in the definition of "Timber". Learned counsel further submitted that the inclusion of veneer in the definition of forest produce was beyond the competence of "State Legislature" inasmuch as veneer was not a forest produce, and therefore it could not come under the heading "Forest". Learned counsel further submitted that the inclusion of veneer in the definition of forest produce was beyond the competence of "State Legislature" inasmuch as veneer was not a forest produce, and therefore it could not come under the heading "Forest". Elaborating the submission learned counsel submitted that it was true that "Forest" in fact included also the produce of the forest found in the natural state. Besides if anything was shown for the preservation and maintenance of forest itself might come in the subject of "Forest" under Entry 17A of the List III. Learned counsel further submitted that making "Veneer" required certain mechanical process and for all practicable purposes it was manufactured product of forest produces, namely, logs and timbers. Learned Advocate General Mr. Bhuyan, however, supported the amendment by saying that no doubt veneer was not exactly a forest produce found in the forest, nevertheless the legislature had the competence to make law as ancillary item under the heading of "Forest" as mentioned in Entry 17A of the List III. 23. Now it is to be seen whether the State Legislature has competence to make law by including "Veneer" in the definition of "Timber". 24. The general principles relating to the interpretation of legislative entries in the Seventh Schedule can be summarised thus : (a) Entries in the three lists are merely legislative heads or fields of legislation, they demarcate the area over which the appropriate legislatures can operate; (b) Allocation of subjects in the Lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but is a mere enumeration of broad and comprehensive categories, dictionary meaning of the words used, it not always decisive; (c) Entries should be interpreted broadly and liberally giving amplitude to the words employed, as these may intend to cover vast and plenary powers; (d) None of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow and restricted sense. It should be read broadly so as to cover or extend to all cognate, subsidiary, ancillary or incidental matters, which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it; (e) If entries either from different Lists or from the same List appear to conflict with each other or at times overlaps shall be made to reconcile. 25. It should be read broadly so as to cover or extend to all cognate, subsidiary, ancillary or incidental matters, which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it; (e) If entries either from different Lists or from the same List appear to conflict with each other or at times overlaps shall be made to reconcile. 25. In order to determine what is forest produce, it is necessary for us to address ourselves to the following two questions and to find out the answer : (1) What is really meant by expression forest produce? (2) What is it that the State Legislature has intended to include in the concept of forest produce for the purpose of vesting the same in the State Government along with private forests ? 26. There is no doubt that the expression forest in its normal and popular connotation includes all that goes with it, such as, trees with fruits on them, shrubs, bushes, woody vegetation, undergrowth, pastures, anything attached to trees, things embeded in the earth like mines and quarries with their produce, wild and stray animals living in forests. In other words, forest produce in its primary and natural state lying in the forest are "Forest Produce". Such forest produces even if gets severed from its place of birth or origin and if they continue to lie there in the same condition form part of forest and as such will be included in the concept of "forest". Even if any forest produce is severed from its place of birth or origin through the intervention of a human agency, if such several forest produce continued to lie in the forest in its primary or predominatly primary state without anything being done to it for altering or changing its natural condition, the same shall form part of the "Forest". In my view, in principle there is no difference between the forest produce that has naturally fallen and the forest produce that has been felled or detached from its place of birth or origin by human agency so long as it continues to lie in the forest in its primary or predominantly primary state shall continue to form part of the "Forest". 27. It is true that the expression Forest used in Entry 17A of List III is wide enough to cover the field of legislation pertaining to timber which is a forest produce. 27. It is true that the expression Forest used in Entry 17A of List III is wide enough to cover the field of legislation pertaining to timber which is a forest produce. An unduly restrictive meaning in my view should not be given. 28. Now coming to the present case whether the expression "Veneer" can be included within the expression "Timber". As already referred to above the forest produce means forest produce found in the forest like trees, shrubs, bushes etc. in the collective form. If they are removed from the earth it will still remain as forest produce. But the veneer is not in the natural state. From the facts mentioned in the petitioners logs from the forests are brought to the factory and special devices are used for manufacture of veneer and definitely it is a manufactured product and therefore Central Excise duties are payable. In view of the above the "Veneer" cannot be said to be a forest produce and therefore it cannot be included in the Definition of "Timber". 29. In view of the above in my view State legislature has no competence to make law to include "Veneer" in the definition of Timber as the same is not a "Forest Produce". Therefore I am of the opinion that the amendment made by incorporating "Veneer" in the definition of Timber is not within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry, 17A of the List III. Mr. Bhuyan has not stated that the State Legislature had power otherwise. 30. In view of the above, insistence for transit pass by the respondents for transportation of veneer is set aside and quashed. 31. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. Order accordingly.