ORDER 1. Petitioner, a workman, working with Ist respondent, is before this Court, inter alia questioning the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by 2nd respondent in No. MAA:CM: ADMN: 7607 dated July 12115, 1986, reducing two increments with cumulative effect from i August 1, 1986 in respect of charge memo dated s May 4,1984. 2. While working with Ist respondent, a 10 memo of allegation' and a charge memo was served on the petitioner alleging certain irregularities which would come within the meaning of the expression 'Misconduct,. By his reply, petitioner had denied the allegations 15 made in 'Memo of allegations' and the 'charge memo'. A detailed enquiry was held by the Enquiry Officer as prescribed in the standing orders. Report alongwith his findings had been submitted to the disciplinary authority by Enquiry Officer. The disciplinary authority after reappreciation of entire evidence on record and after a thorough reassessment of the enquiry report and findings therein, proceeded to pass the impugned order imposing penalty as indicated 25 earlier. Being aggrieved by the said order, petitioner without even availing the statutory appeal provided under the Standing Orders, is before this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs: "(i) issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction, quashing the impunged order dated July 12115, 1986, bearing Reference MAA:CM: ADMN:7607 35 (Anexxure-G) passed by the 2nd respondent, as null and void; (ii) to call for the entire records and quash the entire proceedings being illegal and 40 vitiated; (iii) grant such other order is as this Hon'ble Court deems fit, including the award of costs." 3. Ms. Sheela Krishnan, the learned counsel for the petitioner would canvass the following issues in support of the reliefs sought for in the writ petition. The ground urged are : (a) The Standing Orders of the Ist respondent do not authorise 2nd respondent to initiate and impose any penalties against the delinquent official. Alternatively it is urged that 2nd respondent is incompetent to pass any orders much less an order imposing 1 5 major penalty under the Statutory Orders; (b) Charges are vague and devoid of material particulars. Alternatively it is urged that 2nd respondent is incompetent to pass any orders much less an order imposing 1 5 major penalty under the Statutory Orders; (b) Charges are vague and devoid of material particulars. (c) Charge memo should have preceded the memo of allegations and not vice versa; (d) Inordinate delay in passing the impunged order from the date of completion of enquiry 25 proceedings is fatal to the entire disciplinary proceedings; (e) Disciplinary authority has not furnished enquiry report to the C.S.O. and the non supply of the enquiry report is fatal and would vitiate the entire disciplinary proceedings. (f) Impugned order is cryptic without application of mind to the material on record and the order is not a speaking order and is arbitrary to the core. (g) Lastly past record of the delinquent official is taken into consideration while imposing major penalty, which itself is bad in law. 4. These are the only grounds urged at the time of hearing of the writ petition and on these grounds, learned counsel would submit that the entire disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and require to be set aside by this Court. 5. Respondents have filed their detailed statement of objections, meeting each one of the assertions made in the petition and Smt. Shobha Ananth the learned counsel ably justifies the impunged order passed by the respondent-authority. 6. Heard the respective contentions of the parties. The first ground of attack on. the impugned order is with regard to competence of the 2nd respondent in passing the impugned order. Schedule of the Standing orders of the 1st respondent would indicate that in respect of class of employees under 1 to 6 Grade, it 'S 20 "Area Departmental Reads", who can award punishments in respect of all personnel serving in Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi areas. For the purpose of this Schedule Area Manager, Deputy Area Manager, Operations Manager, Chief 25 Engineer, Chief Accounts Officer, Traffic Manager, Asst. Controller of Stores are deemed to be Area Departmental Heads. Schedule to the Standing orders came to be amended by a notification dated November 1, 1979 and 3(published in the Official Gazette on December 7,1974 in respect of employees in Grade 1 to 6 to which the petitioner belongs. Regional the authority to ion in time 3, 9s case. Proviso 9 to the Scheic specifically includes Commercial Manager at SI. Schedule to the Standing orders came to be amended by a notification dated November 1, 1979 and 3(published in the Official Gazette on December 7,1974 in respect of employees in Grade 1 to 6 to which the petitioner belongs. Regional the authority to ion in time 3, 9s case. Proviso 9 to the Scheic specifically includes Commercial Manager at SI. No. VI to be deemed as Regional Departmental Head. In the instant case, it is the Commercial Manager who,& has passed the order, imposing the penalty for petitioner. The respondents authorisents. There is no petitioner, that the 2nd respondent was incompetent to pass the impugned order. Therefore, 1st ground urged by the petitioner fails. 7. Next, it was contended that charges in the charge memo are vague and it does not contain material particulars. Whether charges are vague or not, has to be examined in the light of circumstances of each case. The test is whether the charge conveys to the employee concerned, the exact nature of the alleged offence in a way that would enable him to meet the charge. Reason being, if the charges are vague, then there is no reasonable opportunity to show cause. Therefore, it is always said that the charges to should contain particulars and should he specific and not vague. Otherwise, it will vitiate the entire enquiry proceedings. Reading of the charge memo dated May 4,1984, would show that it is capable of being understood and is sufficiently definite for the delinquent official to make effective representation. A charge for indiscipline cannot be viewed with the same strictness as a charge for an offence triable under Criminal law. In disciplinary matters, it is sufficient if the person proceeded. against is told, what in substance the accusation against him is. If, for any reason, the charge memo failed to furnish the particulars of the offence, the enquiry will not be vitiated on account of the 25 omission of particulars, if there has been no future of justice by reason of lack of particulars in the charge memo. In the present case one of the circumstances to infer that workman understood the charge is the reply of the employee 30 himself to the chargesheet. When a worker gives an elaborate reply, then he cannot later on say that the charge is vague. In the present case one of the circumstances to infer that workman understood the charge is the reply of the employee 30 himself to the chargesheet. When a worker gives an elaborate reply, then he cannot later on say that the charge is vague. Further the s of the charge has at first instance bes and it cannot be writ petition. In my view, in the present case, charge memo is not vague or so general to make it impossible for the employee for making effective representation. 1.. Accordingly second ground of attack also fails. 8. Next it was contended by learned counsel that issuance of 'memo of allegations' prior to 1 issuance of charge memo itself is sufficient to @ 4. hold that the disciplinary proceedings are not only bad but opposed to procedure prescribed 1 under Standing Orders for holding departmental enquiry proceedings. The learned counsel is not in a position to point out any Regulation in the Standing Orders, which have been contrasovened by respondents and further she is not in a 530position to demonstrate how the procedure adopted by respondents has caused any prejudice to die petitioner to defend himself properly before the Enquiry Officer. In my view, memo of allegations is in the nature of a show cause notice inter alia directing the petitioner to show cause to the allegations made therein. In the present case, charge memo, follows memo of allegations. In the charge memo certain charges are levelled against the petitioner asking him to make effective representation alleged in the said memo. The purpose of these memos is only to bring to the notice of the workman the charges and imputation of misconduct that the 1 st respondents intends to allege against the petitioner and further to give an opportunity to the workman to explain either by denying or accepting the allegations made in the memos. Procedure so adopted by the respondents, in my view, has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner to defend his case before the Enquiry Officer. It is relevant at this stage to state that the Standing Orders of the Ist respondent is silent on this aspect. For all these reasons, it cannot he said that there is deviation from the prescribed 2, procedure, which would vitiate the entire enquiry proceedings. Accordingly, the submission of the learned counsel on this aspect cannot be accepted. 9. It is relevant at this stage to state that the Standing Orders of the Ist respondent is silent on this aspect. For all these reasons, it cannot he said that there is deviation from the prescribed 2, procedure, which would vitiate the entire enquiry proceedings. Accordingly, the submission of the learned counsel on this aspect cannot be accepted. 9. The next ground urged by learned counsel 30 is that there is inordinate delay in passing the oppugned order after completion of the enquiry proceedings by the Enquiry Officer. According to the learned counsel the delay in framing the 35 order by the disciplinary authority is fatal to the disciplinary proceedings. The reason for delay in passing the impugned order has been explained by the respondents in their objection statement. They have stated in their objection that since the misconduct committed by the petitioner and proved in the domestic enquiry warranted a punishment beyond the competence of the Section Officer, so the ease had been referred to Commercial Manager at Madras who is competent authority under Standing Orders to impose punishment. In my view delay in passing the order impugned has been properly explained by respondents and at any rate delay in passing an order of punishment would not be 50 disadvantageous to the petitioner and by no, cl stretch of imagination it can be said, it would vitiate the entire disciplinary proceedings. 10. The next ground urged is that the punishing authority has not assigned any reasons while imposing penalty. So the impugned order is bad, invalid and illegal. Respondents have met this assertion in their objections as under : ".... it is denied that the competent authority had not applied his mind to all the facts and the circumstances of the case before awarding the punishment. The Enquiry Officer had found the Petitioner guilty of all 1.5 the charges except that of threatening. The second respondent after carefully going through the Enquiry Officer's report, proceedings of the enquiry and other related papers had satisfied that the charges levelled 20 against him have been established and concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer had found the Petitioner guilty of all 1.5 the charges except that of threatening. The second respondent after carefully going through the Enquiry Officer's report, proceedings of the enquiry and other related papers had satisfied that the charges levelled 20 against him have been established and concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, there is no need to further discuss the facts of the case much less the evidence adduced before the enquiry." Earlier the general rule was that if an order imposing penalty is passed, then reasons should be given, but recent trend of the decisions would indicate that when the disciplinary 30 authority agrees with the finding of an Enquiry Officer, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to reappraise the evidence to arrive at the same finding. At this juncture it is useful to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the 3. case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and others Vs. Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279 . The Court was pleased to observe as under at pp 294-295 : "In view of the answers so given it has to be now seen whether under the Regulations, the concerned authorities are required to give reasons for their decisions, Regulation 68(3) lays down the procedure the Disciplinary 4.1; Authority is required to follow after it receives the proceedings of the enquiry including the report of the Enquiry Officer. On careful perusal thereof we find that only in those cases where the Disciplinary Authority considers it necessary to direct fresh or further enquiry or disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry 0Wicer, it has to record the reasons for its such directions, but there is no such obligation if it agrees with the findings Of the Enquiry Officer. It can, therefore, be legitimately inferred that when express provisions have been made in the Regulations for recording reasons in only the first two of the three facts situations-and not the other there is no implied obligation also to record the reasons in case of concerto concertorence with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. It can, therefore, be legitimately inferred that when express provisions have been made in the Regulations for recording reasons in only the first two of the three facts situations-and not the other there is no implied obligation also to record the reasons in case of concerto concertorence with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Even if we proceed on the basis that such an obligation is implicit, still the order of the Disciplinary Authority can not be held to be bad, as on perusal thereof, we find that 1.5 before concurring with the findings of the Enquiry Officer it has gone through the entire proceeding and applied its mind thereto. In our considered opinion, when the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to re-appraise the evidence to arrive at the same ripping nig-. We are, therefore, unable to 25 accept the contention of Mr. Dutta that the order of punishment was liable to be struck down as it was a non-speaking order and did not contain any reason." In view of this settled position of law, it may 30 not be necessary for the punishing authority to give elaborate reasons while framing its order, when it agrees with the finding of Enquiry Officer. 11. Now coming to fact of non-supply of entirely report by the Disciplinary Authority, be-or imposing penalty, in the absence of Regulation prescribed for the supply of it to the delinquent official, in my view it is no more res Mtegra, in view of the law laid down by Apex Count in Karunankaran's case. "33. Questions (vi) and (vii) may be considered together. As has been discussed earlier, although the furnishing of the Enquiry Officer's report to the delinquent employee is a part of the reasonable opportunity available to him to defend himself against the ces, so before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the stage at which the said opportunity became available to the employee had stood deferred till the second notice requiring him to show cause against the penalty, was issued to him. The right to prove his innocence to the disciplinary authority was to be exercised by the employee along with his right to show cause as to why no penalty or lesser penalty should 0 be awarded. The right to prove his innocence to the disciplinary authority was to be exercised by the employee along with his right to show cause as to why no penalty or lesser penalty should 0 be awarded. The proposition of law that the two rights were independent of each other and in fact belonged to two difference stages in the inquiry came into sharp focus only after the Forty Second Amendment of the 5 Constitution which abolished the Second stage of the inquiry viz., the inquiry into the nature of punishment. As pointed out earlier, it was mooted but not decided in E.Bashyam case by the two learned Judges, of this Court who referred the question to the larger Bench. It has also been pointed out squarely that in K. C.Asthana case no such question was either raised or decided. It was the first time in 5 Mohd. Ramszan Ahan case that the question sqarely fell for decision before this Court. Hence, till November 20,1990 i,e the day on which Mohd. Ratman Khan case was decided, the position of law on the subject 0 was not settled by this Court. It is for the first time in Mohd. Ranran Igian case this Court laid do the law. That decision made the law laid down there prospective in operation i.e., applicable to the orders of .5 punishment passed after November 20, 1990. The law laid down was not applicable to the orders of punishment passed before that date notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings arising out of the same were pending in Courts after date. The said proceedings had to be decided according to the prevalent prior to the said date which did not require the authority to supply a copy of the Enquiry Officer's report to the employee. The only exception to this was where the service rules with regard to the disciplinary proceedings themselves made it obligatory to supply a copy of the report to the employee." 12. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of Apex Court, this issue need not detain me for long. Even on this ground, petitioner fails. 13. The only exception to this was where the service rules with regard to the disciplinary proceedings themselves made it obligatory to supply a copy of the report to the employee." 12. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of Apex Court, this issue need not detain me for long. Even on this ground, petitioner fails. 13. Lastly the learned counsel would submit that the Disciplinary Authority, while imposing penalty has totally relied upon the past record of the workman without giving an opportunity to the workman to have say in the matter and that according to the learned counsel is opposed to principles of natural justice. Reading of the orindiate that the to past record of to ascertain, if there are ever, charges beyond any doubt. It is only thereafter the Disciplinary Authority has order imposing the penalty. The order so passed does not give any indication whatsoever even to think that the past record of the service of the workman was taken into consideration by punishing authority while'. penalty. In such a situation, question of issuing a show cause notice and affording an opportunity of hearing the petitioner, before imposing any penalty, much less major penalty would not arise. Even on this ground, in my view, it cannot be said that the order passed by Disciplinary Authority is either invaild or illegal. 14. For all these reasons, in my review, the order passed by disciplinary authority dated June 12/15, 1986 is in accordance with law and in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Standing Orders. Hence, no inter concurrence is called for. Accordingly, petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties to; bear their respective costs.